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Abstract
Motivated by applications in Revenue Management (RM), this thesis studies various prob-
lems in sequential decision-making and demand learning.
In the first module, we consider a personalized RM setting, where items with limited in-
ventories are recommended to heterogeneous customers sequentially visiting an e-commerce
platform. We take the perspective of worst-case competitive ratio analysis, and aim to
develop algorithms whose performance guarantees do not depend on the customer arrival
process. We provide the first solution to this problem when there are both multiple items
and multiple prices at which they could be sold, framing it as a general online resource
allocation problem and developing a system of forecast-independent bid prices (Chapter 2).
Second, we study a related assortment planning problem faced by Walmart Online Grocery,
where before checkout, customers are recommended "add-on" items that are complementary
to their current shopping cart (Chapter 3). Third, we derive inventory-dependent price-
skimming policies for the single-leg RM problem, which extends existing competitive ratio
results to non-independent demand (Chapter 4). In this module, we test our algorithms
using a publicly-available data set from a major hotel chain.
In the second module, we study bundling, which is the practice of selling different items
together, and show how to learn and price using bundles. First, we introduce bundling as a
new, alternate method for learning the price elasticities of items, which does not require any
changing of prices; we validate our method on data from a large online retailer (Chapter 5).
Second, we show how to sell bundles of goods profitably even when the goods have high
production costs, and derive both distribution-dependent and distribution-free guarantees
on the profitability (Chapter 6).
In the final module, we study the Markovian multi-armed bandit problem under an
undiscounted finite time horizon (Chapter 7). We improve existing approximation algo-
rithms using LP rounding and random sampling techniques, which result in a (1/2 - eps)-
approximation for the correlated stochastic knapsack problem that is tight relative to the
LP. In this work, we introduce a framework for designing self-sampling algorithms, which
is also used in our chronologically-later-to-appear work on add-on recommendation and
single-leg RM.
Thesis Supervisor: David Simchi-Levi
Title: Professor
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The area of Revenue Management (RM) is concerned with helping firms make more prof-
itable decisions surrounding customer segmentation, product positioning, pricing, inventory
allocation, and the like (Phillips, 2005; Talluri and Van Ryzin, 2006). RM rose as a promi-
nent application of Operations Research during the 1980's, where it single-handedly deter-
mined the winners in the airline industry (Cross, 2011). Indeed, airlines with sophisticated
pricing and yield management capabilities could make much better decisions on their selling
mechanisms, fare class pricing and allocation, and assortments of itineraries offered in their
promotions.
Like most areas in the field of Operations Research, RM has been greatly affected by
the recent advances in computing which have enabled "big data" and "machine learning"
capabilities at firms. First, there has been the adoption of personalization in RM. When
products are purchased through e-commerce, it is possible to collect a cornucopia of data
about each individual, and make the best product recommendations tailored specifically to
them. Second, there has been the adoption of integration in RM. With real-time information
available on not just the state of the market, but also on the state of the firm's supply chain,
it is possible to make better global decisions which simultaneously consider the up-to-date
desires of the consumer, the expected revenues collected by the firm, and the resulting cost
of inventory and fulfillment.
This thesis is focused on methodologies which help organizations make these dynamic,
data-driven decisions. Leveraging tools from theoretical computer science, our goal is to
advance the theory and practice of modern-day RM. At this point, it is fitting to narrow
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our scope, clearly state the overarching assumptions in our work, and emphasize what this
thesis does and does not do.
First, our work is algorithmic in nature and analyzes problems instance by instance.
An instance consists of all the information treated as exogenously given-for example, this
could be the products being sold, the initial stocking decisions, and the demand trajectory
for a day. We are optimizing and measuring only the performance on any single instance.
We do not analyze how the implementation of our algorithms may affect the distribution
of instances faced in the future-in this case, how changing the dynamic pricing algorithm
may affect the demand trajectory in future days-nor do we analyze the sum of revenues
across multiple instances. Similarly, we do not rigorously study higher-level questions, such
as the overall business value gained from investing in infrastructure that enables real-time
information gathering and decision making, instead assuming that these controls are already
available.
In this sense, our analysis is tactical in nature, and can be seen as short-sighted.
Nonetheless, these assumptions are justified in many RM settings. For example, in airline
RM, each instance corresponds to a flight (or a set of related flights), whose seat capacity
and selling horizon have been determined long in advance. The RM team's Key Perfor-
mance Index (KPI) is based on only the instances it was responsible for, measured from the
start to end of those instances. We refer to Talluri and Van Ryzin (2006) for an in-depth
discussion of these assumptions, including also the assumptions about demand/control, and
henceforth, we will focus on these tactical models which enable prescriptive algorithms and
direct implementation on data instances. Our hope is that insights from our lower-level
algorithmic optimizations can also play a part in answering higher-level business questions.
Our emphasis on instances and instance-level optimality also distinguishes our work
from similar lines of work in theoretical computer science, where the emphasis tends to be
on elegant, universal performance guarantees that are tight on some worst-case instance.
For example, we derive the optimal competitive ratio for any given set of airline fare class
prices, even though this ratio is 0% (and hence meaningless) on the worst-case set of prices.
One consequence of this is that our results can involve convoluted expressions in the instance
parameters, and our methods are often more "brute force". However, once again, we want
to answer the immediate business question of "given that this is the instance, here is how
you optimize performance on it" as opposed to making a general statement of the form
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"here is an elegant way of guaranteeing 50%-performance on all possible instances".
In light of these discussions on scope, we outline the modules of this thesis, and describe
their application in Revenue Management.
1.1 First Module: Competitive Ratio Analysis of Personal-
ized RM Settings (Chapters 2, 3, 4)
Chapters 2-4 of this thesis all take place in a personalized RM setting. A firm is selling
products with pre-determined inventories which expire at a known time (e.g. the seats
on a flight, or the rooms in a hotel on a given night). Customers sequentially arrive to
the firm's e-commerce platform (e.g. travel website) over the course of the selling horizon.
The platform observes each customer's characteristics (e.g. computer type) and makes a
personalized offer based on this (e.g. recommend business-class flights to Mac users). The
firm would like to maximize its revenue earned before the products stock out or expire.
The tradeoff in this problem lies between making offers to customers which maximize im-
mediate revenue, vs. making offers which reserve sufficient inventory for the remaining time
horizon. This tradeoff is also encountered in online display advertising, where the invento-
ries correspond to the daily budgets of bidders (advertisers) and the customers represent
impressions (website queries); healthcare scheduling, where the inventories correspond to
appointment slots and the customers correspond to patients; and one-way trading in fi-
nancial markets, where the inventories correspond to initial capital and the heterogeneous
"customers" capture fluctuations in the stock market. In fact, all of these problems can be
abstractly conceived as the same dynamic resource allocation problem, where there are mul-
tiple resources, each of which could be converted to reward at multiple known rates, and the
controller must sequentially choose between different "conversion options" which provide
different rewards at the expense of different (stochastic) resource consumption patterns.
Nonetheless, we will use Revenue Management terminology hereafter.
A problem instance I consists of the firm's initial product, fare class, and stocking
decisions, which are exogenously given. The arrival sequence A of customers visiting the
e-commerce platform is also exogenous, but unknown; the heterogeneous characteristics of
each customer are only observed upon arrival. We consider online algorithms which must
sequentially and irrevocably make an offer to each customer, based on her characteristics
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as well as the inventory state at hand, without knowing what she will choose or who the
future customers will be. We would like to guarantee that the total (expected) revenue
earned by the online algorithm, denoted as ALG, is at least some fraction a of the optimum,
denoted as OPT. Here, the optimum is defined by an offline clairvoyant who knows the
entire arrival sequence A in advance.
By designing algorithms to maximize a, we are taking a conservative approach, since
these algorithms need to "hedge" evenly against all possible arrival scenarios to ensure that
ALG/OPT > a. We are essentially playing a game against an adversary, who is assumed
to choose the arrival sequence A which minimizes ALG/OPT after seeing the algorithm's
strategy; as a result, it is often beneficial to use randomization to "hide" the algorithm's
strategy from the adversary. We say that the ratio a is optimal on instance I if a better
guarantee is not possible, i.e. for any a' > a and fixed (but possibly randomized) algorithm,
the adversary can always choose an arrival sequence A such that ALG/OPT < a'. In this
case, a is called the competitive ratio, and we denote it using CR(I). We allow the value
of the competitive ratio to depend arbitrarily on the parameters of instance 2T; CR(I) is
known to be well-defined by Yao's minimax principle (Yao, 1977).
Note that in competitive ratio analysis, the challenge is conceptual-we aim to iden-
tify some ratio CR(11) which represents the "value of information" in knowing the arrival
sequence A for instance I, as well as a policy which yields that ratio. This can be con-
trasted with personalized RM problems where the arrival sequence A is generated by a
given stochastic process (e.g. IID, or non-homogeneous Poisson), and the challenge is com-
putational-overcoming the "curse of dimensionality" caused by having exponentially-many
inventory states, and identifying a policy which yields optimal or near-optimal revenue in
expectation over the randomness in A. Approximation ratios have been established for
many of these policies, which guarantee that EA[ALG]/EA[OPT] is at least some fraction
a. The competitive ratio provides a lower bound for the approximation ratio, since if
ALG > a - OPT for all arrival sequences A, then this implies ALG > a - OPT in expectation
over the arrival sequences A generated by the stochastic process.
In practice, both approaches have their benefits and drawbacks. Policies designed to
maximize the competitive ratio are computationally simple to implement, and do not require
a specific stochastic model for the arrival sequence. On the other hand, policies designed to
optimize for a given arrival model make much better forward-looking decisions when that
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model is accurate. Throughout our simulations on the public hotel data set from Bodea
et al. (2009), the best performance was obtained when the two approaches were combined
using ensemble meta-heuristics. This has also been observed in the works of Mahdian et al.
(2012); Golrezaei et al. (2014).
1.1.1 Unified Problem Setting
We formally introduce a setting which allows us to discuss our results from Chapter 2 ("On-
line Resource Allocation"), Chapter 3 ("Recommendation at Checkout"), and Chapter 4
("Single-leg RM") in a unified manner. This is a general setting (see Section 2.6) where we
can offer an assortment of multiple products to each customer.
A firm is selling n different items. Each item i starts with a fixed inventory of bi units,
(1) (mni)
and could be offered at one of mi feasible prices r ,.. . These prices, representing
fare classes, are sorted such that 0 < r() < ... < r(). (This can be generalized to allow
for a continuum of feasible prices; see Sections A.5.1 and C.4.) We refer to each combination
of i E {1,.. . ,n} and j E {1, ... , mi} as a fare class product which could be shown.
There are T customers who arrive sequentially. Upon the arrival of customer t, the
firm is given her choice function pt (.). For every product (i, j) and subset S of products,
pt(i, j, S) specifies the probability of customer t choosing (i, j) if she is offered S. For now, we
assume that any subset of products is a feasible assortment to show the customer, and let S
denote the collection of all subsets of {(i, j) : i = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, ... , mi}. (This can be easily
generalized to incorporate restrictions on offering multiple products/prices corresponding to
the same item, restrictions on assortments requiring too much space, restrictions on offering
certain products after a point in time, etc.) The firm offers each customer t an assortment
St in an online fashion, using only products (i, j) for which item i has remaining inventory,
after which the customer's purchase decision is immediately realized according to pt(-).
Note that customer t chooses to purchase nothing with probability 1 - E(ij)es, pti, ,i St)-
Otherwise, if customer t chooses to purchase product (i, j), then the firm earns revenue rj
and decrements the remaining inventory of item i by 1.
The instance I consists of the information on the number of items n, their starting
inventories bi, and their fare classes rf . The arrival sequence A consists of the infor-
mation on the total number of customers, and their choice functions pt(-). For any fixed
(but possibly randomized) online algorithm, problem instance I, and arrival sequence A,
21
we let ALG(I, A) denote the revenue earned in expectation, over both the randomness in
the customer purchase decisions as well as the randomness in the algorithm. Meanwhile,
OPT(I, A) is defined as the optimal objective value of the following LP.
T
max r )pt(i, j, S) xe(S)
t=1 SES (i,j)ES
T
S.. pt (i, i, S) xt (S) < bi i=1, . .. ,In
t=1 SES (j:(ij)ES
Ext(S)=1 t T
SES
xt(S) >0 t =1,..., T;S E S
This is the standard definition of the offline optimum in problems with both online arrivals
and stochastic purchases, originating from Mehta and Panigrahi (2012); Golrezaei et al.
(2014). It can be shown (see Lemmas 2.2.1 and 3.2.7) that OPT(I, A) provides an upper
bound on the expected revenue earned by any offline policy which knows A in advance,
because xt(S) encapsulates the unconditional probability of the policy offering assortment
S to customer t.
1.1.2 Synthesis of Results
Our results in Chapters 2-4 bound
CR(I) = inf ALG(I, A)
A OPT(I, A)
for instances I falling under different families. Our work in Chapters 2 and 3 is the first to
consider instances with both multiple items, as well as multiple prices at which each item's
inventory could be converted into revenue, like in the problem setting defined here. This
combines two challenges for the online algorithm which have previously been considered in
isolation, as we outline below.
First, when there are multiple items each with a single price, there is the challenge of
how to prioritize between selling them at their respective prices, where it may be beneficial
to offer smaller assortments, to reduce cannibalization across items. This challenge was
introduced in the seminal work of Karp et al. (1990) in the form of prioritizing between
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matching different nodes in a bipartite graph, and has since been studied in the form of
online advertising (Mehta et al., 2007) and online retailing (Golrezaei et al., 2014) problems.
On the other hand, when there is a single item with multiple prices, there is the challenge
of how to reserve the item's inventory, where it may be beneficial to offer nothing at all
to customers who are not willing to pay the item's highest feasible price. The reservation
challenge has also been studied extensively, in the form of one-way trading (El-Yaniv et al.,
2001) and revenue management (Ball and Queyranne, 2009) problems.
In Chapter 2, we provide a general solution which simultaneously considers these two
challenges, by introducing a simple online algorithm based on virtual costs, and showing
that it achieves the best-possible competitive ratio. The idea of using virtual costs coin-
cides with bid-price controls in Revenue Management, where in the classical setting the bid
prices (virtual costs) are optimized with respect to a forecast, instead of optimized for the
competitive ratio. Our algorithm generalizes the penalty-function algorithm of Golrezaei
et al. (2014), who introduced the model in Section 1.1.1 but with a single price per item.
Our results in Chapter 2 require the following assumption on the choice models given.
Assumption 1.1.1 (Substitutability). For any customer t and any product (ij), if (ij) E
S C S', then pt (i, j, S) > pt (i, j, S').
The substitutability assumption, introduced in Golrezaei et al. (2014), is very mild
and captures all rational choice models, where a customer has a random utility for each
product (including the no-purchase option) and chooses her highest utility option from the
assortment offered. Substitutability imposes that the items are not complements, i.e. the
probability of selling a specific product can only decrease when more products are added to
the assortment. It is important because it allows us to consider the reservation challenge
separately for each item based on its feasible prices, without having to consider reserving
an item's inventory to help sell another item.
In Chapter 3, we go beyond substitutability and consider a problem motivated by Wal-
mart's online grocery, where customers are recommended "add-ons" to the items in their
shopping carts before checking out. Currently, Walmart's system does not take inventory
into account when making recommendations, as covered in a media articlel about our pa-
per. Furthermore, the add-ons being recommended are usually complementary to the items
1 "Retailers: A better algorithm could increase online sales by 76 percent", Chicago Booth Review, January
31st 2018.
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already in the shopping cart (e.g. butter for bread), and hence introduce additional theo-
retical challenges beyond our work in Chapter 2 or that in Golrezaei et al. (2014). Indeed,
our bid price for each item is determined based on only that item's inventory level, and
is independent of other items. We remedy this in Chapter 3 by introducing the notion
of a protection level in expectation, and an algorithm makes decisions based on expected
inventory levels instead of realized inventory levels. Such an algorithm correctly calibrates
for the amount of each item to "protect" (reserve) when there is complementarity, as we
explain in Section 3.2.3. The rest of the chapter focuses on overcoming the computational
obstacles attached to implementing an online algorithm based on expected inventory state.
In Chapter 4, we study the problem setting from Section 1.1.1 when there is a single item,
and seek improved competitive ratios in this special case. The further special case of inde-
pendent demand, where in the choice functions pt(-) no customer t is interested in more than
one fare class, is the problem previously studied by Ball and Queyranne (2009). We extend
their results by incorporating the price-skimming technique from Eren and Maglaras (2010),
and derive inventory-dependent price-skimming policies which stochastically-increase their
price distributions as inventory decreases. A key technical ingredient in this work is a new
"valuation tracking" subroutine, which tracks the possible values for the optimum, and fol-
lows the most inventory-conservative control which maintains a certain competitive ratio.
Using it, we derive the tight CR(I) for every instance I, and show that it is equal to the
competitive ratio from Ball and Queyranne (2009); Eren and Maglaras (2010), which is
dependent on only the set of feasible prices and not on the starting inventory.
1.1.3 Comparison with Results in Literature
We illustrate our new contributions from Chapters 2-4 by comparing our competitive ratio
bounds with existing ones in the literature. We distinguish instances with multiple items
from those with a single item, and instances with multiple prices per item from those with
a single price per item. As described in Section 1.1.2, instances with multiple items and
instances with multiple prices have both been previously studied, in isolation. For simplicity,
here we only distinguish between having one price per item and having two (arbitrary) prices
per item. We derive the general form of the competitive ratio for arbitrary sets of feasible
prices in both Chapters 2 and 4.
We introduce a third dimension, where we distinguish instances in the large-inventory
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regime and instances with deterministic choice. The large inventory regime is the limiting
case where mini bi -+ oc, capturing retail settings where all items are plentifully stocked.
Deterministic choice assumes that pt(i, j, S) E {0, 1} for all customers t, products (i, j),
and assortments S, capturing deterministic "matching" settings where the customer states
her preferences and then the platform makes the final assignment decision. It turns out
that both of these assumptions lead to the same improvement in competitive ratio, with
the intuition being that under large inventories, the law of large numbers causes aggregate
customer choice to become deterministic. Therefore, our third dimension distinguishes
instances satisfying either of these two assumptions from those satisfying neither of these
two assumptions.
We consider the 8 families of instances defined by these 3 dimensions, where along each
dimension, instances in the family could either be restricted (single item; single price per
item; large inventories or deterministic choice) or unrestricted (multiple items; two prices
per item; no assumptions on inventory/choice). For each family, we display the best-known
lower and upper bounds on CR(I) for instances I in that family, with the tight results being
bolded. The results are shown on the "cube" in Fig. 1-1.
As seen in Fig. 1-1, the competitive ratio guarantee increases from 1/4 in the bottom-left
corner (where there are multiple prices, two arbitrary prices per item, and no assumptions
on inventory/choice) to 1 in the top-right corner (where the problem is trivial). The lower
bound of 1/4 first appeared in our chronologically-earlier Chapter 3, although a cleaner
solution which does not need to handle complementarity is presented in Chapter 2. When
each item has a single price, the improved lower bound of 1/2 was first established by
Mehta and Panigrahi (2012) in the special case where the prices are identical. This was
later generalized to allow for the price of one item differing from the price of another in
Golrezaei et al. (2014), using a clever probabilistic primal-dual argument. The upper bound
of .621 comes from Mehta and Panigrahi (2012).
The tight competitive ratio of 1- 1/e when there are multiple items first appeared in the
seminal work of Karp et al. (1990), in the form of the deterministic online bipartite matching
problem, where all items (offline nodes) have a fixed weight (price) of 1. This was not gener-
alized to allow for differing fixed weights until Aggarwal et al. (2011). Meanwhile, the same
competitive ratio of 1 - 1/e was established for the online b-matching problem in Kalyana-
sundaram and Pruhs (2000), and generalized to the Adwords problem in Mehta et al. (2007),
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Figure 1-1: Lower and upper bounds on the competitive ratio for the 8 families of instances
(our contributions in thesis are indicated; see text for other references). Filled circles
represent tight results, while unfilled circles represent non-tight results. For the non-tight
results, a range indicating both the lower bound and the upper bound is displayed, where
arrows point to lower (resp. upper) bounds that are implied by larger (resp. smaller) families.
when the starting inventories are large. We should point out that in the Adwords problem,
the inventory consumption is fractional, instead of stochastic. Nonetheless, following the
probabilistic primal-dual argument of Golrezaei et al. (2014), we show (see Section 2.6)
that the fractional-consumption model is subsumed by the stochastic-consumption model,
and hence all of the results on Adwords are captured by our framework. The primal-dual
argument of Golrezaei et al. (2014) is rooted in Buchbinder et al. (2007), which contains
the state-of-the-art in analyzing the fractional Adwords problem. We should also refer to
Devanur et al. (2013), which contains the state-of-the-art in analyzing the deterministic
matching problem.
All of these results are generalized to the setting of multiple prices per item in Chap-
ter 2. That is, we derive best-possible multi-price algorithms and competitive ratios in the
fractional-consumption, stochastic-consumption, and discrete-matching settings, extending
the analyses of Buchbinder et al. (2007), Golrezaei et al. (2014), and Devanur et al. (2013),
respectively. The idea of deriving competitive ratios based on prices that are known origi-
nated from Ball and Queyranne (2009), where they consider the case of a single item and
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deterministic choice. When there are multiple items each with two arbitrary prices, our
tight competitive ratio is 1 - 1//e ~ .393, as shown in Fig. 1-1. Note that this is greater
than (1- 1/e)/2 ::.316, which would be the naive guess from combining the aforementioned
ratio of 1 - l/e for the multi-item, single-price case with the ratio of 1/2 from Ball and
Queyranne (2009) for the single-item, two-price case. Therefore, using our bid-price control
policy, which synthesizes the prioritization and reservation challenges, results in a greater
competitive ratio than naively combining the existing policies.
Finally, when there is a single item with a single price, the decision in the problem is
trivial (offer the same item at the same price to every customer). However, the competitive
ratio is again 1 - 1/e (this can be seen from, e.g., Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994)). The
competitive ratio is not 1 because the optimum is defined using the LP from Section 1.1.1,
which is a relaxation of the optimal offline policy that can make "fractional" offers a real-
life policy cannot. To avoid this degeneracy in Chapter 4, where we study the single-item
case, we define the competitive ratio using the Hindsight Optimum (HO) instead of the
LP. We defer the definition of the HO and further discussion comparing different optima to
Section 4.3.1.
Nonetheless, our results in Chapter 4 are still relevant to the "cube" in Fig. 1-1, where
the optimum is based on the LP. First, in Section 4.3.1, we provide an example showing
that the ratio of 1 - 1/e relative to the LP decreases to (e - 1)/(2e - 1) when the item has
two arbitrary prices. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, Ball and Queyranne (2009) only
analyze the single-item case under deterministic choice. Our work in Chapter 4 shows how to
modify their policies to allow for stochastic choice models and obtain the same competitive
ratios relative to the HO. And when the inventory is large, the LP value is no greater
than the HO (asymptotic optimality relative to the LP is well-known; see e.g. Gallego and
Van Ryzin (1994)). Therefore, our work implies a competitive ratio of 1/2 when there is
a single item, two arbitrary prices, and large inventories, for general stochastic customer
choice, as shown in Fig. 1-1.
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1.2 Second Module: Learning and Pricing using Bundles
(Chapters 5, 6)
Chapters 5-6 of this thesis study how bundling, the practice of selling different items to-
gether, can be used by a firm for both demand learning and profit maximization. It has
been known since the seminal paper of Adams and Yellen (1976) that bundling can boost
profits, even when there are no complementarity effects between the items being bundled.
Indeed, by selling the same items under different pricing options, the firm is achieving a
form of price discrimination via bundling, and extracting greater consumer surplus.
1.2.1 Learning Valuation Distributions from Bundle Sales
In Chapter 5, we show that beyond profit maximization, bundling has the added benefit of
leading to richer sales data which contains more information about demand. We develop
an algorithm that, given bundle sales data, fits the customer valuation model of Adams
and Yellen (1976), which has always been used for price optimization but not for demand
estimation. In using it for demand estimation, we show that the price elasticities of items
can be identified, despite the fact that their prices have never changed in the bundle sales
data.
It is particularly interesting to us that earlier work on estimation from bundle sales has
focused on fitting discrete-choice models (Chung and Rao, 2003), which are both different
than the model used for bundle price optimization, and unable to identify price elastici-
ties without additional information such as a second set of sales numbers under changed
prices. (Contrast this with assortment optimization, where the same choice models that are
estimated from data are also used to prescribe optimal assortments; see e.g. Farias et al.
(2013).) Our hope in our work from Chapter 5 is to bridge this gap in the literature, and
provide a complementary problem to both the bundle pricing problem of Adams and Yellen
(1976) and the discrete-choice estimation problem of Chung and Rao (2003).
One benefit of fitting the discrete-choice model is that it is designed to enable powerful
computational machinery, and high-parameter models can be quickly estimated given large-
scale data with many price changes and customer/item covariates. Nonetheless, fitting the
model of Adams and Yellen (1976) allows us to measure an item's price elasticity by simply
comparing its sales rates inside and outside of bundles. Furthermore, we observe that on a
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data set from a large online retailer, the price elasticities of items identified by our model
are consistent with their real price elasticities, as measured by the magnitudes of their sales
spikes under Black Friday discounts. In fact, the best indicator of an item's price elasticity
is the number of people who purchased the other items in its bundles, as we explain in
Chapter 5. This is exactly in line with our model of choice and fitting algorithm.
1.2.2 Pricing Bundles from Learned Valuation Distributions
In Chapter 6, we study the classical bundle pricing problem originating from Adams and
Yellen (1976) of how bundles should be sold when given the customer valuation distributions.
We show how to sell bundles of goods profitably even when the goods have high production
costs, by introducing a new bundling scheme called Pure Bundling with Disposal for Cost
(PBDC). We relate it to the two-part tariff, and derive both distribution-dependent and
distribution-free guarantees on its profitability, which improve previous techniques. We also
conduct extensive numerical experiments, following the setup of Chu et al. (2011), which
demonstrate its profitability over a large range of instances.
One unifying theme of our work in this module is the importance of simple bundling
schemes, which do not overload the customers with too many choices for bundles. Indeed, in
both our learning and pricing problems, we focus on bundling schemes where the customer's
surplus-maximizing decision is easy to compute. Furthermore, we develop a notion of equiv-
alence between bundling schemes for both the learning (see Section D.4.1) and pricing (see
Section 6.2) problems. The conclusion from these equivalences is that our PBDC bundling
scheme provides great opportunity for both demand learning and profit maximization at
the same time.
1.3 Third Module: Tight Approximation Algorithm for
Stochastic Knapsack and Markovian Multi-Armed Ban-
dits (Chapter 7)
Chapter 7 of this thesis considers the Markovian variant of the multi-armed bandit prob-
lem. The input consists of multiple arms, each of which is a Markov chain with rewards.
Arms return reward and evolve to the next state when they are pulled, and the objective
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is to maximize the expected undiscounted reward earned under a finite budget of pulls,
which can be sequentially allocated among arms. The multi-armed bandit problem features
the tradeoff of how to adaptively switch between the arms, to balance the exploration of
arms which could potentially transition to high-reward states, and the exploitation of arms
which could be scheduled within the remaining budget to return high reward. The Marko-
vian formulation captures the stochastic knapsack problem and many reward-maximization
stochastic scheduling problems, along with marketing problems (see Ravi and Sun (2016))
in RM where a finite budget of marketing actions can be sequentially spent on customers
who return feedback (through clicks, etc.) on the state of their interest.
Under a finite budget, the well-known method of Gittins indices does not apply, and
the optimal policy is generally intractable. Our main result is a (1/2 - e)-approximation
algorithm for the irrevocable variant of this problem, where the pre-emption of arms is
not allowed, using LP rounding. Our algorithm imitates the decisions of a relaxed LP,
but needs to sample its own decisions in order to be run in polynomial time, resulting in
the loss of e in the approximation ratio. To the best of our knowledge, this is a novel
obstacle-an LP-based algorithm that provably exists, but cannot easily found because
there are exponentially-many states, and cannot be easily approximated because there are
high-reward states which occur with infinitesimal probabilities. Our algorithm improves
previously-known 1/16- and 1/8-approximations, and is tight in the sense that we show
the integrality gap of our LP to be 1/2, so it is not possible to improve the performance
guarantee without tightening the LP. In the variant where preemption is allowed, we provide
a h-approximation, which improves to a -- approximation if all of the pulls have the same
(unit) cost to the budget.
We encounter a similar obstacle two other times in this thesis, in the chronologically-
later-to-appear Chapters 3 and 4, where we again use self-sampling to convert exponential-
runtime online- algorithms into polynomial-runtime online algorithms that only lose E in the
competitive ratio. For this thesis, we present an abstract view of the sampling technique
and analysis framework, which allows us to discuss our three sampling-based algorithms
under concordant voicing.
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1.3.1 Framework for Designing Self-Sampling Algorithms
Abstractly, our algorithms from Sections 7.3.4, 3.3.3, and 4.3.3 can all be described as
follows. Decisions occur over a finite time horizon. At each time t, we let Xt denote
the (random) state of the system, which affects the algorithm's decision. However, the
algorithm also needs an instruction Jt to make the decision at time t. With this instruc-
tion, the algorithm is polynomial-time. However, these instructions cannot be computed in
polynomial-time.
In Chapters 7 and 3, these instructions are state-independent 2 , in that they are based
on the distribution of Xt. Being state-independent allows the algorithm to "coordinate" its
decisions over different sample paths, and achieve some desired reward in expectation. The
state-independent instruction Jt is combined the actual state realization at each time t to
make a decision that is feasible in reality.
However, the challenge is that the state Xt has exponentially-many possibilities, and its
distribution is intractable to compute exactly. The algorithm can only generate an empirical
distribution by simulating its own execution from3 time t' = 1 to t' = t - 1, using the
previously-recorded instructions J1,... , .t-1 which affect the algorithm's decisions before
time t and hence affect the state of the system at time t. By repeating this simulation Mt
times, where Mt is a fixed constant for each time t, the algorithm obtains Mt samples for
the distribution of Xt. Of course, this empirical distribution could be erroneous and lead
to a faulty instruction J; nonetheless Mt is chosen to be large enough so that the error in
f is outside some E-tolerance with probability at most 6t.
In our meta-analysis, we treat both the instructions {t : t} and the system states
{ : t} as random. The values of 6 t are chosen to sum to e, so that the probability of
having any faulty instruction cannot exceed e via the union bound. Furthermore, we show
that conditioned on the instructions {t : t} being non-faulty, the expected reward of the
2 Alternatively, the instructions can be computed ahead of time, before observing any state realizations.
However, when this framework is used in Chapter 3, online information arrives at the start of each time step
t, so the pre-computation of t is not possible. Therefore, we always interpret the instructions ft as being
generated on-the-fly, for consistency in the analysis framework.
3 It may be tempting to maintain a "cache" of sample paths used for simulation, so that the algorithm
does not have to start simulating from t' = 1 at each time t. However, this would result in biased sample
paths, because conditioned on the previously-recorded instructions 1 .9... - -1, which affect the simulation
at time t, the cache of sample paths would not be uniformly random.
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algorithm is at least some (a - e)-fraction (e.g., a = 1/2) of the optimum. That is,
E[ALGI{Yt : t} non-faulty] (a - e)OPT. (1.1)
Statement (1.1) may seem peculiar. The algorithm's reward ALG depends on the system
states incurred { X : t}. By conditioning on a subset of possible realizations for {,9t : t},
how can the distribution of { X : t} remain unaffected? This is where it becomes of
utmost importance for the analysis that each instruction 't was determined independent
of any realized system states X1,..., Xt, and only dependent on the previously-recorded
instructions 9 i, . . . , 1. The event of {ft : t} being non-faulty only affects the conditional
distribution of {X : t} through its effect on the algorithm's decisions. And by the non-
faulty assumption, the algorithm's decisions lose at most an e-fraction of reward due to
sampling error.
Combining statement (1.1) with the fact that the instructions are non-faulty with prob-
ability at least 1 - e, the following can be derived:
E[ALG] Pr[{9t : t} non-faulty] -E[ALGf{,t : t} non-faulty]
2 (1 - E)(a - E)OPT.
Therefore, this framework allows us to establish constant-factor approximation algorithms
which are made polynomial-time by sampling.
1.3.2 Details of Sampling Framework pertaining to Chapter 7
We now illustrate this framework, by elaborating on how it is used to obtain a (1/2 - E)-
approximation for the stochastic knapsack problem in Chapter 7.
In the stochastic knapsack problem, n denotes the number of items and B denotes the
number of time steps. For each time step t E [B], the instruction Ot consists of, for each
item i E [n], an estimate of the probability that it has not been played before time t, under
the previously-recorded instructions 1, ... , Jt_1. (Again, the algorithm cares about these
probabilities and not just the realization of whether item i was played before time t, since
its aim is to satisfy a bound on expected reward.)
The algorithm would like all of its estimates to be within a multiplicative error bound of
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E with high probability. However, an additional challenge is faced when the error tolerance
required is multiplicative, caused by rare4 events.
To overcome this challenge, instead of fixing a constant number of samples Mt, we
imagine the following sampling process. Let p denote the probability of interest and suppose
we can sample from a Bernoulli(p) distribution until H "hits" (occurrences of probability
p) are encountered. Then it is possible to guarantee with high probability that our estimate
would be in [(1 - e)p, (1 + e)p], because smaller probabilities would have required more
samples before encountering a constant number of hits H. This is formalized in the following
proposition, for which we provide a proof at the end of this section.
Proposition 1.3.1 (Hit Bound for Sampling). Suppose we draw lID samples from a
Bernoulli distribution with unknown probability p > 0 until we encounter H "hits" (oc-
currences of probability p). Let N be the random variable for the number of trials required.
For all E E (0,1/4] and 6 E (0,1], if H > 4 ln(2/6)/e 2 , then
H
Pr[(1 - E)p: H -< (1+ e)p] > 1 - 6.N
The caveat is that this sampling process could run indefinitely, and we have to cut off
the sampling after some number of trials M if we want a polynomial run-time. Nonetheless,
interpreting the sampling in terms of hits allows the algorithm to detect infinitesimal and
zero probabilities, and respond accordingly when the cutoff of M is reached.
We now formally outline our proof of the (1/2 - e)-approximation for the stochastic
knapsack problem and how it uses the analysis framework from Section 1.3.1.
Definition 1.3.2. Define the following constants.
* E: the multiplicative error bound within which we would like all of the algorithm's
estimates to be, with high probability.
" H: an integer which achieves the multiplicative error bound of E by Proposition 1.3.1,
in the hypothetical scenario where samples can be drawn indefinitely.
4 For any fixed number of times to sample Mt, if the probability of interest p is o(1/Mt), then it is not
possible for the sample average approximation to be in [(1 - e)p, (1 + e)p with high probability. Moreover,
approximating these o(1/Mt) probabilities is still relevant, because the reward when they occur could be
e.g. Q(Mt).
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* r: a threshold (equal to e in Chapter 7), where we will not attempt to accurately41SIB
estimate probabilities smaller than this threshold.
* M: the constant number of trials within which all probabilities greater than r will
produce at least H hits, with high probability.
* deft: the default value for each time t (equal to E', xpA,t/ 2 in Chapter 7) used to
approximate probabilities which do not produce H hits within M trials.
Definition 1.3.3. Define the following random variables for each item i E [n] and time
step t E [B].
" Free(i, t): the probability of item i not having been played before time t, which is
a random variable whose value is determined by the realizations of the instructions
"Oi, -. - Jt-1-
" Ni,t: the number of trials required when a Bernoulli(Free(i, t)) distribution is sampled
until H hits are encountered. Defined to be oc if Free(i, t) = 0.
" Freeem"P(i, t): the algorithm's recorded estimate of Free(i, t) based on Ni,t, where the
experiment is cut off after M trials. Freeemp(i, t) is set to H/Ni,t if the experiment for
item i and time t terminates before the cutoff of M, and set to the default value deft
otherwise.
We now define H = F4In(2nB/E)/e2 1 and substitute 6 = i into Proposition 1.3.1 to
obtain that for any i E [n] and t E [B],
Pr E [(I - E)Free(i, t), (1+ E)Free(i, t)] < E
Ni,t nB
(where H/oo is defined to be 0). By the union bound, the event
H
(1 - e)Free(i, t) - < (1 + E)Free(i, t), V i E [n], t E [B] (1.2)Ni,t
occurs with probability at least 1 - e. We define the instructions to be non-faulty if the
realizations of random variables Ni,t and Free(i, t) satisfy (1.2). Note that the values of Ni,t
uniquely determine the values of Freeemp (i, t), which constitute the instructions { :t E
[B]}.
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Conditioning on non-faultiness allows for the following classification. For each time t
and item i, if Free(i,t) > -r, then Ni,t < (_H by (1.2). Thus, if we set the cutoff M to be
(1E)-r ], then all probabilities Free(i, t) above the threshold of T are large enough for the
sampling to terminate without being cut off, and Freeempn(i, t) would be set to H/Ni,t. On
the other hand, if Free(i, t) <; T, then either the sampling is cut off and FreeemP(i, t) = deft,
or it is also possible that Ni,t is still no greater than M and FreeemP(i, t) = H/Ni,t.
The important consequence of this classification is that either FreeemP(i, t) is set to
H/Ni,t and Free(i, t) is within the range [ 1 Freeemp(i, t), 1 Free'"P(i, t)], or Free*"P(i, t)
is set to deft and Free(i, t) is at most T. This establishes that the algorithm's instructions
cause it to earn expected reward at least
(1 -e)2 OPT (1.3)
(1 -e) 2
(The details of (1.3) are specific to the stochastic knapsack problem from Chapter 7 and
unimportant in this discussion about sampling. It is possible to prove such a statement
because we bound OPT from above by an LP-relaxation, and show that an algorithm with
non-faulty instructions can imitate the LP solution to earn (1)2of its reward.)
2(1 6)ofisrwd.
Combining (1.3) with the fact that the event (1.2) occurs (i.e. the instructions are non-
faulty) with probability at least - E, a (1E) approximation results. Redefining E yields
a (1/2 - e)-approximation, which is the main result of Section 7.3.
Finally, as promised, we provide the proof of Proposition 1.3.1 based on the multiplica-
tive Chernoff bound.
Proof of Proposition 1.3.1. N is the sum of H geometric random variables of probability p,
so its expectation if H/p (although note that H/N is actually a biased estimate of p). We
separately show that both "bad" events N > (1e)p and N < (1H occur with probability
at most 6/2. The result will then follow from the union bound. We need to apply the
following standard inequality (Mitzenmacher and Upfal, 2005, thm. 4.4-4.5) in our proof.
Proposition 1.3.4 (Multiplicative Chernoff Bound). Let Bin(n, p) be a random variable
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for the sum of n ID Bernoulli random variables of probability p. Then
PBin(n,p)2Pr[ Bi (n,p) 2( + 6)p] exp(-np62 /3)
P[Bin~n~p) < 1- p exp(-npc 2 /2)
V 0<Ec <1;
V 0< 1.
The event N < (1+H occurs if and only if we have already encountered H hits after
trial F(HI) - 1. The probability of this occurring can be expressed as
Pr[Bin([(+' H ] - 1 ,p)
Bin([H4y] 
- 1,P)
H] = Pr [ +6H
[Bf(1+4e)p1 - lp
-
Bin( H 
-
SPr (1,)
(1+6)p-
H
S(1 + E)PI
exp (1+e)p - ) (1.4)
where the first inequality holds because [ H 1< H and the second inequality
holds by Proposition 1.3.4.
Meanwhile, the event N > H occurs if and only if we have encountered strictly less
than H hits after trial L( H )9]. The probability of this occurring can be expressed as
Pr[Bin(L_')J, p) H - 1] [Bin( H j , P)L 
PH
P Bin( ' ,p)BPr (1E)J
(1-E)p
< exp
exp
2
The first inequality holds because [H ]J H -1. The second inequality holds because
adding 1 to both the numerator and denominator of a fraction less than 1 can only increase
the fraction. The third inequality holds by Proposition 1.3.4. The fourth inequality holds
because H F(1+H1] 1 and 2 < 3.
Now, it is easy to calculate that given H > 41n(2/(1))/(1/4) 2 - 64 In 2, E < 1/4, and
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H - 1
< (1 -e)p
)
(1.5)
H I)p_2
TITOP
3
p 1, the expression (F (1+e)p] - 1)p arising in both (1.4) and (1.5) is bounded from below
by 3H/4. Therefore, both (1.4) and (1.5) are bounded from above by
He2  41ln(2/&) e 2
exp(- ) < exp(- 2 E-4 E 4
2
This completes the proof of the proposition. L
1.3.3 Application of Sampling Framework in Chronologically-later-to-
appear Chapter 3
We explain how the sampling framework was used in the chronologically-later-to-appear
work on personalized recommendation in Chapter 3.
In the recommendation at checkout problem, n denotes the number of items, and T
denotes the number of time steps. At each time step t E [T], the algorithm constructs for
each item i E [n] a sample average estimate di (t) of the number of times that i has been sold
as a recommended add-on by the end of time t, given the previously-recorded instructions.
The instruction t at each time t is a protection list which prevents items i for which di(t)
is too large, relative to its starting inventory bi, from being recommended as add-ons.
For this algorithm we only require an additive e error bound in its estimates, so we are
not concerned about small probabilities. The number of samples required M is fixed for
each time step, and can be computed directly from the Chernoff-Hoeffding inequality.
One intricacy of this problem, however, is that the type the customer at time t is online
information which is not revealed until the start of time t, for all t. We are interested in
online algorithms which are guaranteed to earn a constant fraction of an offline benchmark,
with this benchmark knowing all of the customer types in advance. In this setting, the
algorithm being polynomial-time is in some sense less important, since the comparison
focuses on online vs. offline algorithms, not polynomial-time vs. optimal algorithms.
Nonetheless, in the work in Chapter 3, we show how to convert an exponential-time 1/4-
approximation ("1 /4-competitive algorithm") to a polynomial-time (1/4 - e)-approximation
using the same sampling framework. We outline the proof here.
Definition 1.3.5. For each time t and item i, define di(t) as the true expected number of
units of i that have been sold as an add-on by the end of time t.
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d (t) is treated as a random variable whose value is determined by the realizations of
the instructions _1,..., fit_. Meanwhile, recall that di(t) is the random variable for the
algorithm's estimate of d2 (t), and instruction Jt is determined by d1 (t),. .. , 4(t). For the
realized instruction set {t : t E [T]} to be non-faulty, we only require that they were
determined by {di(t) : t E [T], i E [n]} such that the final estimates satisfy
- 7 b-
dij (T) - E < (() < , V i E[n]. (1.6)21
We would like event (1.6) to occur with probability at least 1-,. In the recommendation
problem, it is not possible to define constants &t bounding the sampling error at each time
t, because randomly-occurring events over the time horizon may require the algorithm to
estimate additional probabilistic quantities using sampling. Nevertheless, it is possible to
show the total number of quantities estimated cannot exceed n(T + n), and hence if we set
M such that each estimate is faulty with probability at most , then by the union
bound, the probability of having any fault cannot exceed E.
The non-faultiness condition (1.6) ensures that at the end of the time horizon, for
any item i, it was not recommended beyond its protection level of bi/2 in actuality, and
also that the algorithm did not overestimate its add-on sales by more than E and thus
overprotect it. By comparing to an LP-relaxation of the offline problem, it is possible to
show that conditioned on non-faulty instructions, the online algorithm's expected revenue
is at least (1/4 - E)OPT. Therefore, the online algorithm's overall expected revenue is at
least (1 - 6)(1/4 - e)OPT, which is the main result of Chapter 3.
1.3.4 Application of Sampling Framework in Chronologically-later-to-
appear Chapter 4
We explain how the sampling framework was used in the chronologically-later-to-appear
work on single-leg RM in Chapter 4.
Unlike Chapters 7 and 3, in Chapter 4, the instruction Jt at each time t is dependent
on the realized state Xt (the remaining inventory). The sampling algorithm is trying to
mimic the random decision (price) that a hypothetical algorithm would choose from the
same state Xt. The hypothetical algorithm's random decision from state Xt depends on
its history and hence cannot be directly computed. Instead, we must sample runs of the
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hypothetical algorithm from the start until hitting a run where state Xt is reached, and
then record the hypothetical algorithm's decision from state Xt as instruction t. Some
states are only reached with infinitesimal probabilities, and therefore the sampling must be
cut off after a constant Mt number of trials, in which case instruction Ot is empty and thus
faulty.
Using the fact that each instruction -t is state-dependent, it is possible to bound the
unconditional probability of t being faulty. Intuitively, this is because low-probability
states that are likely to cause the sampling to be cut off are only reached with low prob-
abilities in the first place. Indeed, we show that if Mt = Q(t2 ), then the probability 6 t of
instruction t being faulty is O(t- 2 ). Since E t- 2 converges, after taking the union bound,
we establish for an arbitrarily small E that
Pr[{ft : t} non-faulty] > 1 -
However, recall from the discussion in Section 1.3.1 that we also need to establish
E[ALG|{Jt : t} non-faulty] (a - e)OPT, (1.7)
which becomes a lot more difficult when the instructions are state-dependent. In fact,
inequality (1.7) as stated is false, because conditioning on non-faultiness greatly down-
weighs low-probability states, which may be the high-revenue states that comprise most of
the expectation of ALG.
To remedy this, in Chapter 4, we mark the first point of failure (if any) on each sample
path consisting of states and instructions. We couple the execution of our algorithm with
the hypothetical algorithm before these points of failure, and show that the revenue before
these points is still collected. This allows us to establish that (a - E)OPT revenue is still
obtained when the instructions are non-faulty, which yields a competitive ratio of (a - E)
with a polynomial-runtime algorithm (for details, see Section 4.3.3).
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Chapter 2
Online Resource Allocation under
Arbitrary Arrivals: Optimal
Algorithms and Tight Competitive
Ratios
We consider the problem of allocating fixed resources to heterogeneous customers arriving
sequentially. We study this problem under the framework of competitive analysis, which
does not assume any predictability in the sequence of customer arrivals. Previous work has
culminated in optimal algorithms under two scenarios: (i) there are multiple resources, each
of which yields reward at a constant rate when allocated; or (ii) there is a single resource,
which yields reward at different rates when allocated to different customers.
In this chapter, we derive optimal allocation algorithms when there are multiple re-
sources, each with multiple reward rates. Our algorithms are simple, intuitive, and robust
against forecast error. Their tight competitive ratio cannot be achieved by combining exist-
ing algorithms, which consider the tradeoffs between multiple resources and multiple reward
rates separately.
By showing how to integrate these tradeoffs while making allocation decisions, we expand
the applicability of competitive analysis in many areas, such as online advertising, matching
markets, and personalized e-commerce. We test our methodological contribution on the
hotel data set of Bodea et al. (2009), where there are multiple resources (hotel rooms),
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each with multiple reward rates (fares at which the room could be sold). We find that
applying our algorithms, in conjunction with algorithms which attempt to forecast and
learn the future transactions, results in the best performance.
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we study a general online resource allocation problem, stated in revenue
management terminology. A firm has multiple items, each with an unreplenishable starting
inventory, and a set of feasible prices at which its units of inventory could be sold. Hetero-
geneous customers arrive sequentially over time. Upon a customer's arrival, the probability
that she would buy each item at each price is revealed; these probabilities can be 0 for items
she is not interested in, or prices that are too high. The firm then chooses an available item
and feasible price to offer her, after which her purchase decision is immediately realized
according to the probability given. The firm's goal is to maximize its expected revenue
before the inventories run out, or there are no more customers.
A special case of our problem is the deterministic case, where all purchase probabilities
are 0 or 1. In this case, the firm knows the maximum a customer is willing to pay for each
item, possibly 0. Therefore, the firm's decision can be reduced to choosing an item to assign
to the customer (charging her maximum willingness-to-pay for that item), or rejecting the
customer if her willingness-to-pay is low for every item.
We study these problems under the framework of competitive analysis. In competitive
analysis, no information is given about the sequence of customers, nor are they assumed
to follow any observable pattern. The algorithm's performance is expressed as a fraction
of an optimum which knows the complete customer sequence in advance. For c < 1, if
an algorithm can guarantee that this fraction is at least c for every problem instance (and
customer sequence), then it is said to achieve a competitive ratio of c. The goal is to develop
robust algorithms which achieve the optimal competitive ratio, i.e. a ratio c* such that no
algorithm, without knowing the customer sequence in advance, can do better.
2.1.1 Previous Work in Competitive Analysis
Our model involves multiple items, as well as multiple feasible prices for each item. This
combines two challenges in competitive analysis, which have previously been studied sepa-
42
rately.
1. Multiple Items: The challenge of how to prioritize between multiple items, when a
customer can only be offered (or assigned) one of them, has been considered in the
online b-matching problem (Kalyanasundaram and Pruhs, 2000), Adwords problem
(Mehta et al., 2007; Buchbinder et al., 2007), and online assortment problem (Gol-
rezaei et al., 2014). The optimal algorithms for these problems all perform some kind
of inventory balancing, placing lower priority on selling items with lower remaining
inventory. Inventory balancing algorithms are also related to the randomized ranking
algorithms used in the online bipartite matching problem (Karp et al., 1990; Aggarwal
et al., 2011).
2. Multiple Prices: The challenge of when to reject a customer only willing to pay a
low price, to preserve inventory for customers willing to pay higher prices, has been
considered in the single-item, deterministic case of our problem (Ball and Queyranne,
2009; Lan et al., 2008). The optimal algorithm employs booking limits, rejecting
customers with low willingness-to-pay once a threshold amount of the item has been
sold.
Our model studies the challenges introduced when multiple prices are incorporated into
the aforementioned problems with multiple items. In Section 2.6, we explain how our tech-
niques can be extended to allow for fractional inventory consumption, like in the Adwords
problem; or multiple items to be offered to each customer, like in the online assortment
problem. We now discuss two additional ways to view our model, which emphasize the
increase in modeling power from allowing for multiple prices:
o First, one can think of each of our (item, price)-combinations as an independent
product. By allowing for multiple prices, we have allowed the multiple products cor-
responding to each item to draw from the same inventory, or resource. The different
products can also consume different amounts of that resource, under the extension
with fractional inventory consumption.
o Second, in some applications, the customers are classified under a finite number of
types, and instead of a pricing decision, there is a different reward (corresponding to
"match quality") for allocating each item to each customer type. This can be reduced
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to our problem, with the feasible prices for an item being that item's "match qualities"
over all types. By allowing for multiple prices, we have allowed each item to yield
different rewards when allocated to different types, as opposed to yielding the same
reward for all types.
2.1.2 Integrating the Challenges
We introduce a bid-price control policy which achieves the optimal competitive ratio under
both multiple items and multiple prices. Our algorithm maintains for each item a bid price,
which is the value placed on one unit of its inventory. The pseudorevenue associated with an
(item, price)-combination is then the price minus the value of the item. The algorithm offers
to each customer the (item, price)-combination with the highest expected pseudorevenue,
never offering combinations with non-positive pseudorevenue.
Bid-price control is a classical idea in revenue management (see Talluri and Van Ryzin
(2006); Liu and Van Ryzin (2008)), where the bid prices are computed using an LP, based
on the remaining inventory and forecasted distribution of remaining customers. However,
since we make no assumptions about future customers, our bid prices are based on only
the remaining inventory. Our bid prices are very simple-they are computed separately
for each item i, like the multiplicative penalties in Golrezaei et al. (2014). Let wi be the
fraction of the starting inventory of i which has already been sold. At each point in time,
the bid price of item i is set to 'i(wi), where Di is a value function dependent on the set
of feasible prices for item i.
To illustrate our algorithm, we display the form of (Di for an example item i which could
be sold at fares $150 or $450, in Figure 2-1. Note the following:
" As the fraction of item i sold increases over time, the value of one unit of inventory
increases, hence the pseudorevenues associated with the feasible prices of item i de-
crease, and the bid-price algorithm places lower priority on offering/assigning item
i. This captures the "inventory balancing" used to address the challenge of multiple
items.
" Let ac be the value at which 'Ii(ai) = 150. The algorithm stops selling item i at
the lower price of 150 once its fraction sold reaches aj, because the pseudorevenue
associated with the lower price is 150 - 4i(wi), which is non-positive for wi ;> ci.
44
$450 ------------------
Value of 1 unit of Inventory, 4I
$150 -----------
0 1
Fraction Sold, wi
Figure 2-1: The value function for an item with feasible price set {150, 450}.
Therefore, our algorithm captures the "booking limits" used to address the challenge
of multiple prices. The specific value of 1 i(wi) also tells the algorithm how to choose
between a lower price which may have higher expected revenue, versus a higher price
which has lower expected inventory consumption.
9 4)i increases from 0 to the maximum price of 450 over [0,1], and is piecewise-convex.
In general, each value function 1i is designed to maximize the competitive ratio CRi
associated with it. As we will explain, the exact function (Pi is defined as the solution to a
differential equation arising from a primal-dual analysis.
The booking limits implied by such a 4P are different than the booking limits derived
by Ball and Queyranne (2009) which are optimal when i is the single item being sold. For
example, if item i has two prices, with ri being the ratio of high to low price, then the value
of ai is a(ri), where
2(r - 1)
a(r) = ln (2.1) 1
1 + 4r(r- 1)/e-1 (2.1)
Meanwhile, the optimal booking limit from the single-item case is 2ri. a is greater than
r with the intuition being that with multiple items, there is less upside to reserving
inventory for higher prices, because the reserved units may have to compete with other items
to be sold. Indeed, when there are both multiple items and multiple prices, the optimal
algorithm must integrate inventory balancing when setting booking limits, instead of using
the single-item booking limits.
45
2.1.3 Competitive Ratio Results
The overall competitive ratio associated with our algorithm is mini CRi, being limited by
the item i with the smallest value of CRi. While this competitive ratio is not achieved by
the exact bid-price algorithm specified in the previous subsection, we prove the following
results in this chapter:
1. A variant of the bid-price algorithm, which we call MULTI-PRICE BALANCE, achieves
a competitive ratio of mini CRi in the asymptotic regime, where all starting inventories
go to 00.
2. A different variant of the bid-price algorithm, which we call MULTI-PRICE RANKING,
achieves a competitive ratio of mini CRi in the deterministic case of our problem.
3. A counterexample, which can be made to fall under both the asymptotic regime
and the deterministic case, shows that the competitive ratio of any algorithm cannot
exceed min CRi.
When there is a single feasible price for an item i, CRi = 1 - .. Our statements 1-3e
are generalizations of results that exist when every item has only one price. Statement 1
corresponds to the inventory balancing algorithm of Golrezaei et al. (2014) achieving a
competitive ratio of 1 - .. Statement 2 corresponds to the ranking-based algorithm ofe
Aggarwal et al. (2011) achieving the same competitive ratio. Statement 3 shows that both
of these results are tight.
These results may not be tight in the non-asymptotic, non-deterministic setting, which is
an important open problem (Devanur et al., 2013) in the single-price case as well. Nonethe-
less, we establish lower bounds on the competitive ratio achieved which hold in the non-
deterministic setting, and are parametrized by k, the minimum starting inventory of an
item. As k increases, these bounds sharply approach the tight guarantee of mini CRi from
the asymptotic regime. In the single-price case, our bounds show that the multiplicative
gap from 1 - is at most (1+ k)(1 - e-1/k), which improves the previously-best-known gap
from Golrezaei et al. (2014).
We illustrate our bounds on the case where every item has two feasible prices, in Figure 2-
2. The competitive ratio CRi associated with an item i is 1 - e-&(i), where ri is its ratio
of high to low price, and a is defined in (2.1). Thus the overall competitive ratio mini CRi
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(1+k)(-e 1/k) [Thm. 2.2.4(iii)]
0 0 10
[GNR14] 1 - .632 ~ 1-
[GNR14] [AGKM11]
1 - e(r) e-a(r) r
2(2r-1) [Thm. 2.2.4(ii)] [Cor. 2.2.5, [Thm. 2.2.7 2r-1
Thm. 2.2.8] Thm. 2.2.8]
tight bounds
-a(r)
ok(/ ) [Thm. 2.2.4(i)]
non-tight bounds
1 - e .3 9 3  1 2A 0 -[CMSLX16]0
k ____Deterninistic Deterninistic
Case Single-item Case
Non-deterministic Setting
b The smallest guarantee of - in this diagram is also implied by the results of Chapter 3.4
Figure 2-2: Competitive ratios achieved in the two-price case, where r denotes the maximum
ratio of an item's high to low price, and k denotes the minimum starting inventory of an
item. The guarantees improve from bottom to top (as r decreases), and from left to right
(as k increases).
can be written as
1 - e~(r), (2.2)
where r = maxi ri. (2.2) is decreasing in r. As r -+ 1, a(r) -+ 1 and (2.2) approaches the
known value of 1 - ~ .632. The smallest competitive ratio occurs as r -+ oo, with (2.2)e
approaching 1 - ~ .393.
The formal statements of our theorems, which allow each item to have an arbitrary
set of feasible prices, are deferred to Section 2.2. We analyze MULTI-PRICE BALANCE in
Section 2.3 and MULTI-PRICE RANKING in Section 2.4. Descriptions of our techniques are
also deferred to these sections.
In general, the tight competitive ratio of CRj can approach 0 is the feasible price set for
item i contains both a large number of prices and a large ratio from highest to lowest price,
which is a known negative result (Aggarwal et al., 2011). Nonetheless, in many applications,
one can enumerate the price points (e.g., an item which could only be sold at $19.99 or
$24.99), or bound the ratio between the highest and lowest prices (e.g., an advertiser who
bids between .1 and .2).
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2.1.4 Application on Hotel Data Set of Bodea et al. (2009)
We first summarize the general benefits of applying competitive analysis, and the com-
petitive algorithms derived from this research. In contrast to traditional algorithms, which
optimize based on a forecast of future demand, or attempt to learn the demand, competitive
algorithms hedge against some worst case, and operate without any demand information.
Most immediately, they are useful for products with highly unpredictable demand (Ball
and Queyranne, 2009; Lan et al., 2008), or for initializing new products with no historical
sales data (Van Ryzin and McGill, 2000). Second, by eschewing stochastic processes for
generating demand, competitive algorithms are usually simple and flexible, leading to clean
insights about the problem (Borodin and El-Yaniv, 2005). Third, past research has reported
on cases where competitive algorithms perform well in practice (Feldman et al., 2010), or
on average in numerical experiments (Golrezaei et al., 2014).
In Section 2.7, we run simulations on the publicly-accessible hotel data set of Bodea et al.
(2009). We use the product availability information to estimate customer choice models,
and the transactional data as the sequence of arrivals. This leads to an online assortment
problem like in Golrezaei et al. (2014), with multiple prices (advance-purchase rate, rack
rate, etc.) for each item (King room, Two-double room, etc.). We compare the performance
of our MULTI-PRICE BALANCE algorithm, using the extension discussed in Section 2.6 which
can offer assortments, to various benchmarks and forecasting algorithms.
The main conclusion from our simulations is that the best performance is achieved by
hybrid algorithms (see Golrezaei et al. (2014)). These are forecasting-based algorithms
which continuously reference our forecast-independent value functions #1, ... ,ID, and ad-
just their decisions accordingly. Although this only changes a small fraction (~ 5%) of
decisions, these tend to be the decisions where the forecast is being most overconfident.
Therefore, not only does this boost average performance, it drastically reduces the variance
in performance caused when the forecast is wrong.
2.1.5 Other Related Work
We briefly discuss some related papers which has not been mentioned until now.
Alternate Approaches to Online Matching. Our problem captures the online
edge-weighted bipartite matching problem, which has been studied under various settings
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designed to get around a basic impossibility result (see Aggarwal et al. (2011)). One such
setting is free disposal (Feldman et al., 2009). Alternatively, one could assume that the
arrivals appear in a random order, which allows for some form of learning (Kesselheim
et al., 2013); this approach is very general and has been extended to online linear program-
ming (Agrawal et al., 2014). However, to our knowledge, we are the first to focus on the
weight-dependent competitive ratio for the online edge-weighted bipartite matching prob-
lem, instead of making assumptions such as free disposal or randomly-ordered arrivals. For
a survey of online matching, we refer to Mehta (2013).
Known Stochastic Processes. When the stochastic process generating the arrivals in
our problem is given, the resulting optimization problem is still computationally intractable.
Nonetheless, many effective heuristics have been proposed, under different variations of the
model (Zhang and Cooper, 2005; Jasin and Kumar, 2012; Ciocan and Farias, 2012; Chen
and Farias, 2013). These heuristics can earn - of the LP optimum in general settings (Chan
and Farias, 2009; Wang et al., 2015; Gallego et al., 2015). Manshadi et al. (2012) derive
an improved performance ratio when the given stochastic process is IID. From a modeling
perspective, our problem with multiple items and multiple prices is similar to the multi-fare,
parallel flights problem of Zhang and Cooper (2005), and the appointment scheduling with
customer preferences problem of Wang et al. (2015).
Alternate Metrics. Competitive/approximation ratio both consider the algorithm's
expected reward as a fraction of an LP optimum. Our problem has been analyzed under
other metrics as well. When the arrival process is unknown but assumed to be IID, one
popular metric is regret, which measures the additive loss from optimum (see Ferreira et al.
(2016)). When the arrival process is known, the fluid and diffusion analysis approaches have
also been used (see Reiman and Wang (2008)). However, unlike competitive ratio, these
metrics all tend to focus on asymptotic performance as the number of customers grows to
infinity. Finally, a recent metric which has been studied is regret ratio (Zhang et al., 2016).
For a comprehensive review of different metrics to use under different models of demand
(for a single item), we refer the reader to Araman and Caldentey (2011).
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2.2 Problem Definition, Algorithm Sketch, and Theorem
Statements
A firm is selling n E N different items. Each item i E [n]l starts with a fixed inventory of
ki E N units, and could be offered at one of mi E N feasible prices, with corresponding fares
.. ER satisfying 0 < r < ... <r . For convenience, we let r = 0 for each
i. In Section A.5.1, we allow for a continuum of feasible prices in some range rminI rmax].
There are T E N customers arriving sequentially. Upon the arrival of customer t E [T],
the firm observes p , the probability that customer t would buy item i at price j, for all
i E [n] and j E [m,]. 2 The firm chooses up to one of the items i with inventory remaining,
and offers it to customer t, at any price j. The customer accepts the offer with probability
in which case the firm earns revenue r , and the inventory of item i is decremented by
1. In Section 2.6, we discuss models where multiple items can be offered or multiple units
of inventory can be consumed at a time.
We define an instance I of the problem to consist of all of the following:
1. Initial information-n, {ki, mi, r , . : i E [n]};
2. Arrival information-T, {p) : t E [T],i E [n],j E [m]}.
An online algorithm prescribes, based on the initial information, how to make the offer-
ing decision at each time t, without knowing {p) : i E [n], j E [mi] } for future customers
t' > t nor the length of the time horizon T. For an online algorithm, let ALG(I) denote
the revenue earned on a run on instance I, which is a random variable with respect to the
customers' purchase decisions as well as any coin flips in the algorithm.
'For a general positive integer b, let [b] denote the set {1, .. ., b}.
2 These probabilities can be 0 for items the customer is not interested in, or prices that are too high. A
rational customer would have pt > ... > p(-'), although we do not need this assumption.
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Meanwhile, we can write the following LP based on instance I:
T n mi
max P r Y X (2.3a)
t=1 i=1 j=1
T mi
pj)xj ki i (E [n] (2.3b)
t=1 j=1
n mi
Z xj <1 t E [T] (2.3c)
i=1 j=1
>0 t E [T], Z E [n], j E [mi] (2.3d)
LP (2.3) encapsulates the execution of any algorithm, which could make full use of the
arrival information at the start, on instance 1. P) represents the unconditional probability
of the algorithm offering item i at price j to customer t. (2.3b) enforces that starting
inventories are respected, while (2.3c) enforces that at most one combination of item and
price is offered to each customer. Objective function (2.3a) represents the expected revenue
earned by the algorithm. Let OPT(I) denote the optimal objective value.
The competitive ratio of the online algorithm is then defined to be
inf .ALG(I)] (2.4)
r OPT(I)
We say that an algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of c if (2.4) is lower-bounded by c.
Given any fixed online algorithm, (2.4) considers the worst-case instance, including the
worst-case arrival sequence. The goal for the algorithm is to hedge against the worst-case
arrival sequence, possibly by using randomness. Definition (2.4) provides a guarantee on
E[ALG(X)I relative to any algorithm which could have been possible, due to the following
result.
Lemma 2.2.1. OPT(I) is an upper bound on the expected revenue of any algorithm, which
could make full use of the arrival information at the start, on instance I.
The proof of Lemma 2.2.1 is deferred to Section A.1. The definition of OPT based on
the LP is standard in problems with stochastic purchase realizations and arbitrary customer
arrivals-we leave its justification to Mehta and Panigrahi (2012); Golrezaei et al. (2014).
In the deterministic case of our problem, every pt is 0 or 1. The problem can be
simplified by letting jt,i = max{j E [mi] : p) = 1}, with Jt,i = 0 if the set is empty, for all
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t E [T] and i E [n]. We say that item i is assigned to customer t to indicate that i is offered
to customer t at price jt,i, which results in a sale; there is no reason to offer any other price.
Customer t can also be rejected, e.g. if jt,i is low for every i. In the deterministic case, the
LP (2.3) is integral, so OPT(I) is equal to the revenue of the best algorithm knowing the
arrival sequence at the start.
2.2.1 The Multi-price Value Function <bi
For an arbitrary item i, we specify its value function 4<D, which is dependent on its feasible
prices r ,. r(.,m). Recall that <Di is a function of wi, the fraction of item i sold. For
wi E [0, 1], <Di(wi) is the value the algorithm currently places on one unit of inventory of i.
First we define booking limits a), ... I (mi) which are the fractions of starting inven-
tory "reserved" for the respective fares r(1) ,. mj) via the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2.2. Consider any item i, with an arbitrary number of discrete prices sat-
isfying 0 < r ') < ... < r mt). There are unique positive values a() ... Im') which sum
to 1 and satisfy
(1) 1 (2) 1
1- -" = - (1 - e-" = . 1 (1- e-i ). (2.5)
1 - r/r 1 -r2/r
There are also unique positive values o(1) . (m which sum to 1 and satisfy
1 r1 (2) - 1 (mi) (2.6)
Furthermore,
a > 1. (2.7)
The proof of Proposition 2.2.2 is deferred to Section A.1. While finding the exact
solution to (2.5) requires finding the roots of a degree-m polynomial, a numerical solution
can easily be found via bisection search.
Proposition 2.2.2 contrasts a l),I, m) in (2.5) with the booking limits 0, .1) (mi)
in (2.6) originally derived by Ball and Queyranne (2009), which are optimal when i is the
single item being sold. Inequality (2.7) says that the fraction of starting inventory reserved
for the lowest fare is at least its "fair share", i.e. 1/mi where mi is the number of fares.
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Booking limits a (1, ... ( r) and value function Ii are a by-product of our analysis, and
maximize the competitive ratio. Our method for deriving them is deferred to Section A.5.
For now, we complete the definition of <Dj:
Definition 2.2.3. For each item i, define the following based on a(. a
" L : the sum ,a defined for all j = 0,...,mi (note that L = 0 and
L my
L(Mi) =)i
" fe(.): a function on [0, 1], where fi(w) is the uniquej E [mi] for which w E [L '', Lj)
(note that i(Lf )) = j + 1 for j = 0,... ,mi - 1; we define fi(L(mi)) to be mi).
The value function (Pi is then defined over wi E [0, 1] by
<i(wi) = ri + (r(-(wi)) r O (w))exp(w i(w))) - (2.8)
An example of a value function <Ij with 2 prices was plotted in Figure 2-1. In general, <Di
is continuously increasing and piecewise-convex over mi segments of lengths a(1), ... I a )
separated by segment borders Li 0 L,... ,  For each j, 4)i reaches the value of r at
Li , hence price j stops being offered once the fraction sold wi reaches L2.
(1)We will see that the competitive ratio CRj associated with <bi is 1 - eU , which is
(1) __ (1) e-i-_ _
optimal. When mi = 1, it can be seen that al = 1, <Di(wi) = ri -j, and CRj = 1 - ,
which correspond to known results. The functions bi, ... ., <Ds facilitate the tradeoff between
immediate reward and future inventory. We develop two algorithms, which use them in
different ways.
2.2.2 Sketch of our MULTI-PRICE BALANCE and MULTI-PRICE
RANKING Algorithms
We first sketch MULTI-PRICE RANKING, which is simpler. It assumes that ki = 1 for all i,
which does not lose generality since an item which starts with multiple units of inventory
can be transformed into multiple disparate items. At the start, the algorithm fixes for each
item i a random seed Wi, drawn independently and uniformly from [0, 11. It then treats
<Dj(Wj) as the bid price for the single unit of item i: it offers to each customer t the available
item i and price j maximizing the expected pseudorevenue, ptjj (r) - <Di(Wi)).
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MULTI-PRICE RANKING hedges against the ambiguity in customer arrivals by using
randomness, which is standard in competitive analysis. The random seed Wi determines
the random minimum price at which the algorithm is willing to sell item i, as well as a
random priority for selling i when the algorithm is choosing between multiple items.
We now sketch MULTI-PRICE BALANCE, which updates the bid price of each item i
based on the fraction wi of its ki units which has been sold. However, the algorithm does
not directly use Gi(wi) as the bid price of item i, because wi would always be a multiple of
y while the booking limits and segment borders which Di is based on may not be multiples
of -. Instead, the algorithm first uses a randomized scheme for rounding the booking limits
to multiples of
Specifically, at the start, the algorithm fixes for each item i random segment bor-
ders ,., which are multiples of - satisfying 0 = < ... < (Mi)
These realizations imply a random, perturbed value function 5. Function e is defined on
{0, y,... , 1}, since the fraction sold wi is always a multiple of . Function 'I still satisfies
0 = (~) 54p( ) <... < 4D(1). The algorithm treats 4i(wi) as the bid price for item i:
it offers to each customer t the item i and price j maximizing the expected pseudorevenue
p ' )- i(wi)). (2.9)
In expression (2.9), the definition of pseudorevenue at price j is ( - )(wi),
i.e. we have used 4i(j)) in place of rj, so that the pseudorevenue is exactly 0 when
Wi = V . However, the realized 4i will generally be close to Di, so that ( rf.
In the asymptotic regime with ki -+ oc, 4i = 4)i deterministically. However, for small ki,
optimizing a randomized procedure for initializing Di (based on r) ... , r as well as ki)
instead of having a deterministic (Di (based on only r, ... , r mi)) allows us to achieve a
greater competitive ratio.
2.2.3 Statements of Our Results
Theorem 2.2.4. MULTI-PRICE BALANCE achieves a competitive ratio of mini CRi, where
-1) (1) 
_for all i, CRi is lower-bounded by all of: (i) (1+- e2 - (ii) O ; and ( +iii)(1+ki)(el/k _1)~ 2 (1+k)(1-e/ki)
if mi = 1.
Corollary 2.2.5. MULTI-PRICE BALANCE achieves a competitive ratio approaching 1 -
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exp(- mini a(')) as each starting inventory ki approaches oc.
Corollary 2.2.6. Suppose that each item has at most m discrete prices and at least k units
of starting inventory. Then the competitive ratio achieved by MULTI-PRICE BALANCE is
lower-bounded by ,14e1/k j-' which approaches 1 - e-1/m as k approaches oo.
Theorem 2.2.4 is our general result, where for each i, CRi is the competitive ratio
associated with the optimal randomized procedure for initializing '1, based on r ,... ,r
and ki.
Lower bound (i) on CRi is attained by a randomized procedure which defines d i based on
the fixed function <Di. The numerator in (i) is a function of the feasible prices r(l) . (.mi)
while the denominator is a function of the starting inventory ki. Note that the denominator
(1+ki)(el/ki -1) decreases toward 1 as ki -+ oc, resulting in Corollary 2.2.5. Corollary 2.2.6
is a further simplification of the bound presented, using inequality (2.7). Lower bound
(ii) is attained from solving an optimization problem for the best randomized procedure,
which is tractable when ki = 1. Interestingly, the bound turns out to be based on the
single-item booking limits a , (mi) instead of a 1 , ... ,a Td. Lower bound (iii) is
the improvement of (i) in the single-price case, where we have gained a factor of el/ki. it
simplifies and improves the bound from Golrezaei et al. (2014).
MULTI-PRICE BALANCE is formalized and Theorem 2.2.4 is proven in Section 2.3. We
explain the ideas behind our primal-dual analysis, why we need random value functions,
and how to overcome the resulting analytical challenges.
Theorem 2.2.7. MULTI-PRICE RANKING achieves a competitive ratio of 1 -
exp(- mini a)) in the deterministic case of our problem.
MULTI-PRICE RANKING is formalized and Theorem 2.2.7 is proven in Section 2.4. While
we described MULTI-PRICE RANKING as an algorithm for our general problem in Sec-
tion 2.2.2, it is most amenable to analysis in the deterministic case. This is also true
in the single-price case, as our analysis uses the framework of Devanur et al. (2013) and
extends it to handle to multiple prices.
Theorem 2.2.8. Consider a set of m prices satisfying 0 < r(1) < ... < r(m), from which
a(') and o-(') are defined according to Proposition 2.2.2. Then there exists a distribution
over instances I (a "randomized instance") with mi = m and r\') - r(), ... Irm) r(m)
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for each item i, on which no online algorithm can have expected revenue greater than (1 -
e-am )E[OPT(I)]. Furthermore, for every instance I in the support of the distribution:
1. the starting inventories ki can be made arbitrarily large;
2. I falls under the deterministic case of our problem.
Theorem 2.2.8 is proven in Section 2.5. It implies that no online algorithm can achieve
a competitive ratio greater than 1 - e-(), via Yao's minimax principle (Yao, 1977). The
counterexample can be made to satisfy the conditions of both Corollary 2.2.5 and Theo-
rem 2.2.7, showing that these results are tight.
In our counterexample, a large number of customers arrive according to a random per-
mutation, like in Karp et al. (1990); Mehta et al. (2007); Golrezaei et al. (2014). In our
case, the customers are further split into m "phases", where the customers in phase j are
willing to pay rO) for any of the items they are interested in. The lengths of the phases are
optimized by an adversary to minimize the competitive ratio.
Interestingly, on the related counterexamples from the literature (Karp et al., 1990;
Mehta et al., 2007; Ball and Queyranne, 2009; Golrezaei et al., 2014), all (reasonable)
algorithms have the same performance. On our counterexample, with the adversarially-
optimized phase lengths, the unique optimal algorithm turns out to be our two algorithms.
We say unique because MULTI-PRICE BALANCE and MULTI-PRICE RANKING converge to-
ward the same algorithm as the starting inventories go to oo; this phenomenon has also
been noted in the single-price case by Aggarwal et al. (2011).
Proposition 2.2.9. For m > 2 prices satisfying 0 < r(l) < ... < r(m), from which a(')
and o() are defined according to Proposition 2.2.2, the following inequalities hold:
(- ) - o,(1 < 1 - e-0 < 1 - e-'m (2.10)
1
1 -r() < (2.11)
1 -+ In r9l
1 - e-a < 1- ea(), where a is the unique solution to 1 - e-= ln d (2.12)
Finally, Proposition 2.2.9, which is proven in Section A.1, puts our tight competitive
ratio of 1 - e-' into perspective. -1) is the existing tight competitive ratio for a single
item, while 1 - 1 is the existing tight competitive ratio for multiple items with one price
e
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each. (2.10) shows that our competitive ratio for multiple items with multiple prices is not
a naive combination of the existing competitive ratios, and hence our algorithms cannot be
obtained by combining existing algorithms.
With a single item whose price can take any value in the continuum [r(1), r(m)], the tight
competitive ratio is 1 (Ball and Queyranne, 2009). 1 - e-', with a as defined1 ln(r(m)/r71))
in (2.12), is our corresponding competitive ratio when there are multiple items (a can be
solved to equal 1 - W(ReR-1)/R, where W is the inverse of the function f(x) = xex, and
R = ln(r"n/r""")--see Section A.5.1). (2.11) and (2.12) say that when the prices vary
within a discrete subset of [r(1),r(m)], the competitive ratios can only be greater. (2.11)
combined with (2.10) shows that our competitive ratio of 1 - e-'1 is Q(1og( 1A)/r(.))
2.3 MULTI-PRICE BALANCE and the Proof of Theo-
rem 2.2.4
MULTI-PRICE BALANCE, as sketched in Section 2.2.2, is formalized in Algorithm 1. For
now, we consider a generic randomized procedure for initializing _m...,l)m) and (I in
Step 1, which deterministically satisfies the following monotonicity conditions:
(0), { , , .... , I1 , 0 = _< ... < _ (Tni 1 (2.13)
4i(0), ( ), .. , (1) E R, 0 = 4i(0) 5y( ) 5 ... <4 (1). (2.14)
Since 5j? is non-decreasing, the expression 4 j(_Lj') - ' (( ) in (2.15) is non-positive once
the number sold Ni reaches ki. Therefore, Algorithm 1 never tries to offer an item i which
has stocked out.
Theorem 2.3.1. Suppose in Line 1 of Algorithm 1, for each i E [n], the segment borders
VI ... L(mi) and value function b are randomly initialized in a way such that
ki(0i(N C( : ) r j E [mi], N E {0, ..., L k -1};
(2.16)
E[I4(L )] > rQj , E[mil.
(2.17)
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Algorithm 1 MULTI-PRICE BALANCE
1: Initialize ., , ei randomly and independently for each i E [n]
2: Ni <- 0 for all i [In] (Ni tracks the total number of copies of item i sold, at any price)
3: fort=1,2,... do
4: Compute
max Pt i - 4,( (2.15)
5: if the value of (2.15) is strictly positive then
6: Offer any item * and price j* maximizing (2.15) to customer t
7: if customer t accepts (occurring with probability ps)) then
8: Zt <- ( ( )) - 'i* (N* /ki) (this is the pseudorevenue earned)
9: Ni* +- Ni* + 1
10: end if
11: end if
12: end for
Then Algorithm 1 achieves a competitive ratio of F.
Theorem 2.3.1 identifies conditions which, when satisfied by the randomized procedure
for each i, yields a competitive ratio of F. Note that (2.16) needs to hold for every potential
instantiation of $i, while (2.17) only needs to hold in expectation over the instantiations. We
prove Theorem 2.3.1 in Section A.2, but outline its proof here and provide some intuition.
First, we take the dual of the LP (2.3):
n T
minE kiy + zt (2.18a)
i=1 t=1
pY yi + Zt p ri t E [T], i E [n], j E [mi] (2.18b)
yi, Zt 0 i E [n, t E [T] (2.18c)
By weak duality, OPT(I) is bounded from above by the objective value of any feasible dual
solution.
During the (random) execution of Algorithm 1, it maintains a dual variable yi = (g)
for each i. At each time t, only if a sale is realized, does the algorithm set zt to a non-zero
value Zt (Line 8) and increment the yi-variables by incrementing N. (Line 9). We prove
three claims:
1. During each time t E [T), the gain in the dual objective is at most some multiple j
of the revenue earned by the algorithm;
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2. During each time t E [T], the conditional expectation of Zt over the random purchase
decision of customer t, combined with the current value of yi, make the LHS of (2.18b)
at least p - (1 ), for all i E [n] and j E [mi];
3. The expectation of j(j)), over the random segment borders and value function
initially chosen by the algorithm, is at least rf), for all i E [n] and j E [mi].
Claim 1 follows from condition (2.16), while Claim 3 follows from condition (2.17). Claims 2
and 3 can be combined to show that the dual variables yj and zt maintained by the algorithm
are feasible, after taking an expectation over all sample paths.
We explain the intuition behind our idea of a random value function, and the resulting
analysis. Even for a single item, with a small starting inventory and a large ratio r from its
highest to lowest price, in order to achieve a constant competitive ratio which does not scale
with r, one must use random booking limits (Ball and Queyranne, 2009). With multiple
items, our equivalent is to have the configuration of segment borders (0)..., be
random, and define an arbitrary value function (Di corresponding to each one. In order to
"average" over these configurations in the analysis, we relax dual feasibility to only hold in
expectation. The idea of feasibility in expectation has been previously seen, but in different
contexts: in Devanur et al. (2013), over a random seed, and in Golrezaei et al. (2014), over
a random purchase decision (similar to our Claim 2).
2.3.1 Optimizing the Randomized Procedures
Theorem 2.3.1 reduces the problem of deriving a competitive algorithm to that of finding a
randomized procedure for initializing 51, ... , (D satisfying (2.16)-(2.17). We can consider
this problem separately for each i, based on r(, ... I r and ki, and omit the subscript i.
A randomized procedure consists of a distribution over the all of the configurations sat-
isfying (2.13), and for each configuration, values for 5 ( .(), .. , 6(1) satisfying (2.14).
We would like to find a randomized procedure which satisfies (2.16)-(2.17) with a max-
imal value of F. While this optimization problem is intractable in general, we can use
the intuition behind the definitions of L(0..., L(m) and <D from Section 2.2.1 to specify a
near-optimal randomized procedure.
Definition 2.3.2. Define the following randomized procedure for initializing 5:
1. Draw a random seed W uniformly from [0, 1];
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2. For each j, set L = k if W < LU~k - LL(j)kJ, and JJO) = kL( kj otherwise;
3. For q E {,, . . ., 1}, let i(q) be the unique j E [m] such that <-)  q < Di) (note
that i(L()) = j+1 for j = 0,..., m - 1; we define .(Lfm)) to be m).
The value function 4 is then defined over q c {O, i,.. . , 1} by
i(q) = (r( - - L -1)) - (f(q)) -r ( -(q)l))exP( ~
4q) 1 exp(a(3)) -1 exp(e((q))) - 1
(2.19)
It is important that the random segment borders D0), ... , bL() are rounded comonoton-
ically (in a perfectly positively correlated fashion) using a single seed, both to ensure that
they satisfy the monotonicity condition in (2.13), and to reduce the number of potential
configurations on which (2.16) needs to hold. $ increases over the m (possibly empty) "seg-
ments" of its domain {0, 1,... ,1}, which are "bordered" by L(0), ... ,L(m). (2.19) is similar
to definition (2.8) for 4), except the sum in (2.19) does not telescope, since L - Vi- 1)
equals a(i) only in expectation.
Theorem 2.3.3. The randomized procedure for initializing 4) from Definition 2.3.2 satisfies
(1)
(2.16)-(2.17) with F = 1+e-1). Furthermore, if m = 1, then the value of F can be
improved to i+k)(1 )
Theorem 2.3.3 is proven in Section A.2. It, in conjunction with Theorem 2.3.1, estab-
lishes bounds (i) and (iii) from our main result for MULTI-PRICE BALANCE, Theorem 2.2.4.
In Section A.2, we state the complete proof of Theorem 2.2.4, including bound (ii), which
involves explicitly formulating the optimization problem over randomized procedures and
solving it when k = 1.
2.4 MULTI-PRICE RANKING and the Proof of Theo-
rem 2.2.7
In Section 2.2.2, we sketched MULTI-PRICE RANKING, for our general problem. In Al-
gorithm 2, we formalize it in the deterministic case, which is the case analyzed in Theo-
rem 2.2.7. Recall that we have assumed, without loss of generality, that ki = 1 for each
item i.
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Algorithm 2 MULTI-PRICE RANKING in the Deterministic Case
1: Initialize Wi uniformly at random from [0, 1], independently for each i G [n
2: availablej <- true for all i E [n]
3: fort=1,2,... do
4: Compute
max (ri-j-ki(W)) (2.20)
iE [n],jE [mi:availablej =true
5: if the value of (2.20) is strictly positive then
6: Offer any item i* maximizing (2.20) to customer t, at price jt,i;
7: availablej; +- false
8: end if
9: end for
Our analysis extends the framework of Devanur et al. (2013) to incorporate multiple
prices. It uses the dual LP defined in (2.18), where every pi' is 0 or 1.
If Algorithm 2 assigns item i to customer t (charging price jt,z), then we set dual variables
Zt = r t'i - i(Wj) and Y = I(Wj), where (Di is the fixed function defined in Section 2.2.1
(we ignore the measure-zero set where D' is undefined). All dual variables not set during a
time period are defined to be zero. The following lemmas are proven in Section A.3:
Lemma 2.4.1. If Algorithm 2 assigns item i to customer t, then ( (-e-1i )(Y(+Z r
w.p.1.
Lemma 2.4.2. Setting yi = E[Y], zt = E[ZtI for all i, t forms a feasible solution to the dual
LP (2.18).
The proof of Theorem 2.2.7 is straight-forward given these lemmas:
Proof. Proof of Theorem 2.2.7. Lemma 2.4.2 implies OPT(I) 5 Eni 1E[YiJ + ET_ 1 E[Zt],
via weak duality. However, by Lemma 2.4.1, the revenue earned by Algorithm 2, or ALG,
is at least miniG[n]{1 - e-i } . (tI= Y Z=1 Zr), with probability 1. Thus, E[ALG] ;
(1 - exp(- minic[] Q )) - OPT(I). 0
2.5 Randomized Instance and the Proof of Theorem 2.2.8
We formalize the randomized instance described in Section 2.2.3 and use it to prove Theo-
rem 2.2.8.
The n E N items i all have mi = m, r n = rG) for all j, and ki = k for some k E N. We
think of n as going to oc, while k is arbitrary. Throughout this example, we often express
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quantities as portions r of n. We abuse notation and write -rn to refer to an integer, even
if -r is irrational, since the error from rounding rn to the nearest integer is negligible as
n -+ oo.
The arrival sequence is randomized following the classical construction of Karp et al.
(1990). There are T = nk customers, split into n "groups" of k identical customers each.
Uniformly draw a random permutation 7r = (71,... ,irn) of (1,... ,n) from the n! possi-
bilities. For i E [n], all k customers in group i would deterministically buy any item in
{i ,..., irn}. Our construction differs from existing ones in that the n groups of customers
are further split into m "phases". Let 3 1,... ,1m be positive numbers summing to 1, cor-
responding to the fraction of groups in each phase, whose values we specify later. For all
j E [m], the customers in groups (f1 + ... + j-1)n + 1 ... ,(1 + .. . + #3 )n are willing to
pay r(A for any of the items in their interest set.
Definition 2.5.1. Define the following shorthand notation for all j = 1,... ,m + 1:
" A3 := 1 J a4f) (note that A1 = 1 and Am+, = 0);
* B: Em_ 'e (note that B1 = 1 and Bm+1 = 0).
Proposition 2.5.2. Given m E N, 0 < r(l) < ... < r(m), and a( 1),..., a(m) as defined
in Proposition 2.2.2, there exists a unique solution to the following system of equations in
variables B2 , .. , Bm:
Bmr(m)e-am) = ... B 2 r(2)e~- 2 = r e_, (2.21)
with 0 < Bm < ... < B2 < B1 = 1.
We define B2,...,Bm according to Proposition 2.5.2. This implies definitions for
01, ... , 3 m, which are strictly positive and sum to 1.
Now, regardless of the permutation 7r, the optimal algorithm allocates the k copies of
item -ir to the customers in group i, for each i E [n], successfully serving all T = nk
customers and earning revenue Em r(3)(/n)k. This is also the optimal objective value of
the LP (2.3). Therefore, OPT(I) = Ei r(i)(#jn)k deterministically, which we can rewrite
as
mZ (rOi) - r~j'))Bjnk. (2.22)
j=1
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2.5.1 Upper Bound on Performance of Online Algorithms
Lemma 2.5.3. The expected revenue of an online algorithm on this randomized instance
is upper-bounded by the maximum value of
m
Zr(i)Bn(1 - e-Ai )k (2.23)
j=1
subject to 0 < Aj In for j E [m - 1], 0 Am, and Em 1 Aj < 1.
Lemma 2.5.3 drastically simplifies the analysis of the online algorithm, because it re-
stricts to algorithms which are indifferent to the realized permutation 7r, allowing for a de-
terministic analysis. However, our analysis differs from existing ones (e.g. (Golrezaei et al.,
2014, Lem. 6)) in that despite the item symmetry, the online algorithm has a decision-how
many customers in each phase to serve, as opposed to reserving inventory for customers in
future phases.
This is controlled by the A-variables, where A3 denotes the expected fraction of item
7r, 's inventory sold to phase-j customers. The expected number of groups served during
phase j is then at most Byn(1 - e-Ai), resulting in the upper bound (2.23). Constraint
A3 < In B comes from the fact that Bjn(1 - e-Ai) must not exceed the total number of
groups in phase j, 43n.
Lemma 2.5.4. Let j c [m] and T E [0, 1]. The maximum value of
m
Zr()Bn(1 - e~Ae)k (2.24)
f=j
subject to At > 0 for all f = j,...,m as well as Em_ Aj -r is
nk r(e)B(1-exp( - a()+ AL;-T ~ )). (2.25)
fm M- j+1
Lemma 2.5.4 establishes the optimal objective value of the optimization problem from
Lemma 2.5.3. The upper bound of In on Aj for j E [m - 11 turns out to not be binding.
With both lemmas, the proof of Theorem 2.2.8 is easy.
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Proof. Proof of Theorem 2.2.8. The value of (2.25) with j = 1 and r = 1 is
nkZrBe(l - e-=e ()=1_e- ) (rf) - r(-e))Bnk, (2.26)
f=1 e=1
where we have used (2.5) to derive the equality. Combining Lemmas 2.5.3-2.5.4, we get that
the RHS of (2.26) is an upper bound on E[ALG(I)], for any online algorithm. Meanwhile,
OPT(I) on this randomized instance is always equal to (2.22), which is exactly the RHS of
(2.26) divided by (1-e- ()). We have established that E[ALG(I)] (1-e- a())E[OPT(I)],
which is the desired result. Finally, the second condition of Theorem 2.2.8 is clearly satisfied;
the first condition is also satisfied because our analysis holds for any value of k E N, hence
k can be made arbitrarily large. E
Remark 2.5.5. Suppose k -+ oo. It can be seen that our algorithm (either MULTI-PRICE
BALANCE or MULTI-PRICE RANKING, which behave identically on this instance-see Ag-
garwal et al. (2011)), with booking limits a(", ... , is the unique optimal algorithm on
this instance. The proof of Lemma 2.5.3 shows that given A 1, ... , Am, the dominant strategy
for the online algorithm is to deplete the inventories of items evenly (which is possible since
k -+ oo), in which case upper bound (2.23) is attained. The proof of Lemma 2.5.4 shows
that the unique optimal values for A1,... ,Am are a()1 , ... ,(M).
It only remains to show that Aj = a(i) is feasible, namely aU) < In a- for j < m.
Applying (2.21), this is equivalent to showing e-j > - , or e- > r(,)
r , or e) - r(i+1)I
which follows from (2.5) since 1 - e- <1
2.6 Extending our Techniques
We explain how our techniques can be extended to allow for fractional inventory consump-
tion like in the Adwords problem (Mehta et al., 2007), or offering multiple items like in the
online assortment problem (Golrezaei et al., 2014). The extension to continuous price sets
in deferred to Section A.5.1.
Consider the following modification of our problem from Section 2.2: when customer
t is offered item i at price j, she deterministically pays p r) and consumes a fractional
amount p Kj) 1 of item i's inventory, instead of paying r) and consuming 1 unit with
probability pt. We assume that mini ki -+ oo. This generalizes the Adwords problem
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under the small bids assumption, by allowing each budget i to be depleted at mi different
rates r(,..r mi)
For this problem, we use MULTI-PRICE BALANCE, except since we are taking mini ki -
o, we can deterministically set each J i = <Di. The three claims used to establish Theo-
rem 2.3.1 are simpler: Claim 2 now holds deterministically instead of requiring a conditional
expectation over Zt, while Claim 3 also holds deterministically since J i is always <bi. In
Theorem 2.3.3, condition (2.16) is now only satisfied under an additional error term e, since
N is no longer a discrete integer. Nonetheless, the rounding error e approaches 0 as ki -+ oc,
so the optimal competitive ratio is still achieved.
For online assortment, we use the term product to refer to an (item, price)-combination
(i, j). Consider the following modification of our problem from Section 2.2: upon the
arrival of customer t, for any subset (assortment) S of products and (i, j) E S, we are given
pji j) (S), the probability that customer t would pick product (i, j) when offered the choice
from S. After being given these probabilities, we must offer an assortment S to customer
t. This generalizes the original online assortment problem, by allowing each item to have
multiple feasible prices. The execution of an algorithm can be encapsulated by the following
modification of the LP (2.3):
T
maxZExt(S) 1: r~jpo -.)(S) (2.27a)
t=1 S (jE
xt(S) pj (S) < ki i E [n] (2.27b)
t=1 S j:(i,j)GS
SZxt(S) = 1 t E [T] (2.27c)
S
Xt (S) > 0 t E [T], S C {(i, j) :i E [n], j E [mi]} (2.27d)
MULTI-PRICE BALANCE can be directly applied to this problem, with the change that it
offers the assortment S maximizing expected pseudorevenue, E(ij)Es Ptj) (S) ('i(L )
Di(wi)), to each customer t. In the analysis, dual constraints (2.18b) now require
z ;> Z(gJ)ES P (S)(rj - yi) for all t and S, which is still implied by the conditions of
Theorem 2.3.1 so long as the choice probabilities for customers satisfy a mild substitutability
assumption (see Golrezaei et al. (2014) for details).
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2.7 Simulations on Hotel Data Set of Bodea et al. (2009)
We test our algorithms on the publicly-accessible hotel data set collected by Bodea et al.
(2009). Based on the data, we consider a multi-price online assortment problem, as defined
in Section 2.6. In general, we aim to follow the experimental setup of Golrezaei et al. (2014).
2.7.1 Experimental Setup
We consider Hotel 1 from the data set, which has more transactions than the other four
hotels. For each transaction, we use booking to refer to the date the transaction occurred,
and occupancy to refer to the dates the customer will stay in the hotel. We consider
occupancies spanning the 5-week period from Sunday, March 11th, 2007 to Sunday, April
15th, 2007. Although the data contains occupancies for a couple of weeks outside this range,
such transactions are sparse.
We merge the different rooms into 4 categories: King rooms, Queen rooms, Suites, and
Two-double rooms. Rooms under the same category draw from the same inventory. We
merge the different fare classes into two: discounted advance-purchase fares and regular
rack rates. We use product to refer to any of the 8 combinations formed by the 4 room
categories and 2 fares.
We estimate a Multinomial Logit (MNL) choice model on these 8 products, for each of 8
customer types. The customer types are based on the booking channel, party size, and VIP
status (if any) associated with a transaction. These types capture preference heterogeneity
(for example, party sizes greater than 1 tend to prefer Suites and Two-double rooms). The
details of our choice estimation are deferred to Section A.6.
We should point out that more sophisticated segmentation and estimation techniques
have been employed on this data set (van Ryzin and Vulcano, 2014; Newman et al., 2014).
Nonetheless, MNL has been reported to perform relatively well (van Ryzin and Vulcano,
2014, sec. 5.2). The MNL choice model is convenient for our purposes because under
it, both the assortment optimization problem, as well as the choice-based LP (2.27) with
exponentially many variables, can be solved efficiently (Talluri and Van Ryzin, 2004; Liu
and Van Ryzin, 2008; Cheung and Simchi-Levi, 2016).
We treat each occupancy date as a separate instance of the problem, for which we define
a sequence of arrivals, with one arrival for each transaction which occupies that date. The
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choice probabilities for each arrival are determined by the customer type associated with
the corresponding transaction. 3 The number of days in advance of occupancy that each
arrival occurred is also recorded, but this information is only relevant for algorithms which
attempt to forecast the remaining number of arrivals based on the remaining length of time.
Before we proceed, we discuss the limitations of our analysis and the data set:
1. In the data set, 55% of the transactions occupy multiple, consecutive days. However,
we treat such a transaction as a separate arrival in the instances for each of those
occupancy dates. While this is a simplifying assumption, the focus of our paper is on
the basic allocation problem without complementarity effects across consecutive days,
and our goal in using the data set is to extract an arrival pattern over time.
2. It is not possible to deduce from the data the fixed capacity for each category of room.
Nonetheless, we consider a wide range of starting capacities in our tests.
3. Estimating the number of customers who do not make a purchase is a standard chal-
lenge in choice modeling, which is exacerbated in this data set by the fact that the
arrivals are rather non-stationary. We test various assumptions on the weight of the
no-purchase option in the MNL model for each customer type. In general, we assume
that this weight is large, which causes the revenue-maximizing assortments to be
large, allowing for tension between offering large assortments which maximize imme-
diate revenue, and offering small assortments which regulate inventory consumption
(details in Section A.6).
2.7.2 Instance Definition
An instance consists of a fixed capacity for each room category, corresponding to a specific
occupancy date. Each customer interested in that occupancy date arrives in sequence, after
which her characteristics (channel, party size, VIP status) are revealed. The problem is to
show a personalized assortment of (room, fare)-options to each customer. The instances we
test are defined below.
* Arrival sequence: 35 possibilities, one for each day in the 5-week occupancy period.
We multiply the arrivals by 10 (i.e. instead of a type-1 customer followed by a type-
3 The choice realized in that transaction was used for choice model estimation, but is not used in defining
the arrival.
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Table 2.1: Details on Room Categories and Fares
Room Category Low Fare High Fare Fraction of Rooms
King $307 $361 52%
Queen $304 $361 15%
Suite $384 $496 13%
Two Double $306 $342 20%
2 customer, we have 10 type-1 customers followed by 10 type-2 customers), being
interested in the high-inventory regime. After multiplication, the average number of
arrivals per day is 1340, peaking on Sundays and Mondays, although the number and
breakdown of customers varies every day.
" Number of products: 8 (room, fare)-combinations, identical for all instances.
" Prices of products: displayed in Table 2.1, identical for all instances. These prices
were determined by taking the average price of that (room, fare)-combination over all
transactions.
" Starting inventories: 3 possibilities, defined by the loading factor, which is the average
number of customers per unit of starting inventory. We use the same loading factors
(1.4, 1.6, 1.8) as Golrezaei et al. (2014). The breakdown of starting inventory is
fixed, based on the relative frequency with which each room type is booked over all
transactions (see Table 2.1).
We test additional synthetic instances, with greater differentiation between high and low
fares and a greater range of loading factors, in Section 2.7.5.
2.7.3 Algorithms Compared
We compare the performances of 9 algorithms on each instance.
First we describe the forecast-independent algorithms we test.
1. Myopic: offer each customer the assortment maximizing immediate expected rev-
enue, from the items that have not stocked out.
2. Conservative: only offer items at their maximum prices, using the optimal algorithm
of Golrezaei et al. (2014) to choose assortments.
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3. Multi-price Balance: offer each customer t the assortment S maximizing
pjpd(S)(rfj) - <>i(wi)), (2.28)
(ij)ES
where wi is the fraction of item i sold. Expression (2.28) is the expected pseudorevenue
of assortment S. Since we are in the high-inventory regime, for simplicity we have
used the fixed value function 4bj, instead of the random <ia, to define the bid price of
each item i.
The Myopic and Conservative algorithms represent two extremes, where the former
extracts the maximum in expectation from every customer and is optimal as the loading
factor approaches 0, while the latter extracts the maximum from every unit of inventory and
is optimal as the loading factor approaches oo. In-between these extremes, our algorithm
attempts to balance revenue-per-customer and revenue-per-item, as it chooses items and
prices to put in the assortment.
Next we describe the forecasting-based algorithms. These algorithms all estimate the
number of each type of customer yet to arrive, and then incorporate this information into
the LP (2.27) to set bid prices. They differ in how they perform the forecasting, and how
frequently they update the bid prices by re-solving the LP. Further details about these
algorithms, as well as discussion of alternative algorithms, are deferred to Section A.6.1.
4. One-shot LP: solve the LP only once, at the start, using the average number of
customers of each type to appear on a given day.
5. LP Resolving: re-solve the LP every 100 arrivals, using updated forecasts and in-
ventory counts. During each re-solve, the estimated number of remaining customers
is updated, taking into account the length of time remaining until occupancy, and
the number of customers that have arrived. The estimated type breakdown is fixed,
based on the aggregate distribution.
6. LP Learning: same as LP Resolving, except the estimated type breakdown is also
updated, based on the empirical distribution observed thus far.
7. LP Clairvoyant: same as LP Resolving, but given the true number of customers of
each type remaining.
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Finally, we describe the hybrid algorithms we test. These algorithms combine a forecast-
ing algorithm with MULTI-PRICE BALANCE, based on a parameter 7 > 1. For each customer
t, the hybrid algorithm considers the expected pseudorevenue (as defined in (2.28)) of the
assortment Sfcst suggested by the forecasting algorithm. If this is at least - of the maximum
-y
value of (2.28) over all assortments S, then the hybrid algorithm offers Sfcst. Otherwise,
the hybrid algorithm offers the assortment suggested by MULTI-PRICE BALANCE, which
maximizes (2.28).
8. Resolve-1.5: hybrid algorithm based on LP Resolving and parameter Y = 1.5.
9. Learn-1.5: hybrid algorithm based on LP Learning and parameter 7 = 1.5.
2.7.4 Results
On every instance, we express the performance of each algorithm as a percentage of the LP
upper bound. That is, we take the expected revenue of the algorithm (approximated over
10 runs), and divide it by the optimal objective value of the LP (2.27) with the true arrival
sequence. In Table 2.2, we report the mean and standard deviation of each algorithm's
percentages over the 35 arrival sequences, for each loading factor.
In general, MULTI-PRICE BALANCE is the most profitable and robust among the forecast-
independent algorithms. The forecast-dependent algorithms have much greater fluctuation
in their performance for different occupancy days, dependent on how accurate their forecasts
were for that day. LP Learning is slightly better than the others, but is most prone to
overfitting in its forecasts.
Nonetheless, by combining these algorithms with MULTI-PRICE BALANCE, the hybrid
algorithms are able to correct for forecast overconfidence and achieve the best performance
overall (aside from the Clairvoyant algorithm, which has a perfect forecast of the future).
We find that although the hybrid algorithm only changes a small fraction (~s 5%) of the
forecasting algorithm's decisions, this drastically improves the profitability and robustness.
2.7.5 Results under Greater Fare Differentiation
The instances tested in Section 2.7.4 were "easy" in that there was not so much difference
between selling rooms at their low or high fares. In this subsection, we synthetically modify
the higher fare for each room category to be twice its lower fare. We also increase the utility
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Table 2.2: The percentages of optimum achieved by different algorithms. The 3 highest percentages in each row are bolded. The 3
lowest standard deviations in each row are italicized.
Forecast-independent Forecast-dependent Hybrid
Myopic Conservative Balance Resolve-1.5
1.4 Mean 0.974 0.940 0.976 0.973 0.962 0.958 0.991 0.977 0.977Stdev 0.023 0.034 0.013 0.016 0.039 0.041 0.008 0.018 0.020
1.6 Mean 0.965 0.960 0.971 0.964 0.961 0.963 0.990 0.977 0.978Stdev 0.025 0.036 0.014 0.021 0.031 0.030 0.008 0.008 0.010
1.8 Mean 0.957 0.972 0.968 0.808 0.962 0.968 0.990 0.977 0.9771.8 Stdev 0.020 0.036 0.012 0.100 0.029 0.023 0.009 0.008 0.007
-1
Loading
Factor Une-shot Resolve Learn Clairvoyant Learn-1.5I
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Figure 2-3: Algorithm performances in the setting with greater fare differentiation. The
lines corresponding to the two hybrid algorithms, which perform the best overall, have been
bolded.
of the no-purchase option in the MNL model for each customer type (see Section A.6), to
maintain the tension between lower fares which maximize expected revenue, and higher
fares which limit inventory consumption.
Furthermore, we test the complete range of loading factors, including both the extreme
where the Myopic algorithm is optimal, and the extreme where the Conservative algorithm
is optimal. In Figure 2-3, we plot the average percentages of optimum attained by each
algorithm over the 35 arrival sequences, for each loading factor.
The conclusion again is that the two hybrid algorithms, which use forecasts but con-
tinuously reference our forecast-independent value functions, are the most profitable and
robust, with MULTI-PRICE BALANCE coming third. However, it is important to note that
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our methodology is only relevant in-between the extremes, where there is a non-trivial
tradeoff between immediate revenue and future inventory. If a firm knew that its inventory
constraints tend to not be binding, then it would be better off using the Myopic algorithm.
Similarly, if a firm knew that it has too much demand for its inventory, then it would be
better off always offering the maximum prices, using the Conservative algorithm.
2.8 Conclusion
Competitive analysis is a well-established methodology in sequential decision-making prob-
lems, providing a baseline decision in the absence of a reliable forecast of the future. Previ-
ously, optimal algorithms have been derived for allocating a single unreplenishable resource
to customers from different fare classes, or allocating multiple resources which each have a
fixed price. In this chapter, we derive optimal allocation algorithms which jointly consider
the tradeoffs between different fares and different resources. This broadly expands the ap-
plicability of competitive analysis, in areas such as online advertising, matching markets,
personalized e-commerce, and appointment scheduling.
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Chapter 3
Dynamic Recommendation at
Checkout under Inventory
Constraints
This work is motivated by a new checkout recommendation system at Walmart's online
grocery, which offers a customer an assortment of up to 8 items that can be added to an
existing order, at potentially discounted prices. We formalize this as an online assortment
planning problem under limited inventory, with customer types defined by the items initially
selected in the order. Multiple item prices, combined with customer withdrawal when their
initially selected items stock out, pose additional challenges for the development of an
online policy. We overcome these challenges by introducing the notion of an inventory
protection level in expectation, and derive an algorithm with a constant-factor competitive
ratio guarantee under adversarial arrivals.
3.1 Introduction
The past decade has seen a tremendous advent in online recommendation systems. Since
different customers arriving to the website have different preferences, instead of recommend-
ing the same products to everyone, personalized recommendation has been widely adopted
for both enhancing customer experience and boosting revenue. For example, Amazon.com
makes recommendations based on a customer's past purchases, the ratings she has given
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to products, and the purchasing behavior of similar customers; according to Linden et al.
(2003) this has dramatically increased click-through and conversion rates. Another example
is Netflix, which tailors recommendations of movies to customer taste. A recent article by
Wood (2014) highlights the popularity of personalized recommendation, reviewing several
start-ups that are adopting customer-specific operational decisions, including Stitch Fix,
Trunk Club, Birchbox, and Club W.
3.1.1 Motivation
Despite the success of personalized recommendation in online retailing, it is often difficult to
accomplish: many customers are transient and make a one-time purchase without registering
an account. Even when historical purchasing information is available, it can be irrelevant
or misleading, because a customer can return to the website planning to purchase products
in a different category. One way to overcome these obstacles is to make recommendations
based on the products currently in the customer's shopping cart.
Walmart has begun to implement this idea in the form of a new recommendation at
checkout system for its online grocery. As described in Yuan et al. (2016): "When a
customer finishes shopping and clicks checkout, she would see a 'stock up' page with at
most 8 additional items recommended, generated by our system."
In contrast to traditional recommendation systems, Walmart's recommendation at
checkout system is based on the products the customer is already purchasing. The rec-
ommended products are usually complementary to the products already in the cart (e.g.
cereal to go with milk), and can even be offered at discounted prices and be seen as a bundle
deal.
3.1.2 Problem Formulation and Main Result
Motivated by Walmart's recommendation at checkout system, we consider the following
online assortment planning problem. A firm is selling n items each with a starting inventory,
and there is no replenishment. Customers arrive sequentially, and each customer t plans on
buying her primary item it for its full price. So long as there is inventory of it available,
the customer arrives at the checkout page. At this point, the recommendation algorithm
can offer the customer an assortment of add-on items, at potentially discounted prices,
which can be purchased with it. Our model can incorporate constraints on the assortments
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offered-for example, Walmart's cardinality constraint of 8 add-ons.
The customer proceeds to purchase a subset of the add-ons offered (possibly none) with
item it, according to known choice probabilities. These choice probabilities are estimated
by aggregating the decisions of past customers who checked out with item it in their basket.
In this vein, it can be seen as the type of customer t, and our model allows for general,
different choice functions for customers with different primary items. That is, we allow for
n different choice functions, each of which is associated with a different item.
In this work, we do not consider the learning problem, and focus on the optimization
problem when the choice functions are given. Our goal is to develop a recommendation
algorithm, which sequentially selects the add-on assortment for each arriving customer, to
maximize the expected revenue earned before the selling season is over or the inventories run
out. To highlight the main idea of our work, we assume that each customer clicks checkout
with a single item in her basket. We treat the sequence of primary items ("arrivals")
as exogenously given, and our aim is to increase revenue with the ability to offer add-on
assortments while controlling inventory.
Online personalized assortment planning is a challenging problem due to the combination
of dynamic assortment selection, heterogeneous customer types, and inventory constraints.
A few recent papers pioneer the study of this problem under different settings: Golrezaei
et al. (2014); Bernstein et al. (2015); Gallego et al. (2016). Compared to existing mod-
els, the following aspects of the recommendation at checkout problem introduce additional
challenges for the development of an online policy:
1. In the previously-considered choice models, if a specific item is not shown in the
assortment, it does not decrease the customer's interest in other items. In our problem,
since the customer wanted to check out a specific primary item, she leaves the online
retailing system if the product she desires is unavailable; she never clicks checkout
and there is no opportunity to offer add-ons.
2. Most existing work on assortment optimization assumes that each item has a fixed
price. Our setting allows for an item to be marked down when it is offered as an add-on:
we allow a fixed, distinct discount price for each item. Therefore, in our assortment
planning problem, the total revenue cannot be determined from only tallying the
inventory depleted, because we would not know how much of that inventory the firm
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managed to sell at the full price.
All in all, in existing models, an item is excluded from the assortment to reduce can-
nibalization of other sales, while in our model, an item could be excluded also to protect
that item for (i) enabling add-on sales to future customers with that item as their primary
item, and (ii) selling it at its full price. As a result, the recommendation at checkout prob-
lem requires new insights on the trade-off between assortment optimization and inventory
protection.
To evaluate online algorithms, we adopt worst-case competitive ratio as our performance
measure (see the book by Borodin and El-Yaniv (2005) for background on this measure).
No assumptions are made about the types of future customers, or the total time horizon
remaining; the sequence of customer types can be thought of as chosen adversarially. This
is useful in practical settings where the demand is highly uncertain. We defer further
discussion about the choice of performance measure to the aforementioned papers.
To define the competitive ratio, let OPT(ii,... , iT) denote an LP-based upper bound
(details deferred to Section 3.2.2) to the expected revenue of an optimal clairvoyant offline
algorithm, which knows in advance both the sequence of primary items ii, .. . , iT (types of
customer arrivals) and problem instance I (including choice functions, revenues, and initial
inventories). Let ALG(ii, .. , iT) denote the expected revenue of an online algorithm, which
knows I but does not know in advance the sequence i 1,. . . , iT. Note that neither algorithm
knows in advance the outcomes of the randomness in the customers' purchase decisions.
We then define the competitive ratio of the algorithm to be
inf inf ALG(ii,. .iT) (3.1)
1 il,...,iTOPT(il, ... , iT)
Our main result is an algorithm whose competitive ratio is at least 1/4 - E, where E is
an error that can be made arbitrarily small, being caused by the necessity of sampling to
make the algorithm polynomial-time.
3.1.3 Directly-related Existing Results
We explain our new algorithmic techniques in Section 3.1.4, but first motivate them by
discussing the existing algorithms and bounds that are closely related.
Consider the special case of our problem where the primary item for each customer is
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a different dummy item with price 0 and starting inventory 1. In this case, there is no
concern about primary items stocking out, and an assortment of non-dummy items (with
fixed add-on prices) can be offered to each of the arriving customers. This is the personalized
assortment problem introduced by Golrezaei et al. (2014). They prove that for any starting
inventory amounts and substitutable choice models (where a customer's interest in one item
cannot decrease if a different item is unavailable), the competitive ratio is at least 1/2. This
can be achieved by the greedy algorithm, which maximizes the immediate revenue from
each customer without considering future inventory.
In our general problem, there is the concern about protecting items, because each unit of
inventory can sold in one of two ways-the "good option", where it is sold as a primary item,
and the "bad option", where it is sold as an add-on-with the good option being better
than the bad option by a potentially unbounded factor. This tradeoff has been analyzed
in the single-leg booking problem studied by Ball and Queyranne (2009); Lan et al. (2008).
For a single item with two selling options, a competitive ratio of 1/2 can be achieved by
a simple rule: flip a coin of probability 1/2; if heads, protect every unit of the item from
being sold under the bad option; if tails, allow the item to be sold under either option.
It may appear that our competitive ratio of 1/4 is easily obtained by combining these
two existing results. Indeed, one could decide whether or not to protect each item with
probability 1/2, losing a factor of 1/2, and otherwise maximize the immediate revenue from
each customer, losing another (1/2)-factor due to being greedy. However, our problem has
the additional feature that the majority of the revenue could require a specific combination
of items. For example, if the majority of the revenue occurs from selling item 2 as an add-on
to item 1, then the algorithm could only obtain this revenue if it both: (i) decided to protect
item 1 from selling out as an add-on, and (ii) decided not to protect item 2 from being sold
as an add-on to item 1.
If we use the strategy of protecting each item with probability 1/2 independently, then
in the preceding example where the revenue comes from selling item 2 as an add-on to item
1, we have already lost a factor of 1/2 x 1/2 = 1/4 before getting to any additional factor
lost due to being greedy. Therefore, this does not achieve a competitive ratio of 1/4. In
fact, it appears that any algorithm which fixes the items and levels of inventory to protect
beforehand, even if it determines these using some coordinated randomness, has competitive
ratio strictly less than 1/4-we defer the detailed calculations to Section 3.2.3.
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3.1.4 New Algorithmic Techniques
This brings us to our main algorithmic innovation, which is a protection level in expectation.
Our algorithm ensures that the expected number of units of each item sold under the "bad
option" does not exceed half of its starting inventory, where the expectation is over the
purchase decisions of the past customers (and this can be computed because their types
have already been revealed to the online algorithm). By contrast, the existing algorithms
fix the inventory to protect beforehand, and ensure that on any realization of customer
purchase decisions the protected inventory is not sold under the "bad option".
Our algorithm is defined by a simple greedy rule:
"Offer the revenue-maximizing add-on assortment to each customer, while en-
suring that the expected units of each item sold as an add-on never exceeds half
of its starting inventory."
Of course, while this constraint is related to expected remaining inventory, the algorithm is
also physically constrained from offering any items whose realized remaining inventory is 0.
Implementing such a rule requires many considerations. For example, suppose both
items i and j have remaining inventory in reality, and the algorithm is deliberating whether
to maximize immediate revenue by offering item j as an add-on to primary item i. Let d,"r
denote the expected number of units of item j that has already been sold as an add-on. To
evaluate whether offering item j would push d"r above its allowable threshold, we must
know:
" If I offer item j given the current inventory state, how much do I add to d"r? In
other words, what is the measure of the present inventory state that has been realized?
" What are the other possible inventory states for the present time step, and what
decisions am I making on those?
We answer these questions by envisioning time as passing fluidly over a unit interval [0,1]
for each time step. We consider the entire distribution for the inventory state (I1,..., In)
at the start of the time step, and evaluate how the values of (di",..., d!'") increase if
we offer from each state the revenue-maximizing assortment from the items j such that
both Ii > 0 and dqu". has not reached its threshold. If this causes any add-on thresholds
to be violated by the end of the time step, then we consider the first breakpoint s* in
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[0,1] where dj"" has reached its threshold for some item j*. Over the time interval [0, s*],
we offer the revenue-maximizing assortments for each inventory state which have already
been computed. In the time interval after s*, we re-optimize the assortments for each state,
where j* is no longer eligible to be an add-on (and this could completely change the optimal
assortments). The algorithm repeats this process, potentially adding multiple breakpoints
in a time step, until the end of the continuous interval [0,1] is reached with no threshold
violations. Finally, the algorithm returns to reality, and makes the corresponding decision
given the inventory state at hand, which is in the form of a random assortment if there were
breakpoints during the time step.
There is a final computational challenge, caused by the fact that there are exponentially-
many inventory states. At the start of each time step, we generate a new empirical distribu-
tion for the inventory state, using the known customer types ii, . . . , it-, and simulating the
random assortments offered by the algorithm and the random purchase decisions of those
customers. This simulation technique is similar in spirit to the one from Chapter 7 In our
final primal-dual analysis of the competitive ratio, we show how to define dual variables
such that the E-error from simulation does not propagate, to achieve a final competitive
ratio of 1/4 - E.
3.1.5 Comparison with Bounds from Literature
Our recommendation at checkout problem is closely related to the aforementioned per-
sonalized assortment (Golrezaei et al., 2014) and single-leg booking (Ball and Queyranne,
2009; Lan et al., 2008) problems from the literature, as well as the online matching with
stochastic rewards problem studied in Mehta and Panigrahi (2012); Mehta et al. (2014),
which is the special case of the personalized assortment problem when the items have the
same price and the assortment offered is constrained to consist of at most one item. Our
problem generalizes all of these problems, and in the special case of single-leg booking,
our algorithm coincides with that of Ball and Queyranne (2009). The competitive ratio
achieved by our analysis, however, is smaller. We do provide an upper bound showing that
the existing competitive ratios cannot be achieved for our problem in general. Table 3.1
presents a detailed comparison of our model with existing models, and our bounds with
existing bounds.
While our lower bound of 1/4 on the competitive ratio does not match our upper bound
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Table 3.1: Comparison of problems and competitive ratios. For each row, bold font indi-
cates greatest generality.
Real-time Personalized Online Matching w/ Two-Fare Single-Leg RecommendationProblem Assortment Stochastic Rewards Booking Problem at Checkout
Reference Golrezaei et al. '14 Mehta/Panigrahi '12 Ball/Queyranne '09 [this chapter]
# of Items multiple multiple single multiple
Revenue one price same price for two prices two prices
of Items per item all items per item per item
Choice arbitrary; assume purchase probabilities deterministic arbitrary; assume
Function substitutability$ for single items weak substitutabilityi
Lower Bd ___ ___- E
Upper Bd 0.621 0.43
0 Golrezaei et al. (2014) impose a necessary mild substitutability assumption on the choice model (i.e., the purchase
probability of an item can only decrease as additional items are added into the assortment). We call our assumption
weak substitutability because, while we assume substitutability between the add-ons, we allow the purchase probability
of an add-on to decrease (to zero) if the primary product requested is unavailable.
4 The competitive ratio improves from }1 to 1 - ~~ 0.632 as the minimum starting inventory increases from 1 to oo,2 e
and in this case, matches the upper bound of 1 - (the upper bound of 0.621 is from Mehta and Panigrahi (2012)
and uses unit starting inventories).
b The competitive ratio improves to 0.534 if the purchase probabilities approach 0, and 0.567 if they are also equal
(the first statement is due to Mehta et al. (2014)).
of .43, we are not aware of any tight competitive ratio results under both: (i) uncertainty
in purchasing, and (ii) small starting inventories. To highlight the difficulty of the problem,
even in the special case of online matching with stochastic rewards, with the further as-
sumption that every purchase probability is equal to a single infinitesimal value p, there is a
gap between the lower bound 0.567 and the upper bound of 0.621 (see Mehta and Panigrahi
(2012) and the later work by Mehta et al. (2014)). When (i) is relaxed and we have the
deterministic online matching problem, a "random ranking" online algorithm can achieve a
tight competitive ratio of 1-1/e (see Karp et al. (1990), its generalization by Aggarwal et al.
(2011), and the unified analysis by Devanur et al. (2013)). Similarly, when (ii) is relaxed
and the starting inventories approach oc, an "inventory balancing" online algorithm can
achieve a tight competitive ratio, also of 1 - 1/e (see Golrezaei et al. (2014); this result is
closely related to the Adwords stream of research initiated in Kalyanasundaram and Pruhs
(2000); Mehta et al. (2007); Buchbinder et al. (2007)). In Section B.1, we discuss why large
starting inventories do not appear to improve our competitive ratio, including an example
under this regime which shows that the competitive ratio must be strictly less than 1/2.
We see our guarantee of 1/4 as the natural baseline competitive ratio which combines
the loss of 1/2 from the online matching with stochastic rewards problem, with the loss of
1/2 from items having the "good option" of being sold as a primary item and "bad option"
of being sold as an add-on. It is particularly interesting to us that the competitive ratio of
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1/4 is not immediately achieved by flipping a coin for each item to decide whether to sell it
under its bad option; instead, it is achieved by constraining the expected units of each item
sold under its bad option.
Finally, we would like to mention that unlike in the classical online matching problem,
where it is immediate that greedy is (1/2)-competitive (Karp et al., 1990; Aggarwal et al.,
2011), showing that greedy is (1/2)-competitive in the online matching with stochastic
rewards problem requires an intricate probabilistic dual-balancing argument (Mehta and
Panigrahi, 2012; Golrezaei et al., 2014). Extending this to a (1/4)-competitive algorithm
for our recommendation at checkout problem requires new insights on how to define dual
variables when the algorithm is based on expected add-on sales, instead of realized add-on
sales.
3.1.6 Other Related Work
The papers which are most related to our work from a technical standpoint have already
been discussed in Sections 3.1.3-3.1.5. In this section we emphasize several papers which
have been previously unmentioned.
The retailing problem of planning a sequence of assortments to offer over a finite horizon
subject to various operational constraints (e.g. assortment cardinality, inventory considera-
tions) has been studied extensively since the seminal papers van Ryzin and Mahajan (1999);
Mahajan and van Ryzin (2001). The model we study here, where the tradeoff is between
immediate revenue vs. future inventory, originally focused on the multinomial-logit choice
model in Talluri and Van Ryzin (2004); Rusmevichientong et al. (2010).
In this chapter, instead of focusing on a specific choice model, we view the assortment
decision as a generic lever for managing the tradeoff between different depletion options
for the inventories which have different revenue rates (see Maglaras and Meissner (2006);
Chan and Farias (2009)). Conceptually, our analysis holds as long as the choice model
satisfies a weak substitutability condition, which essentially says that the add-ons cannot be
complements to each other (even though they can be complements to the primary item).
Computationally, our algorithm is polynomial-time as long as the single-period assortment
optimization problem corresponding to any of the choice models given can be solved effi-
ciently. We refer to Cheung and Simchi-Levi (2016) for a recent summary on the state of
the art in single-period assortment optimization.
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This chapter provides a worst-case approximation guarantee which makes no assump-
tions on the arrival sequence. This benchmark is referred to as the competitive ratio under
adversarial arrivals; see the book by Borodin and El-Yaniv (2005), or Buchbinder et al.
(2016) which discusses some recent results on the competitive ratio. In the context of
the recent assortment planning literature, Golrezaei et al. (2014) focus on the worst-case
competitive ratio, while Bernstein et al. (2015); Gallego et al. (2016) consider improved
approximation guarantees under additional assumptions about the arrival sequence.
3.2 Model Specification
Let R denote the set of real numbers, and N denote the set of positive integers. For a
general m E N, let [m] denote the set {1, ... , m}.
A firm is selling n E N different items. Each item j c [n] starts with an initial inventory
of bj E N units, and there is no replenishment. Each item has two prices: the full price
r E R, and a discounted price of q' E R, satisfying rj > ' s 0 (we allow the single-price
case where rdisc = r3 ). There are n customer types, one for each item i E [n], characterized
by the population of customers who arrive planning to purchase item i, at the full price
of ri. Any items that type-i customers purchase other than i are sold at their discounted
prices. For a customer of type i, we assume that the probabilities of her purchasing different
subsets of items are given in the form of a choice function, as defined below.
3.2.1 Choice Functions for Add-ons
Definition 3.2.1 (Customer Choice Functions). Consider any customer type i E [n]. We
let S denote all of the items (including i) shown to the customer.
9 For each S' C S, let qi (S', S) denote the probability that a customer of type i pur-
chases subset S' when shown S.
* For every j E [n], define
pij(S) = O #i(S', S), (3.2)
S'CS:jES'
which is the total probability that item j is sold when a customer of type i is shown
subset S.
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The execution of the algorithm will depend on the probabilities of the customer choosing
each subset of S given by #j; for an example, see Section B.2. However, the analysis will
only depend on the aggregate probabilities of purchasing each item, defined as pij (S) in
(3.2).
Definition 3.2.2 (Model assumptions). For all i E [n], we make the following assumptions
on the values of pij implied by function #i.
1. i E S implies pii(S) = 1.
2. i V S implies pij = 0 for all j C [n].
3. (Weak Substitutability) {i, j} Si C S 2 implies pij (Si) > Pij (S2).
Assumption 1 says that a customer of type i always purchases item i when it is available,
since by definition they were already planning to check out item i. Assumption 2 says that
a customer of type i purchases nothing when item i is unavailable, since they never get
to the checkout page to see the add-ons. Assumption 3, Weak Substitutability, says that
conditional on i being in the set shown, the probability of successfully selling another item
j can only decrease as more items are added to the set. We use the word weak to emphasize
that substitutability need not hold if i E S2 \ S1, in which case pij(SI) would be zero while
pij(S2) may be non-zero.
Definition 3.2.3 (Terminology). Hereafter we use the following terminology in describing
the interactions between the customers and the firm:
" We say that a customer of type i requests item i, and that i is her primary item;
" We call the set S shown to a customer the assortment which is offered to her;
" If the customer's primary item is in the set S offered to her, then we say that she is
served;
" We call the items in S other than i add-ons.
Definition 3.2.4 (Feasible assortments). We let Si denote the family of feasible non-empty
assortments that can be offered to a customer of type i; the empty assortment 0 is always
feasible and will be considered separately. This allows us to incorporate constraints on the
assortment offered from the firm's side, such as Walmart's cardinality constraint of 8 items.
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Definition 3.2.5 (Assumptions on Si). We make the following assumptions on Si, which
follow from the earlier assumptions in Definition 3.2.2.
" All sets in Si contain i. This is without loss of generality, since Assumption 2 states
that offering any S without i is equivalent to offering 0.
" If any S containing i is not in Si, then that means pij(S) = 0 for all j = i. By
Assumption 3, for any superset S2 of S, pij (S2) = 0 for all j # i, so we can eliminate
S2 from Si as well. Thus we can without loss of generality assume that Si is downward-
closed, i.e. i E Si C S2 E Si implies S1 E Si.
" Si includes the singleton assortment {i}, by Assumption 1.
Example 3.2.6. We provide an example to clarify our notation. Throughout the examples
in this chapter, we use two conventions, for brevity:
1. We only list the maximal subsets in Si (this is enough since Si is downward-closed);
2. We don't list choice probabilities that can be inferred from other choice probabilities.
For this example, the situation is the following. There are 4 items. Customers of type 1
will always buy item 1 (leaving with nothing if it is not offered), and (deterministically) buy
at most one add-on using preference order 2 >- 3 >- 4, with the exception that she is willing
to buy the two add-ons 2 and 4 together. Following the conventions defined in bullets 1-2
above, this can be formalized as follows:
* Si = {{1,2,3,4}} (i.e. all subsets of {1,2,3,4} containing 1 are feasible, by the
conventions);
" 01({1, 2,4}, {1, 2,3,4}) = 1 (i.e. #1 (S', {1, 2,3,4}) = 0 for all S' $ {1, 2,4}, by the
conventions);
0 ki({1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}) = 1; #1({1, 3}, {1, 3, 4}) = 1; 01({1, 4}, {1, 4}) = 1.
We do not specify 01 (., {1, 2, 4}), 01(-, {1, 2}), and #1 (-, {1, 3}) because they can be inferred
using weak substitutability from 1( {1, 2, 3, 4}), #1(., {1, 2, 3}), and #1(-, {1, 3, 4}), respec-
tively. As a result, it could be convenient to shrink Si down to {{1, 2, 4}, {1, 3}}, since all
offerings are equivalent to {1, 2, 4}, {1, 2}, {1, 4}, or {1, 3}.
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3.2.2 Problem Definition and Main Result
Customers arrive sequentially over T E N time periods. After customer t E [T] arrives, the
firm observes her type, it, and then chooses an assortment St E Sit U {0} to offer her. The
firm knows the choice probabilities, but does not know St, the realization of which items
she will actually buy. Furthermore, the firm does not know the types of future customers
it+1, ... , iT, and does not know T. The firm must offer an assortment to each arriving
customer in an online fashion with the objective of maximizing expected revenue before
inventory runs out.
The types of the arriving customers are chosen adversarially and the performance of an
online algorithm is measured by its competitive ratio. To define this term, we first present
the following LP, whose optimal objective value is an upper bound on the expected revenue
of any online algorithm:
T
max E S (rit + E rj"'spij(S))yt(S)
t=1 SE Sit jii
T
s.t. E Y pitj(S)yt (S) 5 bj j E [n] (3.3)t=1 SESit
Y yt(S) < 1 t G [T]
SESit
yt(S) > 0 t E [T],S E Sit.
Let OPT(ii,... ,iT) denote the optimal objective value of this LP; note that it is a
function of the types of arriving customers. For all t, yt(S) corresponds to the probability
that assortment S is offered during time t (over all sample paths with these fixed customer
types). The objective function is the expected revenue obtained as a result of these proba-
bilistic offerings. The first set of constraints impose that the expected units of item j sold
does not exceed its starting inventory of bj, while the next set of constraints impose that the
total probability customer t is offered a non-empty subset does not exceed 1. Note that we
do not need a variable for yt(0), since no revenue is earned and no inventory is consumed.
The following is a standard in both revenue management (see Golrezaei et al. (2014))
and discrete mathematics (see Dean et al. (2008)):
Lemma 3.2.7. OPT(i 1,.. ., iT) is an upper bound on the expected revenue obtainable by
any offline algorithm, which knows i 1 ,... , ir at the start of the time horizon.
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Nonetheless, we provide a self-contained proof for our specific problem in Section B.3. By
Lemma 3.2.7, OPT(ii,. .. , iT) is also an upper bound on the expected revenue obtainable by
any online algorithm, when the arrivals are i,..., ,i. Having established this benchmark,
we define competitive ratio as follows:
Definition 3.2.8. Fix an online algorithm. For a given instance I (consisting of choice
functions, revenues, and starting inventories), let ALG(ii,.. , ir) denote the expected rev-
enue earned by the algorithm when the sequence of arrival types is i1 ,... ir. Then the
competitive ratio of the algorithm is
inf inf ALG(ii,...,iT)
-r i1 , . iTE[n] OPT(ii,. . ., iT)
In other words, an adversary, who knows the algorithm beforehand (but knows neither
the outcomes of any randomness in the algorithm nor the customers' purchase decisions),
chooses an instance and arrival sequence to minimize the online algorithm's expected rev-
enue as a fraction of the offline optimum. Note that for the offline optimum, we are using a
value which could be greater than the expected revenue of the best algorithm which knows
the arrival types in advance. However, this can only decrease the declared ratio, and is
typical in the definition of competitive ratio for online problems where there is randomness
in the offline variant (see, e.g., Mehta and Panigrahi (2012); Golrezaei et al. (2014)).
We prove the following bound on the competitive ratio:
Theorem 3.2.9. For any E > 0, our online algorithm (whose runtime is polynomial in j
and the instance parameters) has competitive ratio at least 1 - E.4
Our algorithm needs to estimate probabilities by sampling virtual outcomes for the
decisions of past customers, which explains the error of e. Before we describe our algorithm,
we present an example which provides intuition by illustrating the main "difficulty" in the
problem.
3.2.3 Motivation for our Algorithm
We present an example which demonstrates why the fixed-protection-level algorithm, which
would follow naturally from the existing literature discussed in Section 3.1.3, does not suffice
for our problem.
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Consider the following instance, where N and M are large integers:
i3; r c = risc = 0, b, = N; r2 = rdisc = , b2 = N; r3 = M2, risc =M, b3=1;
e 1 = {{1, 2}}; 01({1, 2}, {1, 2}) = 1; S2 = {2, 3}}; 12({2, 3}, {2, 3})
In words, there are 3 items, where items 1 and 2 start with N units of inventory each, and
item 3 starts with 1 unit of inventory. Item 1 is a dummy item of zero revenue. Customers
of type 1 can be recommended item 2 as an add-on, earning a small but non-zero revenue
of 1/N with probability 1. However, item 2 is better used as a primary item for selling item
3, because customers of type 2 can be recommended item 3 as an add-on to earn a large
revenue of M with probability 1/N.
The arrival sequence begins with N customers of type 1, and the firm must decide how
many units of item 2 to sell as an add-on at the modest price of 1/N. If the firm is myopic
and sells all of it, then this is suboptimal in the scenario where the arrival sequence continues
with N customers of type 2, because the firm would be forgoing N opportunities to earn
M/N expected revenue. On the other hand, if the firm sells none of item 2 as an add-on,
then it earns zero revenue in the scenario where no customers of type 2 arrive.
Following the discussion of the literature in Section 3.1.3, the firm can balance between
the two extreme scenarios by randomly deciding whether it is going to "protect" items from
being sold as an add-on, with probability 1/2 for each item. Suppose it made this random
decision independently for each item, and consider the scenario where type-2 customers do
arrive. In order to realize the opportunities of selling item 3 as an add-on, the firm must
both: (i) have inventory of item 2 remaining to serve the type-2 customers; and (ii) not be
protecting' item 3. By independence, this only occurs with probability 1/4, so the firm's
expected revenue would be
M. I (I - (1 )N) + o(M)~ M - (3.4)
4 N 4
This is less than 1/4 of the optimum defined in Section 3.2.2 using the LP, which equals
M - (1/N)N = M.
To our knowledge, there is no immediate cure to the problem demonstrated by equation
(3.4). Even if the algorithm made the improved decision of deterministically protecting half
'The firm would also need to flip a coin to decide whether to sell as an add-on for item 3, since its full
price is M 2 , which is yet another order of magnitude greater in revenue.
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of the units of item 2 (instead of randomly protecting all of the units with probability 1/2),
its expected revenue would only increase to
1 1 1_-_1/M -(1 - (1 )N/2) + o(M) M 1 -
2 N 2
which is still less than 1/4 of the optimum. In fact, for any fixed fraction a of starting
inventory to protect, the expected revenue would be
M(1 - a)(1 - e-') (3.5)
which strictly less than 1/4 for any a c [0, 1]. There also does not appear 2 to exist a simple
way to improve upon (3.5) and achieve the 1/4 ratio by correlating the randomized rounding
across items.
This example brings us to the main idea behind our algorithm: for each item, instead of
protecting based on the realized number of units sold, we can protect based on the expected
number of units sold, to improve the guarantee on expected revenue. We defer the difficulty
of specifying such an algorithm to Section 3.3, and first formally modify this example to
establish an upper bound on the competitive ratio.
3.2.4 Upper Bound on Competitive Ratio
We use the example from Section 3.2.3 to generate an upper bound on the competitive
ratio, by choosing the probability distribution between the two scenarios (type-2 customers
arrive; type-2 customers do not arrive) which generates the best bound. Note that we have
changed the full price of item 3 from M2 to M, so that our upper bound still holds under
the restriction that rdisc =r for allj.
Example 3.2.10 (Upper Bound Construction). Let C denote the constant , where w is the
unique real number satisfying we' = 1. Consider the following randomized instance:
en =3; rl = rdisc = 0, b1 = N; r2 = rdisc = 1 b2 = N; r 3 = rdisc = M, b 3 = 1;
" S1 = {{1, 2}}; #1({1, 2}, {1, 2}) = 1; S 2 = {{2, 3}}; 02({2, 3}, {2, 3}) =
2 This example shows why positive correlation (e.g., comonotonicity) does not cure the problem in general.
While negative correlation does cure the problem on this example, it is difficult to define negative correlation
when there are a large number of items and the majority of revenue could come from selling multiple add-ons.
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" Arrivals are T =N,i = ... = iN = 1, w.p. 1 - ;
" Otherwise, arrivals are T 2Ni ... = iN = =iiN+1 2N = 2 (w-p. V.
Our construction is similar in spirit to that of Mehta and Panigrahi (2012), who also
exploit the fact that the optimum can use a fractional LP solution. This is used in the
following theorem.
Theorem 3.2.11. Consider the randomized instance defined in Example 3.2.10, and let
M, N -- oc. The expected value of OPT (i1,. . . ,iT) is at least C+1. On the other hand, for
any online algorithm, the expected value of ALG(i1,. . . , iT) is at most C - InC. By Yao's
minimax principle, the competitive ratio of any online algorithm cannot exceed
C 0.43.
C + 1
Note that Yao's minimax principle (cf. Yao (1977)) states that the competitive ratio
of any (deterministic or randomized) online algorithm that has a lack of knowledge about
the arrival sequence is bounded from above by the competitive ratio of any deterministic
algorithm that knows the probability distribution of the arrival sequence. The value of
C = I = e' = 1.76 has been chosen to minimize the competitive ratio. We defer thew
calculations required to prove Theorem 3.2.11 to Section B.3.
3.3 Algorithm
In this section we describe our algorithm, which offers the revenue-maximizing assortment
during each time period, but ensures for every item that the expected number of units sold
as an add-on never exceeds its add-on threshold, which is half of its starting inventory. In
the following subsections we specify how our algorithm accomplishes this.
3.3.1 Subroutine for Offering Assortments
Definition 3.3.1 (Protection List and Forbidden Set). For each time period t = 1,... T,
let Lt be a list of tuples of the form (item, probability). L' is called a protection list.
Formally,
= ((j ) : k E [Kt]),
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where Kt ;> 0 is its length, j' E [n], and pk E [0, 1].
For all t E [T], 1, ... , jt , and k = 0,... , Kt, let .Jk be a set of items, called a forbidden
set. .Fk is a function of L ,..., Lt and is defined as follows:
-Fk'(IC ,..., I't) := UlskI: k' E [Ks]}) U {jt, : k' < k}.
s<t
We will usually write kt1 for short, when the context is clear.
Example 3.3.2 (Running Example). We will maintain this example throughout, to help
explain our algorithm. Similarly to Section 3.2.1, we only list maximal subsets for each Si,
and don't list choice probabilities that can be inferred.
* bi = oo, b 2 = b3 = b4 = 1;
" r2 > r3 >> r4 > r= 0; r = r isc for all j;
* Si = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}}; 1({1, 2}, {1, 2}) = ; 01({1, 3}, {1, 3}) = 1;
" S3 = {{3,4}}; 03({3,4},{3,4}) = 3;
* (ii, i2) = (1, 3).
The first customer arrives requesting item 1, and is willing to buy either item 2 as an
add-on with probability , or item 3 as an add-on with probability 1. We would like to
choose item 2, since it has much greater revenue. However, we do not want the only unit
of it to be sold as an add-on with probability exceeding }. Therefore, we flip a coin and
only offer it with probability 4, which would result in a sale probability of - = 4. With
probability I, we offer item 3 instead.
Following this reasoning, the protection list Ll is set ((2, 4)), which tells the subroutine
to only offer item 2 with probability 2 during time period 1. By the second time period, the
forbidden set .j will always contain 2, telling the subroutine to not offer item 2 as an add-on.
We formalize the subroutine in Pseudocode 3. It takes as input a time period t, customer
types il,. . . , it (which have been observed by time t), and protection lists L1, ... L, t (which
we assume are given, for now).
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Algorithm 3 SeIlTo(t, i1 ,..., It, L',..., Lt)
1: Ij +- bj for all j c [n] (initialize inventories)
2: for s = 1, ... , t do
3: if I, > 0 then
4: J - ={j, is : Ij = 0}
5: k 0
6: while k < K, do
7: flip a coin which is Heads with pr
8: if Heads then break out of whi
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
obability p'+1
le loop
k +- k + 1
end while
F = ks \ {i,}
S <- argmaxsESi,,\(JuF) E j ri pisj(S)
else
S <- 0
end if
offer assortment S to customer s
observe (or virtually generate) her decision and update inventories I1,... ., I accord-
ingly
18: end for
We make the assumption that the single-period assortment problem in Step 12 can be
solved efficiently; we refer the reader to the references mentioned in Section 3.1.6 for details
on the single-period problem. We also assume that a fixed tie-breaking rule for the revenue
maximization problem has been established at the start; this rule can be arbitrary.
Example 3.3.3 (Running Example). To help with understanding Pseudocode 3, we demon-
strate its execution on an expanded version of Example 3.3.2.
" b 1 = oo, b2 = ... = b 6 = 1;
* r2 > r3 > r4 > r5 > r6 > r1 = 0; rj = rjisC for all j;
" S1 = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4, 6}, {1, 5}}:
- q1({1, 2}, {1, 2}) = 1; 01({1, 3}, {1, 3}) = 1;
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- 01({1,4,6},{1,4,6}) = 1; 01({1,5},{1,5}) =1 (this is the same as Exam-
ple 3.2.6 from Section 3.2.1);
" S3 = {{3,4}}; 03({3,4},{3,4}) =
* (i1 , i2 ,i3 ) = (1, 3, 1).
Assume that the protection lists have been given as L' = ((2, )), L2 L=, 3
((4, 1), (5, }3)).
Consider time s = 1. All inventories are full, so Ii = I, > 0 and J = 0. With
probability 3, k = 0 and F =0, so S = {1, 2}. With probability 3, k =1 and F = {2},
which prevents item 2 from being offered as an add-on, so 5 = {1, 3}. After time period 1,
there are three possibilities for the state of the inventory:
(00, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1) w.p. 2 = ;
(I1, . 16 ,I) = (OC), 1, 1, 1,1 )W.p. 2 = ;
(oo, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1) w.p. . 1 = .
Now consider s = 2. If I, = 13 = 0, then we have no choice but to offer S = 0.
Otherwise, k = 0, F = {2}, and J is either {2} or 0, so S = {3,4}. Although the customer
buys item 4 as an add-on with probability j (greater than 1), we only get to this state with
probability 6 =3, so the add-on threshold for item 4 is not violated. After time 2,
these are the possibilities for the state:{(oo, ?, 0, 0, 1, 1) w.p. 2 3 2
(00, ?, 0, 1, 1, 1) w.p. I + 2 - =
Note that we have merged some states since it will be irrelevant for the remainder of the
execution whether I2 = 0 or 12 = 1 (2 will always be in F and forbidden from being sold as
an add-on).
Now consider s = 3. J always contains 3, and contains 4 with probability q. Indepen-
dently, k = 0 w.p. , k = 1 w.p. (1 - 4)44 = L3, and k = 2 w.p. (1 - !)(I - 4I) = 4.
The respective forbidden sets are {2}, {2, 4}, and {2, 4, 5}. When 4 J and F = {2}, the
revenue-maximizing assortment is {1, 4, 6} (guaranteeing the sales of items 4 and 6). Alter-
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natively, if {4, 5, 6} n (J U F) = {4}, then S = {1, 5}. Finally, if {4, 5, 6} f (J U F) = {4, 5},
then S {1, 6}. Note that since 5 only depends on J U F, if 4 E J, then it doesn't matter
whether k = 0 (F = {2}) or k = 1 (F = {2,4}). The final possibilities for the state at the
end of time t = 3 can be computed to be:
(oo, ?, 0, 0, 1) w.p. (1 + 1) =
(I, ., s =<(00, ?, 0, 0, 1, 0) w.p. 2 -2 + 3 - = 13; 2 L3 -1 .
(oc, ?, 0, 1, 0, 1) w.p. 5 3 = 13;
(00 , ?, 0, 1, 1, 0) W. p. 3 2 6 A
It can be seen that Pr[I4 = 0] =Pr[s = 0] = Pr[I 0]= + = , i.e. the add-
on thresholds for items 4, 5, and 6 are respected. Now we explain how we came up with
protection lists that accomplish this.
3.3.2 Computing Protection Lists
Definition 3.3.4. For all t E [T], given arrival types il,... , it and protection lists
l,. .. , L, consider a run of SeIITo(t, j1 ,... ,it,&1, .... t). We use the phrase final sub-
iteration to refer to sales made by SeilTo from an 5 chosen when s = t, k = Kt (Kt is the
length of list Lt). Define the following functions for each j E [n]:
" let dj (t, ii,... ,it, 1, . .. , t) E [0, bj] be the expected units of item j sold as an add-on
before the final sub-iteration, when SelITo is run on input (t, i,..., it, E1,..., Lt)
" let hj (t, ii, . . . , it, L1, .. ., Lt) E [0, 1] be the probability that item j is sold as an add-on
during the final sub-iteration, when SeilTo is run on input (t, ii,. . , it, 1, . .. , Lt).
The algorithm maintains dj and computes hj during its execution. In general, hj cannot
be computed in polynomial time because the state space is exponential in n, but later we
show that it can be approximated in polynomial time via sampling, with error c as small
as necessary. For now, it may aid comprehension to assume oracle access to the function hj
and set e = 0.
The protection lists are constructed inductively. Pseudocode 4 explains how to construct
list Lt (after observing customer type it), given previous lists L, ... ,". For all j E [n],
dj"" is the value maintained by the algorithm for dj(t, ii, ... ,it, , ... ,Ct-1, ()), where
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() is the empty list. d7" ... , d," are required as input to Pseudocode 4; they are also
updated in Pseudocode 4.
Algorithm 4
(Lt, dc"u,...dc"")
1: ÷-(,K=0
2: loop
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
G -[n] \ (J-1(L1, .... . Ct-', LU{C }
+- hj(t, ii,..., it, 1,... , Lt-1, L) (or an approximation) for all j E G
if d7 + hj < - - c for all j E G then
d ,urr d_ 7 ' + hj for allj E G
return (L, durr,... , d"rr)
end if
(_-_)-dj"" (-e) -durr
*-argminjEG 2 P
hj hE
append (f, p) to list L and increment K by 1
du"r +- d"r + p - $h for all j E G3 p
end loop
Example 3.3.5 (Running Example). To help with understanding Pseudocode 4, we demon-
strate its execution (with e = 0) on a further expanded version of the running example.
* b1 = o, b 2 = .. . = b8 = 1;
" r2 > . .. > r8 > r = 0; r = risc for all j;
* Si= {{1, 2}, {1, 3},{1, 4, 6}, {1, 5}, {1, 7, 8}}:
-k({1, 2}, {1, 2}) = j; #1({1, 3}, {1, 3}) 1;
- 1 ({1, 4, 6}, {1, 4, 6}) = 1; 1({1, 5}, {1, 5}) = 1;
- #({1, 7,8}, {1, 7, 8}) = 1;
" S3 = {{3, 4}}; 3({3, 4}, {3, 4}) = 3
* (ii, i2 , i3, i4) = (1, 3, 1, 1).
Consider time t = 1. At the very start, dj".u has been initialized to dj(1, i, ())= 0 for
all j E [8]. During the first run through the loop, L is (), and G, the set of items which have
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ConstructList(t, ii,..itIL',..,t- 1 ,dcurr, .,dc'r
not reached their add-on thresholds, is {2,...,8}. With an empty protection list, Sel[To
deterministically offers assortment {1, 2} during time 1, resulting in item 2 being sold as
an add-on with probability h2(1, ii, L) = 4. Therefore, h2 > -, and the add-on threshold
4 1 -2
in Step 5 is violated for j =2. In Step 9, f = 2 and p = 2 2 p is computed so3 3.
that had the algorithm offered {1, 2} with probability p (instead of probability 1), then the
expected units of item 2 sold as an add-on would be exactly I, as indicated by the updates
in Step 11.
The algorithm tries again with C = ((2, 4)). Now, h3 = 4, since the probability of
getting to the final sub-iteration is 1 - 2= -, after which item 3 is deterministically sold3 3
as an add-on. The add-on thresholds in Step 5 are upheld and the algorithm updates
durr <- , L' +- L. Note that 2 V G and durr will never again be updated, remaining at
until the end of the selling season.
Now consider time t = 2. It is straight-forward to see that h4 is the only non-zero 11,
with h4 = - I= . The algorithm updates d,"r +- 4 and proceeds to time 3 with '2 =0.
From the analysis in the previous subsection, the state of the inventory (I,... , I8)
at the start of time 3 is (oc, ?, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1) with probability 4, and (oc, ?, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
with probability 4. The expectations (d . dc"')areat(,},0,0,O,0). Now
consider SeITo(3, ii, i 2 , i 3 , L', L2 , L), where L = 0. With probability 2 (when 14 = 0), the
subroutine will offer {1, 5} (since 4 E J), resulting in the deterministic sale of item 5 as
an add-on. With probability 4, the subroutine will offer {1, 4, 6} and sell items 4 and 6 as
add-ons. Therefore, h4 = 6= 4, while h5 = . The add-on threshold in Step 5 is violated
b- _gCurr 1 2
for both j = 4 and j = 6. In Step 9, the expression 2 dj is equal to 2 5= when
exrsin3 6 wehj
1-0
5j = 4 , and - when j =6. Therefore, we choose f 4 and p =.In Step 11,
d2"" + + 1 j , dcur+ and d curr+ 1 Note that choosing an
f that minimizes p is important for respecting the add-on thresholds; had we chosen f = 6
and p = , then durr would be updated to 2 + 5 - 3>6' 5 6 5 2
The algorithm tries again with updated list L = ((4, })) and updated expectations
(d"u, ... , dc"") = (0, jj, 115 1 , 0, 0). The inventory possibilities are still the same,
and the probability that SeilTo gets to the final sub-iteration is 1 - 1 5. Regardless of
whether 14 = 1, it will offer (and successfully sell) item 5 as an add-on, so = , which
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1 1
exceeds I. Therefore, f = 5 and p = T-5 = 13. Note that item 6 violated its add-on
or2=5np 5 25
_6
threshold with an earlier list, but no longer violates its add-on threshold even though d,",
increased with the earlier iteration. This is why adding items to the list one at a time, even
when multiple items violate their add-on thresholds, is important.
The algorithm tries again having appended (5, 1-) to C and updated dr to ! Now255 2'
SeliTo gets to the final sub-iteration with probability (1 - !)(1 -) = -, in which case it
will deterministically sell item 6 as an add-on. Therefore, h6 = i, which when added to
d6" =T is exactly .. The algorithm proceeds to the next time period with L3 +- L even
though durr will be }; item 6 will immediately get added to L if SeIlTo attempts to offer it
as an add-on again.
In t = 4, the expected units of each item sold as an add-on, (dy"',..., dc"r), is
(0, }, } 1 0, 0). Item 6 has inventory remaining with probability ., since dc"" = 1.2 '2'2' 2' 6 2
Note that 6 is in G during the first iteration where L = (). However, the algorithm will
compute 116 = j, p = 0, and try again with L = ((6, 0)). In this case, SeliTo determin-
istically gets to the final sub-iteration and offers {1,7,8}, resulting in h, = h8 = 1. p
wlbe2' resulting in d,,r 1d-~ n
will be , r n i d and the algorithm can break ties arbitrarily
and choose f = 7. With L = ((6, 0), (7, 1)), SeliTo gets to the final sub-iteration with
2
probability 1, causing h8 to be . The algorithm appends (8,0) to L, after which SeilTo
is finally exhausted of add-ons to offer (even though d'"r < (, 13 must be 0, since a cus-
tomer of type 3 arrived), so it simply offers {1} in the final sub-iteration. The final L4 is
((6, 0), (7, !), (8, 0)).
Proposition 3.3.6. Consider an iteration of the loop in Pseudocode 4, with starting
values for 4,K and d", ,d"". Let E1,E2 > 0. Suppose for all j G [n], durr
is within el of the expected units of item j sold as an add-on before the iteration, i.e.
I dj"' - dj(t, i 1 ,..., it, 1,. , ,,-1, L)1 I 1. Furthermore, suppose that for j E G, the hi
computed in Step 4 satisfies Ihj - hj(t, ii, .. . ,it, L 1, .. . , L-1, L)j 5 E2-
Then for j E G, in Step 6 or Step 11, Pseudocode 4 updates dcurr to be within E1 + &2
of the expected units of item j sold as an add-on after the iteration. That is, when the if
statement in Step 5 is entered,
(dj""rr+ hj) - dj (t + 1, i1,..., Iit+,, L', - -1 , L, ()|561 + E2,
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and otherwise,
(dj""rr+ p. - j) _ dj(t, i1, ..., itC .1...,. Ct-1, E + (V, P))| I :! 1+ E2.
All proofs in this section are straight-forward from the construction of the algorithm
and deferred to Section B.3. If we are assuming oracle access to hj, then no error is ever
accumulated in durr, ... I c=rr 2 = 0, in which case Proposition 3.3.6 simply says
that Pseudocode 4 correctly updates the probabilities durr,..., dcurr.
The following propositions also help conclude that Pseudocodes 3-4 accomplishes their
goals:
Proposition 3.3.7. Consider an iteration of the loop in Pseudocode 4. Suppose for all
j c [n], d7"" does not violate its add-on threshold, i.e. dcr - E. Then for these
j G G, the updated value for d7"" is still at most -E.
Proposition 3.3.8. Any item j E [n] can get added to the protection lists at most once.
That is, in Step 9 of Pseudocode 4, f does not appear in Li,..., L-, L. Furthermore, f
is never again offered as an add-on, and du is not increased, after sub-iteration K of
iteration t.
3.3.3 The Combined Algorithm, with Sampling
We now address how to compute the probability hj(t,ii,... it, L',.... , L-, L) in Step 4
of Pseudocode 4. Fix some large integer M whose value is to be determined later. We
simultaneously estimate hj for all j e G using the naive sampling algorithm in Pseudocode 5.
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Algorithm 5 SampleAddon(t, i,...,it,C,..., , M) -÷ {fh :j C G}
1: G +- [n] \ (Kt( 1,..., Ct) U {it}), where Kt is the length of list Lt
2: C3 +- 0 for all j c G
3: repeat
4: run SeIITo(t,ii,...,it, 1,...,Lt), virtually generating the purchase decisions in
Step 17
5: Cj <- C, +1 for all j E G that was sold as an add-on in sub-iteration Kt of iteration
t
6: until M runs have passed
7: return {- : j c G}
Its accuracy can be bounded immediately by Chernoff-Hoeffding (see Lugosi (2009)):
Lemma 3.3.9. Recall that hj(t, ii, ... , it, L', . . C or hj for short, is the probability
that j is sold as an add-on during the final sub-iteration of SelITo(t, i,.. .,it, 1,... I,).
Therefore, for all j E G and any E2 > 0, the estimate 2 provided in Step 7 of Pseudocode 5
satisfies
Pr [---hj|I > E2] < 2e-2M
We are finally ready to put the online, sampling personalized assortment algorithm
together.
Algorithm 6 OnlineSamplingPersonalizedAssortment(e)
1: dj"' <- 0 for all j E [n]
2: for t =1, ... , T do
3: observe customer type it
4: run ConstructList(ti 1 ,...,itl1, ... , ,d"',...,d", ), using Sam pleAddon
with M = }(Tjn)2 ln 2n(T+n) to estimate the functions hl,... h
5: set Lt and update durr..., dcIrI according to the results of the previous step
6: offer an assortment to customer t in reality, using Steps 3 to 17 of
SelTo(t, ii,. . . Iit, L1,.., Lt) with s = t, and update inventories according to her pur-
chase decision
7: end for
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When a new customer arrives, the algorithm first runs itself from the start using the
known arrivals, repeating this process a large number of times to estimate the expectations.
Then the algorithm uses these estimates to offer the best assortment in reality. This iterative
sampling over time periods is similar to what is done in Chapter 7, where an offline algorithm
that makes decisions based on expectations over all sample paths, instead of realizations
on the current sample path, is presented. To our knowledge, we present the first online
algorithm of this type, and the example from Section B.2 demonstrates the necessity of
making decisions based on expectations.
Theorem 3.3.10. Fix some small E > 0 and consider
OnlineSamplingPersonalizedAssortment(e). For all j E [n], let dj denote the total ex-
pected units of item j sold as an add-on, and let dj denote the recorded value of d "., at
the end of the selling season.
Then with probability at least 1 - E, - & d for all j E [n]. Furthermore,
OnlineSamplingPersonalizedAssortment(E) terminates in time polynomial in T, n, and ,
assuming that we can solve the single-period assortment optimization problem in constant
time.
It may be tempting to make the sampling more efficient by storing the states of the M
sample paths as t progresses from 1 to T, so that we do not have to run SeliTo from period
1 every time. However, this would make the state of the sample paths before the final
sub-iteration of SeIlTo(t, i 1 ,...,it, 1,..., L') depend on L', resulting in a biased sample.
3.4 Analysis
In this section we prove Theorem 3.2.9, which bounds the competitive ratio of our algorithm
OnlineSamplingPersonalizedAssortment(e). We reuse the definitions from the statement of
Theorem 3.3.10: dj is our algorithm's value of dc"rr at the end of the selling season, while
dj is the true expected units of item j sold as an add-on. Again, it may aid comprehension
to assume that e = 0 and dj = d3 for all j E [n]; i.e., our algorithm had oracle access to the
sales probabilities instead of having to estimate them.
We provide a general roadmap of the proof:
1. We define each Oj, the dual variable for the inventory constraint on item j, based on
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dj and dj, providing shadow prices for each unit of starting inventory;
2. To ensure feasibility, we also need to have dual variables At which provide shadow
prices for each customer t (Lemma 3.4.3);
3. We bound from above the value of the LP defined in Section 3.2.2 using weak duality
(Lemma 3.4.4);
4. To bound the revenue our algorithm earns from selling add-ons to customer t, we
need to bound the probability of customer t being served and the probabilities of add-
ons not stocking out, which we accomplish given the protection levels in expectation
(Lemma 3.4.7);
5. This allows us to obtain a lower bound on the expected revenue of our algorithm
(Lemma 3.4.8);
6. Finally, using a variant of Markov's inequality (Proposition 3.4.9), we show that the
lower bound from Step 5 is at least - - E of the upper bound from Step 3, and that
the e-error in sampling translates to an c-loss in revenue (Section 3.4.3).
3.4.1 Bounding OPT via Duality
Definition 3.4.1. We define the following notation, for all j E [n]:
" Let aj denote the number of arriving customers of type j. That is, aj = I{t C [T]
it = j}.
* Set dj as follows:
max{d, d. + E} if d > -;
dj otherwise.
Note that if E = 0, then dj = ij = dj.
It simplifies the analysis to assume that a < bj for all j E [n]. This can be justified
by the fact that it is strictly dominant to serve all customers if possible, i.e. offer to each
customer t an assortment containing at least item it as long as it has remaining inventory.
Since customers of type j always buy item j when offered, the bj + 1'st customer requesting
each item would never get served.
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Definition 3.4.2. For each i c [n], introduce a fixed
di~c( a3 + 2dj
Si c argmaxsEs, s _ j 2d
We assume that Si is chosen to not contain any j # i such that aj + 2dj > bj. This
assumption is WOLOG: by removing all such elements from S, we have not removed any
positive terms from the sum, and for the remaining j' E S' (where S' :=S \ {j : j
i, aj + 2dj bj}), pij (S') pij (S) holds by weak substitutability.
With this assumption, dj < - for all j E Si \ {i}. By definition, either dj 3  dj+ Ewhich
would imply d7 < -E, or < E. In both cases, the conclusion is that dj < b E,
.~ 2 or 2!c I 2
since bj is always at least 1. This means that at any point in our algorithm, the value of
never reached the threshold of I - e. As a result, items in Si \ {i} do not appear in3 2
any protection list and are never in the forbidden set, for all i E [nI.
Now we are ready to specify the bound on OPT(il,.. ., iT), which is the optimal objective
value of the LP defined in Section 3.2.2. The dual of this LP can be written as follows,
where {0 : j E [n]} are the variables corresponding to the first n primal constraints, and
{A' : t C [TJ} are the variables corresponding to the next T primal constraints:
n T
min 3bjj + A'
j=1 t=1
n
s.t. >3pitj(S)Oj + At > ri -+ rdiscpiti(S) t C [T], S E Sit
j=1 jii
03 > 0 j E [n]
At > 0 t c [T].
We propose the following values for the dual variables:
rjaj + 2r iscdj.
-i = r b j E [n],
At = ri,(1- ) + r ic(1 - a + 2 )pitj(S ) t C [T].
Golrezaei et al. (2014) were able to define dual variables that are sample-path dependent,
and prove feasibility on every sample path. We need to define our dual variables based on
the dj's, which can be seen as aggregate statistics over all the sample paths, in order to
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prove feasibility. Note that the value of At is fully determined by the type of the customer,
it.
Lemma 3.4.3 (Dual Feasibility). The solution of the dual LP defined in (3.6) is feasible.
Proof. Proof. We know that ai, bi, for all t E [T], by assumption. Also, for j = it,
Pij(Sit) can only be non-zero for j C S , which implies a3 + 2dj bj. Therefore, At > 0.
It is also easy to see that O > 0 for all j C [n].
The remaining constraints can be rearranged as
At > rit - Oit + Zpitj(S)(rjsc - 0 j), (3.7)
where we have used the fact that pii(S) = 1 for all i and S E Si.
Take an arbitrary t e [T] and S E Sit. By our definition of the dual variables, 03
rdisc aj 2di for all j # it, since rj 0 r . Also it is immediate that ! ri - 1 . Therefore,r5 b, 
-i bloti simeit ha
the RHS of (3.7) is at most
rit(1 - )+ r "(1 -
Now, S* was specifically chosen to maximize the second part of the preceding expression
among all S E Sit. Therefore, the preceding expression is no greater than our definition of
At, completing the proof of dual feasibility. 0
Lemma 3.4.4 (Dual Objective Value). The objective value of the dual solution in (3.6) is
at most
discn a3 + 2dj2riai+ E2r 'scdJ.+ E r (1- b+2d
i=1 j==1 i=1 joi
Proof. Proof. Substituting our values of Oj and At into the objective function of the dual
LP, we get
n T n TS bj3 0+ A = E(raj +2r scdj)+ (rit(1- b)+ rC (1- +2d1 t=1 j=1 t=1 bt 3
n n n a)+1 i a d
= rjaj + E 2r Oscd -+ r(1 - )+ r (-
j=1 j=1 i=1 t
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. ....... 1
Noting the fact ai is defined to be the cardinality of the set {t c [T] it = i} and rearranging
the terms, we have
n T n n n
Z bj03 + Z A < E 2riai + E 2rscdj + Z ai E r (1j=1 t=1 i=1 j=1 i=1 jstb Pi S*
which completes the proof. L
Combining Lemmas 3.4.3-3.4.4 and applying weak duality, we have established in this
subsection that the expression from Lemma 3.4.4 is an upper bound on OPT(ii,..., T).
3.4.2 Bounding the Algorithm's Revenue
Definition 3.4.5. For a run of our algorithm, define the following random variables:
" For all t E [T] and j E [n], let I denote the inventory of item j remaining at the end
of time period t. It is understood that 10 = b, its starting inventory, for all items
j E [n].
" For all t C [T], let St E Sit U {0} denote the assortment offered at time t.
" For all t E [T] and j E [n], let P be the indicator random variable for whether
customer t bought item j. P can only potentially be 1 for j E St.
" For all j E [n], let Dj denote the units of item j sold as an add-on by the end of the
selling season. Note that Dj = Etigtj PJ, and E[Dj] = dj.
" For all t E [T], let Vt denote the items in St with inventory available at time t. That
is, Vt = {j E Si : i > 0}.
The following proposition is immediate:
Proposition 3.4.6. For all j E [n], the units of item j sold for its full price by the end of
the selling season is min{bj - Dj,aj }.
Proof. Proof. For any j E [nJ, consider a single sample path with a fixed value for Dj.
The units of item j remaining to sell at full price is bj - Dj. Since our algorithm offers
item j to every customer requesting it as long as inventory is available, the number of these
customers served is min{bj - Dj, a}. LI
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Now we analyze the revenue earned by our algorithm in expectation and compare it to
Lemma 3.4.4. The following lemma is crucial in bounding the revenue earned from selling
add-ons.
Lemma 3.4.7 (Bound on Add-on Revenue). For all t E [T], the revenue earned by our
algorithm from selling add-ons during time t, Pit , is in expectation at least
rispitj(Sit)(Pr[Ij7 > 0] - b3 )
b -- a -
(Recall that for all j e St \ {it}, we have aj + 2dj < bj, which implies bj - aj $ 0.)
Proof. Proof. Fix an arbitrary t E [T]. We have
E[ZriscP] d [riscpiiS)
j~it joit
= E[ r p i (St) tI-1 > 0] Pr[I-1 > 0]. (3.8)
j:Ait
Both equalities use the law of total expectation. The first equality holds because
v' isc rtl = [. 1E [ E r= 3 ESt [E r iscP St], and the inner expectation is equal to
r ptj(St), since for a fixed S', P is an independent binary random variable which
is 1 with probability pi (St). The second equality holds because if It- = 0, then St =0,
and piy (0 ) = 0 for all j.
Now, we claim that on every sample path where It-' > 0, the following holds:
r spitj (S) r pitj (V)
.j7it joit
= Z discp(t)
JCVt ,j~it
> dis
E rj spj, j ( Sit)
.jeVtjAit
The first inequality is true because conditioned on It- > 0, Vt was a feasible choice of
assortment during the maximization step (Step 12) of Pseudocode 3 (add-ons in Vt are
never in the forbidden set, and have inventory available). The second inequality is true
because conditioned on I > 0, Vt is always a subset of S containing it, and by weak
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substitutability, pij(Vt) > pij(S ) for all j C Vt. Thus (3.8) is at least
E[ S r"pitj(Si) It- > 0 Pr[I- > 0]
JEVt,j#it
E rjisc pitj(St ) Pr [I'- > 01It71> 0] Pr[I47 > 0]
jES* ,j$it
rpij(S ) Pr [(It- > 0) n (It 1 > 0)]jES* j~it
it
> E risc Pij(St )(Pr[Il > 0] - Pr[Ij-1 = 0]),
jES* ,j7itit
where in the first equality we have used the definition that Vt is the subset of St with
inventory remaining.
Finally, Ij-' = 0 implies If = 0. By Proposition 3.4.6, this event is equivalent to
Di + min{bj - Dj, aj} = bj, which in turn is equivalent to min{bj - aj, Dj} = bj - aj, or
D3 > b- - aj. By Markov's inequality, this is at most _ , completing the proofj .7 bj - bj - aj
of Lemma 3.4.7. L
Lemma 3.4.8 (Algorithm's Expected Revenue). The expected revenue of our algorithm is
at least
ri - E[minjbi - Di, ai}] + r -s rjsC(E[min{bi - Di, ai}] - - as +- 2d3
= j=1 i=1 jst 2
Proof. Proof. Recall that for every customer t E [T], our algorithm serves her as long as
item it is available. Therefore, the revenue earned on a run of our algorithm is
T
rit. 1(I7 > 0) + Er iscP).it j -t=1 jii
Its expected value is equal to
T T
E[ rit -1(I > 0)] + E ES r Pfl.
t=1 t=1 pjit
The first term is the expected revenue earned from selling items i to customers requesting
it (at the full price of ri), while the second term is the expected revenue earned from selling
items j = it as add-ons (at the discounted price of r isc) summed over all time periods t.
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Applying Proposition 3.4.6, the first term is equal to
n1 n1
Er i - E 1 (l- > 0)] = r -E[min{bi - Di, ai}.
i=1 t:it=i i=1
Applying the definitions that Dj = . P and E[Dj] = dj, the second term is equal
to
T
EE r cP]
.= 7 1 7
n
- jrdsc E Pt
j=1 t:itoj
j=1
(3.10)
We also analyze the second term in a different way. It can be re-arranged as follows:
T t
EE E 0"P]
t=1 j~hit
n
= E EE rjd'cPj.
i=1 t:it=i jii
Fix an arbitrary i and apply Lemma 3.4.7 for all t such that it = i. We obtain
5E rj[5 Pit]
t:it=i J#i
> r dscpij(Si)(Pr[Il-1>0] b- a-
t:it=i jES 3 3
= r pij(SZ)( 5 Pr[Ij- 1 > 0] - a - - a)
jESj~~ t:it=i
-= 5 r sp ij(Si') (E[min{bi - Di,at}J - a b 2dja
jESi,jfi 2 b-a.)
where the final equality follows after the same derivation as (3.9). Now, by definition,
dj < dj. Therefore, we can replace dj with dj and the expression would be no greater.
Furthermore, since 2d, < bj - a. for all j E S \ {j}, b-a 2-a. +j Substituting back into
(3.11), we conclude that
T n d i 2 j + a P j ( i )E [ SriiscP] > E r- sc(E[min{bi - Di, ai}] - - 2db +a)P J(Sf). (3.12)
t=1 joit i=1 jESi,j=i 2
Taking (3.9)+-(3.10)+-(3.12) completes the proof of Lemma 3.4.8.
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(3.9)
(3.11)
3.4.3 Proof of Theorem 3.2.9
In this subsection we aim to prove our main result Theorem 3.2.9, by using Theorem 3.3.10
to bound the expression from Lemma 3.4.4 relative to the expression from Lemma 3.4.8.
Both expressions can be seen as a sum of three terms, and we compare the respective terms
separately. Namely, we compare
Zri-E[min{bi-Di,ai}] to Z2ria,
i=1 i=1
riiscdj to Z2risc
j=1 j=1
1 ry di(E[minfbi - Di, ai}] - a j + 2d)(Si) to a r - a3 + 2d,
i=1 jai i=1 i si
Fix a small e. We will condition on our sampling algorithm not failing, i.e. dE - <
d3 K : for all j E [n], which occurs with probability at least 1 - E. We will scale our total
revenue by (1 - e) at the end, and treat a failed run as a run with 0 revenue.
To bound the value min{bj - Dy, aj}, we use the following modification of Markov's
inequality:
Proposition 3.4.9. For some b > 0, let X be a random variable distributed over [0, b] with
E[X] > . Then for any a such that 0 < a K b, E[min{X, a}] 1.
Proof. Proof. Consider the random variable X - min{X, a}. When X > a, its value is at
most b - a, since X K b. When X < a, its value is 0. Therefore, E[X - min{X, a}]
(b - a) Pr[X > a], which in conjunction with E[X] > implies
b
E[min{X, a}] -- (b - a) Pr[X > a]. (3.13)2
If Pr[X > a] K , then (3.13) implies E[min{X, a}] > b - , =, as desired.2 - 2
Otherwise, if Pr[X > a] > 1, we can immediately conclude from the non-negativity of
X and a that E[min{X, a}] a - Pr[X > a], which combined with Pr[X > a] > 1 yields the
desired result.
Now, to compare the first terms, consider any i E [n]. E[Di] = di -b, which implies
E[bi - Di] bi. Therefore, we can apply Proposition 3.4.9 with X = bi - Di to obtain
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E[min{bi - Di, ai}] > i for all i E [n]. This establishes that
ri - E[min{bi - Di, ag}] 4 2ria.
i=1 i=1
(3.14)
To compare the second terms, consider any j E [n]. If dj : dj, then dj = dj + e and
dZ d- - E I 2Edj -e. Also, d3  dj - E. Therefore, for these j, 2 > _
2d 4d;+4c 4 4dj+4&
1 2e11 2 2E = - - E. This establishes that
4 4(1/2 - E) + 4E 4
r SCdj 2 ) 2 C
j=1 j=1
(3.15)
Finally, to compare the third terms, we can again apply Proposition 3.4.9 for all i E [n]
to obtain
r n C(+E[min{bi-Di, a a + 2d, )Pij (Si1) > n r a + 2d
i=1 34i i=1 js 3
(3.16)
Adding (3.14), (3.15), and (3.16), we conclude that with probability at least 1 - E,
our algorithm earns revenue at least - - E of the dual objective. Therefore, us-
ing OnlineSamplingPersonalizedAssortment(e), for any instance and sequence of arrivals,
ALG(ii,. .. ,iT) > (1 - e)(! - E) - OPT(ii,. . .,iT), completing the proof of Theorem 3.2.9.
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Chapter 4
On Policies for Single-leg Revenue
Management with Limited
Demand Information
In this chapter we study the single-leg revenue management problem, with no informa-
tion given about the demand trajectory over time. The competitive ratio for this problem
has been established by Ball and Queyranne (2009) under the assumption of independent
demand. We extend their results to general non-independent demand, by incorporating
the price-skimming technique from Eren and Maglaras (2010). That is, we derive price-
skimming policies which stochastically-increase their price distributions as inventory de-
creases, in a way that yields the best-possible competitive ratio. Furthermore, our policies
have the benefit that they can be easily adapted to exploit available demand information,
such as the personal characteristics of an incoming online customer, while maintaining the
competitive ratio guarantee. A key technical ingredient in our chapter is a new "valuation
tracking" subroutine, which tracks the possible values for the optimum, and follows the
most inventory-conservative control which maintains the desired competitive ratio.
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we consider the single-leg revenue management problem, where a firm is
selling multiple products that share a single capacity over a finite time horizon. The price
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of each product and the unreplenishable starting capacity are exogenously determined. The
firm's objective is to maximize its total revenue earned, by dynamically controlling the
availability of different products over time. There is a tradeoff between controls which max-
imize immediate revenue, and controls which reserve sufficient capacity for the remaining
time horizon.
The motivating application for this problem lies in airlines, where each flight leg has a
limited seat capacity, and the products correspond to different "fare classes" (e.g. economy,
business) which offer seats at different prices. The seat capacity and fare classes have
been determined long in advance, through factors such as business strategy, positioning,
competition, etc. The time horizon is finite, ending upon the flight's departure.
We study this problem in the setting where very limited information is given or can be
learned about demand. This setting was introduced by Ball and Queyranne (2009); Lan
et al. (2008), where meaningful controls can be derived based on only the knowledge of the
fare class prices. Ball and Queyranne (2009) consider booking limit policies, which can be
described as follows. Initially, all of the fare classes are made available to customers. Once
a critical threshold on the total seat sales is reached, the lowest fare becomes unavailable;
progressively higher fares are made unavailable until the flight either becomes full or takes
off.
An important assumption made in the model of Ball and Queyranne (2009) is that
demand for the different fare classes is independent. That is, although the lower fares are
made available until their booking thresholds are reached, there is no risk of cannibalizing
the sales of higher fares. The justification for this assumption in the literature is two-
fold. First, the fare classes have been designed to segment customers and achieve price
discrimination, i.e. the perks provided by business class dissuade price-insensitive business
travelers from having interest in lower-class fares. Second, these business travelers tend
to book last-minute, i.e. by the time they book the lower-class fares have usually become
unavailable anyway.
However, the advent of e-commerce has brought both an increase in customer sophis-
tication, and an increased opportunity for more sophisticated booking controls. The goal
of this chapter is to derive such controls, which perform well without the assumption of
independent demand.
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4.1.1 Model and Results
Throughout this chapter, we analyze the extreme case where customers always substitute
to the lowest available fare, delaying the extension to general rational choice models to the
Conclusion. We can thus describe each customer using a valuation, or maximum willingness-
to-pay. The control reduces to dynamic pricing, where at each point in time a single price
is offered, and customers who encounter that price make a purchase if and only if it does
not exceed their valuation. (Offering multiple prices is redundant, because the lower price
would always be chosen over the higher price.)
We let P denote the set of fare class prices, which are the feasible prices to charge. The
starting capacity comes in the form of k discrete units of inventory. The selling horizon
consists of T discrete time steps, which are sufficiently granular such that at most one
customer arrives during each time step. We let V denote the maximum price in P that the
customer in time t is willing to pay, which is 0 if no customer arrived. An online algorithm
must sequentially choose a price Pt for each time t, and if Vt > Pt, then revenue Pt is earned
and one unit of inventory is depleted.
In settings where no information is given about the sequence of valuations, an online al-
gorithm is evaluated by comparing its total revenue earned on different sequences to that of
a clairvoyant optimum. For any sequence V1,... , VT, the offline optimum OPT(V1 , . . ., VT)
is defined as the maximum revenue that could have been earned from knowing all the valua-
tions in advance, equal to the k largest values in V1 , . . . , VT. For c < 1, if an online algorithm
can guarantee that its revenue is at least c -OPT(V1, . . . , VT) on every sequence V1, .. . , VT,
then it is said to be c-competitive. If c is best-possible in that any (potentially randomized)
online algorithm cannot simultaneously guarantee greater than c -OPT(V1,..., VT) revenue
on all sequences V1 ,. . . , VT, then c is called the competitive ratio.
In the model of Ball and Queyranne (2009), the competitive ratio for any problem
instance is shown to be a function of only the price set P, which we will denote using
CR(P). Their model corresponds to ours when each Vt is deterministic and given at the
start of time t. The decision at time t then reduces to an accept-reject decision, where
accepting customer t corresponds to charging her maximum willingness-to-pay of Vt, and
rejecting customer t corresponds to charging any price above Vt (possibly oc if the inventory
has run out). Ball and Queyranne (2009) derive CR(P)-competitive booking limit policies
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which specify when to reject customers paying low prices.
In this chapter, we derive CR(P)-competitive online algorithms under the following
models with progressively less information:
1. V is deterministic and given at the end of time t (Section 4.2);
2. V is stochastic and its distribution is given at the end of time t (in this case, we
define the offline benchmark as the Hindsight Optimum E[OPT(V1 , ... , Vr)J, instead
of based on the Deterministic Linear Program-see Section 4.3);
3. No information on V is ever given (Section 4.4).
All of these algorithms are best-possible, in that if an online algorithm cannot be better than
CR(P)-competitive under the model of Ball and Queyranne (2009), then an online algorithm
also cannot be better than CR(P)-competitive under our models with less information.
Our algorithms use the price-skimming technique of Eren and Maglaras (2010), who
analyze how the price of an item should be distributed (e.g. across stores, across time) when
the price set P is known but the demand is completely unknown. Their model corresponds
to ours when the inventory constraint is irrelevant (e.g. when k > T), in which case they
show that the competitive ratio is also CR(P). Our work shows how the price-skimming
distribution should depend on inventory when it is relevant: at any time step, the price
distribution which maximizes the competitive ratio is strictly stochastically-decreasing in
the amount of remaining inventory (see Section 4.2.4). In fact, this is analogous to a classical
structural property when the demand sequence is known or distributionally-known: at any
time step, the price which maximizes the expected revenue is strictly decreasing in the
amount of remaining inventory (Gallego and Van Ryzin, 1994; Zhao and Zheng, 2000).
Finally, in Section 4.5, we discuss the model where each valuation V is stochastic and
distributionally-given at the start of time t. This is the personalized online revenue man-
agement setup introduced by Golrezaei et al. (2014), with a very practical motivation of
e-commerce, where personalized recommendations (e.g. business-class flight) can be made
to each customer based on her characteristics (e.g. Mac user). Our algorithms in Sec-
tions 4.2-4.3 are designed for e-tailers who choose not to engage in personalized pricing,
and we instead use the estimated distributions of V to refine the pricing strategy for future
customers. Nevertheless, our algorithms can be naturally adapted into the personalized
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pricing setting, and in Section 4.5 we show how to exploit personalization without losing
the worst-case performance ratio of CR(P).
4.1.2 Sketch of Techniques, and Comparison with Existing Techniques
The main technical contribution behind our results is a new "valuation tracking" procedure
which incorporates both booking limits and price-skimming. We motivate it using the
following example, under the model where each valuation V is deterministic and revealed
at the end of time t. The price set is P = {1, 2, 4}, and we will refer to customers with these
valuations as being of type-L (Low), type-M (Medium), and type-H (High), respectively.
The competitive ratio for this price set derived by Ball and Queyranne (2009) and Eren
and Maglaras (2010) is CR(P) = 1/2, and we describe below their respective 1/2-competitive
policies.
" Booking Limits (Ball and Queyranne, 2009): Initially charge $1; increase the price to
$2 after 1/2 of the starting inventory has been sold; further increase the price to $4
after 3/4 of the starting inventory has been sold. (This is the variant of booking limits
with "theft nesting".)
" Price-skimming (Eren and Maglaras, 2010): Charge $1 for 1/2 of the time steps;
charge $2 for 1/4 of the time steps; charge $4 for 1/4 of the time steps.
We now discuss what happens if we try to implement these policies under our model.
Attempt 1: Direct implementation of booking limits. It is easy to see that this
would not be 1/2-competitive--suppose just one type-H customer arrived at the start. The
algorithm would be charging the low price of $1, while the offline optimum would be the
customer's valuation of $4.
Any direct implementation of price-skimming would suffer similarly, since there could
be a single type-H customer who arrives during a time when the price is set to $1.
Attempt 2: Price-skimming as a randomized price. It appears that the problem
with Attempt 1 can be solved using the "random price" interpretation of price-skimming-
instead of deterministically partitioning the time horizon according to ratios }1, , { and
offering prices 1,2,4 respectively, one could at each time step choose the prices randomly
with respective probabilities -, }, -. Then, if a single type-H customer arrives, the expected
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revenue would be
1 1 1
- - I1+ - - 2 + - .4 = 2
2 4 4
which is 1/2 of the customer's valuation of $4. It can be checked that 1/2 of the customer's
valuation is also earned when it is $1 or $2; this is by construction of the price-skimming
distribution.
However, having a fixed price-skimming distribution is no longer effective under inven-
tory constraints. Indeed, if a long sequence of type-L customers arrive, then this would
deplete the inventory with high probability, and type-H customers who arrive last-minute
would not be served, and the ratio of optimum earned would again be 1/4.
Attempt 3: Naive incorporation of booking limits into price-skimming. It
appears that the problem with Attempt 2 can be solved by respecting the booking limits,
i.e. forbidding price-skimming from randomly choosing the price of $1 after 1/2 of the
starting inventory has been sold. However, this still fails to be 1/2-competitive, as shown
by the following example. Suppose the starting inventory is 4, and that 2 type-H customers
arrive followed by a type-L customer, with no customers arriving after that. The optimum
would be $9. However, the algorithm's revenue would only equal $4: it would earn $2 in
expectation from each of the type-H customers, depleting 2 units of inventory, and then
earn $0 from the type-L customer due to the booking limit.
Our procedure: Valuation tracking. The problem with Attempt 3 leads to the
following observation-the optimum is guaranteed to increase from the first 4 customers
(since there are 4 units of inventory), so in order to be 1/2-competitive, the algorithm must
maintain the initial price-skimming distribution for the first 4 customers. After that, the
algorithm can respect booking limits as long as customers rejected in this way would not
increase the optimum, and in fact should do so, to avoid the problem in Attempt 2 of
stocking out. This motivates our procedure below.
* Valuation Tracking: At each time t, let it denote the smallest value (possibly 0) in the
4 largest valuations to have arrived before time t (since 4 is the starting inventory).
Then, randomly choose the price in a way such that the algorithm's expected revenue
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during time t is equal to
(V - ft) for any Vt > f. (4.1)2
Vt - ft is the gain in the offline optimum should the valuation of customer t be Vt, and
1/2 is the desired competitive ratio. The constraint that the algorithm's revenue is exactly
equal to (4.1) effectively forces it to use the most inventory-conservative controls which
maintains 1/2-competitiveness, thereby hedging against a stockout. The price distribution
used at each time t depends on the inventory state, and in fact, the calculation for the
algorithm's expected revenue must account for the probability of stocking out before time
t. The surprising fact is that it is possible to choose price distributions which collectively
guarantee (4.1).
We illustrate our basic valuation tracking procedure in Section 4.2.1 by "stacking" the
past valuations in a geometric configuration, and formalize it in Section 4.2.2. The basic
procedure is designed to have a clean analysis and we consider variants in Sections 4.2.3-
4.2.4, as well as generalize it to the stochastic-valuation model in Section 4.3.2. A unique
challenge arises in Section 4.3.3, where we use sampling to convert a CR(P)-competitive
valuation tracking procedure with exponential runtime into a (CR(P) - E)-competitive pro-
cedure with polynomial runtime.
4.1.3 Related Work
Single-leg revenue management is a cornerstone problem in the area of revenue management
and pricing, as outlined in the book by Talluri and Van Ryzin (2006). Many different ap-
proaches for modeling demand have been considered over the years, as surveyed in Araman
and Caldentey (2011). Our work falls under the stream of literature which analyzes the
competitive ratio, and extends the booking limits of Ball and Queyranne (2009) to general
non-independent demand by incorporating the price-skimming of Eren and Maglaras (2010).
We should point out that our "random price" interpretation of price-skimming originated
from Bergemann and Schlag (2008). Randomization is a powerful technique for improving
the competitive ratio of online algorithms; for further background we refer to the book by
Borodin and El-Yaniv (2005).
Motivated by e-commerce, the competitive ratio has been studied in many "personalized
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recommendation" settings (see Golrezaei et al. (2014), as well as Chapters 2 and 3). In
this other work, there are multiple commodities ("legs") and interchangeability in which
commodities are sold to each customer. Our work differs from this other work in two ways.
First, we do not rely on personalized controls, and instead derive a global price-skimming
distribution, which is useful for online retailers who choose not to engage in personalized
pricing. Also, even when personalization is desired, we derive in Section 4.5 how to exploit
personalized information in the single-leg case, and our competitive ratio guarantee CR(P)
is greater than the one from Chapter 2 for multiple legs.
Finally, while we analyze the problem of inventory-constrained dynamic pricing through-
out this chapter, our results easily generalize to the dynamic assortment setting, as explained
in the Conclusion of this chapter. We view our techniques as a general way to trade off
between revenue earning and inventory consumption (see Maglaras and Meissner (2006))
when there is a single leg, known fare classes, but general unknown demand.
4.2 Deterministic Valuations
In this section we consider the problem defined in Section 4.1.1 under the model where each
customer's valuation is deterministic and revealed immediately after she leaves.
First we define some additional notation to that defined in Section 4.1.1. For any positive
integer n, let [n] denote the set {1, ... , n}. For notational convenience, we will assume that
P consists of m discrete prices, i.e. P = {r() : j E [m]}, sorted 0 < r(1) < ... < r(m). All of
our results can be generalized to the case where P is a continuum of prices taking the form
Irmin, rmI, as we discuss in Section C.4. We define r(0) to be 0, and then the valuation
V at any time t lies in r(), ... , r(m), with V = r(0) representing the lack of a customer
during time t. Similarly, we define r(m+1) to be oc, and then the price Pt at any time t lies
in r( 1... , r(m+1), with Pt = r(o) representing the firm shutting off demand during time t,
which is the only option if its inventory is out of stock. Let Xt be the indicator variable for
making a sale during time t, i.e. it is 1 if Vt > Pt, and 0 otherwise.
Let T denote the number of time steps. None of the algorithms in this chapter assume
any knowledge of T; note that T can always be made arbitrarily large by inserting customers
with valuation 0. We will hereafter treat T as the unknown total number of customers, and
use the phrase "customer t" to refer to valuation V (even if it is 0).
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An online algorithm must choose each Pt based on the history of past prices and valu-
ations, P1, V,... , Pt_1, Vt-1. This history also determines the values of X 1, . . . , Xt_1. The
online algorithm does not know T, and has no information about Vt, Vt+1, - -. , VT, when
choosing Pt. In contrast, the offline optimum knows the entire sequence 1,... , VT be-
fore having to choose any prices. Given any valuation sequence V1, ... , Vcr, we use the
Pt and Xt variables to refer to the execution of an online algorithm on the valuation se-
quence. Since the online algorithm may be randomized, we treat Pt and Xt as random
variables. Let ALG(V,..., VT) denote the total revenue earned by the online algorithm,
equal to =1 PtXt. Then E[ALG(V,..., VT)] is its expected revenue. Meanwhile, let
OPT(V, . .. , VT) denote the offline optimum for sequence V1, ... , VT, equal to the min{k, T}
largest valuations from V1, . . . , VT. Formally, an online algorithm is said to be c-competitive
if
E[ALG(V,... ,VT)] c. OPT(V1,... ,VT), V T> 1,(V1,... ,VT) E (PU {0})T (4.2)
We will omit the arguments (V, ... , VT) in ALG and OPT when the context is clear.
As explained in Section 4.1.1, since our problem captures the problems of both Ball and
Queyranne (2009) and Eren and Maglaras (2010), an upper bound for the value of c in (4.2)
is given by CR(P), as defined below.
Definition 4.2.1. For any m > 1, 0 < r(i) < ... < r(m), and P = {rW, . . , r(")}, define:
" qi) =1 - Q for all j C [m] (recall that r(0) = 0);
" q = EmIgq
" CR(P) = .q
The interpretation of q() in Ball and Queyranne (2009) is the fraction of initial inven-
tory "set aside" for prices j and higher. The interpretation of qi) in Eren and Maglaras
(2010) is the fraction of time that price j should be charged. Both of the papers establish
that the competitive ratio cannot be better than CR(P) via Yao's minimax principle (Yao,
1977). Therefore, for any fixed (but possibly randomized) online algorithm in our problem,
there exists a sequence V,..., VT such E[ALG(V,..., VT)] <; CR(P) - OPT(Vi, ... , VT). In
this chapter we derive various CR(P)-competitive algorithms, using our valuation tracking
procedure as the core subroutine.
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4.2.1 Intuition behind Valuation Tracking Procedure
The goal of our basic procedure is to, for each customer, earn a constant fraction CR(P) of
the gain in OPT from that customer arriving, which would imply being CR(P)-competitive.
To accomplish this, it tracks the current value of OPT, i.e. the sum of the k largest valuations
to have arrived thus far, which are assumed to be known.
Consider an example where the feasible price set is P = {1, 2, 4}, in which case CR(P) =
. Suppose the starting inventory is k = 5, and that 5 customers, with valuations 4, 1, 4, 1, 2,
have already arrived. The current value of OPT is then the sum of these 5 valuations,
4 1+ + 4+ 1+ 2 = 12.
The procedure considers the possibilities for the increase in OPT from the next customer,
which we denote as AOPT. Since the smallest valuation currently counted toward OPT is
1, if the valuation of the next customer if 4, then AOPT = 3; if it is 2, then AOPT = 1. If
the next customer has valuation not exceeding 1, then AOPT = 0. The procedure wants
to guarantee that its expected revenue on the next customer is at least ! - AOPT, for all of
these possible valuations. To accomplish this, it has to consider the probability that it has
stocked out at this point; on those sample paths its revenue is 0.
Our procedure cleanly accounts for the probability of stocking out using the following
approach. Each customer is assigned to a specific unit of inventory i E [k] upon arrival.
Each inventory unit i maintains a variable level[i], which is the maximum valuation of a
customer previously assigned to it. The next customer is always assigned to an unit i* with
the smallest value of level[i*], regardless of whether that unit i* has already been sold. In
this way, the assignment procedure is deterministic, and allows us to maintain an invariant:
the probability a unit i has been sold is dependent on only the (deterministic) value of
level[i.
For each customer, the procedure makes an offer to her only if unit i* has not been sold,
at a random price exceeding level[i*]. The higher level[i*] is, the more likely it is that
unit i* has been sold, and the lower the expected revenue from that customer. However, if
level[i*] is high, then the potential increase in OPT from that customer is also lower; if the
valuation of the customer does not exceed level[i*], then both the procedure's revenue and
AOPT are 0. By properly choosing the distributions for the random prices, our procedure
is able to maintain the invariant on the probability of each unit being sold, while earning
120
level[i] level[i
4 4
Revealed
Valuation
2 2
k1
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
inventory unit i inventory unit i
Figure 4-1: The configuration of valuations, before and after a customer with valuation 2
arrives.
- AOPT in expectation from each customer.
Returning to the example, given that the first 5 customers had valuations 4, 1,4,1,2,
the values of level[i] for i = 1, . . , k are shown in the LHS of Fig. 4-1. The next customer,
" customer #6", is assigned to inventory unit 2. After her valuation is revealed to be 2,
the updated configuration is shown on the RHS of Fig. 4-1, regardless of whether she was
rejected.
Customer #6 would have been rejected if unit 2 was sold before her arrival, even if other
units were available. When P = {1, 2, 4}, the probability that a unit i has been sold equals
0, -, !, 1 if level[i] is 0, 1, 2, 4, respectively. These probabilities correspond to the values of2' 4'
qU) from Definition 4.2.1. Since level[2] was 1 before customer #6 arrived, she is made
an offer with probability i, at a random price exceeding 1. The price is 2 with probability
proportional to ., and 4 with probability proportional to - (again using the values of qU)),
hence each price would be offered with probability -. The customer's valuation is 2, so she
will only buy the item if offered price 2, which occurs with total probability 1 - 1 Note
that:
1. Customer #6 increases the probability of unit 2 being sold from 1 to ', which is2 4'
consistent with her increasing level[2] from 1 to 2;
2. Customer #6 increases the value of OPT, equal to Y k level[i], by 1 (from 12 to
13);
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Algorithm 7 Weakly Randomized Online Algorithm
1: level[i] = 0, sold[i] = false for i = k
2: t = 1
3: while customer t arrives do
4: f = mini{level[i']}
5: i = min{i' : level[i' = f}
6: if sold[i] = f alse then
7: offer price r(U) with probability m oU , for all j = t + 1,.. . , m
8: else
9: reject the customer by choosing price oo
10: end if
11: observe valuation V and purchase decision Xt
12: if V = r(i) for somej =f + 1, ... ,mthen
13: leveli] = j
14: if Xt = 1 then sold[i] = true
15: end if
16: end ift = t + 1
17: end while
Input: Customers t = 1, 2,... arriving online, with each valuation V revealed after the
price Pt is chosen.
Output: For each customer t, a (possibly random) price Pt for her.
3. Customer #6 brings in expected revenue j2 =
Therefore, during time step 6, our procedure has earned expected revenue AOPT. We will
show that it achieves this for a general P, and all time steps t, regardless of the valuation
of customer t.
4.2.2 Valuation Tracking Procedure and Analysis
We now formalize our valuation tracking procedure, in Algorithm 7.
In line 7, the procedure offers exactly one of the prices r(it,+), . . . , r(m), with the offering
probabilities summing to unity. Note that it cannot branch to line 7 if et = m. This can be
seen in the following way. If it = m, then i* must have been assigned to some past customer
t' with Vt, = r(m). At time t', either inventory unit i* was already sold, or customer t' was
offered a price at most r(m), which she would have accepted. In either case, sold[i'] must
be true.
The analysis of Algorithm 7 is conceptually simple. Let bi,t be the index in 0,..., m
such that level[i] = rbit) at the end of time t, and jt be the index such that V = r(it).
We show that the following claims are maintained:
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1. At the end of each time step t, the probability that any inventory unit i has been sold
is (Etij q(J))/q;
2. During a time step t, if the valuation of the customer exceeds the level of the inventory
unit she is assigned to, i.e. jt > et, then:
(a) The expected revenue earned by Algorithm 7 is -(rit) - r(t));q
(b) The increase in the offline optimum is rit) - r('t).
If jt ; t during a time step t, then both the revenue of Algorithm 7 and the gain in OPT
are 0.
These claims establish the following theorem, whose full proof is deferred to Section C. 1.
Theorem 4.2.2. Algorithm 7 is CR(P)-competitive.
4.2.3 Modified Algorithm based on Valuation Tracking Procedure
In this section we present a modified version of Algorithm 7 which is useful for the subsequent
developments under the stochastic-valuation model in Section 4.3.
First we show how to modify Algorithm 7 so that its decision at each time t de-
pends on only the remaining inventory, instead of the entire history of purchase decisions
X 1,..., Xt_1.
Definition 4.2.3. For all t = 0,..., T, let It denote the random variable for the amount
of remaining inventory at the end of time t, which is equal to k - E,= Xt,.
Our modified algorithm makes an offer to customer t according to the probability that
unit i* hasn't been sold, conditioned on the realized value of It_,. In this way, its decisions
depend on only the inventory state, instead of the exact decisions of past customers.
Definition 4.2.4 (Algorithm 7'). Define the following algorithm for choosing the price
at each time t, based on the past valuations V1,..., Vt_1 and the amount of remaining
inventory It_1.
1. Consider the indices i* and ft during iteration t of Algorithm 7, which are deterministic
based on V1,..., V_ 1 .
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2. Compute the probability that sold[i*l = true on a run of Algorithm 7, conditioned
on It_1 units of inventory remaining after time t - 1 in that run. Let 7t denote this
probability.
3. With probability -yt, make an offer to customer t with the same price distribution as
Algorithm 7 (line 7); with probability 1 - -yt, reject customer t.
Algorithm 7' chooses the distribution for Pt by "averaging" over all runs of Algorithm 7
which have the same value of It_,. We first remark that this can be done in polynomial
time, despite there being exponentially many sample paths for Algorithm 7. We prove the
following in Section C.2.
Lemma 4.2.5. The value of -yt in Step 2 of Algorithm 7' can be computed in polynomial
time.
We now introduce some notation to disambiguate between random variables depicting
the runs of different algorithms.
Definition 4.2.6. For an algorithm A, let PA, XtA, and ItA be the random variables for
the price at time t, purchase decision at time t, and inventory remaining at the end of time
t, respectively. Let ALGA be the random variable for the total revenue earned by algorithm
A. We will omit the superscripts A when the context is clear.
Let A = Al refer to Algorithm 7 and A = Al' refer to Algorithm 7'.
We show that Algorithms 7 and 7' are virtually the same in that they have identical
distributions for the remaining inventory at each time step, as well as the random price at
each time step conditioned on any value of remaining inventory. This also establishes that
Algorithm 7' is feasible, in that it does not try to make a sale with zero remaining inventory.
Lemma 4.2.7. For all t E [T], k' E {O,... , k} such that Pr[I'\ = k'] > 0, and j c
{1,... ,m, M +1}, Pr(P 1' _ I = k'] = Pr[PAl - r(j) A = k'.
Also, for all t = 0,... , T and k' E {o, ... , k}, Pr[IAl' = k'] = Pr[IAl k1'.
Lemma 4.2.7, proven in Section C.2, is a consequence of the design of Algorithm 7'.
For all t, the random price ptAl' is identically distributed as PtA , conditional on any value
for the amount of remaining inventory at the end of time t - 1. Hence if ItA_ and I'1
are identically distributed, then so are ItAl' and ItAl. This allows us to inductively establish
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that the two algorithms have the same aggregate behavior after combining all sample paths,
even though their behavior may differ given a specific history of purchase decisions. This
also makes it easy to see that the expected revenues of the two algorithms are the same.
Lemma 4.2.7 directly implies the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2.8. Algorithm 7' is CR(P)-competitive.
4.2.4 Further Modified Algorithm and Structural Properties
In this section we present a further-modified version of Algorithm 7' which satisfies two
structural properties: (i) it never rejects a customer if it has remaining inventory, offering
the maximum price instead; (ii) the distribution of prices offered to a customer is strictly
stochastically-decreasing in the amount of remaining inventory. Property (ii) is consistent
with the classical structural result from Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994, Thm. 1) and its
generalization to non-homogeneous demand in Zhao and Zheng (2000, Thm. 3): at any
time step, if the firm has more inventory, then it is strictly more willing to sell at lower
prices.
Definition 4.2.9 (Algorithm 7"). Define the following modification to Algorithm 7': in
Step 3, offer price the maximum price r(m) to customer t, instead of rejecting her, with
probability 1 - 'yt.
We prove the following general lemma, which is intuitively easy to see, in Section C.2.
Lemma 4.2.10. Let A be any pricing algorithm. Let A' be the modified algorithm which:
whenever A would reject a customer while there is remaining inventory, A' offers price r(m)
instead. Then on any valuation sequence 1,..., VT, E[ALGA'] ;> E[ALGA].
Lemma 4.2.10 shows that Algorithm 7" is CR(P)-competitive. Now, we would like to
further show that the probability of Algorithm 7' rejecting, or correspondingly the proba-
bility of Algorithm 7" offering the maximum price, is smaller when conditioned on larger
values of remaining inventory.
Theorem 4.2.11. Suppose that the unconditional probability of Algorithm 7' rejecting cus-
tomer t, Pr[sold[i*] = true], lies in (0,1). Then for any k1 < k 2 with Pr[It_1 = ki] > 0
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and Pr[It_1 = k2J > 0,
Pr[sold[i*] = truelt-i = ki] > Pr[sold[i*] = true It-1 = k2].
That is, Algorithm 7" chooses strictly stochastically-lower prices when it has more inventory.
This structural property is intuitive, and we defer its proof to Section C.2.
4.3 Stochastic Valuations
The model with stochastic valuations differs from the model with deterministic valuations
studied in the previous section in the following ways. The valuation of each arriving cus-
tomer is now randomly drawn from some probability distribution. The valuations of different
customers are independent, but not necessarily identically distributed. An online algorithm
is given the valuation distribution for each customer after the price for that customer has
been chosen.
Definition 4.3.1. We use the following notation, defined for all t:
" V: the valuation of customer t, a random variable taking values in
{r(o),r(M,. . . ,r(m) 1
* Vt: the probability vector (V(0 o(1),...,V(")) for the distribution of V, with vU =
Pr[Vt = r(] and E __ = 1;
" Vt: (Vi, . .. , Vt), the vector of realized valuations up to time t;
* PA: (P,. . .. , PA), the vector of prices up to time t chosen by algorithm A.
We now provide a justification for our choice of offline optimum in our definition of
competitiveness and competitive ratio, where in (4.2) we have replaced OPT(Vi,.... , VT)
with its expected value (and the values of V are realized independently).
4.3.1 Discussion of the Offline Optimum with Stochastic Valuations
The weakest (least clairvoyant) offline benchmark one could compare against with stochas-
tic valuations is the following. Consider an offline algorithm which is given the sequence
of valuation distributions, vi, ... ,VT, in advance. Given this sequence, it can solve for
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the policy which maximizes expected revenue, using dynamic programming. Clearly, the
expected revenue of such a policy is an upper bound on the expected revenue obtainable by
an online algorithm.
However, such a benchmark is difficult to compare against, because the optimal policy
knowing vI, ... , VT, while computable in polynomial time, may not admit any structure.
Therefore, we relax the offline optimum by allowing the offline algorithm to know the
realizations of all the valuations VI,..., VT in advance. The optimal algorithm knowing
such information then has a trivial structure (sell to the k largest valuations).
In line with the definition from Section 4.2, let OPT(VI, ... , VT) denote the sum of the k
largest valuations in V1, ... , VT. We define the competitive ratio with stochastic valuations
to be
inf E[ALG(vi,. . . , v) V (4.3)
Vi,...,VT Ev1 ~, 1 ,. .,VT~VT[OPT(V1,..., VT)
In (4.3), an adversary chooses vi,... ,VT, which determines the expected revenue of the
online algorithm; the offline optimum is defined to be the expected value of OPT(Vi,... , VT)
where V1 , . .. , VT are realized according to vi, ... ., VT. We should note that such an expected
value cannot be computed in polynomial time; it is related to computing the expected
project duration in a PERT network with independent task durations, which is #P-hard
(Hagstrom, 1988).
Finally, we should point out that a different relaxation in the offline optimum is possible,
originating from Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994); see also Talluri and Van Ryzin (2006).
Given the valuation distributions, Vi,..., VT, one can write the following Deterministic
Linear Program (DLP):
m T
max E r() 1 4( Pr[V > r(i)] (4.4)
j=1 t=1
m T
Z Zx Pr[V r() < kj=1 t=1
x <1 t6 E[T]
j=1
x > 0 j c [m],t E [T]
Let OPTLP(V1, . , VT) denote the optimal objective value of the LP (4.4) where the value
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of each Pr[Vt ;> r(j)] is computed based on vt. It can be shown that OPTLP(v1,.-. , VT) is an
upper bound on the expected revenue of the optimal dynamic programming policy knowing
v, ... , vT, since xU) encapsulates the unconditional probability of the policy offering price
j to customer t.
Nonetheless, in this chapter we don't compare against OPTLP(V1,. . . ,VT), which ap-
pears to be too strong of an offline benchmark. We show that the competitive ratio of
CR(P), which was optimal in our deterministic setting, can still be achieved with stochastic
valuations under definition (4.3). In other words, allowing the offline optimum to know
the realizations of V1,..., VT does not decrease the competitive ratio. On the other hand,
allowing the offline optimum to use the fractionality of the DLP (4.4) does decrease the
competitive ratio; we provide some examples in Section C.5.
4.3.2 Optimally-Competitive Algorithm with Exponential Runtime
Having established our offline benchmark, we now derive CR(P)-competitive algorithms in
the stochastic-valuation model. We do so by using our valuation tracking procedure as a
subroutine, in a similar way to the development in Section 4.2.3, which may be helpful to
reference.
Conceptually, our algorithm is a generalization of Algorithm 7' to stochastic valuations.
However, since the assignment procedure in Algorithm 7 is no longer deterministic, we
describe the algorithm in a different way. At a time step t, given vi,... , vt_1 and k':
1: Consider a run of Algorithm 7 to the end of time t, where V1,..., V_1 are randomly
drawn according to vi, . . . , vt-1. For all j E {1,. .. , mm + 1}, compute Pr{PIl =
r )-l = k'], where the probability is over both the random valuations and the
random prices chosen by the algorithm. (If Pr[IA\ = k'] has measure 0, then choose
price r(m+1).)
2. For each j E {1,.. . Im, m+1}, choose price r(j) with probability Pr[PAl - r(j)IIA_ -
k'].
Let Exp denote this algorithm, and we will use the corresponding notation from Defini-
tion 4.2.6. It will be seen that Exp is a feasible policy when we establish that I; and Itl
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are identically distributed. First expand the expression Pr[PAl = r2(I) jA = k'J as follows:
Pr[PtA' = r(j) r pA_!, V_,] - Pr[PAl n Vt-1]
Pr[PAl = (j) n k]A P 1, Vt,:I A1 =k'
Pr[ItA_\ = k'I Pr[P A_ n Vt 1 ]
pAl 1 I=k'
(4.5)
In (4.5), the probability Pr[PA1 - r(i)IPAi, Vt_], which conditions on a fixed history
PjAl, V1 ,... ,P%,AI Vt_1 , is defined by lines 6-10 of Algorithm 7. Thus, calculating (4.5)
requires enumerating all histories that result in ItjA = k'.
Unfortunately, at each time step t, this takes time exponential in t. The computational
difficulty arises because the assignment procedure in Algorithm 7 is no longer deterministic,
as it was throughout Section 4.2. For now, we ignore computational constraints and focus
on obtaining an CR(P)-competitive online algorithm; in Section 4.3.3 we show how to use
sampling to achieve polynomial runtime while only losing e in the competitiveness.
The following lemma is analogous to Lemma 4.2.7 and proved in Section C.3.
Lemma 4.3.2. For all t E [T], k' E {0,...,k} such that PrI _E = k'] > 0, and j E
{1, ..., m, m+1},
Pr[PExp - IExp _ ) k] - Pr[PA1 = r(j)IIAl = k']. (4.6)
Also, for all t =0,...,T and k' G {0,...,k},
Pr[IExP = k'] = Pr[IA1 - k']. (4.7)
Lemma 4.3.2 establishes that Exp is a feasible policy, i.e. it does not try to make a
sale with no inventory remaining. Having established this, it remains to prove that Exp is
optimally competitive. Theorem 4.3.3 is proved in Section C.3.
Theorem 4.3.3. E[ALG Exp( 1 ,... , VT)] = E[ALGA 1 ... ,VT)]. By Theorem 4.2.2,
ALGA 1  T) = -!OPT(V1 ,... , VT) for all realizations (V1, ... , VT). Therefore, Exp
is CR(P)-competitive.
We should point out that although Exp does not inherit the polynomial-time property
from Algorithm 7', it does inherit the structural property of the price at any time being
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stochastically-decreasing in the amount of remaining inventory. This is immediate from
Theorem 4.2.11, which holds conditioned on any realization of V, . . . , VT.
Also, note the following. PExp and PtA1 are only guaranteed to be identically distributed
when averaged over all the sample paths up to time t - 1 such that the total remaining
inventory is k'. They may not be identically distributed when conditioned on a specific pur-
chase sequence X1, . . , Xt 1 such that t- 1 Xt, = k - k', or a specific valuation sequence
Vi,..., Vt-i. Nonetheless, our method works in general. For example, if valuations were
correlated, then we would condition on both It-1 and V1,..., Vt-. One benefit of condi-
tioning on only It-1 in the independent case is to limit the state space, which is necessary
for our polynomial-time sampling algorithm in Section 4.3.3.
4.3.3 Emulating the Exponential-runtime Algorithm using Sampling
In this section we show how to "emulate" Exp, using sampling, to achieve a polynomial
runtime. First we provide a high-level overview of the challenges and the techniques used to
overcome them. The intrinsic difficulty is that our original procedure is based on tracking the
value of the offline optimum, but this becomes a #P-hard problem when the optimum equals
the expected value of the k largest elements from independent realizations (see Hagstrom
(1988)).
To overcome this using sampling, suppose we are at the start of time t, with inventory
k' remaining. If we randomly sample a run of Algorithm 7 (drawing valuations randomly)
such that IA - /, and copy price PtAl for time t, then we would match the probabilities
prescribed in (4.5). This motivates the following algorithm: sample runs of Algorithm 7
to the end of t - 1 until hitting one where IA = k', and then choose the price for time t
according to lines 6-10 of Algorithm 7. Such an algorithm is equivalent to Exp, and thus
would be CR(P)-competitive.
However, on sample paths where Pr[IAl - k' is small, the sampling could take arbi-
trarily long. We limit the number of sampling tries so that the algorithm deterministically
finishes in polynomial time, and show that the total measure of sample paths which fail at
any point is O(e). Unfortunately, there could be correlation between the sampling failing,
and having high revenue on a sample path. Nonetheless, we can couple the sample paths
of the sampling algorithm to those of the exponential-time algorithm, mark the first point
of failure on each sample path, and bound the difference in revenue after that point.
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Algorithm 8 Weakly Randomized Online Algorithm based on Inventory Remaining
1: inventory = k
2: t = 1
3: while customer t arrives do
4: repeat
5: run Algorithm 7 to the start of time t, with valuations V1 ,. .. , Vt_1 drawn accord-
ing to vi,...,v_1, and prices PA, PAl realized according to the random prices
chosen by Algorithm 7
6: if t-1 = inventory then
7: choose each price r(1),... , (m) r(m+) according to the probability that Al-
gorithm 7 (on this run) would choose that price for customer t
8: observe vt
9: observe purchase decision of customer t and update inventory accordingly
10: t = t + 1 and continue to next iteration of while loop
11: end if
12: until C(k + 1)t 2 runs elapse
13: choose price oo
14: t = t + 1
15: end while
Input: Customers t = 1, 2,... arriving online, with each valuation distribution vt revealed
after the price Pt is chosen.
Output: For each customer t, a (possibly random) price Pt for her.
The details of the sampling algorithm, which we will call Samp, are specified in Algo-
rithm 8.
In line 12, C is a positive integer to be chosen later. The decision of what to do when
the sampling fails, i.e. defaults to line 13, is inconsequential, since in our analysis we do not
expect any revenue from a sample path after the first point of failure.
To bound the revenue of Algorithm 8, we consider an algorithm which behaves identically
to Algorithm 8, except even when it defaults to line 13, it is able to behave as if the sampling
succeeded and makes the same decisions as lines 7-10. Such an algorithm is equivalent to
Exp, and hereafter we will refer to it as Exp. The results of the sample runs do not affect
the outcome of the algorithm, but help with bookkeeping.
Definition 4.3.4. Let Fjsamp be the indicator random variable for the sampling in Algo-
rithm 8 failing at time t, defined for all t E [T + 1]. Let F + - 1 deterministically.
Analogously, let FExP be the indicator random variable for the sampling in Exp "failing" at
time t, Vt E [T + 1].
For convenience, here we will use different random variables to denote the valuations
131
in the runs of Samp and Exp: V Samp and V Exp, respectively. We will also use the notation
from Definition 4.2.6.
Definition 4.3.5. Define the history up to time t to consist of realizations up to
and including the sampling at time t. Formally, for all t E [T + 1], let ht =
(fi, pi, vi, ... ,ft_,pt_1,vt_1,ft), where:
" ft, c {0, 1}, for all t' E [t];
* pt, is a price in {r( 1), ... , r (m), r(m+)}, for all t' E [t - 1];
" vt' is a valuation in {r(0), r(1), .... ,r(m)}, for all t E [t - 1].
Furthermore, define the following vectors of random variables for all t E fT + 1]:
* Hsamp = (FSamp pSamp VSamp,..., FSamp pSamp VSam Samp
" H -= pEXP, VExp . FX F_, Vt-, FExp1 P 1 * 1 1 1 t-J
Now, we would like to partition the sample paths by the history up to the first point of
failure, and prove that the two algorithms behave identically up to this point.
Definition 4.3.6. Let Ft denote the histories up to time t such that the first failure
in the sampling occurs at time t. Formally, for all t E fT + 11, Tt is the set of ht =
(fi, pi, vi, .. ,ft_1,pt_1,vt-,ft) such that fi = ... = ft-1 = 0 and ft = 1. (p,...,pt-1
and v,.. . ,vt_1 are arbitrary, and thus Fd = (m + 1)2(t1).)
Lemma 4.3.7. For a run of Algorithm 8, UTi 1 UhtE.t{H1amp = ht} is a set of
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive events. Analogously, for a run of Exp,
uT+1O Uhte{H xP" = ht} is a set of mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive events.
Furthermore, Pr[H Samp = ht] = Pr[H xP = ht], for all t E fT + 1] and ht E Ft.
Lemma 4.3.7 is straight-forward, so we defer its proof to Section C.3. Having proved it,
we can write:
T+1
E[ALGSamp] = E[ALGsamPIHSamp = ht] Pr[H namp = ht] (4.8)
t=1 htE-t
T+1
E[ALG Exp] = E[ALGExPIH xP = ht] Pr[H xP = ht]. (4.9)
t=1 he EFt
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Since we also know that Pr[Hsam = ht] = Pr[H E'p = ht], our goal is to compare the
expected revenues of the two algorithms conditional on each history ht E Ft.
When t = T + 1, i.e. the sampling never fails, it is easy to see that the two revenues are
equal. Indeed, for any hT+1 E FT+1:
T
1EAL~aPHsamp=hT1 = E[Zp amp . IVSamp> pSamP)H4I -li T+1]
T
= >Zpt - 1(vt : pt)
t=1
= E[ALGExpH 1 = hr+1. (4.10)
Lemma 4.3.8. Recall that E[OPT(V,..., VT)] is the expected value of the offline optimum
with V1, ... , VT drawn independently according to v1,. .. ,VT. For t < T and ht c Tt,
E[ALGExp H'Xp = ht] - E[ALGSampIHSamp = ht] E[OPT(V1 , ... , VT)], (4.11)
Proof. Proof. Consider any t E [T] and ht e Ft. We have
E[ALGsamP|Hja"P = ht] > IE[ pigam (Vam pa"p) Htsamp = ht]
t'1
t-1
SZpt, -1(vt pt'). (4.12)
t'= 1
Meanwhile, E[ALGExPIHX ht] can be decomposed into
t- 1 T
Z pt, - 1(vt' pt')+EZP xP-1(V P PXPH l=]. (4.13)
t'=1t'=t
We elaborate on the second term in (4.13). Clearly, tl tExp ExpExp) cannot
exceed the sum of the min{k, T - t + 1} largest valuations to appear during t,. . . , T, which
we denote by OPT(Vt ExpI... I Exp). Furthermore, the random valuations VtExp xp
are independent of the history H Exp up to time t, so we can remove the conditioning and
upper-bound (4.13) with
t-1
Zpt' I1(vt, > pt') +IE [OPT (VtxI,. ,V Xp)]. (4.14)
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The expectation in (4.14) is with respect to VtExp xp being drawn independently
according to Vt, . V.. ,v. (4.14) in turn is no greater than E>,-ipt' - 1(vt' Pt') +
E[OPT(V ",... , Vf")], where the random variables iExp VExP are not conditioned
on the event Hj'x = ht. The proof of the lemma concludes by comparing this expression
with (4.12).
Substituting (4.10), for hT+1 e FT+1, and (4.11), for hl,..., hT E F, .. .FT, into (4.8)
and (4.9), we conclude that
T
E[ALGExp] - E[ALGsamP] E[OPT] - ( E Pr[Hsamp = ht]). (4.15)
t=1 htEFt
By Definition 4.3.6, the expression in parentheses is the total probability of the sampling
failing at any point, before choosing the final price P anmp. We bound the term for each
t E [T] separately. As t increases, the number of samples increases, so the probability of
failure decreases:
Lemma 4.3.9. For all t c [T], EhtEt Pr[H anp = ht] 7.
Proof. Proof. Consider any t E [T]. For all ht C Ft, let G(ht) =
(f1 ,p1 , vi,. .. , ft-1,pt_1 ,vt-_), which is the vector of the first 3(t - 1) entries in ht. Let
G = (FfP, P1XP, V1Exp, .. ., FLf, Pi'_f), which is a vector of 3(t - 1) random vari-
ables.
We can write EhtEft Pr[Ht' = hi] as
Pr[F; = 1 IG_ = G(ht)] Pr[Gixt = G(ht)]. (4.16)
ht EFt
Now, for each ht E Ft, Pr[F;x - 1IGt - G(ht)] is the probability that all C(k + 1)t 2
independent runs of Algorithm 7 fail to match the inventory remaining at the start of time
t according to ht. For convenience, define I(ht) = k - , 1(vt, > pt,). Then
Pr[FExp =IGEXP - G(ht)] = (1 - Pr[ItA = I(ht)])c(k+1)t (4.17)
where ItA_\ is the total inventory remaining at the start of time t in a run of Algorithm 7.
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Therefore, we can partition the ht in Ft by I(ht). For all k' C {o, ... , k}, define Pt,k'
Pr[IAl - k']. The following can be derived by substituting (4.17) into (4.16):
k
Pr[Ht'" = ht] = (1 - pt,k')t2 Pr[GrxP = G(ht)]
ht E-Ft k1=0 ht E~t:(ht)=k'
k
exp(-pt,k'C(k + 1)t 2 ) Pr[G Ex = G(ht 14.18)
k'=O ht E~t:(ht)=k'
At this point, we would like to argue that EhtEFtJ:I(ht)=k' Pr[G t = G(ht)] Pr[I2 =
k']. To see this, note that Ehte Et:I(h)=k' Pr[Gti =- G(ht)] = Pr[IX = k' (F- = . . .
S= 0).
Applying the second statement of Lemma 4.3.2, we see that Pr[Ix = k'] Pt,k'-
Substituting into (4.18), the following can be derived:
k
Pr[H xP = ht] 5 Pt,k' exp(-pt,k'C(k + 1)t2 )
ht EFt k =0
C 
E k+1)t2 eP(- I)
k'=O
1
eCt2 -
The second inequality holds because for a single Pt,k' E [0, 1], the function pt,k'e~Pt,k'C(k+1)t2
is maximized at Pt,k' = C(k 1)t2 . The proof of the lemma is now complete.
It now follows easily that the sampling algorithm is within E of being optimally compet-
itive.
Theorem 4.3.10. For all e > 0, if we set C = ] in line 12 of Algorithm 8, then it is
(! E)-competitive, and has runtime polynomial in, k, T, and m.q
Theorem 4.3.10 is straight-forward and proved in Section C.3.
4.4 No Information on Valuations
In this section we discuss whether it is possible for an online algorithm to be CR(P)-
competitive without any information (before or after, deterministic or distributional) on
the valuations.
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First we show that this is impossible for any online algorithm which price-skims inde-
pendently, i.e. realizes its random price at each time step using an independent source of
random bits.
Proposition 4.4.1. Suppose that either: (i) m > 2 and valuations can be 0 (as usual);
or (ii) m > 3 and valuations cannot be 0. (Recall that m is the number of prices.) Then
for any online algorithm where each Pt chosen independently based on the sales history
X1,..., Xt_1 , there exists a sequence V1,...,VT such that
E[ALG(V 1,.. .,V)] <CR
OPT(V1,... , VT)
Proof. Proof of Proposition 4.4.1. Let the starting inventory k = 1.
First, it is easy to see that if the distribution of P is not such that Pr[Pi = r(i)] =
g(j) for all j E [m], then for some deterministic instance consisting of a single valuationq
in {r(l),. .. r(m) 1, E[ALG] will be strictly less than 1. Therefore we can without loss ofOPT q
generality assume that Pr[Pi = r()] = for all j E [m] (regardless of whether valuations
q
can be 0).
Now suppose m > 3. Consider the distribution of P2 conditioned on X, = 0. If Pr[P2
r(m)IXi = 0] = 1, then consider the instance T = 2, V = 1, V2 = r(m- 1). OPT = r(m-),
which exceeds 1, since m > 3. Meanwhile, qE[ALG] = q- < OPT. On the other hand, if
Pr[P2  r(m)IXi = 0] < 1, then consider the instance T = 3, V1 = V2 - r(m- 1), V3 = r(m).
OPT = r(m). qE[P1X1] = r(m- 1), while E[X1 ] = 1 - g . The best case for the algorithm,
given that V2 = r(m- 1), is P2 = r(m- 1) when P2 < r(m). Let Pr[P2 = r(m- 1)IX = 0] = a,
which we know is positive. In this case, qE[P2X 2] = r(m- 1)aq(m) and E[X2 ] - eq . Hence
qE[P3X 3 ] is at most qr(m)(1 - E[X1 +X 2]) = r(m)(1 - a)q(m). All in all, qE[ALG] is at most
r(m-1) + r(m-1)a(1 - r(m 1 ) + r(m)(1 - a)(1 - )(r(m) r(m)
=r(m) + a(2r(m-1) - (r(m 1 )) 2 - r(m))
r(m)
r(m).- 0 (r(m) - )2
r(m)
The term getting subtracted is non-zero since a > 0 and r(m) > r(m- 1). Therefore,
qE[ALG] < OPT. This completes the proof when m > 3, since CR(P) = 1/q.
The case where m = 2 and valuations can be 0 is argued analogously. If Pr[P2
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r(2)] = 1, then consider the instance T = 2, V = 0, V2 = r(1 ). If Pr[P2 < r(2)] = 1, then
consider the instance T = 3, V = V2  r(), V3 - r(2). In both cases, it can be seen that
qE[ALG] < OPT, completing the proof of Proposition 4.4.1. 0
However, we show that it is possible to be CR(P)-competitive if the online algorithm can
price-skim in a "coordinated" fashion, with the same probabilities as in Eren and Maglaras
(2010).
Proposition 4.4.2. Consider the following random-fixed-price policy:
1. Initially, choose a random price P which is equal to each r(j) with probability q(j)/q;
2. Offer price P as long as there is remaining inventory.
This policy is CR(P)-competitive.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 4.4.2. Consider any realization of the valuations, V1 ,... , VT.
Iteratively define the following quantities, for j from m down to 1:
T
n( = min 1l(Vt = r()), k - n(j'). (4.19)
t=1 j'=j+1
Essentially, for each j, n() denotes the number of valuations equal to r() that should
be picked out when picking out the min{k, T} largest valuations. OPT is then equal to
gM1 r(j)n(j).
Now consider the execution of the policy on this instance. For all j E [m], if the random
fixed price P is equal to r(), then the number of sales will be equal to min{Z_ t1(V> >
r(j)), k}, which by definition is equal to Z/=, n(j'). Therefore,
]E[ALG] q
E j r (j' n(j1)
- q n'= ~ (1 -- )rfi)
=1 il=1
.1q E n(')r~) ')j
which equals !OPT, completing the proof that the random fixed price is CR(P)-competitive.q
LII
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It is known that correlated randomness is very powerful in the design of online algorithms
(see, e.g., Karp et al. (1990), who derive an extremely elegant solution to the online matching
problem using correlated randomness). Indeed, we can use our policy from Proposition 4.4.2
under our previous models with more information on the valuations and still have a CR(P)-
competitive algorithm. However, this is impractical for several reasons. First, the fact that
the random price must be fixed makes it impossible to make use of additional information
that may be available on the valuations (this issue was also raised in Eren and Maglaras
(2010)). Second, the random-fixed-price policy does not show how the price should evolve
as inventory is depleted, and does not satisfy the intuitive structural property in dynamic
pricing that the price is greater if the remaining inventory is less (see Section 4.2.4). In
Section 4.5, we show how our algorithms from Sections 4.2-4.3 can be adapted into the
setting where the personal information of each customer can be used in determining her
price.
4.5 Personalization Revenue Management Model
In this section we consider the personalized online revenue management setup introduced
by Golrezaei et al. (2014), where:
" the stochastic decision of each customer can be modeled accurately upon her arrival
to the e-commerce platform (by using her characteristics);
" however, the overall intensity and characteristics of customers to arrive over time is
difficult to model (and treated as unknown/arbitrary).
In our model, this would correspond to the stochastic-valuation model in Section 4.3, with
the change that the distribution of each Vt is given before the algorithm has to set a price,
instead of after. The algorithms from Section 4.3 can still be applied, and will be CR(P)-
competitive. Furthermore, it is not possible to be better than CR(P)-competitive even with
this personalized information, as discussed in Section 4.1.1.
Nonetheless, in this section we specify how our online algorithms can exploit personalized
information to strictly improve their decisions while remaining CR(P)-competitive. Take
any CR(P)-competitive algorithm A for the stochastic-valuation model (e.g. the algorithm
from Section 4.3.2, or a modification following Section 4.2.4 which never rejects customers
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before stocking out). For each time step t and inventory level k' > 0 such that Pr[IJ -
k'] > 0, consider the distribution for the price Pt chosen by algorithm A conditioned on
I_1 = k' (this depends on the previously-observed valuation distributions v1 ,..., v_1).
Since now we also know the distribution vt of valuation Vt, we can compute the probability
of algorithm A making a sale during time t,
m
-4rPr[P ~ =r)IIi = k']Pr[Vt r(i)], (4.20)
j=1
as well as its expected revenue,
Zr) Pr[P -= r(A)IIA - k'] Pr[Vt r(')]. (4.21)
j=1
We can interpret (4.21) as the reward given to the algorithm during time t in exchange for
the probability (4.20) of consuming inventory. The price distribution used by the algorithm
to obtain such an exchange was chosen without knowing the distribution of Vt. However,
since now we do know the distribution of Vt, we can potentially make a decision which
achieves more expected reward under the same consumption probability. Specifically, we
solve the following LP:
max r(i) Pr[Vt > r( )]pj (t, k')
j=1
s.t. Pr[Vt r( )p (t, k') = Pr[PtA = r(3)I_ = k') Pr[Vt > rs)] (4.22)
j=1 j=1
m
pj(t, k') < 1
j=1
pj (t, k') 0 V j =1, ... ,m
pj (t, k') represents the probability that we should offer price j at time t, conditioned on the
remaining inventory being k'. We know that setting each p3 (t, k') = Pr[PA = r(i)|IA1 = k']
is a feasible solution, and hence the optimal objective value of the optimization problem is
at least (4.21). Let {p(t, k') j = 1, ... , m} denote an optimal solution to the optimization
problem, for all t and k'.
Proposition 4.5.1. Consider the online algorithm which, at each time step t, sets the
price randomly according to probabilities {pj(t, k') : j = 1,... , m}, where k' is the remaining
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inventory at the start of time t. Then for any sequence of valuation distributions vi,.. , VT,
the algorithm's total expected revenue is at least Ev1~ v ,...,VTV[OPT (V1,. .. ,VT)].
Proposition 4.5.1 is established in the same way as Theorems 4.2.8 and 4.3.3-for t =
1, ... ,T, we can inductively ensure from constraint (4.22) that the distribution for the
starting inventory level matches that of A. Since the algorithm has the same distribution
for inventory state at each time t and earns at least as much revenue as A in expectation
on every inventory state, its total revenue must be at least the offline optimum (and in fact
is often much better since it exploits personalization).
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have provided a general solution to the single-leg revenue management
problem which yields the best-possible competitive ratio with limited demand informa-
tion. Our policies unify the inventory-dependent booking policies in Ball and Queyranne
(2009) with the random price-skimming policies in Eren and Maglaras (2010). An impor-
tant feature of our policies is that they show at each time step how the price distribution
should depend on inventory when the future is unknown, complementing classical results
which show how the optimal price should depend on inventory when the future is known.
Our policies were derived using a new "valuation tracking" technique, which geometrically
tracks the optimum and hedges against the arrival sequence immediately ending in the most
inventory-conservative fashion. We believe this to be of general interest for competitive ratio
analysis.
Finally, we explain why our analysis of the pricing case, where each customer has a
valuation and chooses the lowest fare not exceeding it, captures all rational choice models.
Suppose instead that the firm could offer an assortment of fare classes, and that each
customer has a ranked list of fare classes she is willing to purchase, and chooses the highest-
ranked fare class that is offered to her. We can define V to be the maximum fare in the
list that customer t is willing to purchase, and then the offline optimum would still be the
k largest values from V,..., VT. Meanwhile, we can modify the online algorithm so that
whenever it would have offered price Pt, it now shows all fares greater than or equal to Pt.
This algorithm would still make a sale whenever Vt ;> Pt, except now it has the opportunity
to earn revenue greater than Pt, if customer t does not choose the lowest offered fare. As
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a result, our CR(P)-competitive algorithms under the pricing model imply corresponding
CR(P)-competitive algorithms under the assortment model.
Nevertheless, we would like to end on two open questions related to the assortment
generalization. First, our argument above assumes rational choice models; however in prac-
tice certain fare classes could be designed as "decoys" for other fare classes. Second, our
algorithms imply an "assortment-skimming" distribution over revenue-ordered assortments,
but this assumes there is no limit on the number of fare classes offered. We believe that
assortment skimming under cardinality constraints is an interesting problem.
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Chapter 5
Learning Valuation Distributions
from Bundle Sales
Bundling has long been used as a form of price discrimination, allowing for items to be sold
at a discount when they are purchased together with others. In this chapter, we show that
bundling has the added benefit of leading to richer sales data, providing more information
about customer demand than individual sales numbers.
We introduce the "reverse" bundling problem of reconstructing the valuation distribu-
tions which would fit a set of bundle sales numbers. We show how to solve this fitting
problem for a basic class of customer valuation models from the bundling literature, via
an iterative algorithm with guaranteed convergence. An important insight from fitting this
simple model is that an item's price elasticity can be measured by comparing its sales rates
inside and outside of bundles.
Finally, we validate this insight on data from a large online retailer, where indeed, the
price elasticities of items, as indicated by their sales spikes after a Black Friday markdown,
are consistent with their bundle sales before Black Friday. We believe our method to be
especially useful in designer fashion, where new products with bundle discounts are often
introduced, and little would be known about price elasticity otherwise.
5.1 Introduction
Consider a firm offering an item at a fixed price of $10. Arriving customers purchase the
item if and only if their valuation, or maximum willingness-to-pay, for the item is at least
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$10. The firm would like to learn about its customers' valuations. For example, if half of the
customers bought the item, then the firm could deduce that half of the valuations must be
higher than $10. However, this reveals nothing about how far away from $10 the customer
valuations spread. That is, the firm cannot deduce the item's price elasticity, e.g. how a
price drop to $8 would increase the proportion of customers with valuations exceeding price,
from a single sales observation at $10.
Now suppose instead that the firm offered two different items at $10 each, and also
offered them as a bundle at the discounted price of $18. Under this pricing scheme, a
customer who values the items at $9 and $11 respectively would purchase the bundle,
despite valuing the 1st item below $10, because given that she is certainly going to buy the
2nd item, she can add the 1st item for $8 by buying the bundle. This customer is labeled
as "a" in Fig. 5-la. Similarly, customers b and c, who would have purchased nothing and
item 1 respectively without the discount, would also be swayed into purchasing the bundle.
By observing sales numbers from this bundle pricing scheme ($10 for each item; $18 for
both), the firm can decode information about the price elasticities. For example, suppose the
firm observed that all customers purchase either both items or none, with 50% selecting each
option, as in Fig. 5-1b. This suggests that the valuations below $10 are tightly concentrated
between $8 and $10, since whenever a customer would have purchased just one item, she
was always willing to add the other for the discounted price of $8. By contrast, suppose the
firm observed that each of the four decision options (buy none, buy item 1, buy item 2, buy
both) occur similarly often, around 25% of the time, as in Fig. 5-1c. This suggests that the
valuations spread far away from $10, since the bundle discount is not significant enough to
discourage customers from buying just one item.
Of course, the deductions in Fig. 5-1 are based on specific modeling assumptions, namely
that customers: (i) want at most one of each item, (ii) value the bundle at the sum of
individual valuations, and (iii) have independent item valuations. Nonetheless, the key
insight is that bundle sales numbers generally reveal more information about customer
valuations, and most importantly, reveal information about price elasticities that individual
sales numbers cannot.
In this chapter, we explore this phenomenon and introduce a new Learning from Bundle
Sales problem, which complements the classical Bundle Pricing problem.
* Bundle Pricing: given the distribution of customer valuations, and knowing that
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(a) Customer valuations divided
into regions based on purchase
decision. The x-axis and y-
axis represent a customer's valu-
ations for items 1 and 2, respec-
tively.
0%
0%
(b) Sales numbers show that
the bundle discount is extremely
significant. Indicator of tightly
concentrated valuations, and
hence high price elasticities.
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(c) Sales numbers show that the
bundle discount is relatively in-
significant. Indicator of widely
spread valuations, and hence low
price elasticities.
Figure 5-1: How to use bundle sales to speculate on price elasticities
145
Number of Transactions
5 $250 179
$ 2 5 0 7 4 4
$300
72 79 197
Buy all 3 for $760 ($40 discount)a
Figure 5-2: The pricing scheme used in the debut of Adidas Yeezy Season 6, with synthetic
sales numbers
This data is compiled by counting, for each subset of items, the number of transactions that
(out of the three items in question) contain exactly that subset.
each customer buys the subset of items maximizing her surplus (valuation minus
price), how do we systematically price the subsets to maximize expected revenue?
e Learning from Bundle Sales: given for each non-empty subset of items the price
and the number of customers who bought it, what can we deduce about the distribu-
tion of valuations?
The Learning from Bundle Sales problem requires only aggregate sales numbers, as
shown in an example in Fig. 5-2, which are naturally collected through a retailer's oper-
ations. Therefore, it is applicable in any industry where discounted bundles are sold, like
designer fashion, budget airlines (where ancillary services are bundled), and fast food (where
combo meals are offered).
Motivated by the data in Fig. 5-2, we fit a basic class of valuation models where cus-
tomers are unit-demand with additive and independent valuations, as in assumptions (i)-(iii)
above. These assumptions allow for identifiability from the limited data in Fig. 5-2, and
coincidentally, are consistent with the bundle pricing literature (see the section on Related
Work). Under these assumptions, we separately divide each item's valuations into three
regions: above individual price, below individual price but above "discounted price" (indi-
vidual price minus the discount of $40), and below discounted price. We then identify the
distribution of customers over these regions for each item, by fitting to the bundle sales
numbers.
The solution to our fitting problem is shown in Fig. 5-3. It can be thought of as
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$250 -- 2 5 260
73% $300
$210 7 -41
61% 12% - 27%
$210 $250
Figure 5-3: Estimated breakdown of customer valuations, if our model and fitting method
are used
Each of the 7 non-black regions corresponds to one of the 7 sales numbers from Fig. 5-2.
For example, the transparent white region corresponds to the 179 customers who bought
the entire bundle.
the rectangular prism with 7 parameters (start and end for each axis, plus one density
parameter) which best fits the 7 sales numbers in Fig. 5-2. This rectangular prism is
narrow along both the shorts and sneakers axes, implying that these items have concentrated
valuations and high price elasticities. It was fit into this shape because only 7 (resp. 9)
people bought the other two items in the bundle without the shorts (resp. sneakers), i.e.
very few people had valuations below $210 (resp. $260) which would cause them to decline
a near-complete bundle in this case. By contrast, 44 people declined the hoodie despite
buying the shorts and sneakers, implying that it has a low price elasticity.
In Section 5.2, we formalize our fitting problem, present our iterative algorithm for
solving it, establish guaranteed convergence, and test numerical accuracy under violated
model assumptions.
In Section 5.3, we test our insights on data from an industry collaboration with a large
Latin American online retailer. We consider their home and kitchen items, which are sold
in many discounted bundles, and measure each item's price elasticity by the magnitude of
its sales spike after a Black Friday markdown. We find that indeed, these price elasticities
are consistent with those indicated by the bundle sales before Black Friday. Furthermore,
the best indicator of an item's price elasticity is the number of people who purchased the
other items in its bundles, exactly in alignment with the intuition from Fig. 5-3.
In the Conclusion, we discuss the limitations in using our restricted class of valuation
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distributions to model price elasticities. But even with these limitations, the data from our
industry collaborator suggests, that while our assumptions may be violated, our insights
are still useful. Therefore, they should be incorporated even when additional information
beyond Fig. 5-2 is available and richer classes of valuations can be identified-this is a
vast direction for future research. The limited data described in Fig. 5-2 is commonly
encountered by online retailers (like our industry collaborator) and designer fashion brands
(like Yeezy) who cycle through new products and offer package discounts on them. In these
situations, we have provided the first scientifically-rigorous method for computing price
elasticities, allowing managers to make better product segmentation and pricing decisions
in the future.
5.1.1 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider the learning from bundle sales
problem that we formulated. The classical bundling problem focuses on price optimization,
and various questions have been studied under a plethora of customer valuation models over
the past decades-we refer to some recent papers (Abdallah, 2016; Chen et al., 2017) as
well as Chapter 6 for a comprehensive literature review. The primary model of analytical
interest in this chapter (single bundle discount, additive and independent valuations) is
parsimonious in that it has few enough parameters to be identifiable from a single set of
sales numbers, yet captures some notion of price elasticity in these parameters. It originated
from Adams and Yellen (1976), and is a pioneering model in the bundling literature.
The general problem of modeling multi-item and bundle valuations has been studied in
many areas, including discrete-choice modeling (Chung and Rao, 2003), conjoint analysis
(Jedidi et al., 2003; Toubia et al., 2003), learning in auctions (Buchbinder and Naor, 2009),
and copula inference (Letham et al., 2014), to list a few references. The models considered
are richer than ours, but all require additional data to be identifiable, such as sales obser-
vations under different prices, item covariates, personalized sales records, survey details, or
repeated queries to the same customer.
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5.2 Model for Customer Valuations
A firm has n different items for sale, referenced by the set [n] = {1, ... , n}. Each customer
wants at most one of each item, and knows her valuation v(S) for every subset S of items.
The firm posts a price P(S) > 0 for every subset S C [n], with P(0) = 0. A customer
buys the subset S which maximizes' her surplus, defined as v(s) - P(S). v is treated as
random and drawn from a distribution D, which represents the valuation functions of the
population. The firm observes the purchase decisions of customers with valuations drawn
IID from D and counts the number who selected each subset.
Throughout the analysis in this chapter, we will assume that valuations are:
* Additive, i.e. each customer has atomic item valuations X1,..., Xn > 0 and v(S)
ies Xi VS;
" Independent, i.e. D is a product distribution D, x ... x D, and xi is drawn indepen-
dently from the marginal distribution Di for all i E [n].
As discussed in the Introduction, combinatorial or correlated valuations introduce too many
degrees of freedom and such a model cannot be identified when the input consists of merely
2" sales counts.
In this section, we will further assume that:
" There is a single bundle discount, given for buying all the items in question, i.e.
P(S) = EiEs Pi 
S n
n$n
j1 Pi - d, S =[n]
where P1 , . . . , Pn > 0 are individual prices and d E (0, I P] is the discount;
" The firm observes the number of no-purchases;
" n > 3, i.e. the firm has at least 23 = 8 sales counts to work with.
We relax these assumptions in Section D.4, where we also allow P to take the form of a
two-part tariff, develop the setting where no-purchases are unobserved, and solve the n = 2
case by brute force. The proofs of Lemmas in this section are straight-forward and deferred
to Section D.1.
'For convenience, we break ties arbitrarily; this can be achieved by small perturbations in P.
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5.2.1 Formulation of Fitting Problem
Definition 5.2.1. For all S C [n], let Ps denote the empirical probability of subset S being
selected by a customer (these can be calculated by the firm assuming that no-purchases are
observed).
Our goal is to compute empirical estimates of
{ Pr[xi < Pi - d], Pr[Pi - d < xi < PJ], Pr[Pi < xi] : i E [n] (5.1)
which best fit {ps : S C [n]} under the data generating process defined above. These
estimates, which sum to unity for each i, would provide two quantiles of each item's valuation
distribution Di, which correspond to immediate sales rate and price elasticity. They can
also be used to, e.g., reconstruct a Uniform or Normal demand curve with two parameters.
Definition 5.2.2. For all i E [n], let:
" qi = Pr[xi > P], the probability of a customer being willing to buy item i at individual
price Pi;
" a*= Pr[xi P - djxj < Pi], the probability of a customer being willing to buy item
i at price P - d, conditioned on her not being willing to buy item i at price P.
It is easy to see that given q* and a* for all i, the probabilities in (5.1) can be derived.
Henceforth, we will focus on the problem of estimating q* and a*.
Lemma 5.2.3. For a customer with valuations x 1 ,...,x,, the surplus-maximizing subset
is [n] iff
max{P - xi, 0} < d. (5.2)
i= 1
We can interpret max{P - xi, 0} as the deficit incurred by the customer had she been
forced to buy item i at price P, which is 0 if xi > P. This allows us to characterize the
customer's purchase decision. Indeed, she first checks inequality (5.2), i.e. whether her total
deficit from buying all the items is covered by the bundle discount. If so, then she buys all
the items. Otherwise, she individually selects the items i for which her valuation is at least
the individual price P, and buys this subset.
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Lemma 5.2.4. For all S C [n], the probability of a customer selecting subset S is
(flq) (1 -qi))(1-Pr[Z(P-xi) d|Pi-d<xi<PVi S] fa*). (5.3)
izES is igs igs
Intuitively, the three parentheses in expression (5.3) can be interpreted as follows. For
a subset S # [n] to be selected, the customer has to: (i) value the items i E S above their
individual prices; (ii) value the items i V S below their individual prices; and (iii) not prefer
the full bundle over S, i.e. incur greater than d deficit from buying the items i 0 S.
With Lemma 5.2.4, our fitting problem can be defined as solving a system based on
(5.3).
Definition 5.2.5. [Fitting Problem] For all S # 0, let FS denote an approximation used
for the value of Pr [EiES(P - xi) 5 diPi - d < xi < P Vi E S]. Then the fitting problem
is to solve for qi,... , q, and a,,... , a, from the following system of equations:
(H7Ij) (17(1 - qi)) (1 - F[n]\s ai) = Ps VS $ [n]. (5.4)
ieS is iqS
For now, we focus on solving (5.4) given {FS : S # 0}, treating the values of FS as
fixed input parameters. The following lemma derives some baseline parameter values in
Fs = - using the uniform distribution; we will see that they generally provide a good
approximation.
Lemma 5.2.6. Let S # 0 and suppose that for all i E S, the conditional distribution of Di
on [Pi - d, P) is uniform. Then Pr [ ZiEs(Pi - xi) ! d|Pi - d < xi < Pi Vi E S] = 1.
5.2.2 Iterative Fitting Algorithm
The problem from Definition 5.2.5 involves an intractable system of equations with degree-
(2n) polynomials; even if n = 3, there appears to be no closed-form solution. Furthermore,
the given values of js are noisy observations and the given values of Fs are approximations,
potentially leading to an inconsistent set of equations. To cope, we develop a method which
fits the equations iteratively, and bound its error relative to the error in p-s and Fs. Its
error approaches 0, i.e. our method recovers the true values of qi' and a*, as the errors in
both Ps and FS approach 0.
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For i = 1, ... , n initialize
q(O) (i ( Psu{ )-/IS -1 (5.6)
Ses PS
for k = 0,1, ... do
For i=1, ... ,n set
ak) - max{1 -\, 0}. (5.7)
q (1 -%
For i = 1, ... , n set
qk+) Su{i} 1- F(ksHjgsafk) )) (5.8)
sesi PS 1 - F[n]\s\{i} fjgs'j:A a3
end for
Figure 5-4: Iterative algorithm, on input {ps : S = [n]}, {Fs :S 0}, and {S: i E [n]}
Our iterative algorithm is motivated by the following. If we take any subset S, and
compare equation (5.4) for S and S U {i}, then supposing that i ( S and S U {i} : [n], we
have
isuli} 1 qj (- F[n]\S\{i} HjgSjLi a .
PS q\ 1 - F[n]\s fijs aj (5.5)
That is, comparing psu{i} with PS almost lets us compute qj (the sales rate of item i at
individual price P), except for the term in parentheses which is a bias caused by the bundle
discount.
Nonetheless, we can ignore this term to get an initial solution for (qi, ... , qn). Substi-
tuting these values into the equations in (5.4), we can solve for (al, ... , an). We then use
these values of ai to update our solution for (q,.... I qn), according to (5.5). By repeating
this procedure which alternates between updating (qi,..., qn) and updating (al,..., an),
the algorithm is able to account for the bundle discount and correct the bias in its initial
estimates-see Fig. 5-4 for its pseudocode.
Instructions (5.6) and (5.8) take an additional input parameter Si which can be set.
Si denotes the collection of subsets S for which the algorithm will combine equation (5.5)
to solve for qi. One useful insight is that the bias term in (5.5) is least significant when
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S = 0, because this is when the customer is furthest from being affected by the bundle
discount.2 However, setting Si to contain more sets than 0 can reduce the error from the
noise in Ps. Meanwhile, instruction (5.7) computes aj, the term corresponding to the price
elasticity of item i, using the purchase probability of subset [n] \ {i}. This provides another
useful insight: item i's price elasticity is determined by the number of people who bought
the other items in the bundle, yet refused to add item i to unlock the discount.
5.2.3 Convergence Guarantee
Our algorithm outputs a sequence of estimates (q k) ) and (a (k) ) for each q* and a*,
respectively. The error in q () and a depends on the error in the values of Ps and FS that
were input to the algorithm. Here we state our convergence result in the noise-free, uniform
special case, where there is no error in either Ps or Fs. Our general analytical results, with
noisy observations and arbitrary distributions, are deferred to Section D.2.
Theorem 5.2.7. Suppose that for all S # [n], Ps equals the true probability (5.3) of subset
S being selected. Furthermore suppose that for all i c [n], Di is a uniform distribution
and probabilities q* and a* lie in (0,1). Then our algorithm in Fig. 5-4, with parameters
FS = 1 VS and Si = {0} Vi, does not divides by zero and correctly solves system (5.4),
identifying the model parameters with
lim q ) = qi and lim a = a Vi E [n].
k-+c~o ik-+oo
Theorem 5.2.7 is a corollary of the more general Theorem D.2.16 (resp. Theorem D.2.15)
from Section D.2, which bounds for all i the multiplicative error between q k) and qj' (resp.
a k) and al) as a function of k, the maximum multiplicative error in the values of Ps, and
the maximum multiplicative error in the values of Fs. This error bound approaches 0 as
k -* oc (at the rate of exponential decay) and the errors in Ps and FS both approach 0.
5.2.4 Testing Algorithm on Synthetic Data
In Section D.3, we test our algorithm in settings with error in the values of Ps and non-
uniform distributions, where Theorem 5.2.7 would not guarantee convergence to the correct
2 For a rigorous explanation of this fact, consider the setting where Fs = for all S. The bias term equals
(1 ai(n-IS -1) ls a3 )(1 - 1 ls aj), which is less than 1 and decreasing over S C ([n] \ {i}).
Therefore, the bias is more significant for larger subsets S.
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underlying parameters. We have followed the setup from Chu et al. (2011), and summarize
our main findings below:
" By iterating our algorithm with a simple stopping criterion based on comparing a(k) to
a(k- 1), approximately-correct parameters can be reached using less than 10 iterations
on average;
" The error due to noise in Ps can be mitigated by increasing the cardinality of parameter
Si;I
* The error due to the distribution being non-uniform is less than 2%, as long as the
distribution is unimodal. We provide an explanation for this surprising accuracy in
Section D.3.4.
5.3 Testing Model on Data from Online Retailer
In this section we test how the insights from our model translate to real-world price elas-
ticities.
We consider sales data provided by a large Latin American online retailer, on their home
and kitchen items, many of which are sold in discounted bundles. For each item and bundle,
we are given its price and sales for 26 weeks starting June 1st, 2016. The last of these 26
weeks contains both Black Friday (November 25th, 2016) and the Cyber Monday following
it. This is a special promotional period during which many items are heavily. marked down.
We use an item's sales boost after a Black Friday markdown to measure its price elas-
ticity, and test whether this agrees with the elasticity indicated by its bundle sales prior to
Black Friday. As an example, consider Table 5.1. Having only seen the sales of the items at
a fixed price, can we use their bundle sales to speculate on their sales boosts after a Black
Friday markdown?
A naive observation of the data might suggest that neither item is particularly elastic,
because the discounted bundle did not sell many copies (only 29) relative to the weekly
sales of the items (222 and 30, respectively). However, the analysis in our chapter would
suggest that the recipe book is much less elastic than the pressure cooker. This is because
a large number of people (222) paid $207 for the pressure cooker alone, declining to add
the recipe book at the highly discounted price of $5 by paying $212 for the bundle instead.
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Table 5.1: An example from the data. Can we speculate on the "?" entries using only the
information in the table? (Answers below.)
First 25 Weeks Black Friday Week
Price in R$ Avg. Sales/wk Price in R$ Sales
Pressure Cooker $207 222 $190 ($17 markdown) ?
Recipe Book $14 30 $3 ($11 markdown) ?
Bundle $212 ($9 discount) 29 $212 (dominated by markdowns)
By contract, much fewer (30) people purchased the recipe book alone, usually wanting it as
part of a bundle.
In the end, indeed, the recipe book sold only 176 copies during Black Friday week,
representing a dismal price elasticity for a massive 79% Black Friday markdown. Meanwhile,
the pressure cooker sold 1153 copies during Black Friday week, achieving a similar sales
increase from a much smaller 8% markdown and hence representing a much better price
elasticity.
5.3.1 Relationship between Bundle Sales and Price Elasticity
We test whether the relationships from the example in Table 5.1 generalize to the other
items in the data set. Most of the items have been offered in multiple bundles, so for each
item, we consider aggregate statistics over the bundles containing it.
Definition 5.3.1. Define the following for each item i, based on the 25 weeks before Black
Friday.
" PctBund(i): out of all copies of i sold, the fraction of which came from a bundle
purchase.
" PctBundPartners(i): the average value of PctBund over the partner items of i, where
an item j is considered a partner of i if there is some bundle containing both i and j.
" AvgBundDisc(i): the % discount provided by the bundles containing i (taking a
weighted average).
For full details on how we processed these statistics from the data, we defer to Section D.5.
To illustrate these statistics, we calculate them for the items in Table 5.1. In the full
data, the (pressure) cooker was only part of the bundle with the (recipe) book, while the
155
SI S
S
S
0 S.
S S
0' '~
S
5 Og
3
* 6
'ooker. 0 00g
:S 0 Book
0% Pc~n~) 100%
in[P
AvgB
riceElas(i) ......
0
S 9 1 . Gker:
ook 0 g*
lo w e r ..~o ............ .................
0% PcBundPartners(i) 0
Figure 5-5: Relationship between bundle sales and price elasticity. The items from Table 5.1
are labeled "x".
book was part of many bundles with different kitchen appliances. An additional 235 copies
of it were sold weekly in these other bundles. Therefore,
29 29+235
PctBund(Cooker) = ~ 12% and PctBund(Book) = 90%.
29+ 222 29 30 235
The cooker's sole partner is the book, so PctBundPartners(Cooker) = PctBund(Book) =
90%. Meanwhile, PctBundPartners(Book) = 24% after averaging over all of its partners.
Finally, AvgBundDisc considers the % discounts provided by the bundles, which for this
one is 1 - 214 ~ 4%. Hence AvgBundDisc(Cooker) = 4%. AvgBundDisc(Book) takes a
weighted average over all of the bundles containing the book, ending up at 8%.
For each item i, we let PriceElas(i) denote its price elasticity, measured as its % increase
in sales during Black Friday week, divided by its % decrease in individual price. We are
interested in the relationship of PriceElas(i) with both AvgBund(i) g Dand PBundPans
where we have divided by the bundle discount, to penalize bundle sales percentages that
came from highly discounted bundles.
For the 51 items which were marked down during Black Friday and had bundle sales prior
to that, we plot ln[PriceElas(i)-AvgBundDisc(i)] vs. both PctBund(i) and PctBundPartners(i),
in Fig. 5-5. We will not attempt to express the y-axis on an absolute scale, and instead
focus on relative magnitudes. Accordingly, we will use Kendall's -r coefficient to measure
correlation with the x-axis.
In Fig. 5-5, PctBund(i) demonstrates a noticeable correlation with price elasticity, with
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T = .16 (i.e. 58% of the pairs were concordant), which for 51 data points results in a two-
sided p-value of .08. However, the correlation is weak with many outliers, as exemplified by
the recipe book.
Meanwhile, PctBundPartners(i) demonstrates a highly significant correlation with price
elasticity, with r = .3 and p = .002. This is exactly as explained by our model: if many
people bought the partners of item i without adding i at a bundle discount, then they also
wouldn't buy item i after an individual discount; on the other hand, if nobody bought the
partners of item i individually, then a logical hypothesis is that everybody was willing to
add i to the bundle.
It is also interesting to note that in Fig. 5-5, the uncertainty for a given value of
PctBundPartners(i) appears to be one-sided. That is, a high PctBundPartners(i) could still
imply a low price elasticity, likely caused by bundle sales that were driven by highly com-
plementary items. However, a low PctBundPartners(i) never implied a high price elasticity,
likely because substitutes being bundled together (which would cause this effect) rarely
occurs in practice.
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we explore the phenomenon of bundle sales data containing richer informa-
tion about customer valuations. We show how to fit a fundamental demand model from
bundling theory to bundle sales data, thereby also providing the first method of estimating
price elasticities under very limited data (no price changes, covariate information, etc.). We
verify the existence of our phenomenon on a real-world data set, and specifically validate
our theoretically-backed insight that the best indicator of an item's price elasticity is the
sales of the partner items it is bundled with.
Our model emphasizes simplicity and identifiability from limited data, but does not
capture aspects such as complements and substitutes. Nonetheless, on real data where its
assumptions may be violated, we saw from Fig. 5-5 that it still provides a logical method of
comparing price elasticities between items, which is correct significantly more often than not.
We also saw from Fig. 5-5 that our model can be improved by identifying complementary
items (as opposed to substitutes). In situations where this is possible because additional
data is available, we believe that vast future research can be done, in analyzing higher-
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parameter models which incorporate our insights.
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Chapter 6
Reaping the Benefits of Bundling
under High Production Costs
It is well-known that selling different goods in a single bundle can significantly increase
revenue, even when the valuations for the goods are independent. However, bundling is
no longer profitable if the goods have high production costs. To overcome this challenge,
we introduce a new mechanism, Pure Bundling with Disposal for Cost (PBDC), where
after buying the bundle, the customer is allowed to return any subset of goods for their
production cost. We derive both distribution-dependent and distribution-free guarantees
on its profitability, which improve previous techniques. Our distribution-dependent bound
suggests that the firm should never price the bundle such that the profit margin is less than
1/3 of the expected welfare, while also showing that PBDC is optimal for a large num-
ber of independent goods. Our distribution-free bound suggests that on the distributions
where PBDC performs worst, individual sales perform well. Finally, we conduct extensive
simulations which confirm that PBDC outperforms other simple pricing schemes overall.
6.1 Introduction
We study the monopolist pricing problem of a firm selling n heterogeneous items. For each
item, customers have a valuation, which is their maximum willingness-to-pay, drawn from
a known distribution. A customer wants at most one of each item. The firm offers take-it-
or-leave-it prices for every subset of items, and the customer chooses the subset maximizing
her surplus (valuation for the subset minus price), with the no-purchase option always being
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available. We assume the customer's valuation for a subset is additive over the items in the
set. The objective of the firm is to maximize expected per-customer revenue.
In the full generality of the problem, the firm has 2' - 1 prices to set. However, it
is important to find profitable yet simple pricing schemes that are determined by a small
number of prices. Two such schemes are Pure Components (PC), where items are priced
separately (and the price of a subset is understood to be the sum of its constituent prices),
and Pure Bundling (PB), the strategy of only offering all the items together. A third
scheme that generalizes both PC and PB is Mixed Bundling (MB), which offers individual
item prices as well as a bundle price for all the items. MB can be seen as a form of price
discrimination, where customers who highly value an item can buy it for its individual price,
while customers with lower valuations still have a chance of buying it as part of a discounted
bundle.
The efficacy of simple pricing schemes is of immense importance in retail, and has
been studied over the past few decades in the economics literature, the operations re-
search/marketing interface literature, and more recently, the computer science literature.
For a single item, the solution is immediate: choose the price p maximizing p(l - F(p)),
where F is the CDF of the valuation (see Myerson (1981)). However, for two items, even if
their valuations are independent, bundling can be better than individual sales.
For example, suppose we have two products with IID valuations, each of which is 1 half
the time, and 2 half the time. If we sell the items individually, we can always get a sale
for 1, or get a sale half the time for 2. In either case, the combined expected revenue is 2.
However, if we sell the items as a bundle for 3, then the bundle will be purchased 1 of the4
time, yielding an expected revenue of 4.
The key observation is that the valuation of the bundle is more concentrated around its
mean than the valuation of the individual items, which causes less consumer heterogeneity,
and we can choose a price that is the highest willingness-to-pay for a larger fraction of
customers. This makes it easier to reduce deadweight loss, which is revenue lost from
pricing a customer with positive valuation out of the market, and consumer surplus, which
is revenue lost from offering a customer a better price than necessary.
The power of bundling is even greater when valuations are negatively correlated-
consider two products with marginal valuations that are uniform on [0, 11 but correlated
in a way such that they always sum to 1. In this case, offering the bundle at the price of
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1 will always get a sale, extracting the entire welfare, while selling the items individually
yields at most 1, half the available surplus. These effects have long been known in the2'
economics literature, following the pioneering work of Stigler (1963), Adams and Yellen
(1976), Schmalensee (1984), and McAfee et al. (1989).
Of course, bundling is not always superior to individual sales-this is especially true once
we consider production costs. For example, suppose we have two goods with ID valuations
that are uniform on [0, 3], but each cost 2 to produce. Selling them individually at price
5 will yield a profit of - per item and is better than selling them as a bundle-these are
low-profit-margin items that are only valuable to a small fraction of the population, and by
bundling them we may force a customer into consuming a good for which her valuation is
less than the production cost.
Over the decades, a lot of work has been done to compare the profit of Pure Bundling ver-
sus Pure Components. Adams and Yellen (1976) write, "The chief defect of Pure Bundling
is its difficulty in complying with Exclusion," where Exclusion refers to the principle that
a transfer is better off not occuring when the consumer's valuation is below the producer's
cost. It is observed in Schmalensee (1984) for the case of bivariate normal valuations that
Pure Bundling is better when mean valuations are high compared to costs. Bakos and Bryn-
jolfsson (1999) prove that bundling a large number of goods can extract almost all of the
available surplus, but this is crucially dependent on the items being "information goods",
i.e. goods with no production costs. Fang and Norman (2006) characterize conditions under
which Pure Bundling outperforms Pure Components for a fixed number of items, and all
of their conditions imply low costs. Li et al. (2013) define a measure of consumer hetero-
geneity that increases with costs, and present computational results showing Pure Bundling
performs poorly relative to Pure Components as their measure of consumer heterogeneity
increases.
The indisputable conclusion from all this work is that high costs are the greatest im-
pediment to the magic of bundling. However, we argue that there is a simple way to enjoy
the effects of bundling while allowing for the flexibility of individual sales-sell all of the
items as a bundle, but allow the customer to return any subset of items for a refund equal
to their total production cost. We call this scheme Pure Bundling with Disposal for Cost
(PBDC). It is a strict improvement of Pure Bundling where the customer's valuations that
were below the cost have been truncated to equal the cost. Meanwhile, the firm is indifferent
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between producing an item for its cost or returning its cost to the customer, but PBDC
makes it easier to sell the bundle because customers with low valuations for specific items
won't be priced out of the market.
Importantly, there is great flexibility in how to present PBDC to the customer in a
transparent and attractive way. In fact, we show that PBDC has a few equivalent formu-
lations which can already be seen in the market. One formulation is a tariff to enter the
market, after which all products are sold at cost. Alternatively, PBDC can be introduced
with an individual price for each item and a per-item discount for each item purchased
beyond the first. From a marketing point of view, the tariff strategy is more attractive
when the number of items is large, while the discount strategy is more attractive when the
number of items is small.
Our scheme can be compared to that of Hitt and Chen (2005), who recognized the
need for a middle ground between Pure Bundling and Pure Components. They introduced
the scheme Customized Bundling, which prices each bundle based only on its size, and not
which items are included. Chu et al. (2008)1 perform extensive numerical experiments for
the same scheme, calling it Bundle-Size Pricing (BSP), showing that it can extract 99% of
the optimal profit in their simulations.
PBDC can be seen as orthogonal to BSP-while BSP imposes symmetric pricing across
items but allows non-linear pricing based on quantity, PBDC allows asymmetric pricing
across items based on cost but imposes additive pricing once the customer pays the tariff
to enter the market. When all item costs are identical, PBDC is a simplified version of
BSP, because instead of having n prices to decide, there is only one price to decide, be it
thought of as the bundle price, the tariff, or the discount. However, since we are able to
relate PBDC to Pure Bundling, it is much easier to analyze. Our work provides the first
theoretical explanation for some of the empirical successes in Chu et al. (2008)-indeed,
in their simulations, costs are either equal, or insignificant (equal to half of the product's
mean valuation).
We present two types of theoretical bounds in this chapter. Both require that items
have independent valuations, which is a standard and often necessary assumption in the
bundling literature. Both also rely on a transformation from costs to negative valuations
which as far as we know is new.
'See Chu et al. (2011) for the journal version.
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First, we prove that PBDC, with an appropriately chosen bundle price, extracts the
entire welfare as the number of items approaches infinity, so long as the valuations have
uniformly bounded variances. This type of result is based on the law of large numbers,
which says that the sum of cost-truncated valuations, which we denote with the random
variable X, lies within (1 e)E[X] with high probability. Therefore, the bundle price of
(1 - E)E[XI will be accepted by a (1 - e)-fraction of the customers, profiting almost the
expected welfare, E[X] - C (C is the total cost of producing all the items), which is an
upper bound on profit.
Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) have already proven this result for the case without costs,
and Armstrong (1999) has proven this result for a cost-based two-part tariff which we show
is equivalent to PBDC, so this result in itself is not new. However, our analysis introduces
the use of Cantelli's stronger, one-sided concentration inequality in bundling, recovering
previous bounds asymptotically and achieving a better bound when the coefficient of vari-
ation of X is large. In the latter case, both of the previous works recommend a bundle
price of C + e(E[X] - C), earning negligible profit, whereas our analysis never recommends
a bundle price below C + - (E[X] - C) and guarantees a non-zero profit.
Furthermore, we recommend PBDC even when the number of items is small-the second
type of theoretical bound we present is problem-independent, unaffected by the number of
items or their variances. We prove that the expected profit of the best PBDC pricing is at
least 5 of the expected profit of the optimal mechanism, except in detectable pathological
cases, where the best PC pricing achieves this guarantee. The benchmark in this theorem
is the maximum expected profit that could be achieved from explicitly pricing all subsets of
items 2 . This is a tighter benchmark than expected welfare, which could be infinite without
distributional assumptions.
We use tools from the computer science literature to bound this benchmark, most no-
tably from Babaioff et al. (2014), who prove in the costless case that the better of PB and
PC earns at least of the optimal revenue. We improve their bound from . to I by
using Cantelli's inequality, and enhancing their core-tail decomposition technique in analyz-
ing the core and tail together. We also construct an example improving the upper bound
from 2 to 3+1n2 , 1, where the previous best-known example is from Hart and
2 Technically, the optimal mechanism is also allowed to offer lotteries of items, which have been shown to
be necessary for achieving the optimum, in Hart and Reny (2012).
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Nisan (2012). Finally, we generalize the result of Babaioff et al. to the case with costs,
where PBDC is needed instead of PB. We should point out that when the benchmark is the
optimal mechanism, one cannot simply truncate all valuations from below by cost, because
the optimal mechanism could exploit low valuations to reduce the cannibalization of higher-
profit options. In general, profit is non-monotone, i.e. increasing customer valuations can
decrease the optimal profit, as reported in Hart and Nisan (2012).
In addition to the theoretical considerations, we provide a continuation of the numerical
experiments from Chu et al. (2008), extensively testing the efficacy of PBDC on a finite
number of items. We use the same independent demand distributions with the same pa-
rameters as Chu et al. (2008). In their setting where costs are low and identical across
items, PBDC is a special case of BSP. However, it still attains between 97.5% and 100%
of the (nearly optimal) BSP profit. If we allow costs to vary and be more significant, then
PBDC drastically outperforms other simple mechanisms (PC, PB, BSP), demonstrating its
robustness under different scenarios. In fact, the worst case for PBDC is the aforementioned
setting where it attains 97.5% of the profit of the best simple mechanism; contrast this with
79.9%, 16.8%, 59.5% for PC, PB, BSP, respectively, in their wost-case settings. In addition
to being profit-maximizing, PBDC also achieves excellent global surplus in our simulations.
Finally, we show that PBDC attains between 96.6% and 99.4% of the optimal profit (which
prices all subsets) when n = 3, and scales well as n increases.
The general goal of our work is to dispel the myth that high costs should drive a firm
away from bundling and toward individual sales. PBDC allows the firm to reap the benefits
of bundling while preventing items from being consumed for utility below cost. We should
point out that there do exist costless examples with independent valuations on which PBDC
performs poorly relative to the optimal mechanism (which is why it is necessary to include
PC in the statement of the second theoretical result). Here is a list, along with why PBDC
(equivalent to PB) is ill-advised for each instance:
" Example 15 from Hart and Nisan (2012): there are various different valuations, each
of which realizes to an exorbitant value with a small probability; bundling is ineffective
because the probability that more than one valuation is non-zero is infinitessimal
* Examples 1 and 2 from Rubinstein (2016): there is a need to partition the items, i.e.
split them into groups, and offer each group as a different bundle
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* Example 6.4.2 from Section 6.4: there is a need to price-discriminate, i.e. offer high
individual prices and a discounted bundle price
However, our numerical experiments demonstrate that over "average" instances, PBDC
performs far better than these pathological constructions and the worst-case bound of I ~
19.2% suggest. Indeed, once PBDC has eliminated the effect of costs, selling everything
under one bundle leaves very little to be desired.
6.1.1 Literature Review
Bundling has been the focus of many papers in three different disciplines: economics, com-
puter science, and operations research/marketing science. In general, the literature can be
classified into three categories: papers that provide insights, papers that suggest approxi-
mate algorithms with attractive worst-case bounds, and papers that develop computation-
ally efficient algorithms. In this subsection we attempt to highlight the most important
contributions to the bundling literature, independent of discipline.
Two Items. In the economics literature, the earliest recognition of bundling being able
to increase the revenue from selling two items is usually attributed to Stigler (1963); other
early research for two products includes Adams and Yellen (1976); Schmalensee (1984);
McAfee et al. (1989). Since then, Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003); McCardle et al. (2007)
have established conditions for bundling being optimal for two potentially correlated goods.
Simple Mechanisms. For more than two items, there is a great practical interest in
finding simple pricing schemes that are both profitable and easy to explain to the customer;
for surveys on how bundling has affected marketing practice see Stremersch and Tellis
(2002); Venkatesh and Mahajan (2009). However, the only concrete, general pricing scheme
we have found in this literature, other than the classical PC and PB, is the BSP proposed
by Hitt and Chen (2005) and Chu et al. (2008). Our scheme, PBDC, attempts to add to
this literature by providing a transparent, easy-to-compute heuristic.
Most of the attempts to prove that simple pricing schemes are indeed capturing most
of the optimal profit have been restricted to special cases (see Manelli and Vincent (2006,
2007)), or empirical evidence, as in the case of BSP, where its great experimental success
has been unexplained. That's where we turn to the computer science literature. There has
been more general work on auctions with multiple buyers, or valuation functions where the
valuation for a subset may not be additive over the items in the set, for which we refer to
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Rubinstein and Weinberg (2015); Yao (2015) and the references therein. We focus on the
case of a single buyer with additive valuations, which is the bundling problem.
In this special case, Hart and Nisan (2012) introduce performance guarantees for simple
mechanisms, which are further studied in Hart and Reny (2012); Hart and Nisan (2013).
One line of work (Li and Yuan (2013); Babaioff et al. (2014)) culminated in a proof that
either PB or PC must be within ! of optimal, for arbitrary independent valuations. By6
relating PBDC to PB, and improving upon their techniques, we are able to prove that either
PBDC or PC must be within - of optimal for the independent case with costs. When all
costs are equal, PBDC is a special case of BSP, so our work provides the first theoretical
explanation for some of the successes in Chu et al. (2008).
Recently, mechanisms where items are partitioned before bundling have also been ad-
vocated as simple in Cai and Huang (2013); Rubinstein (2016). Our bound improves the
theoretical guarantee for the partitioning scheme in Rubinstein (2016) from - to -. The
same core-tail decomposition of Babaioff et al. (2014) has also been recently used in Bateni
et al. (2015); Yao (2015), so our new bound improves guarantees from those works as well.
Computational Solutions. Others have tried to tackle the problem with more items
by giving up on simplicity and computing an explicit optimal or near-optimal solution
using optimization techniques. A mixed integer programming formulation was first seen
in Hanson and Martin (1990), and recently in the mechanism design literature, explicit
polynomial-time solutions were provided via linear programming in Cai et al. (2012); Cai
and Huang (2013).
As far as computing the optimal prices for simple mechanisms, Wu et al. (2008) use
non-linear mixed integer programming to solve for the optimal BSP prices, while Rubin-
stein (2016) gives a PTAS for the optimal partitioning. Computation is another benefit of
PBDC-like PB, it only requires calculating one price, which can be done via convolution.
Large Number of Items. Yet another line of work addresses the complexity of many
items by claiming that PB is guaranteed to be optimal as the number of items approaches
infinity, assuming independence and uniformly bounded variances. Traditionally, this line
of work has dealt with information goods which have no marginal costs (see Bakos and
Brynjolfsson (1999, 2000)), or showed that costs have a substantial effect on the efficacy
of PB (see Fang and Norman (2006); Ibragimov and Walden (2010)). Armstrong (1999)
advocates that the same result can be achieved with costs by using a cost-based two-part
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tariff, which we prove is equivalent to PBDC.
Our research strengthens this line of work by using Cantelli's one-sided concentration
inequality to get a tighter problem-dependent bound. Furthermore, we advocate for PBDC
even on a small number of items, both with our problem-independent bound, and our
numerical experiments.
Closed-form Solutions. There is also interest in finding analytical closed-form so-
lutions for the optimal pricing under simple cases of the problem. In the case of two
independent valuations, one of which is uniform on [0, b1] and the other which is uniform
on [0, b 2], Eckalbar (2010) derives elementary equations for the optimal Mixed Bundling
prices. Bhargava (2013) shows that the equations involve roots of high-degree polynomials
once costs are introduced, and uses a linear approximation to record solutions. Our trans-
formation in Section 6.2 shows that the problem with costs is equivalent to the problem
for distributions uniform on [a,, bj] and [a2, b2], where a, and a2 could be negative. The
difficulty of analytical solutions in general is discussed in Wilson (1993); Armstrong (1996);
Prasad et al. (2010).
6.1.2 Summary of Contributions and Outline of Chapter
" We introduce the idea of PBDC, eliminating the problem costs pose to bundling
(Section 6.2):
- We show that PBDC has equivalent formulations in the cost-based two-part tariff
that exists in the theoretical literature, as well as a new per-item discount scheme
- The idea of PBDC motivates a transformation from costs to negative valuations,
enabling the analysis in subsequent sections
" We improve "large-number-of-items" bounds for the performance of PBDC, using
Cantelli's inequality (Section 6.3):
- We recover existing bounds asymptotically and achieve a better bound when the
coefficient of variation is large
- Our bound suggests that the firm should not price the bundle such that the profit
margin is less than 1/3 of the expected welfare
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" We provide finite-item, distribution-free bounds for the performance of PBDC (Sec-
tion 6.4):
- We generalize existing bounds to the case with costs, where PBDC is needed
instead of PB
- We improve existing bounds in both directions (upper and lower bound)
- We compare this type of performance guarantee to that in the previous section
" We provide a continuation of the numerical experiments from Chu et al. (2008),
demonstrating the efficacy of PBDC for a finite number of items (Section 6.5)
6.2 Set-up and Equivalence Propositions
A firm has n different items for sale. For each i, the cost incurred by the firm for selling item
i is ci, a non-negative real number. ci can be thought of as an instantaneous production
cost, the opportunity cost of saving the inventory for someone else, or the value of the item
to the seller.
Each of the firm's customers has a valuation vector x C R' for the items. A customer
wants at most one of each item, and her utility for a subset of items S is EiEs Xi. X
can be thought of as a random vector drawn from D, the distribution of valuation vectors
across the population. The firm is risk-neutral and its objective is to maximize the expected
per-customer profit.
In the full generality of the problem, the firm's mechanism for selling the items is a menu
M of entries (q, s), where q E [0, 1]' is the allocation indicating the fraction of each item
transferred to the customer, and s is the payment that must be made for this allocation.
If q has fractional entries, then the allocation can be thought of as a lottery where the
customer only gets some items with a certain probability. The customer is also risk-neutral
and chooses the entry maximizing her expected surplus, qTx - s. We will assume that for
every entry, the payment covers the expected cost for the firm to produce that allocation,
i.e. s > qTc, where c = (ci,... , c.). Simultaneously removing all entries in the menu with
s < qTc cannot decrease the profit, since this can only force a customer who previously
selected an entry with negative profit to select an entry with non-negative profit.
Let X denote the support of D. Given a menu M, for all x E X, let qm(x) denote the
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allocation chosen by a customer with valuation vector x, and sM (x) denote the correspond-
ing payment. We will omit the subscript M when the context is clear. (qM(x), sM(x)) must
maximize the surplus of the customer among all entries of M 3 (the mechanism is incentive-
compatible), and one of these entries must be the no-purchase option with q = 0, s = 0 (the
mechanism is individually rational).
The firm's profit maximization problem can be written as maxM Ex~D[sM(X) -
qm (x)Tc}. However, the optimization over general menus is intractable, and the result-
ing menu may not be practical.
Definition 6.2.1. A pricing scheme is a restricted class of menus, implied by a compact
way of communicating the menu to the customer. It is assumed that the optimization
problem over the restricted class of menus can be solved efficiently.
The following pricing schemes are frequently referenced throughout this chapter:
1. Pure Components (PC): items are offered individually, at respective non-negative
prices PfC pPC
2. Pure Components with Uniform Discount (PCUD): items are offered individually, at
respective prices PfCUD pPCUD. There is an absolute discount of PoCUD which
is applied to each item bought beyond the first. For all i, p.PCUD > pPCUD > o is
imposed.
3. Pure Bundling (PB): all of the items are offered in a single bundle at non-negative
price PB and there are no separate sales.
4. Pure Bundling with Disposal (PBD): all of the items are offered in a single bundle
at price PBD with the agreement that if the customer buys the bundle, she can
return any subset of items S for a refund equal to EiES pPBD For all i, pPBD > is
imposed. Furthermore, P0BD pPBD is imposed.
5. Tariff Pricing (TP): there is a membership fee of PTP to enter the market. If the
customer enters the market, she can buy up to one unit of each item i for the price
of PTP PTP PTP pTP are all imposed to be non-negative.
3 In the case there are multiple maxima, the firm can choose between them; this can always be achieved
by small perturbations.
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6. Bundle-Size Pricing (BSP): the price of a subset S is pBS, which is dependent only
on the number of items in S, and not which items are in S. 0 = pBSP < pBSP <
pBSP is imposed.
PC and PB were introduced by Adams and Yellen (1976). PCUD and PBD are variations
of PC and PB, respectively, and to the best of our knowledge, PCUD and PBD are new to
this chapter. BSP was introduced by Hitt and Chen (2005); Chu et al. (2008), while the
idea of TP could be seen in Armstrong (1999). Note that PC corresponds to the degenerate
case of PBD where PRBD _ pPBD
Our first observation is the following:
Proposition 6.2.2. PCUD, PBD, and TP represent the same class of menus. Specifically,
given a PBD representation with prices
(PPBD PPBD PBD)
the corresponding PCUD representation is
n(PoPCUD _ pPBD - pPBD pPCUD _ pPBD +pPCUD PCUD PPBD PCUD)
i=1
and the corresponding TP representation is
n
(TP _ pPBD _ pPBD PTP = pPBD TP pPBD
The proofs of propositions are deferred to the appendix. Hereinafter, we will always
refer to PBD instead of PCUD and TP for the analysis; however, the existence of PCUD
and TP gives the firm additional flexibility in how to describe these menus to the customer.
Specifically, when the number of items is small, PCUD should be used instead of TP, since
it does not sound so enticing for one to pay a surcharge in order to buy a small number
of items. On the other hand, when the number of items is large, POPCUD tends to be large,
causing the individual items to be marked at exorbitant prices should PCUD be used. In
this case, paying a membership fee to have access to all the items does not sound so bad.
We are especially interested in the following subclass of PBD, where pPBD = c for all
i. Similar subclasses can also be defined for PCUD and TP, following Proposition 6.2.2.
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Pure Bundling with Disposal for Cost (PBDC): the bundle with all of the items is offered
at POBD. If the customer buys the bundle, she can return any subset S of items for a
refund of ZiEs ci.
Setting the refund for each item equal to its cost is a logical restriction to put on PBD.
To see why, consider the following definitions:
Definition 6.2.3. The welfare generated by a customer with valuations (x1,... , x") is
Sn1 max{xj - ci, 0}, which is realized when every item valued above cost is transferred
and no other items are transferred. Welfare can be split up as follows:
" The total surplus is the welfare realized from transfers that occurred, equal to
E= 1n qi(x)(xi - ci). Total surplus can be further split up depending on the price
charged:
- The producer surplus is another term for the profit earned by the firm, equal to
s(x) - En 1 qi(x)cj.
- The consumer surplus is the utility gained by the customer, equal to
E=1 qi(x)xi - s(x).
" The deadweight loss is the welfare lost because an item valued above cost was not
transferred, equal to i:x, >c,(1 - qi(x))(xi - ci).
" The overinclusion loss4 is the welfare lost because items were consumed for utility
below cost, equal to Zixjc, qi(x)(ci - xi).
It is clear from the equations that the sum of producer surplus, consumer surplus, dead-
weight loss, and overinclusion loss is Ei:xj>c (xj - ci), equal to welfare. Also, the fact
that the consumer surplus is non-negative (since the customer can always choose the no-
purchase option) implies that the profit is no greater than the total surplus, which in turn
is no greater than the welfare.
PBDC (and thus PBD) is strictly better than PB in the following sense:
Proposition 6.2.4. Given a PB menu with price pPB which is at least c1+.. .+c1c, consider
instead the PBD menu with prices (pPBD - pPB P1PBD =c1,...,P?BD = cn). For all x:
4 We use this terminology because Adams and Yellen (1976) refer to the act of not incurring this loss as
exclusion.
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* The producer surplus is no less than before.
" The consumer surplus is no less than before.
" The deadweight loss is no more than before.
" The overinclusion loss is no more than before.
Note that the preceding statements are not only in expectation; for every valuation
vector x both the firm and the customer are better off. There is no reason to use PB if
PBDC can be used instead, because PBDC is effectively PB where all valuations xi have
been replaced by max{x, ci}. This observation leads us to the following lemma:
Proposition 6.2.5. The firm's problem of maximizing expected profit with distribution D
and costs c is equivalent to the transformed problem of maximizing expected revenue with
distribution D', where D' is the distribution D shifted downward by ci in every dimension
i. Furthermore, for any menu in the original problem, the corresponding menu in the
transformed problem has the payment for each allocation reduced by the cost of producing
that allocation.
Proposition 6.2.5 is stated in precise mathematical language and proven in the ap-
pendix. If the original optimization problem was over a restricted class of menus, then
the class restriction in the transformed setting can be found via the second statement in
Proposition 6.2.5.
For the remainder of this chapter, we focus on bounding the revenue of PBDC in the
transformed setting, which is more amenable to analysis. PBDC becomes the class of menus
that offer the same price P for any non-empty subset of items (see Remark E.1.1 in the
appendix for a technical proof of this). The customer makes a purchase if and only if her
non-negative valuations (corresponding to valuations no less than cost) sum to at least P,
in which case the firm earns P.
It may be tempting to truncate all negative customer valuations to 0 and claim that after
this further transformation, PBDC is identical to PB. However, in Section 6.4, we bound
the performance of the best PBDC menu relative to the optimal menu (with no restric-
tion to a pricing scheme), which can be designed to exploit negative valuations to reduce
the cannibalization of higher-priced menu entries. In general, revenue is non-monotone,
172
i.e. increasing customer valuations can decrease the optimal revenue-see Hart and Nisan
(2012).
6.3 Asymptotic Performance Bounds
In this section we analyze the performance of PBDC with a large number of items, whose
costs have been transformed into negative valuations according to the previous section.
We assume that the valuations for different items are independent random variables. Also
making some assumptions on the means and variances of the individual distributions, PBDC
is asymptotically optimal as the number of items becomes large.
Armstrong (1999) has already proven this result for Cost-based Tariff Pricing (TP with
the additional restriction that P TP = ci for all i), which is equivalent to PBDC via Proposi-
tion 6.2.2. However, our analysis works under weaker assumptions, by employing Cantelli's
inequality, along with other tools. To our knowledge, we are the first to use Cantelli's
one-sided concentration inequality to get an improved performance bound for bundling;
previous works by Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999); Armstrong (1999); Fang and Norman
(2006) all use the weaker Chebyshev's inequality. The analysis also motivates our finite-
item, distribution-free bounds in Section 6.4, where we again make improvements using
Cantelli's inequality.
Lemma 6.3.1. (Cantelli's Inequality) Let X be a random variable with (finite) mean A and
variance o2. Let t be an arbitrary non-negative real number. Then
P[X - A <5 -t] < o
We refer the reader to Lugosi (2009) for a proof, as well as more background. Our main
result in this section is the following:
Theorem 6.3.2. Suppose a firm is selling items to a customer with valuation vector
x drawn from distribution D. Let VAL+(D) denote the mean of the welfare, equal to
Ex-D[ZEmax{x,0}], and assume that 0 < VAL+(D) < oo. Furthermore, let Cv+(D)
denote the coefficient of variation of the welfare, equal to ~.-D , and assume
that Cv+(D) < oo. Then for all e c [0, 1], the expected revenue of the PBDC menu with
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price (1 - 6)VAL+(D) is at least e2 _+) - VAL+(D). In particular, if
2(Cv+(D)) 2 
= V ()23, 6.4)
3(Cv+(D))s + 2(
then the expected revenue is at least
4
2 4 VA L+(D) (6.5)
4 + 24(Cv+(D))a + 45(Cv+(D))3 + 27(Cv+(D)) 2
which in turn is at least
(1 - 6(Cv+(D))2) -VAL+(D). (6.6)
(6.6) shows that when the coefficient of variation is close to 0, e scales with (Cv+(D))23
and earns a (1 - E((Cv+(D))1))-fraction of the expected welfare, recovering the result
from Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) and Armstrong (1999). However, for larger Cv+(D),
we still get a non-zero revenue guarantee in (6.5), and interestingly our analysis never
recommends offering the bundle below the price of (1 - )VAL+(D) = vAL.(D) Contrast3 3
this to the previous analyses, which recommend E = 1 when Cv+(D) > 1, earning zero
revenue. The value of E in (6.4), recommended by our analysis, is useful even when the firm
has the resources to compute the optimal value of E from D-both as a managerial reference
point, as well as in situations where the firm knows the mean and variance in demand but
is uncertain about the exact distribution.
Theorem 6.3.2 treats the welfare as an abstract random variable, but the revenue guar-
antee is weak if the coefficient of variation is large. Independence is important in allowing
the "law of large numbers" to control Cv+(D) when the number of items n is large.
Corollary 6.3.3. Suppose a firm is selling n items to a customer with independent valua-
tions x1,... , xn forming product distribution D. Let Amin be a lower bound on E[max{xj, 0}],
and let oa be an upper bound on Var[max{xj,0}], over i = 1,... ,n. Suppose imin > 0,
L-max < oo, and n > ( Oz)2. Then the expected revenue of an optimal menu within PBDC/Amin
is at least
(1 - 6() max ) -2VAL+ (D).
Amin C
Taking n -+ oo, we get the result that PBDC extracts the entire welfare. Note that
truncating the random variables xi from below by 0 can only increase the mean and decrease
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the variance, so any lower bound on E[xi] and upper bound on Var[xi] would also satisfy
the conditions in Corollary 6.3.3.
Proof. Proof of Theorem 6.3.2. Let X = En 1 max{x, 0} be a single random variable
representing the welfare of a valuation vector drawn from D. As additional shorthand, let
p = VAL+(D) denote the mean of X, - = VAL+(D) -Cv+(D) denote the standard deviation
of X, and C = Cv+(D) denote the coefficient of variation of X.
We would like to bound the probability that X < (1 - E)p from above. Applying Can-
telli's inequality with t = EM, this probability is at most . Therefore, our expected
revenue is at least
0. 2  (1 _ 2 2
02+ E22 g2 + 2 P2
The fraction of expected welfare earned is
E 2 _ E3 2 _ 3(6 )
2 + C2 -23C- + i+ 2(67)
e2 -(+ C-)3
> 40 (6.8)
-5C3+ C2
The first inequality uses the weighted arithmetic mean-geometric mean inequality (see Zhao
(2008) for a reference), which yields 3 C2  6C2)- y2C3. The second inequality is
because for a fraction 1 with 0 < a < b subtracting the same amount less than b from both
the numerator and the denominator can only decrease the fraction.
2Ci
Now, if we choose e = 2 (this is motivated by setting the derivative of (6.8) to
3C3+ 2
zero), then the LHS of (6.7) becomes
4C3(1 
-
_)
(3C- + 2)2(iCN +02) (2 + 3C)2( )
4
4 + 24C3 + 45C3 + 27C2
4 + L5-C3 + 2C3
1- +C 4C/ +44+72(4 + 24C3s + 45C3 + 27C2
> - 6C3
where the inequality holds because the expression in parentheses is less than 1. This estab-
lishes both (6.5) and (6.6), completing the proof of Theorem 6.3.2. E
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Proof. Proof of Corollary 6.3.3. By independence, Var[Z', max{x, 0}] =
Z 1 Var[max{x, 0}J] which is at most no,2. Furthermore, E[> 1 max{3N, 0}] >! nymin.
Therefore, Cv+(D) is upper bounded by , and it is easy to see from the proof of
Theorem 6.3.2 that all of its statements continue to hold when Cv+(D) is replaced by an
upper bound on Cv+(D). The condition n > ( maL)2 ensures that Cv+(D) < 1, and the
result follows immediately from substituting Cv+(D) U into (6.6). l
6.4 Finite-item, Distribution-free Performance Bounds
In this section we analyze the performance of PBDC with only the independence assumption
on the items, whose costs have been transformed into negative valuations according to
Section 6.2. All proofs are deferred to the appendix, but we sketch the techniques needed
to handle arbitrary distributions.
Theorem 6.4.1. Suppose a firm is selling items to a customer with independent (and
potentially negative) valuations forming product distribution D. Let REv(D) denote the
expected revenue of an optimal menu (along with tie-breaking rules) for distribution D.
Then the expected revenue of either the optimal menu within PBDC or the optimal menu
within PC is at least
I
- . REv(D).
5.2
In the previous section, we showed that with assumptions on the number of items and
their variances, PBDC can earn almost all of the expected welfare, VAL+(D). However, this
is clearly false without distributional assumptions-VAL+(D) can be infinite. To recover
some guarantee on performance, we need to use the core-tail decomposition, a technique
developed through Hart and Nisan (2012); Li and Yuan (2013); Babaioff et al. (2014).
The idea of the core-tail decomposition is to split off from each independent distribution
all the valuations above a large positive cutoff (the "tail"). The remaining valuations (the
"core") are bounded, and it can be shown using a concentration inequality that PB (in
our case PBDC) performs well relative to the welfare of the core. Meanwhile, PC can be
shown to perform well relative to the optimal mechanism in the tail. Finally, the core bound
(relative to the expected welfare of the core) and the tail bound (relative to the optimal
expected revenue for the tail) can be combined to get a performance guarantee relative to
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Table 6.1: Comparison of Guarantees
Corollary 6.3.3 (Section 6.3) Theorem 6.4.1 (Section 6.4)
Dependence on n bound only relevant for large n none
Assumptions on Distributions uniformly bounded variance none
Benchmark expected welfare expected revenue of optimal menu
% of Benchmark Guaranteed 100% as n -+ oc with the help of PC
Related Literature Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) Babaioff et al. (2014)
The advantages of each bound are bolded.
the optimal expected revenue on D.
Theorem 6.4.1 improves upon the main result of Babaioff et al. (2014) by increasing
the guarantee from . to -, and allowing for negative valuations. The differences in our6 5.2'
analysis can be summarized as follows:
" We analyze the core and tail together, and show that the worst case for PBDC in the
core and worst case for PC in the tail cannot simultaneously occur
" We use Cantelli's inequality instead of Chebyshev's inequality in the core bound
" We show that the core bound and the tail bound can still be combined to upper-
bound the optimal revenue on D when the optimal mechanism can exploit negative
valuations
Table 6.1 compares Theorem 6.4.1 to the type of bound in the previous section, in
particular Corollary 6.3.3. Essentially, to accommodate arbitrary distributions, we have
to settle for a constant fraction of the optimum, compare against an optimum that is
convoluted, and also allow ourselves to use PC in pathological cases.
One additional point worth mentioning is that it is unclear from Theorem 6.4.1 what the
optimal prices for PBDC or PC are. It is assumed that the firm, knowing distribution D, can
compute the optimal prices for both PBDC and PC and use the scheme with higher expected
revenue, with the knowledge that it will be within - of optimal. Meanwhile, Theorem 6.3.2,
with its simpler analysis, has an explicit benchmark price of C - VAL+(D) for3(Cv+(D))2 3+2
the bundle in PBDC.
Finally, we address the tightness of Theorem 6.4.1. First we present a theoretical upper
bound.
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Example 6.4.2. Consider an instance with 2 costless items, which have IID valuations dis-
tributed as follows. There is a point mass of size 1 - p at 0, a point mass of size P at2
2, and the remaining 2 mass distributed in an equal-revenue fashion on [1, 2), i.e. selling
individually at any price in [1, 2) results in the same revenue. Formally, if Y is a random
variable with this distribution, then
1 y = 0
IP[Y -Y]={P l<y 2
P[Y~~ 1 ]= < y < 2
where the value of p is optimized to be 3 ~ 0.81.
Theorem 6.4.3. Consider the instance in Example 6.4.2. The best possible PC revenue is
2p, attained by selling individual items at any price in [1, 2]. The best possible PB revenue
is also 2p, attained by selling the bundle at the price of 2 or 3. The optimal revenue is at
least 2p(2 - p); this value can be achieved by selling individual items at the price of 2, and
the bundle at the discounted price of 3.
Therefore, neither PC nor PB can obtain more than 312 - REv(D) which is approxi-
mately
1
1.19 REv(D).
In Example 6.4.2, both PC and PB perform poorly because there is a need to price-
discriminate, i.e. allow customers who highly value an item to buy it for its individual
price, but still give customers with lower valuations a chance of buying it as part of a
discounted bundle. Very recently, Rubinstein (2016) constructed an example where both
PC and PB perform poorly because there is a need to partition the items, i.e. split them
into groups, and offer each group as a different bundle. In his example, the better of PC
and PB can only obtain . + e of the revenue via partitioning, which is smaller than our
bound. However, our example exhibits the worst-known loss from not price-discriminating,
where even partitioning performs poorly relative to the optimal mechanism. Our example
also only requires two ID items, following the examples of Hart and Nisan (2012); Hart and
Reny (2012); the example in Rubinstein (2016) requires a large number of distinct items.
Nonetheless, there is a large gap between the best-known lower bound from Theo-
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rem 6.4.1 and the best-known upper bounds, and furthermore, being guaranteed only
1 ~19.2% of the optimal profit does not sound so enticing. However, this bound arises
from a worst-case analysis that needs to address pathological instances, on which PBDC
does not obtain - of the optimum, but PC does. In the next section, we test the perfor-5.2
mance of PBDC over "average" instances.
6.5 Numerical Experiments
In this section we conduct a continuation of the numerical experiments from Chu et al.
(2008) where PBDC is included as an additional pricing scheme. As a disclaimer, we should
quote Chu et al. (2008) on the limitations inherent to this kind of numerical analysis:
"Although we attempt to cover a large space of parameter values, the results
clearly depend on the specific parameters we choose (i.e., the choice of grid).
Further, there is no way for us to know whether we are under- or oversampling
the relevant (i.e., empirically plausible) combinations of parameters. So, for
example, when we describe average outcomes, these should certainly not be
interpreted as outcomes that would be expected in an empirical sense-they
should be interpreted narrowly as the average of the experiments we performed."
6.5.1 Procedure
For consistency, we follow the setup from Chu et al. (2008) as closely as possible. We use the
same five families of valuation distributions commonly used to model demand-Exponential,
Logit, Lognormal, Normal, and Uniform. We also use the same ranges of parameters for
these families, as outlined in Table 6.2. The parameters were calibrated so that valuations
across different families have similar means on average, and the highest means are around 10
times the lowest means. We allow for free disposal, just like Chu et al. (2008)-all negative
valuations are converted to 0. We assume that valuations are independent across items.
As far as costs, we consider three scenarios:
1. Heterogeneous Items: valuation distributions fluctuate in accordance with Table 6.2,
while costs are low. The cost of each item is set to 0.2, except in the case of Uniform
distributions, where it is set to half the item's mean valuation. These are the same
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Table 6.2: Ranges of Parameters, replicated from Chu et al. (2008)
Exponential Marginal distributions are Exponential, with means chosen uniformly
from [0.2, 2]. Thus the rates A are in [0.5, 5].
Logit Marginal distributions are Gumbel, with fixed scale o = 0.25 and means
chosen uniformly from [0, 2.51. Thus the locations p are in [-0.2 5-y, 2.5 -
0.25y] ~ [-0.14,2.36].
Lognormal Marginal distributions are Lognormal. Logarithms of valuations are
Normally distributed with means chosen uniformly from [-1.5, 1] and
fixed variance o.2 = 0.25. Thus the original valuations have means in
[e-1.5+0. 12 5, e1+0. 12 5 ] ~ [0.25, 3.08].
Normal Marginal distributions are Normal with means chosen uniformly from
[-1, 2.5] and variances chosen uniformly from [0.25, 1.75].
Uniform Marginal distributions are Uniform on [0, b], where b is chosen uniformly
from [0.4,4]. Thus the means are in [0.2,2].
Note that Chu et al. (2008) have two separate families of Normal distributions, one with
varying mean and one with varying variance. For convenience, we allow both to vary at the
same time.
numbers used in Chu et al. (2008), so this scenario is a duplicate of some of their
experiments.
2. Heterogeneous Costs: valuation distributions are identical, while costs fluctuate. The
costs are chosen uniformly from [0, 2.5], approximately the same range as the means.
In the case of the bounded Uniform distribution, the costs are chosen uniformly from
0 to 0.75 times the maximum valuation, so that there always are some customers
who value the item above cost. The fixed valuation distributions are disclosed in
Table 6.3-we choose a mean that is on the high end of the range to avoid degenerate
instances, where the welfare in the system is near 0 when costs are high.
3. Heterogeneous Items and Costs: both valuation distributions and costs are allowed to
fluctuate (independently) according to the preceding scenarios.
The parameters and costs are summarized in Table 6.3.
We compare the four simple pricing schemes-PC, PB, BSP, and PBDC. Unlike Chu
et al. (2008), we do not compute the optimal deterministic profit with 2" - 1 prices, since it
is hard to compute, difficult to implement in practice, and could be far off from the optimal
profit of a randomized mechanism anyway. Skipping this expensive computation allows us
to consider n from 2 up to 6.
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Table 6.3: Summary of Parameters and Costs
Taste Distribution Range for Means Fixed Mean Range for Costs Fixed Cost
Exponential [0.20,2.00 1.25 [0,2.5] 0.2
Logit [0.00,2.50] 1.5 [0,2.5] 0.2
Lognormal [0.25,3.08] e0.5+0 12 5  1.87 [0,2.5] 0.2
Normal [0.00,2.50] 1.5 (and variance 1) [0,2.5] 0.2
Uniform [0.20,2.00] irrelevant [0, 1.5]xmean 0.5xmean
For each combination of the 3 cost scenarios, 5 demand distributions, and 5 options
for n, we randomly generate 200 instances, resulting in 15000 total instances. Chu et al.
(2008) were able to discretize the parameter space for each combination and generate 220
instances in a grid. While generating instances in a grid is more reliable than generating
instances randomly, we simply have too many combinations, because we allow costs to
vary independently, allow for larger n, and in the case of Normal distributions, also allow
variances to vary independently. Our randomized approach has the advantage of being
scalable, and not depending on the exact grid chosen. Furthermore, we have verified that
200 instances per combination is enough, in that repeating the experiments does not cause
the reported observations to change by any significance.
6.5.2 Observations
First, we report the performance of the simple pricing schemes separated by scenario. For
each instance (out of the 15000), we compute which of PC, PB, BSP, PBDC earns the most
profit on that instance, and record the performance of every pricing scheme as a fraction of
this optimum. For each scenario (out of the 3), we report the median performance as well
as 10'th percentile performance of every pricing scheme across the 1000 instances of each
distribution family (200 for each of n = 2,..., 6), in Table 6.4. We also count the number
of instances on which each pricing scheme was best, in Table 6.5.
We know from Chu et al. (2008) that BSP is within 1% of the deterministic optimum in
most of their settings, so there is minimal room for improvement under scenario 1. In fact,
PBDC is a special case of BSP when all costs are identical, and very similar to PB when
costs are low. However, as one can see in Table 6.4, PBDC still extracts close to 100% of
the BSP profit under this scenario, hence it also extracts close to 100% of the deterministic
optimum. For Uniform valuations, PBDC is no longer a special case of BSP, since costs
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Table 6.4: Median and 10'th Percentile Performances of Pricing Schemes
Heterogeneous Items Heterogeneous Costs Both Heterogeneous
PC PB BSP PBDC PC PB BSP PBDC PC PB BSP PBDC
0.1 %ile .766 .940 1 .994 .850 .269 .807 .995 .884 .137 .759 .978
Exponential 0.5 %ile .835 .972 1 .999 .931 .489 .907 1 .964 .403 .926 1
0.1 %ile .826 .937 1 .988 .815 .063 .245 .996 .852 .001 .385 .987
Logit 0.5 %ile .873 .992 1 .998 .891 .481 .595 1 .938 .168 .894 1
0.1 %ile .734 .982 1 .998 .775 .513 .760 1 .852 .015 .327 .931
Lognormal 0.5 %ile .799 .996 1 1 .861 .730 .880 1 .970 .245 .887 1
0.1 %ile .825 .745 1 .957 .858 .297 .779 .982 .904 .010 .699 .974
Normal 0.5 %ile .890 .880 1 .975 .926 .547 .912 1 .978 .198 .933 1
0.1 %ile .904 .834 .940 .949 .872 .348 .875 .948 .914 .380 .605 .937
Uniform 0.5 %ile .959 .867 .975 .998 .933 .578 .974 1 .982 .638 .875 1
For each scenario, the best performance in each row is bolded. The overall worst median performance of each pricing scheme is italicized.
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vary proportionally with means. PBDC actually outperforms BSP in this setting-indeed,
this is by far the worst setting for BSP listed in (Chu et al., 2008, tbl. 5), where it only
extracts 91% of the deterministic optimum.
Scenario 2, where valuation distributions are identical but costs are allowed to fluctuate,
really exhibits the power of PBDC, which allows customers to consume only the items they
value above cost via self-selection. PC loses out on not bundling similar items that differ
only in cost, while BSP is forced to compromise between charging cheap prices where high-
cost items may be consumed for utility below cost, or charging expensive prices that result
in a lot of deadweight loss in the low-cost items. In Section E.4, we show an instance that
exemplifies why BSP performs so poorly when the costs in the setup from Chu et al. (2008)
are increased.
When both valuation distributions and costs are allowed to vary under scenario 3, PBDC
is still the best strategy by a significant margin. However, the benefits of bundling have
decreased when items can be drastically different, so PC has gained ground. It seems
intuitive to hypothesize that the performance of PC is inflated by the small values of n we
are using. In the next subsection, we organize our reports separated by n, under scenario 3
(where both valuation distributions and costs are allowed to fluctuate).
6.5.3 Separation by n and Effects on Welfare
In this subsection, we allow both valuation distributions and costs to vary, and report
averages across demand distributions, separated by n (instead of medians over the different
choices for n, separated by demand distribution). Since the distribution families we're
amalgamating were calibrated to have similar means over their ranges of parameters, it
makes sense in this subsection to report average absolute profits, instead of median fractions.
We also report the figures defined in Definition 6.2.3, in the same way as Chu et al. (2008).
In Table 6.6, we report the expected values of these figures across the 1000 instances for
each n. The main conclusions are best summarized in Figures 6-1-6-2.
The first graph (Figure 6-1) shows that although PBDC optimizes from the perspective
of a selfish monopolist interested only in Producer Surplus, it has a similar advantage
in Total Surplus. There is no Overinclusion Loss, and the monopolist is encouraged to
choose a low tariff price so that most customers can enter the market. PC also incurs
no Overinclusion Loss, but incurs more Deadweight Loss because it does not bundle. PB
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Table 6.5: Number of Instances on which each Pricing Scheme was Best
Heterogeneous Items Heterogeneous Costs Both Heterogeneous
PC PB BSP PBDC PC PB BSP PBDC PC PB BSP PBDC
Exponential 5 - 995 - 19 - 114 867 206 - 113 681
Logit 0 - 1000 - 121 - 45 834 179 - 133 688
Lognormal 0 - 1000 - 8 - 70 922 245 - 68 687
Normal 12 - 988 - 20 - 180 800 216 - 201 583
Uniform 228 - 293 479 145 - 348 507 370 - 129 501
00
Table 6.6: Report of Economics Figures, separated by n
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Number of Items Statistic PC PB BSP PBDC
Producer Surplus 0.427 0.301 0.412 0.432
Consumer Surplus 0.287 0.194 0.250 0.292
2 Total Surplus 0.714 0.495 0.662 0.724
Deadweight Loss 0.192 0.351 0.224 0.183
Overinclusion Loss - 0.061 0.021 -
Producer Surplus 0.655 0.395 0.630 0.683
Consumer Surplus 0.437 0.254 0.382 0.436
3 Total Surplus 1.092 0.649 1.011 1.119
Deadweight Loss 0.291 0.604 0.352 0.264
Overinclusion Loss - 0.130 0.020 -
Producer Surplus 0.870 0.457 0.827 0.929
Consumer Surplus 0.587 0.293 0.497 0.582
4 Total Surplus 1.456 0.749 1.324 1.511
Deadweight Loss 0.396 0.905 0.498 0.342
Overinclusion Loss - 0.198 0.031 -
Producer Surplus 1.070 0.504 1.030 1.167
Consumer Surplus 0.705 0.297 0.595 0.703
5 Total Surplus 1.775 0.802 1.625 1.870
Deadweight Loss 0.488 1.158 0.600 0.394
Overinclusion Loss - 0.304 0.039 -
Producer Surplus 1.265 0.553 1.206 1.409
Consumer Surplus 0.844 0.346 0.697 0.828
6 Total Surplus 2.108 0.899 1.902 2.237
Deadweight Loss 0.587 1.440 0.736 0.459
Overinclusion Loss - 0.356 0.057 -
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Figure 6-1: Breakdown of Welfare for each Pricing Scheme, averaged over n
incurs significantly more Overinclusion Loss than any other strategy, forcing the customer
into buying every item at once. All in all, PBDC is equally attractive from the standpoint
of an altruistic policymaker interested in maximizing Total Surplus.
The second graph (Figure 6-2) shows the profits of each pricing scheme as n increases.
The PC profits increase linearly with n, since items are sold separately. Both the PB and
the BSP profits are concave in n-that is, the marginal gain from having one more item to
sell is decreasing. Indeed, PB is burdened with adding to its grand bundle another item
that could be valued below cost, while BSP is burdened with an additional distinct item to
consider in its item-symmetric cost structure. PBDC is the only pricing scheme where the
profit is convex in n, as each item creates additional incentive for the customer to enter the
market, and makes their total utility from entering the market more concentrated. This
confirms the hypothesis that while Table 6.4 reports a small gap between PC and PBDC
under scenario 3, this gap quickly widens as n increases.
6.5.4 Grid Instances and Comparing with the Deterministic Optimum
for n = 3
In this subsection, we generate instances in a grid where both valuation distributions and
costs are allowed to vary, for the n = 3 case. There are 3 possibilities for distribution mean
and 3 possibilities for cost for each of 3 different items, resulting in a total of 36 = 729
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1.600
Figure 6-2: Average Profit of each Pricing Scheme, as a function of n
instances. This is repeated over the 5 different demand distributions. The grid is outlined
in Table 6.7; we centered the grid around the values from Table 6.3.
We report the performance of each simple pricing scheme over these 729 instances in
the same manner as Table 6.4, except this time every number is recorded as a fraction of
the optimal deterministic profit, which is at least the profit of any simple pricing scheme.
The results are displayed in Table 6.8.
In the median case, PBDC obtains between 96.6% to 99.4% of the deterministic optimum
across the different demand distributions. This confirms both that PBDC is performing well
relative to the optimal deterministic profit and not just other simple mechanisms, and that
our earlier numbers with random instances are consistent.
To summarize our numerical experiments, we considered both scenarios with low costs
and scenarios with high costs, and reported median performances over n = 2,..., 6 for
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Table 6.7: Grid for Items Parameters and Costs
Table 6.8: Median and 10'th Percentile Performances over the Grid
Taste Distribution Statistic PC PB BSP PBDC
Exponential 0.1 %ile .863 .159 .600 .889
Exponential 0.5 %ile .932 .474 .872 .966
. 0.1 %ile .881 .000 .219 .966
Logit 0.5 %ile .941 .308 .918 .994
Lognormal 0.1 %ile .834 .575 .735 .946Lgnorma _ 0.5 %ile .909 .898 .959 .989
0.1 %ile .877 .095 .593 .944Normal 0.5 %ile .925 .479 .880 .968
0.1 %ile .874 .340 .461 .899Uniform 0.5 %ile .922 .723 .888 .972
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Taste Distribution Grid for Means Grid for Costs
Exponential {0.5, 1.25, 2} {0, 1.25, 2.5}
Logit {0.5, 1.5, 2.5} {0, 1.25, 2.5}
025 0.625 115Lognormal {e , e Ie2, 1 125 } {1.13, 1.87, 3.08} {0, 1.25, 2.5}
Normal {0.5, 1.5, 2.5} (and fixed variance 1) {0, 1.25, 2.5}
Uniform {0.4, 1, 1.6} {0, 0.75, 1.5} x mean
different demand distributions. When costs are low, PC can earn as little as 79.9% of the
profit of the optimal simple mechanism. When costs are high, PB can earn as little as 16.8%
of the profit of the optimal simple mechanism, BSP can earn as little as 59.5%, and PC
also falls behind as n increases. PBDC has the highest percentages overall, and is by far
the most robust over different cost scenarios, always obtaining at least 97.5% of the profit
of the optimal simple mechanism. We should point out that throughout our simulations,
PBDC was also computationally much faster than BSP, requiring an optimization over 1
price instead of n.
6.6 Conclusion and Open Questions
In this chapter, we propose a simple strategy for the multi-product pricing problem: Pure
Bundling with Disposal for Cost, or PBDC. We prove that PBDC is asymptotically optimal.
When there are only a small number of items, we still guarantee that either PBDC or PC
earns at least - ~ 19.2% of the optimal profit, and our simulations suggest that this is5.2
closer to 96.6%-99.4% in the average case, and that PC is not needed. While this is worse
than the 99% achieved by Chu et al. (2008) for BSP in their experiments with lower costs,
the pricing problem becomes much harder when costs are significant, and the existing simple
pricing schemes (including BSP) fall behind PBDC by a great deal. Yet, production costs
exceeding mean valuations is a common occurrence in industry, where only a small fraction
of a company's customers may have interest in any particular item.
One caveat with PBDC is that the prices do reveal production costs to the customer.
If this is undesired, a potential remedy is optimizing prices over the larger class of Tariff
Pricing (TP) strategies, which has n +1 degrees of freedom and is guaranteed to be at least
as profitable as PBDC. We believe that using TP instead of PBDC is very reasonable in
practice, so long as the firm can accept the significant increase in computation time and
decrease in the manager's ability to interpret the pricing.
However, the true demand distribution is never known, and must be constructed from
data. When the given demand is prone to error, we hypothesize that there is additional
benefit in choosing strategies that optimize one price at a time (such as PC, PB, PBDC)
over strategies that optimize 0(n) prices together (such as BSP, TP, MB). Besides, the
theoretical guarantee for PBDC is no worse than that for TP, and PBDC is optimal as the
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number of items approaches infinity. We find it particularly interesting that as n increases
and there are more potential prices to optimize, the benefit of optimizing only one price is
greater.
All in all, PBDC captures the concentration effects of bundling and the selection effects of
individual sales in a single heuristic that is computationally minimal and highly marketable.
We hope our work on PBDC will have an impact on both the theory and practice of
bundling, and be viewed as an effort to tie together the streams of research from three
different disciplines: economics, computer science, and operations research.
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Chapter 7
Improvements and Generalizations
of Stochastic Knapsack and
Markovian Bandits Approximation
Algorithms
We study the multi-armed bandit problem with arms which are Markov chains with re-
wards. In the finite-horizon setting, the celebrated Gittins indices do not apply, and the
exact solution is intractable. We provide approximation algorithms for the general model of
Markov decision processes with non-unit transition times. When preemption isn't allowed,
we provide a ( e)-approximation, along with an example showing this is tight. When pre-
emption is allowed, we provide a -- approximation, which improves to a f-approximation
when transition times are unity. Our model captures the Markovian Bandits model of
Gupta et al., the Stochastic Knapsack model of Dean et al., and the Budgeted Learning
model of Guha and Munagala. Our algorithms improve existing results in all three areas.
In our analysis, we encounter and overcome to our knowledge a new obstacle-an algorithm
that provably exists via analytical arguments, but cannot be found in polynomial time.
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7.1 Introduction
We are interested in a broad class of stochastic control problems: there are multiple evolving
systems competing for the attention of a single operator, who has limited time to extract as
much reward as possible. Classical examples include a medical researcher allocating his time
between different clinical trials, or a graduate student shifting her efforts between different
ongoing projects. Before we describe the model in detail, we introduce three problems in
the literature which motivated this work.
7.1.1 Markovian Bandits
The Markovian multi-armed bandit problem is the following: there are some number of
Markov chains (arms), each of which only evolve to the next nodel and return some re-
ward when you play (pull) that arm; the controller has to allocate a fixed number of pulls
among the arms to maximize expected reward. The reward returned by the next pull of an
arm depends on the current node that arm is on. When an arm is pulled, the controller
observes the transition taken before having to choose the next arm to pull. Multi-armed
bandit (MAB) problems capture the tradeoff between exploring arms that could potentially
transition to high-reward nodes, versus exploiting arms that have the greatest immediate
payoff.
The infinite-horizon version of this problem with discounted rewards can be solved by
the celebrated index policy of Gittins; see the book by Gittins et al. (2011) for an in-depth
treatment of Gittins indices. However, Gittins indices are dependent on the time horizon
being infinite (Gittins et al., 2011, sect. 3.4.1). The Gittins index measures the asymptotic
performance of an arm, and does not apply when there are a finite number of time steps
remaining.
Also, when we refer to multi-armed bandit, it is not to be confused with the Stochastic
Bandits setting, where each arm is an unknown reward distribution, playing that arm
collects a random sample from its distribution, and the objective is to learn which arm
has the highest mean in a way that minimizes regret. For a comprehensive summary of
Stochastic Bandits and other bandit settings, we refer to the survey by Bubeck and Cesa-
Bianchi (2012). The main difference between Markovian Bandits and Stochastic Bandits
'We use the word node instead of state to avoid confusion with the notion of a state in dynamic pro-
gramming.
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is that in the former, the parameters governing the uncertainty are given as input and the
challenge is computational, while in the latter, there is ambiguity in the parameters and
the challenge is to compete with an adversary who knows the parameters in advance.
The finite-horizon Markovian Bandits problem is intractable even in special cases (see
Goel et al. (2006), and the introduction of Guha and Munagala (2013)), so we turn to
approximation algorithms. The state of the art is an LP-relative g-approximation2 by
Gupta et al. (2011a) (see Gupta et al. (2011b) for the conference version). We improve this
bound by providing an LP-relative -- approximation for a more general model.
Martingale Reward Bandits and Bayesian Bandits
While Markovian Bandits is a different problem from Stochastic Bandits, it is a general-
ization of the closely related Bayesian Bandits problem, where each arm is an unknown
reward distribution, but we have prior beliefs about what these distributions may be, and
we update our beliefs as we collect samples from the arms. The objective is to maximize
expected reward under a fixed budget of plays.
For each arm, every potential posterior distribution can be represented by a node in
a Markov chain, and the transitions between nodes correspond to the laws of Bayesian
inference. However, the resulting Markov chain is forced to satisfy the martingale condition,
ie. the expected reward at the next node must equal the expected reward at the current
node, by Bayes' law. This condition is not satisfied by Stochastic Knapsack with correlated
rewards, as well as certain natural applications of the bandit model. For instance, in
the marketing problems studied by Bertsimas and Mersereau (2007), the arms represent
customers who may require repeated pulls (marketing actions) before they transition to a
reward-generating node.
Nonetheless, fruitful research has been done in the Bayesian Bandits setting-Guha and
Munagala (2013) show that constant-factor approximations can be obtained, also under
a variety of side constraints. For the Bayesian Bandits problem with no side constraints,
Farias and Madan (2011) show that irrevocable policies - policies which cannot start an
arm, stop pulling it at some point, and resume it later - extract a constant fraction of the
optimal (non-irrevocable) reward. Motivated by this, Guha and Munagala (2013) obtain a
2 All of the problems we discuss will be maximization problems, for which an a-approximation refers to
an algorithm that attains at least a of the optimum.
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(I - E)-approximation for Bayesian Bandits that is in fact a irrevocable policy.
Irrevocable Bandits
The above can be contrasted with the work of Gupta et al., who construct a non-martingale
instance where irrevocable policies (they refer to these policies as non-preempting) can only
extract an arbitrarily small fraction of the optimal reward (Gupta et al., 2011a, appx. A.3).
Therefore, without the martingale assumption, one can only hope to compare irrevocable
policies against the irrevocable optimum. We provide a (I - E)-approximation for this
problem, which we refer to as Irrevocable Bandits.
7.1.2 Stochastic Knapsack
The Stochastic Knapsack (SK) problem was introduced by Dean et al. (2004) (see Dean
et al. (2008) for the journal version). We are to schedule some jobs under a fixed time
budget. Each job has a stochastic reward and processing time whose distribution is known
beforehand. We sequentially choose which job to perform next, only discovering its length
and reward in real-time as it is being processed. The objective is to maximize the expected
reward before the time budget is spent. A major focus of this work is on the benefit of
adaptive policies (which can make dynamic choices based on the instantiated lengths of
jobs processed so far) over non-adaptive policies (which must fix an ordering of the jobs
beforehand), but in our work all policies will be adaptive.
Throughout Dean et al. (2008), the authors assume uncorrelated rewards - that is, the
reward of a job is independent of its length. The state of the art for this setting is a (I - 6)-
approximation by Bhalgat (2011); a (I - E)-approximation is also obtained for the variant
where jobs can be canceled at any time by Li and Yuan (2013). Gupta et al. (2011a) provide
a -approximation for Stochastic Knapsack with potentially correlated rewards, and a -
approximation for the variant with cancellation. We improve these bounds by providing
an LP-relative (1 - E)-approximation for a problem which generalizes both variants with
correlated rewards. Furthermore, we construct an example where the true optimum is as
small as -1 +6 of the optimum of the LP relaxation. Therefore, our bound is tight in the sense
that one cannot hope to improve the approximation ratio using the same LP relaxation.
However, it is important to mention that our results, as well as the results of Gupta
et al. (2011a), require the job sizes and budget to be given in unary, since these algorithms
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use a time-indexed LP. It appears that this LP is necessary whenever correlation is allowed
- the non-time-indexed LP can be off by an arbitrarily large factor (Gupta et al., 2011a,
appx. A.2). Techniques for discretizing the time-indexed LP if the job sizes and budget
are given in binary are provided in Gupta et al. (2011a), albeit losing some approximation
factor. Nonetheless, we always think of processing times as discrete hops on a Markov chain,
given in unary. Note that the Stochastic Knapsack problem with correlated rewards and
sizes given in binary can be shown to be PSPACE-hard (Dean et al., 2004, thm. 6).
7.1.3 Futuristic Bandits and Budgeted Bandits
Guha and Munagala (2007a,b) have studied many variants of budgeted learning problems -
including switching costs, concave utilities, and Lagrangian budget constraints. See Guha
and Munagala (2008) for an updated article that also subsumes some of their other works.
Their basic setting, which we refer to as Futuristic Bandits, is identical to Bayesian Bandits
(ie. there are Markov chains satisfying the martingale condition), except no rewards are
dispensed during the execution of the algorithm. Instead, once the budget3 is spent, we
choose a single arm we believe to be best, and only earn the (expected) reward for that
arm. A -approximation is provided in Guha and Munagala (2008), and this is improved
to a (j - e)-approximation in Guha and Munagala (2013). Our algorithm works without
the martingale assumption, but the approximation guarantee is only .
7.1.4 MAB Superprocess with Multi-period Actions
Motivated by these examples, we now introduce our generalized model, which we call MAB
superprocess with multi-period actions. Consider the Markovian Bandits setting, except we
allow for a more general family of inputs, in two ways.
First, we allow transitions on the Markov chains to consume more than one pull worth
of budget. We can think of these transitions as having a non-unit processing time. The
processing times can be stochastic, and correlated with the node transition that takes place.
The rewards can be accrued upon pulling the node, or only accrued if the processing time
completes before the time budget runs out. The applications of such a generalization to
3 1n some variants, there is a cost budget instead of a time budget, and exploring each arm incurs a
different cost. We explain in Section 7.2 why our model also generalizes this setting, which they refer to as
Budgeted Bandits.
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US Air Force jet maintenance have recently been considered in Kessler (2013), where it is
referred to as multi-period actions.
The second generalization is that we allow each arm to be a Markov decision process;
such a problem is referred to as MAB superprocess in Gittins et al. (2011). Now, when the
controller pulls an arm, they have a choice of actions, each of which results in a different
joint distribution on reward, processing time, and transition taken.
The purpose of the first generalization is to allow MAB to model the jobs from Stochastic
Knapsack which have rewards correlated with processing time and can't be canceled. The
purpose of the second generalization is to allow MAB to model Futuristic Bandits, where
exploiting an arm corresponds to a separate action. The details of our reductions, along
with examples, will be presented throughout Section 7.2, once we have introduced formal
notation.
We consider two problem variants for our general model: the case with preemption
(ie. we can start playing an arm, not play it for some time steps, and resume playing it
later), and the case without preemption. The variant without preemption is necessary
to generalize Stochastic Knapsack and Irrevocable Bandits. The variant with preemption
generalizes Markovian Bandits and Futuristic Bandits.
7.1.5 Outline
This chapter can be outlined as follows:
" Reductions from existing problems to MAB superprocess with multi-period actions
[sect. 7.2]
" Polynomial-sized LP relaxations for both variants of MAB superprocess with multi-
period actions, and analytical proofs that they are indeed relaxations [sect. 7.2.5]
" A (I - e)-approximation for MAB superprocess with multi-period actions-no preemp-
tion, with runtime polynomial in the input and 1 [sect. 7.3]
" A matching upper bound where it is impossible to obtain more than 1 + e of the2
optimum of the LP relaxation [sect. 7.3.1]
" A 4-approximation for MAB superprocess (with preemption) [sect. 7.4]
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Table 7.1: Comparison of results for SK
Previous Result as a Special
Problem Result Case of Our Problems
Binary SK - a (Bhalgat, 2011)
2Binary SK w/ Cancellation - E (Li and Yuan, 2013) [
Unary Correlated SK (Gupta et al., 2011a) - 6 [thm. 7.2.7]
Unary Correlated SK w/ Cancellation IT (Gupta et al., 2011a) 2 -E [thm. 7.2.7]
Table 7.2: Comparison of results for MAB
Previous Result as a Special Result with
Problem Result Case of Our Problems Martingale Assumption
Markovian Bandits 4 [thm. 7.2.8] - e (Guha and Munagala, 2013)48 27
Irrevocable Bandits - - E [thm. 7.2.7] - E (Guha and Munagala, 2013)
Futuristic Bandits - [thm. 7.2.8] - e (Guha and Munagala, 2013)
Budgeted Bandits - 7 [thm. 7.2.9] - E (Guha and Munagala, 2008)
* A -- approximation for MAB superprocess with multi-period actions (and preemption)
[sect. 7.4.3]
The ways in which these approximation ratios improve previous results on SK and MAB
is summarized in Tables 7.1 and 7.2.
7.1.6 Sketch of Techniques
The sketch we provide here is brief, but a more detailed high-level overview is provided at
the beginning of each subsection.
In the variant without preemption, we prove that given any feasible solution to the LP
relaxation, there exists a policy which plays every node with half the probability it is played
in the LP solution. This would yield a 1-approximation, but the policy cannot be specified
in polynomial time, because the previous argument is purely existential. Instead, we show
how to approximate the policy via sampling, in a way that doesn't cause error propagation.
In the variant with preemption, we derive an approximation algorithm which uses pri-
ority indices, based on an optimal solution to the LP relaxation, to accomplish the explore-
exploit tradeoff. Our priority-based policy is based on the ideas behind the convex decompo-
sition and gap filling operations from Gupta et al. (2011a). We perform a tighter analysis
for our algorithm and show how it can be generalized to the model of Markov decision
processes with non-unit transition times. Our analysis uses Samuels' conjecture (Samuels,
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1966) for n = 3 (which is proven) to bound the upper tail.
7.1.7 Related Work
The results on bandits, Stochastic Knapsack, and budgeted learning that are most related
to our results have already been introduced in the earlier subsections, but we mention some
additional results here. One such result for Stochastic Knapsack is the bi-criteria (1 - E)-
approximation of Bhalgat et al. (2011) that uses 1 + e as much space; such a result is
also obtained via alternate methods by Li and Yuan (2013) and generalized to the setting
with both correlated rewards and cancellation. Also, Gupta et al. (2014) introduce the
new stochastic orienteering problem, which associates jobs in SK with locations in a metric
space. The benefit of adaptive policies for this problem is also addressed by Bansal and
Nagarajan (2014).
Another example of a stochastic optimization problem where adaptive policies are neces-
sary is the stochastic matching problem of Bansal et al. (2012) - in fact we use one of their
lemmas in our analysis. Recently, the setting of stochastic matching has been integrated
into online matching problems by Mehta and Panigrahi (2012).
All of the problems described thus far focus on expected reward. In contrast, Ilhan
et al. (2011) study the variant of SK where the objective is to maximize the probability
of achieving a target reward; older work on this model includes Carraway et al. (1993).
Approximation algorithms for minimizing the expected sum of weighted completion times
when the processing times are stochastic are provided in M6hring et al. (1999) and Skutella
and Uetz (2001). SK with chance constraints - maximizing the expected reward subject to
the probability of running overtime being at most p - is studied in Goel and Indyk (1999)
and Kleinberg et al. (2000).
Looking at more comprehensive synopses, we point the reader interested in infinite-
horizon Markovian Bandits to the book by Gittins et al. (2011). Families of bandit problems
other than Markovian, including Stochastic and Adversarial, are surveyed by Bubeck and
Cesa-Bianchi (2012). For an encyclopedic treatment of using dynamic programming to solve
stochastic control problems, we refer the reader to the book by Bertsekas (1995). For an
encyclopedic treatment of stochastic scheduling, we refer the reader to the book by Pinedo
(2012).
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7.2 Problem Definition
We first define the fully general MAB superprocess with multi-period actions (and preemp-
tion) problem described in the introduction. We introduce the variant without preemption
later.
Problem 7.2.1 (Original Problem). There are n E N arms which are Markov decision pro-
cesses. For each arm i, let Si denote its finite set of nodes, with the starting node, or root
node, being pi. To play an arm i that is currently on node u C Si, we select an action
a from the finite, non-empty action set Au, after which the arm will transition to a new
node v E Si in t time steps, accruing reward over this duration. We will also refer to this
process as playing action a on node u, since for each pair (u, a), we are given as input the
joint distribution of the destination node, transition time, and reward. Specifically, for all
u E Si, a c Au, and possible pairs of destination and transition time (V, t), let pa denote
the probability of transitioning to node v in exactly t time steps, when action a is played
on node u. We will refer to this transition by the quadruple (u, a, v, t), and conditioned on
it occurring, let R',V, denote the reward accrued t' time steps from the present, for all
t'.=O0,..., t - 1. R4,, is a random variable with known distribution, taking values in
[0, oo).
Each Markov decision process i starts on its root node, pi. There is a total budget of
B E N time steps over which we would like to maximize the reward, in expectation. At
each time step, if no arm is in the middle of a transition, then we may choose a new arm to
play, along with an action4 . We observe the destination and sequence of rewards over the
transition time, realized according to the probabilities defined above. After the transition
is over, we may choose a new arm and action to play. After B total time steps pass, our
final reward is the sum of rewards collected up to that point, and an arm in the middle of
transition is cut off.
7.2.1 Problem Simplification
We now perform a sequence of transformations to simplify the problem and notation, as
well as aid in the analysis throughout the rest of the chapter. Assuming that the budget
4 For convenience, we allow ourselves to not play an arm at a time step, even though playing is always
beneficial, in that all rewards are non-negative.
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B and transition times t are given in unary, all of the transformations can be performed in
polynomial time.
TRANSFORMATION 1. We use A = Ug_ 1 UUEs, Aa, a common set of actions for all nodes
across all arms, defining incompatible actions to result in no transition.
TRANSFORMATION 2. We change all transition times t greater than B to equal B,
cutting off rewards with t' > B. Since there are only B time steps, the exact value of any
t > B does not matter, and only the rewards with t' = 0,..., B - 1 may be obtainable.
TRANSFORMATION 3. We replace each random reward R , with its deterministic
equivalent , = E[Ruvt ]. This does not affect the objective of maximizing expected
reward.
TRANSFORMATION 4. We add self-loops with unit-time and zero reward so that for all
nodes u and actions a, VES Pt = 1. That is, an arm always makes a transition,
instead of stopping.
TRANSFORMATION 5. We expand all transitions with non-unit processing times. For
any transition (u, a, v, t) with t > 1, we:
1. Add bridge nodes wi,...,wt-1;
2. Set transition probability pU,,,1 = PU,,,t, and change p ,,, to be 0;
3. Set transition probabilities b1, 2 1 =... =P , = 1 for all b E A;
4. Set all other transition probabilities involving wi,. . . , wt-1 to be 0;
5.St earsag,~ = ray, rbg1, = rgayv,1, ... ,r_,, = r a, ,,t,i_ for all5. Set rewards r b - aJ1' bVt0 alW77 W-'''
b c A.
As long as we enforce the bridge nodes must be played as soon as they are reached, the new
problem is equivalent to the old problem. Notationally, we will assume that they are played
with action a. Also, we will eliminate the subscripts t, t' and just write pa,, ra, now that
all transitions with t > 1 have been eliminated.
TRANSFORMATION 6. For all i E [n], u E Si, and a E A, define ra = ZvESp,v-ra, , and
consider the Markov decision process that earns deterministic reward ra every time action
a is played on node u, instead of a random reward rg, that depends on the destination
node v. Under the objective of maximizing expected reward, the two processes are again
equivalent.
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TRANSFORMATION 7. We convert each rooted Markov decision process into a layered
acyclic digraph, up to depth B. That is, we assume there exists a function depth mapping
nodes to 0,.. . , B such that depth(pi) = 0 for all i [n], and all transitions (u, a, v) with
, > 0 satisfy depth(v) = depth(u) + 1. This can be done by expanding each node in the
original graph into a time-indexed copy of itself for t = 1, ... , B-we refer to (Gupta et al.,
2011a, appx. E.1) for the standard reduction, which immediately generalizes to the case of
Markov decision processes with bridge nodes. We can cut off at depth B since there are
only B time steps in total.
We restate the problem after all the transformations, summarizing the notation.
Problem 7.2.2 (Transformed Problem). An instance of MAB superprocess with multi-period
actions consists of the following:
" A: the global set of actions, indexed by a, containing
- a: the default action used to play bridge nodes;
* n: the number of arms, indexed by i, each with
- Si: a finite set of nodes;
- Bi: the set of bridge nodes, a potentially empty subset of Si;
- pi: a root node in Si \ Bi;
- pa,: the probability of transitioning to node v when action a is played on node
u, for all a E A and u, v E Si (with u = v possible);
- ra: the reward obtained when action a is played on node u, for all a E A and
u C Si;
" B: the number of time steps, indexed by t;
" depth: a function from U U1 Si to {0, ... , B} satisfying
- depth(pi) = 0 for all i;
- depth(v) = depth (u) + 1 for all (u, a, v) with pa, > 0.
The objective is to choose an arm and an action during each time step to maximize expected
reward. At a time step, if the arm last played is on a bridge node, then the same arm must
be played again.
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7.2.2 Dynamic Programming
Algorithms for this problem are described in the form of an adaptive policy, a specification
of which arm and action to play for each state the system could potentially be in. A state
in this case is determined by the following information: the node each arm is on, and the
time step we are at5 . The optimal policy can be defined by an exponential-sized dynamic
program. We write the Bellman state-updating equations as constraints to get a linear
program whose feasible region is precisely the set of admissible policies. After adding in
the objective function of maximizing expected reward, solving this exponential-sized linear
program would be equivalent to solving our problem to optimality.
Definition 7.2.3. Define the following notation and related terminology.
1. For any positive integer m, let [m] denote the set {1, ... , m}.
2. Let S = U'" Si, the union of all nodes across all arms.
3. For all u C S, let Par(u) = {(v, a) E S x A : pa> }, the set of parents of u, i.e. the
(node, action) combinations that have a positive probability of transitioning to u.
4. Let S = Si x ... x So, the set of joint nodes, which are ordered n-tuples indicating
the node each arm is on.
5. For all 7r E S and u E Si, let 7ru be the joint node such that 7r! = u, and 7ru = 7ry for
all j =- i.
A state in the dynamic program can then be defined as a joint node 7r along with a time
t. Let yir,t be the probability of having arms on nodes according to ir at the beginning of
time t. Let i be the probability we play arm i at time t with action a, when the arms
are on nodes according to 7r. Note that some (7r, t) pairs are impossible states6, but for
notational convenience we still have variables for these states.
Our objective is
n B
max 7ri E Zit (7.1)
7rES i=1 aE A t=1
5Even though we have converted all Markov decision processes into layered acyclic digraphs, we cannot
deduce the time elapsed from the nodes each arm is on, since we allow ourselves to not play any arm at a
time step. Therefore, the time step must be included separately in the state information.
6 For example we could never be at a joint node with two or more arms on bridge nodes, and we could
not get an arm on a node of depth 5 at the beginning of time 5.
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with the following constraints on how we can play the arms:
n
S z4,i,, : yxt 7r E S, t E [B] (7.2a)
i=1 aEA
Zir,i,t = y,t 7r E S, i: 7ri B, t C [B] (7.2b)
z,i,t ; 7r E S, i [n], a c A, t c [B] (7.2c)
The novel constraint is (7.2b), which guarantees that we must play a bridge node upon
arrival. The remaining constraints update the y,,t's correctly:
Y(P1 ---,P-),1 = 1 (7.3a)
y-,1= 0 7r E S \{(pI, ..,p)} (7.3b)
n
Y7r,t Y7r,t-I z , a -
i=1 aE A
i pa t > 1, 7r C S (7.3c)
i=1 (u,a)E Par(7ri)
Essentially, the only decision variables are the z-variables; there are as many y-variables
as equalities in (7.3a)-(7.3c). These constraints guarantee EZs yT,t = 1 for all t E [B], and
combined with (7.2a), we obtain
z a,i, < t E [B] (7.4)
7rES i=1 aEA
Let (ExpLP) denote the linear program defined by objective (7.1) and constraints (7.2a)-
(7.2c), (7.3a)-(7.3c) which imply (7.4). This is the dynamic program for MAB superprocess
with multi-period actions (and preemption).
7.2.3 No Preemption Variant
Now we define MAB superprocess with multi-period actions-no preemption. We follow the
same set-up from Problem 7.2.1, and assume that the same sequence of transformations
from Section 7.2.1 have been performed to arrive at Problem 7.2.2. However, we add the
further constraint that for each arm, the set of time steps during which we play it must be
contiguous. We encorce this by adding a terminal node to each arm, from which it cannot
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be played; if an arm not on its root node is not played during a time step, then it transitions
to its terminal node.
Definition 7.2.4. Define the following notation and related terminology.
1. For all i E [n], let #i denote the terminal node of arm i, and let Si = Si U {i}.
2. Let S' = S' x . .. x S' \{7r : -ri {pi, qi }, 7rj V {pj, #j}, i / j}, where we have excluded
the joint nodes with two or more arms in the middle of being processed.
3. For all 7r E S', let I(7r) = {i :7ri = Oi}, the indices of arms that could be played from
7r.
4. For all i E [n], let A, = {7r E S' : 7ri {pi, Oi}}, the joint nodes with arm i active, i.e.
in the middle of being processed.
5. Let A = U', Ai, the set of joint nodes with an active arm.
6. For all 7r E S', let P(7r) denote the subset of S' that would transition to 7r with no
play during a time step.
(a) If 7r A, then P(7r) = {7r} U (Ui0I{7r" : u E Si \ {pi}}). 'P(7r) contains 7r
because 7r V A, hence 7r does not contain an active arm which would transition
to its terminal node with no play, and hence the system would remain at the
same joint node 7r. Furthermore, for any i such that i V I(7r) (i.e. 7ri = #i), arm
i would transition from any u E Si \ {pi} to #i with no play, hence for such u,
P(7r) contains joint node 7rU.
(b) If 7r c A, then P(7r) = 0. This is because if joint node 7r has an active arm i,
then we can only arrive at 7r by playing i, i.e. we cannot arrive at 7r with no play.
Now we can write the dynamic program for the variant without preemption. The ob-
jective is
B
max r 7 z (7.5)
7rES' iEI(7r) aEA t=1
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with very similar constraints on the z-variables:
iEI(7r) aEA
z,it = Yxr,t
zait > 0
7r E S', t E [B]
7r E S', i: 7ri C B, t C [B]
7r C S', i E 1(7r), a e A, t E [B]
The only difference from (7.2a)-(7.2c) is that arms on terminal nodes cannot be played.
However, moving forward, the state-updating constraints become more complicated, be-
cause now an arm can make a transition even while it is not being played, namely, the
transition to the terminal node. We update the y-variables as follows:
Y(pl,...,Pn),l = 1
y,1 =0
Yir,t = (Yir',t-i - Sr
7r'EP(7r) iEI(7r') aEA
Yir,t = (za,,it 1 ) a
a:(pi,a)EPar(7ri) 7r'ET( TPi)
(7.7a)
7r G S'\ {(pi, .. , p)} (7.7b)
t > 1,, 7r ECSt\ A (7.7c)
t > I1Ii E [n],w Cr Aj,depth (7w) 1
(7.7d)
Y7r,t = Pzaitl
(u,a)EPar(r)
t > 1, i C [n], 7r E Ai, depth(7ri) > 1
(7.7e)
(7.7c) updates y,,t for 7r V A, ie. joint nodes with no active arms. Such a joint node -r
can only be arrived upon by making no play from a joint node in 'P(r).
(7.7d), (7.7e) update yr,t for 7r E A. To get to joint node 7r E Ai, we must have played
arm i during the previous time step and transitioned to node ri. However, the restrictions
on the previous joint node depend on whether depth(7ri) = 1. If so, then arm i was on pi at
time step t - 1, so it's possible to get to 7r from any joint node in P(7rPi). That is, in the
previous joint node, there could have been an active arm that is not i. This is reflected in
(7.7d). On the other hand, if depth(7ri) > 1, then arm i must have been the active arm at
time step t - 1, as described in (7.7e).
Like before, these equations guarantee that at each time step, we are at exactly one
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(7.6a)
(7.6b)
(7.6c)
joint node, ie. Ecs' y,,t = 1. Combined with (7.6a), we obtain
z , <1 t E [B] (7.8)
rES' iEI(7r) aEA
Let (ExpLP') denote the linear program defined by objective (7.5) and constraints (7.6a)-
(7.6c), (7.7a)-(7.7e) which imply (7.8). This is the dynamic program for MAB superprocess
with multi-period actions-no preemption.
7.2.4 Reductions from SK and MAB
Before we proceed, we explain why our model captures the problems described in the in-
troduction.
Markovian Bandits can be captured immediately by defining the action set to consist of
a single action, and not having any transition times greater than unity. Irrevocable Bandits,
the non-preempting variant, can be captured analogously by using the no preemption variant
of our problem defined in Section 7.2.3.
We show how to reduce the Stochastic Knapsack variants to Problem 7.2.1, which can
then be considered under the non-preempting variant in Section 7.2.3. A job in an instance
of correlated Stochastic Knapsack can be given as follows, when processing times are in
unary (Gupta et al., 2011a, sect. 2.1). Let B be the total time budget. For each t E [B],
let Pt be the probability of the job finishing after exactly t time steps, and in such a case,
let it be the reward returned upon completion. There are two problem variants, one where
jobs cannot be canceled once started, and another where jobs can be canceled at any time
(e.g., after observing that it will not finish before a critical threshold).
TRANSFORMATION 8 (CORRELATED SK WITHOUT CANCELLATION TO PROB-
LEM 7.2.1). There is a single action and we will ignore the superscript a. The set of
nodes is {p, #}, with the root node being p. For each t E [B], we set pp,o,t = Pt, with
R,,,t_1 taking the deterministic value of ft. This transition represents the job finishing
after exactly t time steps, returning a reward upon processing the final time step.
TRANSFORMATION 9 (CORRELATED SK WITH CANCELLATION TO PROBLEM 7.2.1).
There is a single action and we will ignore the superscript a. The set of nodes is
{S1,... , SB, 1}, with the root node being S1 . Node St represents the job processing its t'th
time step, and node # represents the job finishing. For each t E [B], we set ps,4,1 = ,
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the probability of the job finishing upon processing time step t conditioned on it not finish-
ing before then. We set pst,st 1,i =1 - pst,$,1- The rewards are on the transitions from St
to #, with Rst,$,1,o taking the deterministic value of it.
We show some examples of these transformations in Section F.1. As previously stated,
for both variants of SK, we use the non-preempting adaptation of our problem defined
in Section 7.2.3. However, we should point out that for SK with Cancellation, allowing
preemption on the jobs under our model results in a distinct problem. In Section F.2, we
construct an example where a policy that both preempts and cancels earns more reward
than the best policy possible with only cancellation, even when rewards are uncorrelated
with processing times.
Finally, we show how to reduce Futuristic Bandits to Problem 7.2.1. In Futuristic Ban-
dits, there are n Markov chains with rewards on nodes. There is a budget of T "exploration"
time steps. During these time steps, arms can be played so that they transition to different
nodes, but no reward is obtained. At the end of these time steps, each arm is on some final
node. Then there is a single "exploit" time step where the greatest reward among the n
final nodes is obtained. The objective is to maximize the expected amount exploited.
TRANSFORMATION 10 (FUTURISTIC BANDITS TO PROBLEM 7.2.1). We can use the
Markov chains from Futuristic Bandits directly as the arms in Problem 7.2.1. However, we
place no rewards on nodes. Instead, we add a separate "exploit" action, which when played
on a node, returns the reward of that node. The exploit action has processing time T + 1
and we set our time budget B to be 2T + 1.
This is equivalent to the Futuristic Bandits problem. First, note that it is impossible to
collect exploitation rewards from more than one arm. Also, we can explore for at most T
time steps if we are going to earn any reward at all. Note that in our problem it is possible
to stop exploring before T time steps pass. However, it is never beneficial to do so when the
rewards on nodes satisfy the martingale condition, as assumed in Futuristic Bandits. The
Budgeted Bandits generalization can also be reduced to Problem 7.2.1 by having different
processing times for exploring different arms.
7.2.5 Polynomial-sized LP Relaxations
We now write the polynomial-sized LP relaxations of our earlier problems. We keep track
of the probabilities of being on the nodes of each arm individually without considering their
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joint distribution. Let se,t be the probability arm i is on node u at the beginning of time t.
Let x'U't be the probability we play action a on node u at time t.
For both variants of the problem, we have the objective
B
max ru 1> xUt
uES aEA t=1
(7.9)
and constraints on how we can play each individual arm:
>3a, < SU t
aEA
XUt = SUtt
a > 0XU t -
u E S, t E [B]
u E B, t G [B]
u E S, a E A, t E [B]
(7.10a)
(7. 10b)
(7.10c)
Furthermore, there is a single constraint
uES aEA
t C [B] (7.11)
enforcing that the total probabilities of plays across all arms cannot exceed 1 at any time
step.
The state-updating constraints differ for the two variants of the problem. If we allow
preemption, then they are:
spi,1 = 1
sU,1 = 0
sU't = sU't-i - E U +
aEA
i E [n]
X ,t_1 * ,
(v,a)EPar(u)
t>1, U E S
If we disallow preemption, then an arm can only be on a non-root node if we played the
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(7.12a)
(7.12b)
(7.12c)
same arm during the previous time step. This is reflected in (7.13c)-(7.13d):
s,= 1 i E [n] (7.13a)
s"', = 0 u E S \ {pi, . . . , pn} (7.13b)
sp= s - x t > 1, i E [n] (7.13c)
aEA
sut = xt_1 . Pa t> 1, U E S \ {p1,.. . , Pn} (7.13d)
(v,a)EPar(u)
Let (PolyLP) denote the linear program defined by objective (7.9) and constraints
(7.10a)-(7.10c), (7.11), (7.12a)-(7.12c). Similarly, let (PolyLP') denote the linear program
defined by objective (7.9) and constraints (7.10a)-(7.10c), (7.11), (7.13a)-(7.13d). We still
have to prove the polynomial-sized linear programs are indeed relaxations of the exponential-
sized linear programs. For any linear program LP, let OPTLP denote its optimal objective
value.
Lemma 7.2.5. Given a feasible solution {z {yr,t} to (ExpLP), we can construct a
solution to (PolyLP) with the same objective value by setting Xa't = tes. z 
E7rES:7ri=u Yrt for all i E [n], u E Si, a c A, t c [B]. Thus the feasible region of (PolyLP) is
a projection of that of (ExpLP) onto a subspace and OPTxpLP 5 OPTolyLP-
Lemma 7.2.6. Given a feasible solution {zai,t}, {y,,t} to (ExpLP'), we can construct a
solution to (PolyLP') with the same objective value by setting Xa't = reS Za'
EZrES':7ri=u Y 7,,t for all i c [n], u E Si, a C A, t E [B]. Thus the feasible region of (PolyLP')
is a projection of that of (ExpLP') onto a subspace and OPTXpLP' OPTpolyLP'-
Essentially, Lemma 7.2.5 says that PolyLP reduces from ExpLP, and Lemma 7.2.6 says
that PolyLP' reduces from ExpLP'. Recall that the feasible regions of ExpLP and ExpLP'
correspond exactly to the admissible policies in the two variants. These lemmas say that
the performance of any adaptive policy can be upper bounded by the polynomial-sized
relaxations. Our lemmas are analogous to similar statements from earlier works (e.g. Gupta
et al., 2011a, lem. 2.1), but put into the context of an exponential-sized linear program.
Their proofs are mostly analytical and deferred to Section F.3.
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7.2.6 Main Results
Now that we have established the preliminaries, we are ready to state our main results in
the form of theorems.
Theorem 7.2.7. Given a feasible solution {xut}, {su,t} to (PolyLP'), there exists a solution
to (ExpLP') with ,= z ly , =1 su,t for all i E [n], u E Si, a E
7rit U ti zEr:,ri=U Yrr,t ~ut ali~~~~~L
A, t E [B], obtaining reward 1OPTPO.yLP' . We can use sampling to turn this into a -
approximation algorithm for MAB superprocess with multi-period actions-no preemption,
with runtime polynomial in the input and 1.
We prove this theorem in Section 7.3, and also show that it is tight, constructing an
instance under the special case of correlated SK where it is impossible to obtain reward
greater than (I + E)OPT(pOlyLpI).
Theorem 7.2.8. There is a (PolyLP)-relative -!--approximation algorithm for MAB super-27
process (with preemption), when all processing times are 1.
Theorem 7.2.9. There is a (PolyLP)-relative -- approximation algorithm for MAB super-
process with multi-period actions (and preemption).
We prove these theorems in Section 7.4.
7.3 Proof of Theorem 7.2.7
In this section we prove Theorem 7.2.7. To build intuition, we will first present the upper
bound, showing a family of examples with OPT ,LPI approaching 2
PPlyLPI2
7.3.1 Construction for Upper Bound
Let N be a large integer. We will describe our n = 2 arms as stochastic jobs. Job 1 takes
N + 1 time with probability 1 - }, in which case it returns a reward of 1. It takes 1 time
with probability _, in which case it returns no reward. Job 2 deterministically takes 1 time
and returns a reward of 1. The budget is B = N + 1 time steps.
Any actual policy can never get more than 1 reward, since it cannot get a positive
reward from both jobs.
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After all the reductions from Section 7.2, the Markov Chains representing these jobs
can be denoted as follows. Let Si = {So, Si,. . . , SN, 01}, with pi = So. There is only
one action, and we will omit the action superscripts. The only uncertainty is at So, with
Pso,s = 1 - -,pso,4l = . The remaining transitions are ps,s2  PsN-,SN
PSN,01 = 1, and self loop on the terminal node p4,41 = 1. The only reward is a reward
of 1 on node SN. Meanwhile, S2 consists only of nodes {P2, #2}, with Pp2 ,42 = P2,2 1,
rP2 = 1.
Consider the solution for (PolyLP') with xsO,1 = 1, XS 1 ,2 = - = XSN,N+1 = X
N'N0, xP2,2 = X P2,N+l = I, all other x-variables equal to 0, and s-variables determined
using (7.13a)-(7.13d). It can be checked that this solution is feasible, and that its objective
value of 2 - - is optimal, since all of the potential reward is acquired. Hence as we take
N -* oo, we get OPTEpL -- 1
OPTPolyLPI -
Note that we can put all of S1 \ {pi, 01 } in B if we want; it doesn't change the example
whether job 1 can be canceled once started. It also doesn't matter whether we allow
preemption-both OPYTELP and O~PT pLP/ are . + E for this example.
Let's analyze what goes wrong when we attempt to replicate the optimal solution to the
LP relaxation in an actual policy. We start job 1 at time 1 with probability xs0 ,1 = 1. If it
does not terminate after 1 time step, which occurs with probability 1 - }, then we play job
1 through to the end, matching xS 1 ,2 = - . = XSN,N+1 = 1- -. If it does, then we start job
2 at time 2. This occurs with unconditional probability xP 2 ,2 = as planned. However,
in this case, we cannot start job 2 again at time 3 (since it has already been processed at
time 2), even though xP2 ,3 = - is telling us to do so. The LP relaxation fails to consider
that event "job 1 takes time 1" is directly correlated with event "job 2 is started at time 2",
so the positive values specified by x P2 ,3, - - -, xp2,N+1 are illegal plays.
Motivated by this example, we observe that if we only try to play u at time t with
probability X,2 then we can obtain a solution to (ExpLP') (and hence a feasible policy)
that is a scaled copy of the solution to (PolyLP').
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7.3.2 Specification of Solution to (ExpLP')
Fix a solution {x~t, su,t} to (PolyLP'). Our objective in this subsection is to construct a
solution z, yt} to (ExpLP') such that
za ,4, U- =i [n], u E Si, a c A (7.14)
7rES':7ri=u
obtaining half the objective value of (PolyLP'). We will prove feasibility in Section 7.3.3.
The intuition for the construction is as follows. For any u E Si and t E [B], in order
to play node u at time t, we must have started playing arm i at time t - depth(u), since
preemption is not allowed. Therefore, it is possible to partition the combinations of u, a, t
where Xat > 0 according to the time at which we must play pi. Having established this, we
only have to make decisions on which new arm to start, when the values of Xt, prescribe
that the current arm should be stopped. To satisfy the global constraint (7.14), the decision
to start arm i at time t (in a specific state) depends on the total probability of being able
to start arm i at time t (conditioned on the past policy and realizations).
For convenience, define xu,t = E>aA C- and Z,,t, = ZaA z,,t. We will complete the
specification of { , y,t} over B iterations t = 1,... , B. On iteration t:
1. Compute yr,t for all 7r E S', using (7.7a)-(7.7e).
2. Define P,,t = yx,t if 7r ( A, and ,,t = y,,t - ZaEA Zgg, if 7r E Ai for some i E [n] (if
r E A4, then : a E A} has already been set in a previous iteration).
3. For all i E [n], define fi,t = ZES':Ii=Pi Y7r,t
4. For all i E [n], 7r E S' such that 7ri = pi, and a E A, set z = ,t f-
5. For all i E [n], and 7r E S' such that 7ri = pi and 7rj E {pj,<0j} for j f i, define
g-z~,i,t = E~''(r Z~r',j,t.-
6. For all i E [n], u c Si \ {pi}, 7r e S' such that ri = u, and a E A, set Zgit+depth(u) =
ur~t~tedthtu)u
In Step 2, t,,t represents the probability that we are at joint node 7r and looking to
start a new arm at time t, abandoning the arm in progress if there is any. In Step 3, fi,t is
the total probability of being able to start arm i at time t, which we define as arm i being
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available when we are looking to start a new arm at time t. The normalization in Step 4
ensures that each arm is started with the correct probability at time t. In Step 5, g,i,t is
the probability arm i is started at time t, and other arms are on nodes {7r :.j # i} while
arm i executes (another arm j could have made a transition to #j during the first time step
t). Step 6 specifies how to continue playing arm i in subsequent time steps if it is started
at time t. Note that g,.pi,i,t is guaranteed to be defined in this case, since 7ri ( {pi, #i} and
7r E S' implies 7rj E {pj, Oj} for all j # i.
This completes the specification of the solution to (ExpLP'). Every y,t is set in Step 1,
and every z', is set in either Step 4 or Step 6.
Using the definition of fi,t, Step 4 guarantees that for i C [n], a c A,
a - 1 X
E 
- i~ 2  fit7rES':7ri=Pi 7rES':7ri=pi
Xa
2
Meanwhile, Step 6 guarantees that for i E [n], u E Si \ {pi}, a E A,
a X t+depth(u)Z r,i,t+depth(u) 97rPi,i,t' dept
7rES':7ri=u 7rES':7ri=u
_pit u,t+depth(u)
2 Xpt
Xa
u,t+depth(u)
2
We explain the second equality. Since u 5 pi implies arm i is the active arm in all of
{7r c S' : 7ri = u}, this set is equal to {pi, 01} x ... x u x ... x {pn, 0n}. Summing g7rPiit
over all the possibilities for {rj : j = i} yields the total probability arm i is started at time
t. This is equal to ZES'--~p, aEaA Z",t,, which by the first calculation is equal to .
The proof of (7.14) is now complete.
7.3.3 Proof of Feasibility
At a high level, the main challenge in proving feasibility is verifying (7.6a), i.e. the total
probability of plays scheduled for joint node 7 and time t does not exceed the probability of
being at joint node 7r and time t. Given the way the solution was constructed, it is mostly
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an analytical exercise (Lemma 7.3.1) to reduce (7.6a) to showing that the values of fi,t are
sufficiently large. fi,t is the probability of being able to start arm i at time t, which we are
not able to do if the current arm has not been prescribed to stop, or if arm i has already
been played. Lemma 7.3.2 shows that the probability of these events occurring is just small
enough when the probabilities of the LP relaxation, xzt, are scaled down by a factor of 2.
We will inductively prove feasibility over iterations t = 1,..., B. Suppose all of the
variables {za ,, y,,t,} with t' < t have already been set in a way that satisfies constraints
(7.6a)-(7.6c), (7.7a)-(7.7e). Some of the variables z ,i with t' > t may have also been set
in Step 6 of earlier iterations; if so, suppose they have already been proven to satisfy (7.6c).
On iteration t, we first compute in Step 1 y,,t for all 7r E S'; these are guaranteed to
satisfy (7.7a)-(7.7e) by definition. To complete the induction, we need to show that (7.6a)-
(7.6c) hold after setting the z-variables in Step 4, and furthermore, (7.6c) holds for any
zat, (with t' > t) we set in Step 6.
We first prove the following lemma:
Lemma 7.3.1. Suppose ir c A, for some i E [n]. Let u = ri (which is neither pi nor 0J.
Then aE A z yart, and furthermore if u E B, then zit = y,,t.
Proof. Proof. First suppose depth(u) = 1. (7.7d) says y,,t =
Za:(pi,a)EPar(u) (r'EP(rPi) 7 ',it- ppiu. Every 7r' in the sum has 7r = pi, so z w, Was
set in Step 4 of iteration t - 1 to r , - - _ . Substituting into (7.7d), we get
yIt t-
a:(pi,a)EPar(u) ir'EP(7rPi) i i--1
S7( S pr',t--) 1 a
7r'E P(7rPi) 21 a:(pi,a)EPar(u)
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Meanwhile, for all a E A, z 7r was set in Step 6 of iteration t - 1 to gPiti - 't Hence
SPpt--
z~ri, 97ri~it- ',- 1
u 
piit- 
-a
= Lr'- x ttxI
7r'EP(,rPi) b A - p,9 ,',t -1 2'
7r'EP(7rPi) f i
where the second equality is by the definition of g,.P,j,t_1, and the third equality uses the
fact that z4 ,,H1t was set in Step 4 of iteration t - 1. To prove EaeA 7r za, y,,,t, it suffices
to show ZaeA uXa,t Za:(pi,a)EPar(u) apt-1  . This follows immediately from combining
constraints (7.10a) and (7.13d) of (PolyLP'). Furthermore, if u C B, then we can use (7.10b)
to get z', ,i = y,,t.
Now suppose depth(u) > 1. (7.7e) says yr,t = (a)EPar(u) - ',. Since v y pi,
z 7r vjt-1 was set in Step 6 of iteration t' := t - depth(u) to grPj, x - Substituting into
xpi't'
(7.7e), we get
Y-7r, t =riit -5'
(v,a)EPar(u) xpi't'
97rPi,i,t' . a
WCP -1) pv,u
(pvt ,a)EPar(u)
Meanwhile, for all a E A, za, was set in Step 6 of iteration t' to g7rPj,i,t' xt . To7r i, tx pi't,
prove EaeA z ,it ! yr,t, it suffices to show ZaEA Xu , < E(va)EPar(u) _ p,. This
is again obtained from (7.10a) and (7.13d), and if u E B, then we can use (7.10b) to get
z,t = Y7r,t.
By the lemma, f,,t 0 if 7r Ai for some i E [n]. On the other hand, 9it 0 is
immediate from definition if 7r ( A. Therefore, B,,t > 0 for all ir C S', and (7.6c) is satisfied
by all the z-variables set in Step 4 or Step 6. Furthermore, the lemma guarantees (7.6b)
for the za,,, with 7ri C B set in previous iterations.
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It remains to prove (7.6a). If 7r E Ai, then the LHS of (7.6a) is
j E 1(7) jC-1(7)\{i} 1 xpjt
= Z7rit + (yr,t - Zr,i,t) f 2 -
jEI(7r)\{i}
For the first equality, note that z7,,j,t for j : i is set in Step 4 of the current iteration,
but z,,i,t has already been set in an earlier iteration. The second equality is immediate
from the definition of 9,,. Note that yar,t - z.,j,t > 0, by Lemma 7.3.1. If we knew
) P. 1, then we would have -eI(x) zjt z,,it + (y,, - zz,i,t)(1) = Y,t,
which is (7.6a).
On the other hand, if 7r V A, then the LHS of (7.6a) is Y1,t - 1 XfJ7, t where
in this case all of the z,,j,t are set in Step 4 of the current iteration. Similarly, if we knew
Z I() 2 -j, t 1, then we would have (7.6a).
To complete the proof of feasibility, it suffices to show < 1 (note that fj,t2= f3,t
is always non-negative, by its definition and Lemma 7.3.1). This is implied by the following
lemma, which proves a simpler statement:
Lemma 7.3.2. fi,t E'_ X, for all i C [n].
Proof. Proof. Fix some i E [n]. By the definitions in Step 2 and Step 3,
fA t = E Y7r, t - E5 Z7r,j,t
7rES':7ir=pi j74i 7tEAj:7r=pj
Let's start by bounding rES':r-pi y,t, the total probability arm i is still on pi at the
start of time t. This is equal to 1 - Et'< EES:=P, z,,i,t, where we subtract from 1 the
total probability arm i was initiated before time t. By (7.14), ES',. z , fft for
all t' < t. Furthermore,
tp ,t' < 1 (7.15)
tl<t
from iteratively applying (7.13c) to (7.13a), and combining with (7.10a) 7. Therefore,
7 Intuitively, we're arguing that solution to the LP relaxation still satisfies the total probability arm i
being played from its root node not exceeding unity.
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Now we bound the remaining term in the equation for fi,t:
Z Z~rj,t := YS E E Z~r,t
joi irE Aj:7rj=pi joi vESj\{pj} 7r:7rj=pirj=V
< E E E Z7r,j,t
j4i vESj\{pj} 7r:ir3 =v
i#i vES,\{pj}
1 At
j=1 vES\{pj}
1
( - E ,K)
j=1
The first inequality uses the non-negativity of z,,j,t in the inductively proven (7.6c), the
second equality uses (7.14), the second inequality uses the non-negativity of xv,t in (7.10c),
and the third inequality uses (7.11).
Combining the two terms, we get fi,t Q j t as desired.
j=1 2 asdsr.
7.3.4 Approximation Algorithm via Sampling
We would like to infer a polynomial-time policy from this exponential-sized solution
{zat, y7r,t} of (ExpLP'). It is not possible to merely compute the values of z,1 on the
realized sample path, because z,1 depends on fi,t, the total probability of being able to
start arm i at time t over exponentially many states. To overcome this challenge, at each
time step t, we sample (run the algorithm up to time t a large number of times, realizing new
transitions each time) to estimate the values of fi,t, before making a decision. We record
the sampling results and the decisions prescribed by such, since future sampling depends
on past algorithm decisions.
Hereinafter we will assume that the {xU, s,,t} we are imitating is an optimal solution
of (PolyLP'). Consider the following algorithm, which takes in as parameters a terminal
time step t E [B], and probabilities Ajet for each i E [n], t' < t (which for now should be
considered to be fi,,, to aid in the comprehension of the algorithm):
Policy(t, { A,t, : I E [n], t' < t})
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* Initialize t' = 1, current = 0.
" While t' < t:
1. If current = 0, then
(a) For each arm i that is on pi, set current = i with probability ff- 1. '; if
the sum of these probabilities exceeds 1 (ie. this step is inadmissible), then
terminate with no reward.
(b) If current was set in this way, leave t' unchanged and enter the next if block.
Otherwise, leave current at 0 but increment t' by 1.
2. If current =L 0, then
(a) Let u denote the node arm current is on. For each a E A, play action a on
Define
Policy:
arm current with probability .
(b) Suppose we transition onto node v as a result of this play. With probability
Xv~tf, leave current unchanged. Otherwise, set current = 0.
(c) Increment t' by 1.
the following events and probabilities, which depend on the input passed into
* For all i E [n], t' < (t + 1), let Ai, be the event that at the beginning of time t',
current = 0 and arm i is on pi. Let Free(i,t') = Pr[Ai,t'].
* For all i E [n], t' < t, let Started(i, t') be the probability that we play arm i from pi at
time t'.
o For all u E S, a E A, t' < t, let Played(u, a, t') be the probability that we play action
a on node u at time t'.
It is easy to see that Policy is an algorithmic specification of feasible solution {z,,t, y,,t}
if we run it on input (B, {fi,t : i E [n], t E [B]}). Indeed, we would iteratively have for
t = 1, ...,I B:
" Free(i, t) = fi,t for all i E [n]
* Started(i, t) = Free(i, t) - ' - Lp-, = Lp-, for all i E [n]
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* Played(u, a, t) = Started(i, t - depth(u)) - for all u E S,a EA
Xpj,t-depth(u) 2
The final statement can be seen inductively:
Played(u, a, t) = Played (v, b, t - 1) - pb
(v,b)EPar(u) Su,t
- E (Started (i, t - 1 - depth(v)) . ) - b t
(v,b)EPar(u) Xpit1depth(v) Sut
= Started(i, t - depth(u)) X 4 t (7.16)
Xp ,t-depth(u)
where the first equality is by Steps 2a-b, the second equality is by the induction hypothesis,
and the final equality is by (7.13d).
Therefore, we would have a 1-approximation if we knew {fj,t : i c [n], t E [B]}, but
unfortunately computing fi,t requires summing exponentially many terms. We can try to
approximate it by sampling, but we can't even generate a sample from the binary distri-
bution with probability fi,t since that requires knowing the exact values of fi,t, for t' < t.
So we give up trying to approximate fi,t, and instead iteratively approximate the values of
Free(i, t) when Policy is ran on previously approximated Free(i, t) values.
Fix some small E, J > 0 that will be determined later. Let e,6 = . Change Policy
so that the probabilities in Step la are multiplied by (1 - E)2 (and change the definitions
of Ai,tz, Free, Started, Played accordingly).
Sampling Algorithm
" Initialize FreeemP(i, 1) = 1 for all i E [n].
" Fort= 2, ... , B:
1. Run Policy(t - 1, {Free'"P(i, t') : i E [n], t' < t}) a total of M = 81SIB ' times.
For all i C [n], let Ci,t count the number of times event Ai,t occurred.
2. For each i E [n], if Ci,t > pe,5, set FreeemP(i, t) =L- ; otherwise set FreeemP(i, t)
n pj,tj=1 2
Consider iteration t of Sampling Algorithm. {Freeemp(i, t') : i E [n], t' < t} have already
been finalized, and we are sampling event Ai,t when (the E-modified) Policy is ran on those
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finalized approximations to record values for {Freeemp(i, t) : i E [n]}. For all i E [n], if
Ci,t > pt,,, then the probability of C,' lying in ((1 - E) - Free(i, t), (1 + E) - Free(i, t)) is
at least 8 1 - 6. As far as when we have Ci,t > p,, note that if Free(i, t) > then
E[Ci,t] > 2p,, so the Chernoff bound says Pr[Ci,t p,] = O(J7) = O(6). We have
discussed two O(6) probability events in this paragraph of sampling/Chernoff yielding an
unlikely and undesired result; call these events failures.
By the union bound, the probability of having any failure over iterations t = 2,..., B
is at most 2(B - 1)n(6 + O(6)) = O(Bn6). Assuming no failures, we will inductively prove
(1-E)2 XJt < Started(i, t) max - e) -xp)' E (7.17)
I1+ E 2 2 '4ISIB~
for all i E [n]. This is clear when t = 1 since Started(i, 1) = X exactly for all i E [n].
Now suppose t > 2. We will first prove a lemma on the true probabilities Free(i,t),
which is the "approximate" version of Lemma 7.3.2:
Lemma 7.3.3. Suppose Policy is ran on input (t - 1, {Free'"P(i, t') : i E [n], t' < t})
and there were no failures while obtaining the sample average approximations FreeP(i, t')
Then for all i E [n], Free(i,t) - E x
Proof. Proof. We know that event Ai,t will occur if at time t, arm i has not yet been started,
and no other arm is active. By the union bound, 1 - Free(i, t) Et,i< Started (i, t') +
En=1 Zues\{p 3 } EA Played(u, a, t). Assuming (7.17) holds, we can bound
Z Started(i, t') Z ((1 - E)X ' +4SIB
t'<t t'<t
< 2 EdXPI.,t + 4 1I
t' <t
2 4
8 This is because Free'"P(i, t) is an average over M > -p runs, which is enough samples to guarantee
this probability; see Motwani and Raghavan (2010).
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where the final inequality uses (7.15). Similarly, assuming (7.17) holds, we can bound
z ZPlayed(u, a, t)
j=1 uESj\{pj} aEA
E E ~ Started(i, t - depth(u)) - XU't
j=1 UESj\{pj} Xpi,t-depth(u)
E 1Z ((1 - Xpi,t-depth(u) + Xut
=1 uES\p} 2 41S\{ xpit-depth(u)
S4Bj=1 uES,\{p,}
:1=1
where the equality uses (7.16), the second inequality uses the fact that xu,t xpi,t-depth(u),
and the final inequality uses (7.11). Combining these bounds completes the proof of the
lemma.
By the description in Step la of Policy, for all i E [n], we have
Started (i, t) = Free(i, t) - 1 - -_ . (1 - E)2
2 Free ep(i, t) (7.18)
If Ci,t > p,,j, then Freeemp(i, t) will be set to C9, and furthermore no failures implies
(I - E) . Free(i, t) M5 < (1+ e) - Free(i, t). Substituting into (7.18), we get (1-)2 Xpt(1M -).eitK 1+,- 2
Started(i, t) (1 - E)- which implies (7.17). On the other hand, if Ci,t P ,,6, then
Free'"P(i, t) will be set to En1 X, and assuming no failures it must have been the case
that Free(i, t) - 4S. Substituting into (7.18), we get Started(i, t) 1 Xp4-t41SIB41SIB 2 > 1 Xpp,
(1 - e) 2 < which implies the upper bound in (7.17). For the lower bound, Lemma 7.3.3
says Free(i, t) > FreeemP(i, t), so Started(i, t) > (1 - E)
2 
.xpi~ (1_E)2
___2 -1+E 2
This completes the induction for (7.17). The final thing to check is that with these new
parameters {FreeemP(i, t) : i C [n]}, the sum of the probabilities in Step la of Policy does not
exceed 1. FreeemP(i, t) will either get set to 1  or be at least (1 -E) -Free(i, t), which
is at least (1-e)-En I fall by Lemma 7.3.3. In either case, FreeemP(i, t) (1_,).En f
for all i E [n], so the desired sum in Step la is at most 1 1 (1 - E)2 < 1.
We have an algorithm that fails with probability O(Bn6), and when it doesn't fail,
Started(i, t) > (1-E)2 XOjt for all i c [n], t E [B], which in conjunction with (7.16) shows1+6 2
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that we obtain expected reward at least (1-E) 2 - - OPTolyLp/. Recall from Lemma 7.2.6
that OPTpolyLp' > OPTxpLP'. Treating a failed run as a run with 0 reward, we can set 6 =
E)( ) to get a ( - e)-approximation. Finally, note that the runtime of this approximation
algorithm is polynomial in the input, , and ln('), completing the proof of Theorem 7.2.7.
7.4 Proof of Theorem 7.2.8
In this section we prove Theorem 7.2.8, and also show how to modify the proof to prove
Theorem 7.2.9.
7.4.1 Description of Algorithm
The high-level description of the algorithm is as follows. A priority index, which is a time
step t in [B], is maintained for each arm. To start, the algorithm plays the arm, say i, with
the lowest priority index9 . Arm i will make a transition and its index will evolve. Arm i is
played until it reaches a point where its index is much greater than the depth of the node
it is on. Once this occurs, the algorithm switches to the arm that now has the smallest
index, and repeats this process. Recall that switching back and forth between arms, i.e.
preemption, is necessary for an algorithm to be within a constant factor of optimality. On
the other hand, the constraint based on depth ensures that the algorithm does not switch
away after an arm has been played a large number of times to reach a high-reward node.
Our priority-based policy is motivated by the ideas from (Gupta et al., 2011a, sect. 4-5).
Fix an optimal solution {Xt, set} to (PolyLP). The priority indices are maintained
based on this solution. For an arm on node u, it will always have some status (u, a, ),
which says that the next play of the arm should be with action a, and that this play has
priority t. We allow t = oc to indicate that the algorithm will never try to play the arm
again; in this case we omit the action argument.
We initialize each arm i to status (pi, a, t) with probability , for all a E A and t E [B],
where C > 0 is some constant to be optimized later. With probability 1 - ZaEA t=1  ,
the arm is initialized to status (pi, oo) and never touched; note that this probability is at
least 1 - .
If we play an arm and it transitions to node u, we need to decide what status (u, a, t)
9 Please note that this is not to be confused with the colloquialism of "higher priorities going first".
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to put that arm in. For all i E [n], u E Si \ {pi}, a c A, t E [B], (v, b) c Par(u), and
t' < t, we prescribe a probability qv,b,t',u,a,t with which we will put arm i into status (u, a, t),
conditioned on arriving at node u after playing action b on node v at priority t'. The
evolution of statuses is independent of other arms. The following lemma shows that it is
possible to solve for values of qv,b,t',u,a,t which are feasible, and respect the values of xat:
Lemma 7.4.1. Suppose we are given the x's of a feasible solution to (PolyLP). Then we
can find {qv,b,t',u,a,t : u c S\{pi,. . ., p}, a E A, t c [B], (v, b) c Par(u), t' < t} in polynomial
time such that
qv,b,t,,a,t <1 u c S \ {pi, . ,, }, (v, b) E Par(u), t' E [B - 1]
aEA t:t>t'
(7.19a)
-3 pI, - qvbt'u, =a, u C S \ {p,... , p,}, a E A, t E {2, ... ,B}
(v,b)EPar(u) t':t'<t
(7.19b)
Furthermore, if u C B, then we can strengthen (7.19a) to qv,b,t',u,a,t'+1 = 1-
(7.19a) ensures that the probabilities telling us what to do, when we arrive at node u
after playing action b on node v at time t', are well-defined; the case where u is a bridge
node will be needed to prove Theorem 7.2.9. For all i E [n], u E Si \ {pi}, (v, b) c Par(u),
and t' c [B - 1], define qv,b,t',u,oo = 1 - ZaEA Zt>t' qv,b,t',u,a,t, the probability we abandon
arm i after making the transition to u.
At a high level, Lemma 7.4.1 is a flow decomposition result and our analogue to the
convex decomposition from Gupta et al. (2011a). It says that for each arm i, {xt : u C
Si, t C [B], a E A} is a flow satisfying precedence constraints on both nodes u and times t,
and can be decomposed into "local instructions on each transition" (i.e. what to do upon
arriving at u after playing b on v at priority t') to reconstruct the original flow. Its proof is
deferred to Section F.4.
Having defined the values of qv,b,t',ua,t, the overall algorithm can now be described in
two steps:
1. While there exists an arm with priority not oo, play an arm with the smallest index
(breaking ties arbitrarily) until it arrives at a status (u, a, t) such that t > 2 -depth (u)
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(t = oc would suffice).
2. Repeat until all arms have priority oc.
To clarify Step 1, once we start playing a lowest-index arm, its index will evolve and increase.
However, we do not pause playing it once its index is no longer the lowest; instead, we pause
playing it once it reaches a combination of index t and node u such that t > 2 . depth(u).
We are also constrained by a budget of B time steps, but it will simplify the analysis to
assume our algorithm finishes all the arms and collects reward only for plays up to time B.
Under this assumption, the statuses an arm goes through is independent of the outcomes
on all other arms; the inter-dependence only affects the order in which arms are played (and
thus which nodes obtain reward).
Also, note that this is only a valid algorithm because Theorem 7.2.8 assumes all pro-
cessing times are 1, so there are no bridge nodes. If there were bridge nodes, then we may
not be allowed to switch to an arm with lowest index, being forced to play the arm on a
bridge node.
7.4.2 Analysis of Algorithm
For all i E [n], u E Si, a E A, t E [B], let time(u, a, t) be the random variable for the time
step at which our algorithm plays arm i from status (u, a, t), with time(u, a, t) = oo if arm
i never gets in status (u, a, t). Then Pr[time(pj, a, t) < oc] = 4 for all i E [n], a E A,
t C [B]. If u is a non-root node, then we can induct on depth(u) to prove for all a E A,
t E [B] that
Pr[time(u, a, t) < oo] = Pr[time(v, b, t') < 00] - p,- qv,b,t',u,a,t
(v,b)EPar(u) t'<t
b
(v,b)EPar(u) t'<t
a
X='t (7.20)
C
where the final equality follows from Lemma 7.4.1.
For an event A, let 1 A be the indicator random variable for A. The expected reward
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obtained by our algorithm is
B
EE I:r 1{time(u,a,t)<B}
uES aEA t=1
B
r E[ {time(u,a,t)<B} I time(u, a, t) < oc] - Pr[time(u, a, t) < oc]
uESaEA t=1
B X a
- r'Z Pr[time(u, a, t) B I time(u, a, t) < oo] '
uESaEA t=1
For the remainder of this subsection, we will set C = 3 and prove for an arbitrary i E [n],
u E Si, a E A, t c [B] that Pr[time(u, a, t) B I time(u, a, t) < oc] > . It suffices to prove
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that Pr[time(u, a, t) 5 t I time(u, a, t) < oc] 1, since t < B.
Case 1. Suppose t > 2-depth(u). We prove that conditioned on the event {time(u, a, t) <
oo}, {time(u, a, t) > t} occurs with probability at most .
Note that every node v can have at most one b, t' such that time(v, b, t') < oo; let time(v)
denote this quantity (and be oo if time(v, b, t') = oo for all b E A, t' E [B]). The nodes v
that are played before u are those with time(v) < time(u, a, t). Since our algorithm plays a
node at every time step, time(u, a, t) > t if and only if there are t or more nodes v 0 u such
that time(v) < time(u, a, t). But this is equivalent to there being exactly t nodes v # u such
that time(v) < time(u, a, t) and time(v) t. The depth(u) ancestors of u are guaranteed to
satisfy this.
Hence the event {time(u, a, t) > t} is equivalent to {depth(u) +
ZveS\S 1 {time(v)<time(u,a,t)} * 1 {time(v)<t} = t}. But t > 2 - depth(u), so this implies
{EVESsi 1jtime(v)<time(u,a,t)} *ljtime(v)! t} !1 = f IvES\Si l~iev<ienat}2 .
Now, whether the sum is at least -L is unchanged if we exclude all v such that depth(v) > .2 
- *
Indeed, if any such v satisfies time(v) < time(u, a, t), then all of its ancestors also do, and
its first [-L~ ancestors ensure that the sum, without any nodes of depth at least -, is at2 2'
least 1. Thus, the last event is equivalent to
{jtime(v)<time(U,a't)} : (7.21)
vES\Sj:depth(v)<
Suppose time(v) = time(v, b, t') for some b E A and t' E [B]. We would like to argue
that in order for both time(v) < time(u, a, t) and depth(v) < j to hold, it must be the case
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that t' < t. Suppose to the contrary that t' > t. If t' > 2 . depth(v), then the algorithm
can only play (v, b, t') once t' becomes the lowest index, which must happen after (u, a, t)
becomes the lowest index, hence time(v, b, t') < time(u, a, t) is impossible. Otherwise, if
t' < 2 -depth(v), then depth(v) > L > I, violating depth(v) < . Thus indeed t' < t and
(7.21) < I{time(v,b,t')<time(u,a,t)} 2
vES\Si:depth(v)< bE A t'=1
{~time(v,b,t')<oo} > 21
vES\Si bEA t'=1
We establish that the probability of interest Pr[time(u, a, t) > t I time(u, a, t) < oc] is at
most
Pr [ 1 {time(,b,t')<oo} > I time(u, a, t) < oo
vES\Si bEA t'=1
=Pr Z {time(v,b,t')<oo} 2
j3 i vES bEA t'=I
where we remove the conditioning due to independence between arms. Now, let
t
Y = min { 1 {time(v,b,t')<oo}' 2}
vES bEA t'=1
for all j # i. The previous probability is equal to Pr[Z~ Y > -L]. Note that
tt
E[E , Y Pr[time(v, b, t') < ool
j:Ai j Ai vCSj bE A t'=1
zz b
t'=1 vES bEA
t
3
where the second inequality uses (7.20), and the final inequality uses (7.11). We can do
better than the Markov bound on Pr[Zi Y > -J because the random variables {Y}jgi are
independent. Furthermore, each Y is non-zero with probability at most } (arm j is never
touched with probability at least ), so since is at most t when it is non-zero, E[Y] < L
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for all j = i. We now invoke the following lemma:
Lemma 7.4.2. Let t > 0 be arbitrary and Y1,..., Y, be independent non-negative random
variables with individual expectations at most t and sum of expectations at most . Then
Pr['i Y > 1] is maximized when only two random variables are non-zero, each taking
value { with probability { (and value 0 otherwise). Therefore, Pr[ZjiYg > 11 < 1 - (1 -
1)2 _ 5
This lemma would complete the proof that Pr[time(u, a, t) > t I time(u, a, t) < oc] K 9
-9
under Case 1, where t > 2 - depth(u). We defer the proof of Lemma 7.4.2 to Section F.4.
It uses the conjecture from Samuels (1966) for n = 3; the conjecture has been proven for
n < 4 in Samuels (1968). The proof also uses a technical lemma from Bansal et al. (2012).
Case 2. Suppose t < 2 . depth(u). Then depth(u) must be at least 1, so conditioned on
time(u, a, t) < oc, there must be some (v, b) E Par(u) and t' < t such that time(v, b, t') <
oc. Furthermore, the algorithm will play status (u, a, t) at time step time(v, b, t') + 1, so
time(u, a, t) < t will hold so long as time(v, b, t') t', since t' < t. Thus Pr[time(u, a, t)
t I time(u, a, t) < oc] > Pr[time(v, b, t') t I time(v, b, t') < oc]. We can iterate this argument
until the the problem reduces to Case 1. This completes the proof that Pr[time(u, a, t) <
t I time(u, a, t) < oc] > 1 under Case 2.
9
Therefore, the expected reward obtained by our algorithm is at least
ZUES Za tA r = Z,1(1 - ) , which is the same as LOPT1yLP, completing the
proof of Theorem 7.2.8.
7.4.3 Proof of Theorem 7.2.9
In this subsection we show how to modify the algorithm and analysis when there are multi-
period actions, to prove Theorem 7.2.9. As mentioned in Section 7.4.1, we must modify
Step 1 of the algorithm when there are bridge nodes. If we arrive at a status (u, a, t) such
that t > 2 - depth(u) but u E B (and a = a), we are forced to immediately play the same
arm again, instead of switching to another arm with a lower index.
The overall framework of the analysis still holds, except now the bound is optimized
when we set C = 6. Our goal is to prove for an arbitrary i E [n], u E Si, a E A, t E [B]
that Pr[time(u, a, t) > t I time(u, a, t) < oc] 5 . We still have that event {time(u, a, t) > t}
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implies (7.21). Suppose for an arbitrary v E S \ Si that depth(v) < j and time(v) <2
time(u, a, t), where time(v) = time(v, b, t'). We can no longer argue that t' < t, but we
would like to argue that t' < 3. Suppose to the contrary that t' > i.
Then t' > 3 - depth(v), so t' > 2 - depth(v) ie. we would check priorities before playing
(v, b, t'). However, if v E B, then it could be the case that time(v, b, t') < time(u, a, t) even
though t' > t. If so, consider w, the youngest (largest depth) ancestor of v that isn't a
bridge node. Suppose time(w) = time(w, b', t"); it must be the case that t" < t. By the final
statement of Lemma 7.4.1, the depth(v) - depth(w) immediate descendents of w, which are
bridge nodes, must have priority indices t" + 1, ... , t" + depth(v) - depth(w), respectively.
The youngest of these descendents is v, hence t' = t" + depth (v) - depth(w). But t" < t and
depth(v) < 1, so t' < t causing a contradiction.
Therefore t' < 3. The bound on E[Zj A Yj ] changes to
33tE[~ EE E Pr[ti me(v, b, t') < oc]
7 b
t'=1 ES bEA
t
4
Thus Pr[time(u, a, t) > t I time(u, a, t) < cc] 5 Pr[EZ.# Y > j] where the final
inequality is Markov's inequality. Note that we cannot use the stronger Samuels' conjecture
here because we would need it for n = 5, which is unproven; if we could, then we could get
a better approximation factor (and we would re-optimize C).
The rest of the analysis, including Case 2, is the same as before. Therefore, the expected
reward obtained by our algorithm is at least ZUES EaGA ru Z,3 1 (1 - .)u, which is the
same as LOPTolyLP, completing the proof of Theorem 7.2.9.
7.5 Conclusion and Open Questions
In this chapter, we presented a (.!-,)-approximation for the fully general MAB superprocess
with multi-period actions-no preemption problem, by following a scaled copy of an optimal
solution to the LP relaxation, and this is tight. However, when preemption is allowed, we
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were only able to obtain a '-approximation, using the solution to the LP relaxation mainly
for generating priorities, and resorting to weak Markov-type bounds in the analysis. It seems
difficult to follow a scaled copy of a solution to the LP relaxation when preemption is allowed,
because arms can be paused and restarted. We do conjecture that our separation of (2 - E)
between the LP and the optimal algorithm is correct in this case, and that it is possible
to obtain a (} - e)-approximation, but this remains an open problem. Also, we have not
explored how our techniques apply to certain extensions of the multi-armed bandit problem
(switching costs, simultaneous plays, delayed feedback, contextual information, etc.).
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Directions
In this thesis, we have studied a broad range of topics in Revenue Management which can
be classified along two dimensions: demand learning vs. revenue maximization, and single-
period vs. multi-period (where learning and/or shared resource constraints link the time
periods together).
Demand Learning Revenue Maximization
Estimation using Bundles Bundle Pricing
Single-period (Chapter 5) (Chapter 6)
Online Resource Allocation (Chapter 2)
Recommendation at Checkout (Chapter 3)
Multi-period Single-leg RM (Chapter 4)
Markovian Multi-Armed Bandits
(Chapter 7)
All of the chapters in this thesis, with the exception of Chapter 4, involve multiple
items, and a lot of the focus is on the avoiding the "curse of dimensionality" by using simple
heuristics. These heuristics are based on independent bid prices and protection levels in
Chapters 2-3, simple bundling schemes in Chapters 5-6, and rounding a polynomial-sized
LP-relaxation in Chapter 7.
We should reiterate that our work allows direct implementation on data instances, but
does not directly address higher-level business strategy. We believe it is interesting future
work to rigorously analyze the interplay between lower-order algorithmic optimization and
higher-order business questions.
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Another recurring theme in our work, more on the theoretical side, is the necessity of
sampling to make algorithms run in polynomial-time. The chronologically-earliest appear-
ance of this was in our work on Markovian multi-armed bandits and stochastic knapsack in
Chapter 7. It is extremely interesting to us that the same analysis framework was useful in
the chronologically-later-to-appear Chapters 3 and 4, on seemingly unrelated problems.
Finally, we discuss a direction where we have joint work that is not part of this thesis.
Although the algorithms in Chapters 2-4 do not assume any stochastic model for the num-
ber of customers or their characteristics, they assume that a customer's choice model, as a
function of her characteristics, has already been learned (e.g., from collaborative filtering
on extensive historical transactions). Meanwhile, our work in Chapter 7 and the area of
multi-armed bandits in general study the tradeoff between exploring the popularity of new
products with limited historical data, vs. repeatedly exploiting products already known to
be popular. We believe it is an exciting future direction to consider algorithms which incor-
porate the learning of choice patterns that are consistent across products and customers,
while still hedging against strict uncertainty in the number of future customers and their
characteristics.
232
Bibliography
T. Abdallah. On the benefit (or cost) of large-scale bundling. Available at SSRN, 2016.
W. J. Adams and J. L. Yellen. Commodity bundling and the burden of monopoly. The
quarterly journal of economics, pages 475-498, 1976.
G. Aggarwal, G. Goel, C. Karande, and A. Mehta. Online vertex-weighted bipartite match-
ing and single-bid budgeted allocations. In Proceedings of the twenty-second annual A CM-
SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pages 1253-1264. Society for Industrial and
Applied Mathematics, 2011.
S. Agrawal, Z. Wang, and Y. Ye. A dynamic near-optimal algorithm for online linear
programming. Operations Research, 62(4):876-890, 2014.
V. F. Araman and R. Caldentey. Revenue management with incomplete demand informa-
tion. Wiley Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science, 2011.
M. Armstrong. Multiproduct nonlinear pricing. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric
Society, pages 51-75, 1996.
M. Armstrong. Price discrimination by a many-product firm. The Review of Economic
Studies, 66(1):151-168, 1999.
M. Babaioff, N. Immorlica, B. Lucier, and S. M. Weinberg. A simple and approximately
optimal mechanism for an additive buyer. In Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS),
2014 IEEE 55th Annual Symposium on, pages 21-30. IEEE, 2014.
Y. Bakos and E. Brynjolfsson. Bundling information goods: Pricing, profits, and efficiency.
Management science, 45(12):1613-1630, 1999.
Y. Bakos and E. Brynjolfsson. Bundling and competition on the internet. Marketing science,
19(1):63-82, 2000.
M. 0. Ball and M. Queyranne. Toward robust revenue management: Competitive analysis
of online booking. Operations Research, 57(4):950-963, 2009.
N. Bansal and V. Nagarajan. On the adaptivity gap of stochastic orienteering. In Integer
Programming and Combinatorial Optimization, pages 114-125. Springer, 2014.
N. Bansal, A. Gupta, J. Li, J. Mestre, V. Nagarajan, and A. Rudra. When lp is the cure
for your matching woes: Improved bounds for stochastic matchings. Algorithmica, 63(4):
733-762, 2012.
233
M. Bateni, S. Dehghani, M. Hajiaghayi, and S. Seddighin. Revenue maximization for selling
multiple correlated items. In Algorithms-ESA 2015, pages 95-105. Springer, 2015.
D. Bergemann and K. H. Schlag. Pricing without priors. Journal of the European Economic
Association, 6(2-3):560-569, 2008.
F. Bernstein, A. G. K6k, and L. Xie. Dynamic assortment customization with limited
inventories. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 17(4):538-553, 2015.
D. P. Bertsekas. Dynamic programming and optimal control. Athena Scientific Belmont,
MA, 1995.
D. Bertsimas and A. J. Mersereau. A learning approach for interactive marketing to a
customer segment. Operations Research, 55(6):1120-1135, 2007.
A. Bhalgat. A (2+eps)-approximation algorithm for the stochastic knapsack problem. Un-
published Manuscript, 2011.
A. Bhalgat, A. Goel, and S. Khanna. Improved approximation results for stochastic knap-
sack problems. In Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on
Discrete Algorithms, pages 1647-1665. SIAM, 2011.
H. K. Bhargava. Mixed bundling of two independently valued goods. Management Science,
59(9):2170-2185, 2013.
T. Bodea, M. Ferguson, and L. Garrow. Data set-choice-based revenue management:
Data from a major hotel chain. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 11
(2):356-361, 2009.
A. Borodin and R. El-Yaniv. Online computation and competitive analysis. cambridge
university press, 2005.
S. Bubeck and N. Cesa-Bianchi. Regret analysis of stochastic and nonstochastic multi-armed
bandit problems. arXiv preprint arXiv:1204.5721, 2012.
N. Buchbinder and J. S. Naor. The design of competitive online algorithms via a primal-dual
approach. Foundations and Trends@ in Theoretical Computer Science, 3(2-3):93-263,
2009.
N. Buchbinder, K. Jain, and J. S. Naor. Online primal-dual algorithms for maximizing
ad-auctions revenue. In European Symposium on Algorithms, pages 253-264. Springer,
2007.
N. Buchbinder, S. Chen, J. Naor, and 0. Shamir. Unified algorithms for online learning
and competitive analysis. Mathematics of Operations Research, 41(2):612-625, 2016.
Y. Cai and Z. Huang. Simple and nearly optimal multi-item auctions. In Proceedings of the
Twenty-Fourth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pages 564-577.
SIAM, 2013.
Y. Cai, C. Daskalakis, and S. M. Weinberg. An algorithmic characterization of multi-
dimensional mechanisms. In Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on
Theory of computing, pages 459-478. ACM, 2012.
234
R. L. Carraway, R. L. Schmidt, and L. R. Weatherford. An algorithm for maximizing target
achievement in the stochastic knapsack problem with normal returns. Naval Research
Logistics (NRL), 40(2):161-173, 1993.
C. W. Chan and V. F. Farias. Stochastic depletion problems: Effective myopic policies for
a class of dynamic optimization problems. Mathematics of Operations Research, 34(2):
333-350, 2009.
H. Chen, M. Hu, and G. Perakis. Distribution-free pricing. available on SSRN, 2017.
Y. Chen and V. F. Farias. Simple policies for dynamic pricing with imperfect forecasts.
Operations Research, 61(3):612-624, 2013.
W. C. Cheung and D. Simchi-Levi. Efficiency and performance guarantees for choice-based
network revenue management problems with flexible products. available on SSRN, 2016.
C. S. Chu, P. Leslie, and A. Sorensen. Nearly optimal pricing for multiproduct firms.
Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008.
C. S. Chu, P. Leslie, and A. Sorensen. Bundle-size pricing as an approximation to mixed
bundling. The American Economic Review, pages 263-303, 2011.
J. Chung and V. R. Rao. A general choice model for bundles with multiple-category prod-
ucts: Application to market segmentation and optimal pricing for bundles. Journal of
Marketing Research, 40(2):115-130, 2003.
D. F. Ciocan and V. Farias. Model predictive control for dynamic resource allocation.
Mathematics of Operations Research, 37(3):501-525, 2012.
R. G. Cross. Revenue management: Hard-core tactics for market domination. Crown
Business, 2011.
B. C. Dean, M. X. Goemans, and J. Vondrdk. Approximating the stochastic knapsack prob-
lem: The benefit of adaptivity. In Foundations of Computer Science, 2004. Proceedings.
45th Annual IEEE Symposium on, pages 208-217. IEEE, 2004.
B. C. Dean, M. X. Goemans, and J. Vondrik. Approximating the stochastic knapsack
problem: The benefit of adaptivity. Mathematics of Operations Research, 33(4):945-964,
2008.
N. R. Devanur, K. Jain, and R. D. Kleinberg. Randomized primal-dual analysis of ranking
for online bipartite matching. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual ACM-SIAM
Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pages 101-107. SIAM, 2013.
J. C. Eckalbar. Closed-form solutions to bundling problems. Journal of Economics 6
Management Strategy, 19(2):513-544, 2010.
R. El-Yaniv, A. Fiat, R. M. Karp, and G. Turpin. Optimal search and one-way trading
online algorithms. Algorithmica, 30(1):101-139, 2001.
S. S. Eren and C. Maglaras. Monopoly pricing with limited demand information. Journal
of revenue and pricing management, 9(1-2):23-48, 2010.
235
H. Fang and P. Norman. To bundle or not to bundle. RAND Journal of Economics, pages
946-963, 2006.
V. F. Farias and R. Madan. The irrevocable multiarmed bandit problem. Operations
Research, 59(2):383-399, 2011.
V. F. Farias, S. Jagabathula, and D. Shah. A nonparametric approach to modeling choice
with limited data. Management science, 59(2):305-322, 2013.
J. Feldman, N. Korula, V. Mirrokni, S. Muthukrishnan, and M. Pil. Online ad assignment
with free disposal. In International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, pages
374-385. Springer, 2009.
J. Feldman, M. Henzinger, N. Korula, V. Mirrokni, and C. Stein. Online stochastic packing
applied to display ad allocation. Algorithms-ESA 2010, pages 182-194, 2010.
K. J. Ferreira, D. Simchi-Levi, and H. Wang. Online network revenue management using
thompson sampling. manuscript on SSRN, 2016.
G. Gallego and G. Van Ryzin. Optimal dynamic pricing of inventories with stochastic
demand over finite horizons. Management science, 40(8):999-1020, 1994.
G. Gallego, A. Li, V.-A. Truong, and X. Wang. Online resource allocation with customer
choice. arXiv preprint arXiv:1511.01837, 2015.
G. Gallego, A. Li, V.-A. Truong, and X. Wang. Online personalized resource allocation
with customer choice. Technical report, Columbia University, 2016.
J. Gittins, K. Glazebrook, and R. Weber. Multi-armed bandit allocation indices. John Wiley
& Sons, 2011.
A. Goel and P. Indyk. Stochastic load balancing and related problems. In Foundations of
Computer Science, 1999. 40th Annual Symposium on, pages 579-586. IEEE, 1999.
A. Goel, S. Guha, and K. Munagala. Asking the right questions: Model-driven optimiza-
tion using probes. In Proceedings of the twenty-fifth ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART
symposium on Principles of database systems, pages 203-212. ACM, 2006.
N. Golrezaei, H. Nazerzadeh, and P. Rusmevichientong. Real-time optimization of person-
alized assortments. Management Science, 60(6):1532-1551, 2014.
S. Guha and K. Munagala. Approximation algorithms for budgeted learning problems. In
Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pages
104-113. ACM, 2007a.
S. Guha and K. Munagala. Model-driven optimization using adaptive probes. In Proceedings
of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, pages 308-317.
Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2007b.
S. Guha and K. Munagala. Sequential design of experiments via linear programming. arXiv
preprint arXiv:0805.2630, 2008.
S. Guha and K. Munagala. Approximation algorithms for bayesian multi-armed bandit
problems. arXiv preprint arXiv:1306.3525, 2013.
236
A. Gupta, R. Krishnaswamy, M. Molinaro, and R. Ravi. Approximation algorithms for
correlated knapsacks and non-martingale bandits. arXiv preprint arXiv:1102.3749, 2011a.
A. Gupta, R. Krishnaswamy, M. Molinaro, and R. Ravi. Approximation algorithms for
correlated knapsacks and non-martingale bandits. In Foundations of Computer Science
(FOCS), 2011 IEEE 52nd Annual Symposium on, pages 827-836. IEEE, 2011b.
A. Gupta, R. Krishnaswamy, V. Nagarajan, and R. Ravi. Running errands in time: Ap-
proximation algorithms for stochastic orienteering. Mathematics of Operations Research,
40(1):56-79, 2014.
J. N. Hagstrom. Computational complexity of pert problems. Networks, 18(2):139-147,
1988.
W. Hanson and R. K. Martin. Optimal bundle pricing. Management Science, 36(2):155-174,
1990.
S. Hart and N. Nisan. Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items. In Pro-
ceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 656-656. ACM,
2012.
S. Hart and N. Nisan. The menu-size complexity of auctions. In Proceedings of the fourteenth
A CM conference on Electronic commerce, pages 565-566. ACM, 2013.
S. Hart and P. J. Reny. Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other
observations. Center for the Study of Rationality, 2012.
L. M. Hitt and P.-y. Chen. Bundling with customer self-selection: A simple approach to
bundling low-marginal-cost goods. Management Science, 51(10):1481-1493, 2005.
R. Ibragimov and J. Walden. Optimal bundling strategies under heavy-tailed valuations.
Management Science, 56(11):1963-1976, 2010.
T. Ilhan, S. M. Iravani, and M. S. Daskin. Technical note-the adaptive knapsack problem
with stochastic rewards. Operations research, 59(1):242-248, 2011.
S. Jasin and S. Kumar. A re-solving heuristic with bounded revenue loss for network revenue
management with customer choice. Mathematics of Operations Research, 37(2):313-345,
2012.
K. Jedidi, S. Jagpal, and P. Manchanda. Measuring heterogeneous reservation prices for
product bundles. Marketing Science, 22(1):107-130, 2003.
B. Kalyanasundaram and K. R. Pruhs. An optimal deterministic algorithm for online b-
matching. Theoretical Computer Science, 233(1):319-325, 2000.
R. M. Karp, U. V. Vazirani, and V. V. Vazirani. An optimal algorithm for on-line bipartite
matching. In Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of
computing, pages 352-358. ACM, 1990.
T. Kesselheim, K. Radke, A. T6nnis, and B. V6cking. An optimal online algorithm for
weighted bipartite matching and extensions to combinatorial auctions. In European Sym-
posium on Algorithms, pages 589-600. Springer, 2013.
237
J. M. Kessler. United States air force fighter jet maintenance models: effectiveness of index
policies. PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2013.
J. Kleinberg, Y. Rabani, and E. Tardos. Allocating bandwidth for bursty connections.
SIAM Journal on Computing, 30(1):191-217, 2000.
Y. Lan, H. Gao, M. 0. Ball, and I. Karaesmen. Revenue management with limited demand
information. Management Science, 54(9):1594-1609, 2008.
B. Letham, W. Sun, and A. Sheopuri. Latent variable copula inference for bundle pricing
from retail transaction data. In Proceedings of the 31st International Conference on
Machine Learning (ICML-14), pages 217-225, 2014.
J. Li and W. Yuan. Stochastic combinatorial optimization via poisson approximation. In
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pages
971-980. ACM, 2013.
M. Li, H. Feng, F. Chen, and J. Kou. Numerical investigation on mixed bundling and
pricing of information products. International Journal of Production Economics, 144(2):
560-571, 2013.
G. Linden, B. Smith, and J. York. Amazon.com recommendations: Item-to-item collabo-
rative filtering. IEEE Internet Computing, 7(1):76-80, 2003.
Q. Liu and G. Van Ryzin. On the choice-based linear programming model for network
revenue management. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 10(2):288-310,
2008.
G. Lugosi. Concentration- of-measure inequalities. http://www.econ.upf.edu/ lu-
gosi/anu.pdf, 2009.
C. Maglaras and J. Meissner. Dynamic pricing strategies for multiproduct revenue manage-
ment problems. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 8(2):136-148, 2006.
S. Mahajan and G. van Ryzin. Stocking retail assortments under dynamic consumer sub-
stitution. Operations Research, 49(3):334-351, 2001.
M. Mahdian, H. Nazerzadeh, and A. Saberi. Online optimization with uncertain informa-
tion. ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG), 8(1):2, 2012.
A. M. Manelli and D. R. Vincent. Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-
good monopolist. Journal of Economic Theory, 127(1):1-35, 2006.
A. M. Manelli and D. R. Vincent. Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maxi-
mization and the multiple-good monopoly. Journal of Economic Theory, 137(1):153-185,
2007.
V. H. Manshadi, S. 0. Gharan, and A. Saberi. Online stochastic matching: Online actions
based on offline statistics. Mathematics of Operations Research, 37(4):559-573, 2012.
R. P. McAfee, J. McMillan, and M. D. Whinston. Multiproduct monopoly, commodity
bundling, and correlation of values. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, pages 371-383,
1989.
238
K. F. McCardle, K. Rajaram, and C. S. Tang. Bundling retail products: Models and
analysis. European Journal of Operational Research, 177(2):1197-1217, 2007.
A. Mehta. Online matching and ad allocation. Foundations and Trends@ in Theoretical
Computer Science, 8(4):265-368, 2013.
A. Mehta and D. Panigrahi. Online matching with stochastic rewards. In Foundations
of Computer Science (FOCS), 2012 IEEE 53rd Annual Symposium on, pages 728-737.
IEEE, 2012.
A. Mehta, A. Saberi, U. Vazirani, and V. Vazirani. Adwords and generalized online match-
ing. Journal of the ACM (JACM), 54(5):22, 2007.
A. Mehta, B. Waggoner, and M. Zadimoghaddam. Online stochastic matching with unequal
probabilities. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on
Discrete Algorithms, pages 1388-1404. SIAM, 2014.
M. Mitzenmacher and E. Upfal. Probability and computing: Randomized algorithms and
probabilistic analysis. Cambridge University Press, 2005.
R. H. M6hring, A. S. Schulz, and M. Uetz. Approximation in stochastic scheduling: the
power of lp-based priority policies. Journal of the ACM (JA CM), 46(6):924-942, 1999.
R. Motwani and P. Raghavan. Randomized algorithms. Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2010.
R. B. Myerson. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of operations research, 6(1):58-73,
1981.
J. P. Newman, M. E. Ferguson, L. A. Garrow, and T. L. Jacobs. Estimation of choice-
based models using sales data from a single firm. Manufacturing & Service Operations
Management, 16(2):184-197, 2014.
R. L. Phillips. Pricing and revenue optimization. Stanford University Press, 2005.
M. L. Pinedo. Scheduling: theory, algorithms, and systems. Springer Science & Business
Media, 2012.
A. Prasad, R. Venkatesh, and V. Mahajan. Optimal bundling of technological products
with network externality. Management Science, 56(12):2224-2236, 2010.
R. Ravi and B. Sun. Customer-centric marketing: A pragmatic framework. Mit Press, 2016.
M. I. Reiman and Q. Wang. An asymptotically optimal policy for a quantity-based network
revenue management problem. Mathematics of Operations Research, 33(2):257-282, 2008.
A. Rubinstein. On the computational complexity of optimal simple mechanisms. In Pro-
ceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science,
pages 21-28. ACM, 2016.
A. Rubinstein and S. M. Weinberg. Simple mechanisms for a subadditivebuyer and ap-
plications to revenue monotonicity. In Proceedings of the sixteenth ACM conference on
Electronic commerce, pages 377-394. ACM, 2015.
239
P. Rusmevichientong, Z.-J. Shen, and D. Shmoys. Dynamic assortment optimization with
a multinomial logic choice model and capacity constraint. Operations Research, 58(6):
1666-1680, 2010.
S. M. Samuels. On a Chebyshev-type inequality for sums of independent random variables.
Ann. Math. Stat., 37(1):248-259, 1966.
S. M. Samuels. More on a Chebyshev-type inequality for sums of independent random
variables. Defense Technical Information Center, 1968.
R. Schmalensee. Gaussian demand and commodity bundling. Journal of business, pages
S211-S230, 1984.
M. Skutella and M. Uetz. Scheduling precedence-constrained jobs with stochastic processing
times on parallel machines. In Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium
on Discrete algorithms, pages 589-590. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics,
2001.
G. J. Stigler. United states v. loew's inc.: A note on block-booking. Sup. Ct. Rev., page
152, 1963.
S. Stremersch and G. J. Tellis. Strategic bundling of products and prices: A new synthesis
for marketing. Journal of Marketing, 66(1):55-72, 2002.
K. Talluri and G. Van Ryzin. Revenue management under a general discrete choice model
of consumer behavior. Management Science, 50(1):15-33, 2004.
K. T. Talluri and G. J. Van Ryzin. The theory and practice of revenue management,
volume 68. Springer Science & Business Media, 2006.
0. Toubia, D. I. Simester, J. R. Hauser, and E. Dahan. Fast polyhedral adaptive conjoint
estimation. Marketing Science, 22(3):273-303, 2003.
G. van Ryzin and S. Mahajan. On the relationship between inventory costs and variety
benefits in retail assortments. Management Science, 45(11):1496-1509, 1999.
G. Van Ryzin and J. McGill. Revenue management without forecasting or optimization: An
adaptive algorithm for determining airline seat protection levels. Management Science,
46(6):760-775, 2000.
G. van Ryzin and G. Vulcano. A market discovery algorithm to estimate a general class of
nonparametric choice models. Management Science, 61(2):281-300, 2014.
R. Venkatesh and W. Kamakura. Optimal bundling and pricing under a monopoly: Con-
trasting complements and substitutes from independently valued products*. The Journal
of business, 76(2):211-231, 2003.
R. Venkatesh and V. Mahajan. 11 the design and pricing of bundles: a review of normative
guidelines and practical approaches. Handbook of pricing research in marketing, page
232, 2009.
X. Wang, V. Truong, and D. Bank. Online advance admission scheduling for services, with
customer preferences. In Working paper, 2015.
240
R. B. Wilson. Nonlinear pricing. Oxford University Press, 1993.
M. Wood. A new kind of e-commerce adds a personal touch. New York Times, 2014.
S.-y. Wu, L. M. Hitt, P.-y. Chen, and G. Anandalingam. Customized bundle pricing for
information goods: A nonlinear mixed-integer programming approach. Management Sci-
ence, 54(3):608-622, 2008.
A. C.-C. Yao. Probabilistic computations: Toward a unified measure of complexity. In
Foundations of Computer Science, 1977., 18th Annual Symposium on, pages 222-227.
IEEE, 1977.
A. C.-C. Yao. An n-to-1 bidder reduction for multi-item auctions and its applications. In
Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual A CM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms,
pages 92-109. SIAM, 2015.
M. Yuan, Y. Pavlidis, M. Jain, and K. Caster. Walmart online grocery personalization:
Behavioral insights and basket recommendations. In S. Link and J. C. Trujillo, editors,
Advances in Conceptual Modeling, pages 49-64, 2016.
D. Zhang and W. L. Cooper. Revenue management for parallel flights with customer-choice
behavior. Operations Research, 53(3):415-431, 2005.
H. Zhang, C. Shi, C. Qin, and C. Hua. Stochastic regret minimization for revenue man-
agement problems with nonstationary demands. Naval Research Logistics (NRL), 63(6):
433-448, 2016.
W. Zhao and Y.-S. Zheng. Optimal dynamic pricing for perishable assets with nonhomo-
geneous demand. Management science, 46(3):375-388, 2000.
Y. Zhao. Inequalities. http://yufeizhao.com/wc08/ineq.pdf, 2008.
241
242
Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Deferred Proofs from Section 2.2
Proof. Proof of Lemma 2.2.1. Fix any adaptive algorithm (which knows the arrival infor-
mation, but not the realizations of the customers' purchase decisions, at the start) and
consider its execution on instance I. Let X be the indicator random variable (0 or 1)
for the algorithm offering item i at price j to customer t, and P(f be the indicator random
variable for customer t accepting when item i is offered to her at price j. On a given run,
the constraints ET1 Emil p k and E' 1 Emil Xj) < 1 are satisfied. Therefore,
they are still satisfied after taking an expectation over all runs, and furthermore we can
use independence to show that E[PFX ] = E[P, ] - E[X j] = pj x. Therefore, the
algorithm must satisfy constraints (2.3b) and (2.3c) of the LP. Since its revenue on a given
run is ZE1 ZU Z P)r()X~ , taking an expectation over it yields (2.3a), completing
the proof. L
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.2.2. The statement for u(i), ... , a(j) is immediate from the
fact that the explicit value of oij) is (1 - r() )(1 + -2(1 -- ))1, for all j E [mj.
To prove the statement for a('),..., a('), we show that the solution to the system of n
equations formed by (2.5) and ac() + ... a(') = 1 is unique and strictly positive.
Let -y(j) = eW for all j. Then the constraint aM1 + ... a(') = 1 can be rewritten as
17j7" 1 y(J) = . Furthermore, we derive from (2.5) that for all j > 1, y(I) = (1 - r1 ) (l) +
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rU-i) Therefore,
M (j-1) r(j-1)
7(1) .HO+=- (A. 1)
j=2 e
Consider the LHS of (A.1) as a function of y() on [1, 1]. This is a continuous, strictly
increasing function which is at most when -y( = e and I when y(1 = 1. Therefore, there
is a unique solution with y1 E [1, 1), and the resulting value of a) is positive. For j > 1,
since -y(j) can also be written as y() + rO(7 (1- .(l), it can be seen that -y() E [1, 1), hence
the unique value for a(i) is positive as well.
Finally, to see that a') >I, observe that when () = e- 1/m, the LHS of (A.1) is at
least (e-l/m)m - }. Therefore, 7() is at most e-i/ which implies that a(' > L. l
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.2.9. For the first inequality in (2.10), observe that f(x) =
- is a strictly increasing function on [0, 1]. Since (1) E (0, 1), '(1)< , which is
the desired result.
For the second inequality in (2.10), we show a) > 5(), by showing that for all j =
2, ... , m, a() is a smaller multiple of a) than u5j) is of 5(1). This suffices because both the
fractions 50), ... , (m) and I(,..., o(') must sum to 1. For a given j, we must establish
that -< . By definition, = I - 0. Therefore, is suffices to show
tat ami am _______ _______
that () < I-e~" , or aO < m . This follows from the fact that the function
0 ) 1_e-C 1_e- U 1_e-
f(x) = _ is strictly increasing.
To prove (2.11), note that a(' = (1 + E.L 24 - )), while 1 + ln r m
2 In (j) . Therefore, it suffices to show that for any j = 2,. . . , m, In r(j) > I - _ __ .j= r~-1) u-1)r(j)
Letting x = lnr(3' < 0, the desired inequality becomes -x > 1 - ex, which is immediate.
r(u)
For (2.12), we would like to prove that a < a'. Note that a) is the unique solution
to
C(1 + - In (1 - (1 - e--1 )(I - 'r))=,(A2
j=2
while a is the unique solution to
M r(j)
j=21 "l r U-1) = .(A.3)
The LHS of (A.2), as a function of a(', is increasing over (0, 1); the same can be said
about the LHS of (A.3) as a function of a. Therefore, it suffices to show that if a(M = a = x,
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then the LHS of (A.2) is strictly less than the LHS of (A.3), for all x E (0, 1).
Let F = 1 - ex and consider any j > 1. Let s = E,1  (0, 1). It suffices to show that
- ln(1 - F(1 - s)) < F -In , which can be rearranged as SF > F. For the final inequality,
note that f(s) = sF is a strictly concave function on (0, 1), since F E (0, 1). Therefore,
1-s > F, because the LHS is the slope of the secant line through (s, sF) and (1, 1), while
the RHS is the slope of the tangent line through (1, 1). L
A.2 Supplement to Section 2.3
The first subsection contains the deferred proofs from Section 2.3. In the second subsection,
we explain how to optimize the randomized procedure for generating a single value function.
In the third subsection, we put together the proof of Theorem 2.2.4.
The following inequality will be useful throughout the paper. For all j = 2,... , m, (2.5)
says that 1 - e-)< 1 r , where we have used the fact that 1 - e-( < 1. Therefore,
-r(i)
for all j = 2,. .. , m, we can derive that
.u-) < - .(A.4)
A.2.1 Deferred Proofs
Proof. Proof of Theorem 2.3.1. Define Nti to be the algorithm's value for Ni at the end
of time t (No,i is understood to be 0), for all t E [T] and i E [n]. For all t E [T], define
R= rTh and Zt = 4i(Ljt)) - 4D*(N*;/ki*) if a sale was made during time t; definezt t it t t t
R= Zt = 0 otherwise.
Consider the solution to the dual LP (2.18) formed by setting yi = E[di4(Ni)] for
all i E [n], and zt = E[Zt] for all t E [T]. We claim that this solution is feasible. The
non-negativity constraint (2.18c) can be verified directly from the definitions.
Now, consider constraint (2.18b) for a fixed t E [T], i E [n], E [mij. Given the ini-
tializations of ,... L(m'), 1i and the value of Nt-1,i, the algorithm will always make a
decision during time t which earns pseudorevenue whose conditional expectation is at least
PtS(54)(i )- Ji(Nt -')), by definition (2.15). Formally,
E[ZtIL() , L.., i) ,i N- _1, ; - Nt N4_1,C
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for all values of ,... , ,'4, N_1,2 . By the tower property of conditional expectation,
zt = (E[Zt] E )-(Ni i))]. Meanwhile, y has been set to ]E[Ii(N{). Since
NTi > Nt_,, and 54 is increasing, yj E[4 (N'-' )j. Therefore, the LHS of (2.18b),
P yj + zt, is at least E[p() By (2.17), this is at least r , completing the proof
of feasibility.
Applying weak duality, we obtain
0 PT () E kjE [( ( ' ) ]+ E E[Zt]
i=1 k t=1
n ~ ~ Ntt~)
= kjE (: 0 ( )i - (i +,)  E[Zt]
i=1 t=1 t=1
T n
= E ki((Di( ") - (Di(N 1,' )) + Ze . (A.5)
t=1 i=1 k
We now analyze the term inside the expectation,
ki( ) - N i)) + Zt, (A.6)
i=1 2
for every t E [T]. We would like to argue that it is at most -, on every sample path.
There are two cases. If an item i = i* was sold at price j = j* during time t, then (A.6)
equals
ki ( -1 ) - C( + )) + _, N, ,i). (A.7)
Indeed, Ntj = Nt-,, + 1, Nt,j = Nt-,, for all i = i, and Zt = jI(Ljj) - 4D(Ntl) by
definition. Furthermore, since Zt is positive, Nt_1,j must by less than Lf k. Therefore, we
can invoke (2.16) to get that (A.7) is at most rP /F, which is equal to - by definition. In
the other case, if no item was sold during time t, then (A.7) is 0, while Rt = 0 too, so (A.7)
is still at most R.
Substituting back into (A.5), we conclude that OPT(I) ET 1 E[}], which is equal to
}E[ALG(I)] by definition. This completes the proof of Algorithm 1 having a competitive
ratio at least F. E
Proof. Proof of Theorem 2.3.3.
First we prove the following two properties implied by the comonotonic randomized
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rounding procedure for D( ) .... , .m) from Definition 2.3.2:
E[LU)] = LU), j = 0, ... , m; (A.8)
(LO) - Dj ) - (L U) - L j'))| I I , 1 < j' < j:! M. (A.9)k
For (A.8), note that E[Lj)] = [Lkj+1(LUlk- [LULkJ)+ LL Ik] (1- (LO)k - [LU)kJ)) =
1(L()k - [L)kJ) + [LO)kj L().
For (A.9), note that I(Li)-L('))-(LU)-LW')) =(L(J)-LU))-(Lbj')-L')). We will
prove that (LU) - LW)-(LU') -L')) {; the inequality that (LO) - LU))-(LU') - L')) >
1k
-1 follows by symmetry. The maximum value of kLU) is [kLU)J + 1 while the minimum
value of kLU') is [kLU')], hence the result is immediate unless ([kLU)J + 1) - kLU) +
kLU') - LkL(j')J > 1, i.e. kLU') - [kL(j')J > kLU) - [kLU)]. However, in this case, if
kLU) = [kL(i)] +1, then W < kLU) - [kL(i)j < kLU') - [kLU')J and hence LU') is rounded
up as well. Similarly, if LU') is rounded down, then LU) must be rounded down as well. If
LO) and LU') are rounded in the same direction, then (iii) holds.
Having established (A.8) and (A.9), we now show that (2.16)-(2.17) are satisfied.
First we prove (2.17), the claim that E[4(LU))] 2 rU), inductively. Clearly E[D(L( 0))] >
r(O) = 0. Now consider j E [m] and suppose we have established (2.17) for the j - 1 case.
We can compare expression (2.19) with q = LU) and q = L(-1) to obtain 4(LU)) =
4(LU)) + (rU) - r(i-1)) exP(Bj)- . Therefore,
E[4(DU))] r U~) + (rU) - rU-1) E[exp(LU) - LU-1))] - 1
exp(a(i)) - 1
> r(~1) + (rU) - r(j-1))exp(E[L() - Lj-)]) - 1
exp(aU)) - 1
- r(j-1) + (r.U) - r(j-1))exp(ai))_- 1
exp(a(i)) - 1
where the first inequality uses the induction hypothesis, and the second inequality uses
Jensen's inequality (the exponential function exp is convex). The equality follows from
(A.8) and the definition that a() = LU) - LU- 1), completing the induction.
Now we prove (2.16) for an arbitrary j E [m] and N E {0,...., LU)k - 1}. Let q = N
and f = i(q). Note that 1 < f < j, and P-1) < q < DOe. Substituting q = N into the LHS
of (2.16), we get k( (q+) - '(q)) + -(Dj)) - -(q). Adding and subtracting 6(DO0) and
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rearranging, we get
k(I(q + )- <(q)) + (Le) - <1(q) +,6(LA) - (L(O)
The following upper bound can be derived for expression (A. 10):
k(,(q + ) - -(q)) + - i(q) + -
_ 1) eq+1/k-L (k - (k + 1)e-/k) + e -
( r - ) 1
- (U) eeL(-1 k k 1 )+e - 4
eck' - 1
e(- 
-( (1 + k)(1 - e-/k) +(' 
-
-1 - -
+ (l') r('-1))C L~'11- r1
, e- ) - 1
-
1
e -
1 -- )
(A.11)
The inequality holds because k - (1+ k)e- 1 /k > 0 for all k E N, and q is at most L2e -1/k.
It suffices to show that expression (A.11) is bounded from above by
r (1 + k)(el/k - 1)
1 -
(A.12)
To assist in this task, we would like to establish the following for all t' = f + 1, . . . , j and
(- + k)(1 -e /k
1 - e- -
(e') ~'-l) -Lfe-1) _2e') -9'
+ (r - r 
-
(r k)( ) Ik. (A.13)
1 --
But 1-e-) (f)- 1- a 715- * r(efI) due to the definition of a in (2.5), and rr( - e-
1-e-- 1-e-(A)
due to (A.4). Substituting back into inequality (A.13), it suffices to prove
(I (+ k)(1 - e /) + e -
<ema{L)-t"-l-~Le')+LU"-lL )-l -L+ (1 + k)(1 e-1/k)
where we have used Definition 2.2.3 to rewrite the first exponent. Now,
e(k - (1 + k e-1/k ' " ) (k - (1 + k)l - e-1/k
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(A. 10)
(r W )- r (t-)
since k - (1 + k)e- 1/k > 0 and < D'-") Lf'). Thus it remains to prove that
We consider two cases. First suppose 1,W) - Vf"-1) - L(') + L(e"-1) < L ')- v/ -1) _
LW) + L(W'-1), i.e. D'-1) - Df"-1) < L'-) -I"). Then the LHS of (A.14) equals
e"f + eD")-L "-V - e-"" = eL- -1-af, which equals the RHS of (A.14)
by the assumption that _P'- 1) - Df"1) < LV'-1) - Le"-1). In the second case, suppose
D' - DO-1) _ IV') + LW"-1) > p') - L'-1) - L') + Le'~l), i.e. D'-1) - Lf-1) >
Le'-1) - Le"-1). Then inequality (A.14) can be rearranged as
ea(~~~~~')~ Ie~ 1-( l~Lel)( 1) 1(e L(e')__L(W-1) - 1) > 0.
The first bracket is positive by the assumption that LW'-1) -Di"~1) > LW-1) - L("-1) and
the second bracket is non-negative since L(e'-1) < D'). This finishes the proof of (A.14),
and hence (A.13).
Equipped with (A.13), we return the task of proving that expression (A.11) is at most
expression (A.12). If we inductively apply inequality (A.13) to expression (A.11) for f' =
f+1, .. ., j (when f' = f +1, f" = f; when f' = f +2, f" = f if we arrived at case two during
iteration f + 1 and f" = f + 1 otherwise,...), we conclude that expression (A.11) is bounded
from above by
(r(j) J- (i-"'-1) -L()+LWe-1) (1 k) (1 - e1/k)
I - e-aoj
for some f" E {f, . ,j}. The fact that 1 - e-0' - r(_) (1 - e~"()), due to (2.5), and
the fact that (LU) - LW"~1)) - (LU) - IL"-1)) 1/k, due to (A.9), complete the proof of
expression (A.11) being at most expression (A.12), and thus the proof of Theorem 2.3.3 for
general m.
Finally, when m = 1, a(') = 1: In the above proof, since j and f are always 1, (A.11)
can be replaced by r0l) - +-2-1 ) , where we have used the fact that LM) = k always.
This is immediately at most F, for the improved value of F = 1, completing
t (1+k)(1ref/k)fco2pletirt
the proof of Theorem 2.3.3 in its entirety. LI
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A.2.2 Optimizing the Randomized Procedure
We can explicitly formulate the optimization problem over randomized procedures for a
single item with starting inventory k and m prices r(l),... r(m). Using the "balls in bins"
counting argument, the number of configurations satisfying (2.13) is D :(k 1 1 1).
We refer to these configurations in an arbitrary order using the index d E [D], where we
let Pd denote the probability of choosing configuration d, fd(-) denote the value function for
d, and Ld) denote the value of V3) under configuration d for all j = 0, ... , m. The opti-
mization problem of satisfying (2.16)-(2.17) with a maximal value of F can be formulated
as follows:
CR := sup F (A.15a)
k(fd( N +1 fd( N + fd(L)) - f(-) r d E [D], j E [m],0 < N < kLdj -1kf k k d JTj)-dk Fd
(A. 15b)
fd(l) .- fd( fd (0)=0 d e [D]
(A.15c)
D
Pdfd(L P) r) j G [M]
d=1
(A. 15d)
D
d=Pd = 1 (A.15e)
d=1
fd(0), fd( ),...,fd(1) E R; Pd 0 d c [D]
(A.15f)
Constraint (A.15b) corresponds to (2.16), constraint (A.15d) corresponds to (2.17), while
constraint (A.15c) enforces the definition of a value function in (2.14). We let CR denote the
optimal objective value of (A.15). Unfortunately, it is difficult to solve (A.15) exactly, since
the number of configurations D is exponential in the number of prices m, and constraint
(A.15d) is non-linear.
Nonetheless, (A.15) is useful at determining the best competitive ratio which could
be established using our analysis. We know that the randomized procedure from Defini-
tion 2.3.2 (based on <D) is an optimal solution to (A.15) as k -+ oo, since it achieves the
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optimal competitive ratio possible.
We can also solve (A.15) exactly when k = 1, in which case D = m, where we will let
d E [D] denote the configuration with D1) = ... = _L(d-1) = 0 and L(d) - ... = L(m) -
1. (A.15b) reduces to 2 fd(l) : u and needs to hold for d E [D], j d (for j < d,
kLF) - 1 = -1). However, clearly only the constraint with j = d is binding. As a result,d
(A.15b) corresponds to m constraints. (A.15d) corresponds to m constraints of the form
d- 1 Pdfd(l) > r), for j E [m]
Not counting fd(O), which must be set to 0, there are 2m + 1 variables: {fd(1), Pd : d E
[D] } and F. Consider the system of equations obtained in these 2m + 1 variables by setting
(A.15b), (A.15d), and (A.15e) to equality. It can be checked that the unique solution is
r(d) (())fd(l) = ,Vd e [D]; pd = ud)Vd c [D]; F = 2 (A.16)
with a(1), . . . , a(" ) defined from r(), . . . , r(') according to (2.6). Furthermore, this solu-
tion is both feasible, satisfying the non-negativity constraints in (A.15c) and (A.15f), and
optimal. Therefore, the value of CR is (.
A.2.3 Proof of Theorem 2.2.4
Now we put together the proof of Theorem 2.2.4. For all items i E [n], CRi is defined to be
the optimal objective value of (A.15), with k = ki, m = mi, and r(1) = rf , .. (m) r (mi).1 2
Consider Algorithm 1, where for all i, the randomized procedure used to initialize 4i is an
optimal solution to (A.15) achieving the objective value of CRi. For all i, (2.16)-(2.17) is
satisfied as long as F < CRs. Therefore, the maximum value of F satisfying the conditions
of Theorem 2.3.1 is mini CRi. By Theorem 2.3.1, this algorithm achieves a competitive ratio
of mini CR.
To establish bounds (i)-(iii) from Theorem 2.2.4, for all i, we need to find a feasible
randomized procedure with an objective value in (A.15) equal to the bound. For bounds
(i) and (iii), this is established directly by the randomized procedure from Definition 2.3.2
and Theorem 2.3.3. For bound (ii), we need to split the ki units of item i into ki disparate
items. For each single-unit item, its value function in Algorithm 1 is initialized according
to the randomized procedure described by (A. 16). This yields a value of , completing
the proof of Theorem 2.2.4.
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A.3 Deferred Proofs from Section 2.4
Proof. Proof of Lemma 2.4.1. Since the algorithm was willing to sell item i at price j, it
must be the case that Wi < Lj. Let f denote fi(Wi), which is at most j. Since we can
ignore measure-zero events, we assume that Wi = L(e-1). We can rearrange Zt as
(y-1))
r - r +r -r (1) +(r) - r'1) )exp(W - L ) - 1r r + exp(c<)) -1
=(j) - r(f) + ((f) - rj1) exp(ai) - exp(Wi - L )
exp(<)) - 1
Adding Y = b'I(Wi) = (rM - r,(E-1) )exp(Wi- )) to this expression, we get r) - rM +
exp(( ()-1
1-xp-ai , which can be re-written as r) - rM + - - due to (2.5). The result1-exp(-a f) 7 i i _ep_
follows immediately.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 2.4.2. It suffices to show that constraint (2.18b) holds for all t E [T]
and i E [n]. Since p E {0, 1} and the constraint clearly holds when pfj = 0, it suffices to
show that E[Y + Zt] > r ,ti) where jt,i : 0. We will let j = jt,i for brevity.
Fix the realization of Wi' for all i' : i, and consider the run of the algorithm on a
modified instance with item i removed. Having fixed the values of Wg, such a run is
deterministic. Let Zcrit denote the pseudorevenue earned on this run during time t, possibly
0. <bi maps [0, Lj] to [0, rP] bijectively, so we can set Wcrit to be the value in [0, LU] for
which <b(TWcrit) - max{4r) - zcrit, 01.
We now consider the run of the algorithm on the full instance with item i, which is
dependent on the realization of Wi. The following two claims from Devanur et al. (2013)
generalize to our multi-price setting.
1. Dominance: if W, C [0, Wcit), then in the run with item i, item i gets matched.
Proof: Since Wcrit > Wi and Wi 0, Wcrit > 0. Therefore, 4(Wcrit) > 0. Thus <b,(Wcrit)
r) - Zcrit (as opposed to <Ij(Wcrt) = 0), and moreover since Wi < Wcrit and <bi is strictly
increasing, <Ij(Wj) < r) - Zcrit. This implies r-- <bi(Wi) > max{Zcrit , 0}, since Zcrt > 0.
Thus on the run with item i, either i is already matched before time t, or it is matched to
customer t.
2. Monotonicity: Zt > Zcrit (regardless of the realization of Wi).
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Proof: fix the realization of Wi. We compare two deterministic runs of the algorithm: one
with item i, and one without. We can inductively establish over t = 0,... , T that at the
end of time t, the set of unmatched items in the run with i is a superset of that in the run
without i. Therefore, in the run with i, since the algorithm is maximizing pseudorevenue
over a superset of items, its pseudorevenue Zt can be no less than Zcrit.
Now, conditioned on the realizations of W for i' = i, which determines the values of
Zcrit and Wcrit, we have Zt Zcrit (by Monotonicity) and in turn Zcrit > - I(Wcrit)
(by the definition of Wcrit). Meanwhile, as long as i gets matched, Y gets set to @((Wi),
Wcrit
so by Dominance, E[YjI{Wg : ' i} fwr t'(w)dw = D,(Wcrit) - 4(0) = I(Wcrit).
Therefore, E[Y + Zt|{W2' : i' = i}] > rj. The proof follows from the tower property of
conditional expectation.
A.4 Deferred Proofs from Section 2.5
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.5.2. The unique solution to the system (2.21) is obtained
inductively over j = 2,... , m by setting B 3 -= ()e I Bj-. By (A.4), r(j < e-a
r~e_' wr() -
hence B3 < e-U- Bj- 1 . But afj-') > 0 by Proposition 2.2.2, completing the proof that
B7 < B._ 1 for j = 2, ... , m. The fact that 0 < B, is immediate. 0
Proof. Proof of Lemma 2.5.3. Consider the execution of an online algorithm on this ran-
domized instance. For all i E [n] and group of customers t E [n], let Qt,i denote the number
of group-t customers to which item iri is sold, which is a random variable with respect to
the random permutation 7r as well as any randomness in the algorithm. Let qt,i = E[Qti].
Clearly if i < t, then Qt,i = 0, because group-t customers have no interest in item 7ri.
Otherwise, for any i, i > t, we argue that qt,i = qti,. This is because while group t is
arriving, the online algorithm cannot distinguish between items 7ri and 7ri, hence any items
it allocates are equally likely to be item 7ri and item irgi. Therefore, we let qt denote the
value of qt,i for i > t.
Now, consider item 7ra. Since it only has k units of inventory, we know that Zl1 Qtn _
k on every sample path. Using the linearity of expectation, we get that
<qt k. (A.17)
t=1
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Furthermore, for a t E [n], on every sample path, EZt Qti < k, since there are only k
customers in group t. Therefore, (n + 1 - t)qt k, or
k
qt < . (A.18)
For this proof, let Mj = =loj,, for all j = 0,...,m. For all j E [m], let Aj=
t=1j _n+1 qt. Substituting into (A.17), we get the constraint that E', Aj < 1. For
any j E [m - 1], summing inequality (A.18) for t = Mj-in+1,... ,Mjn yields Aj ln ,
since n -+ oo, and Bj = 1 - Mj-1, Bj+1 = 1 - Mj by definition. It is also clear from
definition that Aj > 0 for all j E [m].
Finally, the total expected revenue is
M Mjn
Er(j) E qt(n + 0 t, (A. 19)
j=1 t=Mjin+1
since for each group t there are n + 1 - t items for each of which qt copies are sold
in expectation. Consider any j E [m]. Since Zt=Mjn+1qi = Ak by definition,
t=Ej-in+1 qt(n + 1 - t) is maximized by setting qt to its upper bound in (A.18) for
t = Ma-in + 1, Mi-in + 2.... until the capacity of Ajk is reached. Since n -+ oo, we can
simply compute the value of t for which
k k
+ ... + = Ajk, (A.20)
n - Mj-in n - t
with t E [Mj-in, Mjn]. Letting t = (Mj- 1 + y#j)n with y E [0, 1], and using the definition
of Bj, (A.20) becomes in = A, or y/3i B3 (1 - e-A). Therefore,
Mn (M_ 1 +B3 (1-e~ ))n k
S qt(n+1-t) k -(n+ -t)EEn + 1 -t
t=Mj-in+1 t=Mj-in+1
- Bj(1 - e-Ai)nk
Substituting into (A.19), we get that the expected revenue of the online algorithm is at
most (2.23), where E'm Aj 5 1, Aj 5 In Th for j E [m - 1], and Aj 0 for j E [m],
completing the proof.
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Proof. Proof of Lemma 2.5.4. We use backward induction over j = m,..., 1. When j = m,
(2.25) becomes nkr(m)Bm(1 - exp(-T)), since Am = a(m) by definition. Meanwhile, (2.24)
is maximized by setting Am = 7, resulting in the same expression and establishing the base
case.
Now suppose j < m and that we have already established the lemma in the j + 1
case. If we set Aj = A, for some A E [0,T], then the maximum value of (2.24) subject to
Ai+1,- . . , Am > 0 and Aj+1 + ... + Am < r - A is, by the inductive hypothesis,
r)Bj (I - exp(-A))nk + nk r() B 1 - exp ( a- ) + Aj+1 - (- A)) (A.21)
M - (j + 1) +1
Consider this expression as a function of A. The derivative is
m -1 (-1()+Ai+ 
- (-r-A)
r(j)Bj exp(-A)nk + nk E r(e)Be -1 -exp ( - + A+ 1  ) (A.22)
and the second derivative is clearly negative, so the function is concave. Therefore, it is
maximized by setting the derivative to 0. By definition (2.21), rfBre-() is identical for
all e = j + 1,.. , m, and equal to r(i)Bje~a(j) Thus setting (A.22) to 0 implies:
exp(a() - A) 1 ( A+1( A))M - J* exp -
)_ A Aj+ 1 - (i- - A)
a~~m - A in-j
Rearranging and using the definition that Aj+ 1 = Aj - ad), we get A = aU) - A-J.mj+1*
Substituting this value of A into (A.21), the expression +l-(j-) is equal to A- +, hence
m-(jl)+lm-j+1'
(A.21) is equal to (2.25), completing the induction and the proof of the lemma. E
A.5 Deriving the Multi-price Value Function <bi
Throughout this chapter, we have proven results critically dependent on the exact definitions
of a() , ... , a in (2.5), and <hi in (2.8). In this section we explain how to derive the system(miZ
of equations in (2.5), and the functional form in (2.8). In Subsection A.5.1, we use the same
method to derive the optimal value function when the price of an item i can take any value
in the continuum [rmin, r"]. We omit the subscript i throughout this section.
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Consider constraints (2.16)-(2.17) in Theorem 2.3.3 for a single item with k -+ oo. Let
w = i, and we deterministically set 4 to some D. The goal is to solve for the 4 which
maximizes the value of F.
Observe that
N+1 N D(w+l/k)-4(w)
lim k(4I( (-)) = lim
k-+oo kk-c~ lkx kk k-4x 1/k
which is equal to the derivative of D as w, by definition (b will end up not being differentiable
on a discrete set of measure 0, which can be ignored). Therefore, (2.16) is equivalent to
1V(w) - 4(w) < r W ( 1- 1), (A.23)
F
and needs to hold for all j E [m], w E [0, L(A)]. For a fixed w E (L(- 1), L(J)), (A.23) needs
to hold for all j' = j, ... , m, but is clearly binding when j' = j. Therefore, it suffices to fix
a j E [in] and consider (A.23) when w E (L(- 1), L()).
We should point out that this simplification via the "binding" argument is not possible
for a finite k and random >, because then (A.23) becomes $'(w) - 4(w) < _ - 4(L()),
and the RHS in fact may not be increasing in j.
If we set (A.23) to equality for some j E [m] and all w E (L(- 1), L()), and solve the
differential equation, we get that D(w) must be of the form Cew-r(i)( -1) on (L(- 1), L(J)).
Setting 4(L(j-')) = r(j-1) and 4(L(A)) = r(), we obtain
C r() - rj1
C = L eLj-l
F = _ - (1 - e-- ). (A.24)1 U1
The RHS of (A.24) is the largest value of F which allows (A.23) to hold on segment j. It
is dependent on a(i), which is equal to LU') - LU-1), the length of segment j. For (A.23)
to hold on all segments j E [in], F must be set to min _ _ j - (1 - e-U).
to maximize the /(1-e)
Therefore, we would like to choose segment lengths c(1),.. ,om) summing to 1
to maximize the minimum - (1 - e-a()), which is accomplished by setting
1-rU-1)/rj) ' (1 - e ) equal for all j E [m]. This yields the system of equations (2.5), and
Proposition 2.2.2. The resulting value of F is equal to 1 - e-'1, since r(0 ) = 0. The result-
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ing value of C, when substituted into the equation for 4)(w) on each segment (L(i-1), L(A),
yields (2.8).
The derivation of 4 we just completed, starting from condition (A.23), comes from our
analysis of MULTI-PRICE BALANCE. We note that the exact same inequality (A.23) can
also be derived from our analysis of MULTI-PRICE RANKING.
A.5.1 Continuum of Feasible Prices
Let the feasible price set for the item be [rin, rmx], where 0 < rm"" < rma. Using the
same "binding" argument, it suffices to maximize the value of F for which the following
can hold:
'(w) - 4(w) 5 rm( 1), w E (0, a); (A.25)
F
~(w)
'(w) -- 0, w E (a, 1). (A.26)
4 must also satisfy D(0) = 0, 4(a) = rri", 'D(1) = r"x, while a E (0, 1) is an arbitrary
"booking limit" for the lowest price of rmin.
We know from before that under the optimal solution to (A.25), the value of F can be
at most 1 - e-'. Solving the differential equation where (A.26) is set to equality, D(w) must
take the form CewiF on (a, 1). Substituting 1(a) = rinn and 4)(1) = rm yields
C -iC =1(r"""n -a(r ")- ;
F = 1 OZ
=ln
Therefore, the value of F is also bounded from above by -(7mln). F is maximized by
setting 1-1amin) equal to the other upper bound of 1 - e-; the value at which equality
is achieved is then the competitive ratio.
Letting R = ln(rmx/r"in), the solution to R = 1-e-' can be written as W(ReR-1) _
R+ 1, where W is the Lambert-W function, the inverse function to f(x) = xex for x E R>o.
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Indeed, when a = W(ReR-1), the following can be derived:
1- -a
R
Re- = a + R - 1
Re-1 (a + R - 1)e+R-1
W(ReR-1) = a+ R -1
Substituting a = W(ln(rmx/rmin")eln(rmax-/rin1) - ln(rmax/rm"i) + 1 into the formula
for C, and using the fact that 4D(w) = Cew/F, we get
4)(w) = (rm") -(rmax) n, w E [a, 1].
Meanwhile, the derivation preceding Subsection A.5.1 implies that
eW -1)(w) = r".1" - , W E [0, a].
It can be checked that indeed (D(O) = 0, 4)(a) = rm"" (4) is continuous at w = a), and
4)(1) = rmax. Furthermore, unlike the case of discrete prices, it can be checked that (D is also
differentiable at w = a (on [a, 1], use the form that 4)(w) = CeWiF, hence V'(a) =T().
A.6 Supplement to Numerical Experiments
We provide additional details about our choice estimation. We define 8 customer types, one
for each combination of the 3 following binary features.
1. Group: whether the customer indicated a party size greater than 1.
2. CRO: whether the customer booked using the Central Reservation Office, as opposed
to the hotel's website or a Global Distribution System (for details on these terms, see
Bodea et al. (2009)).
3. VIP: whether the customer had any kind of VIP status.
We did not use features such as: whether the booking date is a weekend, whether the check-
in date is a weekend, the length of stay, or the number of days in advance booked. Such
features did not result in a more predictive model.
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We estimate the mean MNL utilities for each of the 8 products separately for each
customer type. The results are displayed in Table A.1. The total share of each customer
type (out of all the transactions) is also displayed. We should point out that it is possible
for a customer to choose the higher fare for a room, even if the lower fare was also offered.
This is because the higher fares are often packaged with additional offers, such as airline
services, city attractions, in-room services, etc.
We have shifted the mean utilities so that for each customer type, the weights of both
the no-purchase option, and the most-preferred purchase option, is equal to 0. The large
weights on the no-purchase options ensure that the revenue-maximizing assortments tend
to include both the low and high fares.
In the setting with greater fare differentiation (Subsection 2.7.5), the high prices of
the King, Queen, Suite, and Two-double rooms are adjusted to $614, $608, $768, $612,
respectively (twice the lower fares). The mean utility of the no-purchase option is increased
by 2 for every customer type, to ensure that the revenue-maximizing assortments still include
both the low and high fares.
A.6.1 Details on the Forecasting Bid-price Algorithms
To forecast the remaining number of customers, we assume that we know the average number
of customers interested in each occupancy date (1340), as well as the overall trend for how
far in advance customers book, which is plotted in Figure A-1. As an example of how to
use these numbers, consider the occupancy date March 31st. At the start, we forecast there
to be 1340 arrivals. However, suppose by March 6th, 500 customers have arrived. Since we
know from Figure A-1 that roughly 50% of the total population interested in March 31st
will have already booked by March 6th (25 days in advance), we expect there to only be
500 customers remaining.
To forecast the breakdown of remaining customers by type, we assume that we know
the aggregate distribution of customer type over all occupancy dates. For example, from
Section A.6, we know that 28% of all customers are of Type 3. Then we would estimate
28% x 500 = 140 of the 500 remaining customers to be of Type 3. Alternatively, one can try
to learn the specific distribution of customers interested in March 31st. Suppose that only
100, or 20%, of the 500 bookings made before March 6th came from customers of Type 3.
Then we would instead estimate 20% x 500 = 100 of the 500 remaining customers to be of
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Table A.1: MNL choice models for the 8 customer types. The suffix "L" on a room type means lower fare, while the suffix "H" on a
room type means higher fare.
Customer Type MNL Mean Utilities
Group? CRO? VIP? Share KingL QueenL SuiteL 2DoubleL KingH QueenH SuiteH 2DoubleH NoBuy
0.16 -0.36 -1.22 -2.56 -1.04 0 -0.23 -2.25 -1.8 0
0.03 -0.82 -1.98 -2.16 -2.09 0 -1.02 -1.45 -1.82 0
0.28 -1.67 -00 -3.78 -2.71 0 -1.33 -1.8 -1.58 0
0.09 -2.13 -- o -3.38 -3.76 0 -2.12 -1 -1.59 0
0.19 -0.54 -0.97 -2.26 0 -0.91 -1.47 -2.78 -1.41 0
0.04 -0.09 -0.82 -0.95 -0.14 0 -1.35 -1.07 -0.51 0
1 / 0.18 -0.93 -0o -2.56 -0.76 0 -1.66 -1.41 -0.27 0
0.03 -1.39 -o -2.16 -1.8 0 -2.45 -0.61 -0.28 0
Fraction of Total Customers yet to Arrive
0.4
8.1
0
Days until Check-in
Figure A-1: Distribution of arrivals over the days before check-in, formed by aggregating
all transactions.
Type 3.
To use the forecasted information, algorithms incorporate it into the LP (2.27), and set
the bid price of each item i equal to the shadow price of constraint i in (2.27b). These algo-
rithms then offer each customer t the assortment S (from the available items) maximizing
((j)e p (S) (r ( - Ai).
We clarify the exact way in which the forecasted information is incorporated into the
LP. Let there be A customer types, indexed by a = 1,..., A. We use p,(S) to denote the
probability of a customer of type a choosing product (i, j) from assortment S. Suppose that
when we want to re-solve the LP (2.27), the forecasted number of remaining customers of
type a is Na, for all a E [A], and the remaining inventory of item i is Ki, for all i E [n]. We
can formulate the following LP, which is a modification of (2.27):
A
maxZ xa(S) ( W p(S)
a=1 S (ij)ES
A
( ( a(S)j p(S) 5;ki i E [n]
a=1 S j:(i,j)ES
Zxa(S) = Na a E [A]
S
Xa(S) ; 0 a E [A], S C {(i, j) : i e [n], j E [mi]}
We have set T = EA Na and I{t : type of customer t is a}| = Na; note that the ordering
of remaining customers is inconsequential for the LP.
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Although this LP has an exponential number of variables, it can easily be solved using
column generation (e.g., see Liu and Van Ryzin (2008)). Fix an optimal primal solution
(X*(S) a c [A], S C {(i, j) : i E [n], j E [mi]}) and an optimal dual solution (y* : i E
[n]), (z* a E [A]). The bid-price algorithm sets the bid price of each item i equal to y*.
We should point out that for every bid-price algorithm based on dual variables, there is a
corresponding random assignment algorithm based on primal variables. Such an algorithm
would, for each customer type a, offer each assortment S with probability proportional
to x*(S). We have confirmed that these algorithms perform similarly in the simulations.
We compare with the bid-price algorithms instead of the random assignment algorithms
because they follow a form more similar to our MULTI-PRICE BALANCE algorithm.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Exponential Inventory Balancing on Our Problem
First we describe an example with large starting inventories before discussing the why
using an exponential penalty function does not seem to improve the competitive ratio for
our problem, even as the starting inventories become large.
B.1.1 Example
Consider a "scaled-up" version of Example 3.2.10 with initial inventories and selling season
multiplied by k, a large integer. Now the randomized instance is defined as follows:
e n = 3;
* ri = rdisc = 0, b1 = kN;
" r2  r2SC = ]-, b2 = kN;
Sr=rdisc = M, b3 =k;
* Si = {{1, 2}}; q1({1, 2}, {1, 2}) = 1;
" S2 = {{2,3}}; 02({2,3},{2,3}) =N
o The arrivals are:
- T = kNi =...= ikN = 1, w-p- 1
- T = 2kNi1= ... =ikN = 1, ikN+1 = - i2kN 2, w.p- -
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The expected value of OPT(i 1 ,. .. , ir) has been multiplied by k, so it is now k(1 + C).
Intuitively, the offline fractional solution will always extract the full revenue of y - kN = k
from item 2, and extract revenue of M - k from item 3 w.p. 9. Details on the feasible LP
solutions can be found in the proof of Theorem 3.2.11.
Now, consider any online algorithm. It faces the same conundrum as before: it must
determine what fraction of the first kN customers to offer item 2 to without knowing
whether the subsequent kN customers will come. Let a E [0, 1] be the fraction of the first
kN customers served. If the subsequent kN customers come, (1 - a)kN units of item 2
would be remaining for the purpose of selling item 3. The number of units of item 3 sold is
then min{X, k}, where X is a Binomial random variable with parameters ((1 - a)kN, y).
Clearly
E[min{X, k}] < E[XI = (1 - a)k. (B.1)
In the proof of Theorem 3.2.11 we explicitly compute the difference between E[min{X, k}]
and E[X], although for any fixed a < 1 the law of large numbers suggests that
E[min{X, k}] -+ E[X] as k -* oo.
Nonetheless, for any k, we can conclude from (B. 1) that the expected revenue of an online
algorithm serving a of the first kN customers is less than ak+C(1 -a)k, as M, N -+ oo (for
details, see the proof of Theorem 3.2.11). Choosing C = 1, ak + 0(1 - a)k = k regardless
of what a the algorithm chooses, and E[OPT(ii,... , in)] = 2k. Therefore, the competitive
ratio must be less than - even as min{bi,... , b o} o.
2
B.1.2 Comparison of Exponential Inventory Balancing and Protection
Level in Expectation
For their problem, Golrezaei et al. (2014) recommend offering a revenue-maximizing assort-
ment during every time period, where the revenue of each item is scaled by a function of its
fraction of starting inventory remaining. This function is called a penalty function. The in-
tuition is that if a large fraction of an item has already been sold, then lower priority should
given to selling the remaining units. As the starting inventories become large, their expo-
nential penalty function accomplishes the optimal trade-off between selling a high-revenue
item versus selling a low-revenue item that may not be wanted later.
In our problem, there a further trade-off between selling a high-revenue item versus
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saving it for even higher revenue later. As a result, selling too much of an item as an add-
on has the added downside that the inventory could be being disposed for an arbitrarily
small fraction of its potential revenue, and every unit depleted as an add-on incurs the same
risk in revenue loss. The example in the previous subsection illustrates this-every unit of
item 2 sold to the first kN customers loses the same fraction (}) of item 3's large revenue
(M), should the final kN customers come.
Therefore, placing higher value on the final remaining units of each item in the form of
an exponential penalty function appears to yield no benefit. Instead, our algorithm hedges
against the worst-case arrival sequence by withholding half of the inventory of each item
(in expectation) from being sold as an add-on. In that sense, our algorithm also scales
the revenue of each item by a penalty factor, but our penalty factor is a function of the
item's expected fraction of starting inventory remaining, and that function over [0, 1] is the
function which is 0 on [0, 1] and 1 on (}, 1].
B.2 Example Demonstrating the Importance of Correlation
and Protection Level in Expectation
" n = 3; b1 = 1, b2 = 1, b 3 = 2;
* all revenues and discounted revenues are 1;
1= {{1,2,3}}:
-#({1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}) = 1 #({1, 3}, {1, 2, 3}) =
-- #({1, 2}, {1, 2}) =
-- #({1, 3}, {1, 3}) = ;
SS2 = {{2, 3}}; #2({2, 3}, {2, 3}) = 1;
" T = 2, i = 1, i 2 = 2.
Our algorithm would execute as follows. It offers {1, 2, 3} to the first customer. Half the
time, item 2 is sold and the second customer cannot be served. The other half, item 3 is
sold, and sold again when it is offered as an add-on for the second customer.
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In the end, items 1 and 2 are both guaranteed to be sold (since a customer of that type
arrived), while the units of item 3 sold is either 0 (if the first customer bought item 2) or
2 (if the first customer bought item 3). Note that using a deterministic protection level of
b3 = 1 would not have sufficed to achieve these sale probabilities of item 3. The negative
correlation between the sales of items 2 and 3 during t = 1 was very relevant here.
B.3 Omitted Proofs
Proof. Proof of Lemma 3.2.7. Consider any algorithm, which could know il,..., ir at the
start of the time horizon, and consider a sample path with that algorithm. For all t E [T]
and S E Sit, let Yt(S) be the indicator random variable for assortment S being offered
during time t. For all t E [T] and j c [n], let Pt be the indicator random variable for7
customer t buying item j.
Clearly, at most one assortment from Sit can be offered during each t E [T], so we
have ESES Yt(S) 1. Taking the expectation (with respect to both the randomness in
the algorithm, and the randomness in the customers' decisions) on both sides and letting
yt(S) := E[Yt(S)], we have
E yt(S) K 1.
SeSit
During time t, inventory of item j E [n) gets depleted if and only if P = 1, which is
only possible if some S E Sit is offered. Therefore, the depletion of item j during time t is
equal to ES> i P-Yt (S). Conditioned on Yt (S) = 1, Pj is an independent binary random
variable which is 1 with probability pij(S). Since the total depletion of item j over all the
time periods cannot exceed bj, we have
T
Z Py -Yt(S) bj,
t=1 SESi
T5 5 E[P\lYt (S) = 1] - Pr[Yt(S) = 1] < bj,
t=1 SESit
= E Pij(S)yt(S) bj.
t=1 Ses,,,
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Using the same arguments, the revenue on a run of the algorithm is
T
EY P! + E ris'Pt t)
t=1 SES j fit
whose expectation is
T
(r +[ rTCpitj (S))yt(S),
t=1 SES it
since piti,(S) = 1 for all S G Si.
We have shown that for every algorithm, its expected revenue is equal to the objective
value of the LP on a feasible solution of the LP. Therefore, the expected revenue of the
algorithm is no greater than OPT(ii,... , ir), completing the proof of Lemma 3.2.7. El
Proof. Proof of Theorem 3.2.11. First we show that the expected value of OPT(ii,... ,iT)
is at least C + 1. In the case customers N + 1, ... , 2N don't arrive (which occurs with
probability 1 - ), a revenue of N(-!) = 1 can be obtained by offering assortment {1, 2}
during each of t = 1,..., N. In the case customers N +..., 2N arrive (which occurs with
probability -), it can be checked that y 1({1}) = N({}) 1, yN+1( 2 , 3 ) -
y2N({2, 3}) = l is a feasible solution to the LP. Therefore, in this case, OPT(ii, ... ir)
N(- + ) = 1 + M. The expected value of OPT(ii,... , iT) is at least
NC C(1 )(1) + M (I1+ M) = 1+ C,
as desired.
Now consider any online algorithm. It must determine what fraction of the first N
customers to offer item 2 to (as an add-on), without knowing whether the subsequent N
customers requesting item 2 will arrive. Let a E [0, 1] denote the fraction of the first
N customers the online algorithm offers item 2 to. After deciding a, should customers
N + 1 ... , 2N arrive, the best the algorithm can do is use every remaining unit of item 2
to try to sell item 3. That is, the algorithm should serve N - aN of the customers of type
2, and offer item 3 as an add-on while it is available.
The expected revenue of such an algorithm is
aN( ) + C ((N - aN)( ) + (1 - (1 - 1 )N-aN)M), (B.2)
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which can be explained as follows:
" aN of the first N customers are offered item 2 as an add-on, guaranteeing a revenue
of } per customer;
" only if the next N customers arrive (which occurs w.p. V), is there additional revenue:
- the remaining N - aN units of item 2 will be sold at the price of k each;
- the probability that item 3 is not sold is equal to the probability that all N - aN
customers are offered {2, 3} and reject item 3, which occurs with probability
(1 -I)N-aN.
(B.2) can be rearranged as a + C(1 - (1 - )N-aN) + C(1-a). Taking the limit as
M, N -÷ oc, the expression is equal to
a + C(1 - e").
We would like to argue that this expression, which is a continuous and differentiable function
of a over the domain [0, 1], is maximized at a = 1- In C. Indeed, its derivative is 1- Ce 1,
which is positive for a E [0, 1 - In C), 0 when a = 1-ln C, and negative for a c (1 -ln C, 1].
Therefore, the expected revenue of any online algorithm is no greater than 1 - In C +
C(1 - -) = C - In C. Thus the competitive ratio of any online algorithm cannot exceed
C - InC
C+1
Substituting in the optimized value of C = (where we' = 1) completes the proof of
Theorem 3.2.11.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 3.3.6. By the linearity of expectation, the expected units of
item j sold as an add-on after the iteration equals the expected units of item j sold as an
add-on before the iteration plus the probability that item j is sold as an add-on during the
iteration. That is, if Step 6 is executed, then
dj(t + 1, 1,.,it+1, , -, I L-1, L,()
=dj(t, i..it, Ll,..., Lt-1, L) + hj(t,ii..it, Ll,..., EL-1, L)
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(for any it+,) and the desired inequality follows from the triangle inequality. On the other
hand, if Step 11 is executed, then
dj (t, i, .1 .. , it, L,1 . . . Lt-1, E + (, p))
=dj(t, i,..,it, Ll, . .. , Lt--1, C) + p - hj(t, 4,. ... , it, L1,., Lt-1, L)
and the desired inequality follows from the triangle inequality combined with the fact that
p < 1. El
Proof. Proof of Proposition 3.3.7. If the dj"r's are updated in Step 6, then durr < b-
- 2
by the guarantee in Step 5, while if they are updated in Step 11, then p - ( -6) -d "juL
(since hj > 0) by the choice of p. L
Proof. Proof of Proposition 3.3.8. The first statement follows from the definition of -FK,
which is the set of items that appear in L1, ... , L-, L. The second statement follows from
the fact that after sub-iteration K of iteration t, j will always appear in F in Pseudocode 3,
and never appear in G in Pseudocode 4. E
Proof. Proof of Theorem 3.3.10. Consider some iteration t E [T]. In Step 7 of SellTo
with s = t, an extra sub-iteration is possible only for each item that was added to L' by
Step 9 of ConstructList. However, items can be added to protection lists at most once, by
Proposition 3.3.8. Therefore, the total number of sub-iterations over t = 1, . .. , T is at most
T + n.
As a result, SampleAddon is called is at most T + n times, and the total number of
probabilities hj estimated is at most n(T + n). Applying Lemma 3.3.9 with E2 = n, each
of the estimates hj is outside of [hj -- E2, hj +E2] with probability at most 2e-2E M E
By the union bound, the probability that any estimate is not within E2 of its true value is
at most e.
Therefore, with probability at least 1 - E, there are no failures in the sampling and
the requirements on hj in Proposition 3.3.6 are always met. For all j E [n], there is no
error in the algorithm's value for d", i e E = 0, at the start. Inductively applying
Proposition 3.3.6, the total error accumulated over at most T + n sub-iterations is at most
(T + n)E 2 = 6. That is, Idj - jj < E. We can also inductively apply Proposition 3.3.7 to
see that dj - E.
.7 2
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Combining the two preceding inequalities establishes that with probability at least 1-E,
d.7 - e < di < _ for all j E [n], as desired. Now we analyze the runtime.
The runtime of SeilTo with time horizon t is 0((t + n)n) (in Step 11, .Fk can easily be
computed in O(n) time by having an index from each item to its position in the protection
lists). Therefore, the total runtime of SampleAddon over the up to T + n times it is called is
O((T + n)M(T + n)n)) = 0 2((T+n 4  - In (Tn)n (B.3)
which is polynomial in T, n, and . It is easy to see that this is the bottleneck operation
in OnlineSamplingPersonalizedAssortment(E), completing the proof of Theorem 3.3.10. L
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1 Full Proof of Theorem 4.2.2
Definition C.1.1. Define the following:
* Si,t: the indicator random variable for whether inventory unit i is sold by the end
of time t, i.e. the value of sold[i] at the end of time t, defined for all i E [k] and
t = 0, ...,I T;
* it: the inventory unit assigned to customer t, taking a value in [k] for all t E [T];
* i,t: the value such that level[i] = reit) at the end of time t, taking a value in
{0,1, ... , m} for all i E [k] and t = 0,..., T;
* jt: the value in {0, 1,..., m} such that V = rUt), defined for all t E [T].
Fix the deterministic sequence of valuations V1, . . . , VT chosen by the adversary. it, fi,,,
and jt are not random variables; they are determined by V1 ,. . . , VT.
We would like to write the random variables Si,t in terms of the other random variables.
By definition, Sj,o = 0 for all i E [k]. For t > 0, the following equations hold:
Si,,t = Si,,t-1 + Xt; (C.1)
Si,t = Si,t-1, for i $ it. (C.2)
(C.1)-(C.2) are easy to see. In the algorithm, the only inventory unit that could po-
tentially be sold during time t is it. This explains why (C.2) holds for all i # it. It also
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explains why Se,t = 1 if and only if Si,,t_1 = 1 or Xt = 1. Furthermore, Si,,t-i and Xt
cannot both be 1, since the algorithm does not try to sell inventory unit it again at time t
if it has already been sold. This completes the explanation for (C.1).
We now analyze the state of the sold array during the execution of the algorithm.
Lemma C.1.2. At the end of each time step t, the probability that any inventory unit i
has been sold is =1 q(). Formally, for all t 0, ... ,T
E[Si,t] = q Eq(j), for i E [k]. (C.3)
qj=1
Proof. Proof. We proceed by induction on t. (C.3) is true at time t = 0, where E[Si,o] = 0
and ti,O = 0 for all i E [k].
Now suppose we are at the end of some time t > 0 and (C.3) was true at the end of time
t - 1. We need to prove that (C.3) is still true at the end of time t. For i : it, Si,t = Sj,t_1,
by (C.2). The value of level[i] is unchanged by the algorithm during time t, so fi,t = fit_1
as well. The inductive hypothesis from time t- 1 then establishes that E[Si,t] = 1 f q().
It remains prove E[Sit,t] = j 1'j q(W). This is immediate if jt is no greater than fit,t-
(the value of the t variable during iteration t of the algorithm), since both Si,t and fi,t would
be unchanged. If jt > fit,t_1, the following can be derived (let f = fit,t_1 for brevity):
E[Sit,t] = E[St.._1] + E[Xt]
= E[S t- 1] + E[XtISit,t 1  0] - Pr[Si_,t1 =0]
q Ifq(j) + Pr[Xt = 11Sie,t-1 = 0] (1 - I q(j))
j=1 j=1
1q() + q ~j i)+
-U IqqU)
q(j).+EMj
q j=1
The first equality follows from (C.1) and the linearity of expectation. The second equality
conditions on Si,,t_ 1 being 0, since the value of Xt is 0 if Sit, 1 = 1. The third equality
uses the value of E[Sit,t_1] guaranteed by the inductive hypothesis. In the fourth equality,
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the probability of getting a sale, conditioned on Algorithm 7 reaching line 7, is equal to the
probability of choosing a price at most r(Jt), the valuation of customer t. The final equality
achieves the desired result because jt = fit, the new value for level[i] after line 13 of
iteration t of the algorithm.
This completes the induction and the proof of the lemma. El
Now we analyze the expected revenue of the algorithm, which is E[ALG], or
t_ 1 E[PtXt]. As argued earlier, there cannot be a sale in a time step t where jt <; fitt1,
so for these time steps Xt = 0 and E[PtXt] = 0. The following lemma derives the value of
E[PtX] when jt > fitt-1.
Lemma C.1.3. Suppose jt > it,t_1 in a time step t E [T]. Then the expected revenue
earned by the algorithm during time step t is !(r(Jt) - reitt-1)).
Proof. Proof. Let t E [T] be any time step for which jt > fitt-1. For brevity, let f denote
fit,t-1. The following can be derived:
E[PtXt] = E[PtXtSt,t1- = 0] Pr[Sit,t_1 = 01
r(j)E[Xt|Pt = r(W)] Pr[Pt = r(j)ISit,t_ 1 = 0] 1 - Pr[Si,,t_1 = 1])
r()1[jt > j] Pr[P = r(j)Si,t- = 0]) (1 - q(j'))
j= +1 j1
r( ) qU E =j+1 qUI
1 j'=+1 q) q
31 r(j-1)
- rdj) (I - .
q ( jU))
j=i+1
The first equality conditions on Sit,t-1 being 0; note that Xt = 0 if Sit,t-1 = 1. The
second equality conditions on the value of Pt, where we drop the conditioning on Sitt-1
in the term E[XtjPt = rU)] since Pt # oc already implies Sit,t-1 = 0. This term becomes
1[jt ;> j] in the third equality, since it is deterministically 1 or 0 depending on whether
Vt > rU), or equivalently jt > j. The third equality also uses Lemma C.1.2, for the value of
Pr[Si,,t- = 1]. The fourth equality uses the offering probabilities from line 7 of Algorithm 7.
The fifth equality uses the explicit definition of q(j) from Definition 4.2.1, and it is easy to
see that the final expression is equal to I(r(it) - r(').E
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Lemma C.1.3 in turn implies the following lemma.
Lemma C.1.4. The expected revenue earned by the algorithm up to time t, E, 1 IE[Pt'Xt1,
is i=
Proof. Proof. The customers up to time t can be partitioned according to the inventory
unit they were assigned, so
t k
E E [Pt, Xt,] = E E [Pt, Xt,. (C.4)
t'=1 i=1 t'<t:it,=i
Consider any i. For each t' assigned to i, E[PtXt,] is 0 if jt, < ti. Denote the remaining
t' such that jt, > ei,t,_1 by t,....., t', where N > 0 and t' < ... < t'N. Using Lemma C.1.3,
N
( E[P,Xt,] = (E ')-r '-)
t'<t:it"=i n=1
Before time t' , level[i] was last updated at time t' 1 , so fi,tl _1 = jt,. Therefore, the
sum telescopes and the remaining term is ir N (note that r 1  = r 0  = 0). Now,
ji N itN, and levelil is not updated again in time steps t' + 1,..., t, so ei '
N N'IIt S 1N
Substituting Zt, E[PtXt,] = Irei't) into (C.4) completes the proof. L
Having established the revenue of our online algorithm, we compare it to the offline
optimum. Knowing the sequence of valuations V1, ... , VT in advance, it is clear that the
following algorithm is optimal:
1. Find the min{k, T} customers with the largest valuations;
2. Charge each of these customers t her maximum willingness-to-pay Vt;
3. Reject all other customers.
The revenue OPT would be the the sum of the min{k, T} largest valuations.
Definition C.1.5. For all t E [T], let Mk(t) be a vector consisting of the k largest elements
from (V1,... , Vt), in any order. If t < k, fill in the remaining entries of Mk(t) with zeros.
Then OPT = E_ M (T), where M (T) denotes the i'th entry of Mk(T). It turns out
that Mk(t) is closely tracked by the level array from Algorithm 7, as t progresses from
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1 to T. Both fi,t (the value of level[i] at the end of time t) and Mk(t) are deterministic
functions of V1 , ... , Vt.
Lemma C.1.6. For all t = 0,... , T, the entries of the vector (ret),. .. ,k, It)) is a per-
mutation of the entries of the vector Mk(t).
Proof. Proof. We proceed by induction on t. At time t = 0, both Mk(0) and
(r(el), ... , r(ek,o)) is a vector of k zeros, so the statement is true.
Now consider t > 0, and suppose that Mk(t - 1) is a permutation of
(r(elt-1), . . .,r(fk,t-1)). Therefore, a minimum entry in Mk(t - 1) is equal to a minimum
entry in (r(lt-1), . . . , r(k,t-1)), which in turn is equal to r(itt-1), by Definition C.1.1.
If Jt > i,,t_, or equivalently Vt = rUt) > r(it-1), then by the definition of Mk t)I Vt
must be added to Mk(t - 1) and replace any minimum entry equal to r(40-1) Meanwhile,
fit,t = It, and i,t = fi,t-1 for all i , it, thus the only change from (r(lt-1), . . . , r(ek,t-1)) to
(r(elt), . .. , rik,t)) is that the entry at index it has been replaced by rot). Since Mk(t-1) and
(r(t-1), ... , r(fk-1)) go through the same change at time t, Mk(t) is still a permutation
of (r(e t), . . . , r(fkt)).
If instead Jt <; fit,t-1, then every entry of Mk(t - 1) is already at least r0it) = V,
so Mk(t - 1) incurs no change at time t. Similarly, i,t = fi,t_1 for all i E [k], so
(r(Jt-1),... , r(fk,t-1)) incurs no change as well. In both cases, we have established that
Mk(t) is a permutation of (r(tl),..., r(ikt)), completing the induction and the proof. L
With Lemma C.1.4 and Lemma C.1.6, it is easy to establish the competitiveness of
Algorithm 7. Our online algorithm is designed so that during each time step t, it earns
exactly . of the amount that the offline optimum would increase by with the addition of
Vt, and it does not need to observe Vt beforehand to accomplish this.
Proof. Proof of Theorem 4.2.2. Fix any sequence of valuations (V1 ,..., VT). E[ALG] is
equal to E 1E[PtXt], which in turn is equal to I E I r&2,T), by Lemma C.1.4. Mean-
while, OPT = E 1 Mk(T), and the entries of Mk(T) is a permutation of the entries of
(r(lT), . . . ,r(ek)), by Lemma C.1.6. Therefore, OPT = Z r r ,T) = q.-E[ALG], complet-
ing the proof of Theorem 4.2.2. 0
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C.2 Proofs from Sections 4.2.3-4.2.4
Proof. Proof of Lemma 4.2.5. Let i = i*, for brevity. Let Sit be the indicator random
variable for inventory unit i being sold by the end of time t. For all k' E {o,... , k,
Pr[Si,t-1 = OIt-1 = k']
Pr[It_1 = k'|Sj,t_1 = 01 Pr[S,ti = 0] (C.5)
Pr[It_1 = k'ISi,t_1 = 0] Pr[Si,t_1 = 0] + Pr[It_ 1 = k'ISi,t_ = 1] Pr[Si,t 1  1]
by Bayes' law. For all t E [T], i C [k], and k' E {0, ... , k}, we explain how to compute
Pr[It_1 = k'ISi,t_1 = 0] in polynomial time; Pr[It_1 = k'ISi,t_1 = 1] can be computed
analogously.
First we argue that the Bernoulli random variables {Si,t_1 : i' E [k]} are independent.
To see this, note that the assignment procedure in Algorithm 7 is deterministic. Therefore,
each Si,t_1 is only dependent on the prices chosen for the customers assigned to i', and
while these prices could be dependent on each other, they are independent from the prices
chosen for customers not assigned to i'.
Furthermore, It_1 = k - Z'_ 1 Si,t-1. By independence, Pr[It_1 = k'jSi,t_1 = 01 =
Pr[EZoi Si,t_1 = k - k']. Egg Sg,t_1 is simply the sum of k - 1 independent Bernoulli
random variables with known mean (from Lemma C.1.2), hence the probability that it
equals a specific value can be computed using dynamic programming.
We elaborate on the dynamic programming. For notational convenience, without loss
of generality assume i = k. We will inductively for a = 0,... , k - 1 maintain the value
of Pr[Zi, 1 Si,t_1 = b] for all b E {0, . . , k}. It is easy to initialize this for a = 0. Given
Pr[Z 1 Si, t-1 = b] for all b E {0, ... , k}, note that
a+1
Pr[Z Sit-1 = b]
i'=1
a a
= Pr[Z Si,t-i = b - 1] Pr[Sa+1,t- 1 = 1] + Pr[Z Si,t-1 = b] Pr[Sa+,t-l = 01
i'=1 i'=1
for all b E {0,... , k}. Each iteration of a can be computed in time linear in k, and there
are less than k iterations.
Pr[It_1 = k'|Sj,t_1 = 1] can be computed analogously. It is clear that both procedures
can be done in time 0(k 2 ) (ignoring the O(t) time it may take to compute the assignment
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procedure), completing the proof of Lemma 4.2.5.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 4.2.7 and Theorem 4.2.8. We argue that Lemma 4.2.7 and The-
orem 4.2.8 are the special cases of Lemma 4.3.2 and Theorem 4.3.3 from the stochastic-
valuation model. It is easy to check that the statements are analogous, so it suffices to show
that Exp (as defined in Section 4.3.2) executed on deterministic valuations is identical to
Algorithm 7' (as defined in Section 4.2.3).
We show that the decision rule for a single time period t, and any amount of inventory
remaining k', is the same. Let i = i* and f = ft, for brevity. Consider the values of i and
f during iteration t of Algorithm 7 (with the deterministic valuations V1 , . .. , VT). First
consider any j = f + 1,... ,.
_ qU)
Pr[PtA1 ()IA /k = Pr[Si,t- t-1 kJ +1 )
Pr[Sj,t_ =0II = k'] Pr[P A' - T)Si,t 1 = 0, i k ]
= Pr[Pfl = r- ) n Si,t_ 1 = 0 kI]fi =
= Pr[P1r - r|I_ = k']
The first equality holds by the specification of algorithm Algorithm 7'. The second equality
holds by the specification of Algorithm 7, where we can add the conditioning on i =
in the second probability due to independence. The final equality follows because PtAl -
r) 54 oc implies Sj,t_1 = 0.
Ifj = m+-, then
Pr[PtAl' = -tk' = Pr[Si,t-1 = 1I
= Pr[P = oo|I\A = k']
since the event Sj,t_1 = 1 occurs if and only if the event PA1 = o occurs.
Finally, clearly if j ; f, then both Pr[PtAl' - and Pr[P - A1 -)A
are 0.
We have shown that Pr[PAl' ) tA' = r_ jl k' for all
j E {1,. . . , m, r + 1}, so it is the same decision rule as Exp, completing the proof. L
Proof. Proof of Lemma 4.2.10. Fix a valuation sequence V1,. . . , VT and consider any sample
277
El
path in the execution of A; let the sample path be depicted by the sequence of random prices
p, pA The revenue ALGA on that sample path is given by Et: , , PA; note that
the cardinality of the set {t : V > pA} is at most k.
On that same sample path, the modified algorithm A' would sell to the k customers
with the smallest indices in {t : Vt > min{PA, r(m)}} (or all the customers in that set if
its cardinality is less than k). Let S denote the set of customers served by the modified
algorithm. Let b = I{t E S: PA = oo}I, the number of customers with valuation rd) served
by the modified algorithm that were rejected by the original algorithm.
It is easy to see that
ALGA' - ALGA = min{PA, r(m)} pA
tES t: V >pt
Sbr(m) - E PA (C.6)
tES'
where S' is the set of customers that are no longer served by A' because it used up b extra
units of inventory. Since IS'I : b, and PtA < r(m) for all t such that PA < Vt, it is immediate
that (C.6) is non-negative. Since this holds on every sample path for A, we have completed
the proof that E[ALGA'] E[ALGA]. El
Proof. Proof of Theorem 4.2.11 The inventory level It- is equal to k - E_ 1(1 - Si,t-1),
where Si,t_1 is the indicator random variable for inventory unit i being sold by the end of
time t - 1. We will hereafter omit the subscript t - 1.
Each term (1 - Si) is independent and equal to 1 with probability (U,)Lb.+ 1)q /,
which is the probability that inventory unit i has not been sold. We will denote it using pi
and let Y = 1 - Si, for brevity. As long as bi (the index in 0,. .. , m of the highest valuation
assigned to inventory unit i) is not 0 or m, pi E (0, 1). We will without loss of generality
assume that pi E (0, 1) for all i, redefining k and re-indexing as necessary (if pi = 0 or
pi = 1 then Y is deterministic and we can remove it from analysis of the random sum). By
the assumptions in the statement of the theorem, this re-indexing does not cause i* to fall
outside of 1, ... , k; in fact we can without loss of generality assume i* = 1. Furthermore,
k1 , k2 are at least 0 at at most the re-defined k, since they correspond to inventory levels
that are realized with non-zero probability.
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After all of these transformations, the statement reduces to
k k
Pr[Yi = 1| Y = ki] < Pr[Yi = 11 Yi = k2 ] (C.7)
i=1 i=1
where each Y is an independent Bernoulli random variable of probability pi E (0, 1) and
0 < ki < k2 < k. Furthermore, we can without loss of generality assume that k 2 = ki + 1.
If ki = 0, then (C.7) is clearly true, since the LHS is 0 while the RHS is non-zero. So
assume that k1 > 0 and we can rewrite (C.7) as follows:
Pr[Y = 1 n 1 Y, = k] Pr[Y = 1 n j= 1 Y = k1 +1
Pr[Z j 1  = k1] Pr[ i 1 Y = ki + 1]
p, Pr[E - 2 Y' = k, - 1] pi Pr[i -2 Y' = k1 ]
pi Pr[i-2 Yi= ki - 1] + (1 - pi) Pr[Zi= 2 Yi = ki] pi Pr[_ 2 Y = ki] + (1 - pi) Pr[Ei- 2 Y' = k + 1]
/E 1 / -1
( + ( -pi) Pr[ .2 Y = ki] < (+ -p) Pr[ i2 Y = ki + 1Pi Pr[E 2k = ki - 1] Pi Pr[E- 2 k = ki]
Therefore, it suffices to prove that:
Pr[ 2 Y = ki] Pr[Z= 2 Y = ki + 1]
Pr[EZ- 2 Y = k, - 1] Pr[E- 2  = k]
k k k
Pr[Z Y =ki] 2 > Pr[Z Y, = k,+ 1] Pr[ Y=k - 1]
i=2 i=2 i=2
ISC{2,.,k}:j3|=kjiES i S S:ISj=ki+1iES iiS S:|S|=k-1iES iOS
(C.8)
After expanding, both sides are a sum of terms of the form
k
11 Pi(1 - p,) 2 -ai (C.9)
i=2
where each as is 0, 1, or 2 and the sum ZD- 2 ai equals 2ki, the total number of times that
a "positive" term pi (as opposed to a "negative" term (1 - pi)) appears in the product. Let
b denote the total number of i = 2,..., k such that ai = 1, which must be even.
Now, observe that the total number of times the term (C.9) appears in the LHS of the
expansion of (C.8) is (b 2) (because we choose b/2 of the b indices that are "positive" to
come from the first bracket; the remaining b/2 must come from the second bracket) while
the total number of times this term appears in the RHS is (/2+1) (because we choose
b/2 + 1 of the b indices that are "positive" to come from the first bracket), with the latter
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being strictly less. Furthermore, none of these terms are 0, since all of the values of pi lie
strictly between 0 and 1. Therefore, the inequality is strict, completing the proof of the
theorem. I
C.3 Proofs from Section 4.3
Proof. Proof of Lemma 4.3.2. We proceed by induction on t. (4.7) is true for t = 0, since
Pr[Ixp = k] = Pr[IA - k] 1
Now suppose t > 0 and that (4.7) has been established for time t - 1. Then for every
k' such that Pr[I x = k'] > 0, (4.6) holds by definition. Indeed, since Pr[ItA = k'=
Pr[Ih_1 = k'] by the inductive hypothesis, Pr(ItA = k'] > 0 for such k'.
We now consider (4.7) for time t. Note that I;p = Ip -- 1(Vt PExP). Therefore,
Pr[I; = k' = Pr[It =+ I = k; P] (C.10)
for k' E{o,..., k - 1}, while
Pr[I Exp k] = Pr[I Exp= k n Vt < PP]. (C.11)
Now, for any k' {o, ... , k}, if Pr[IExp k'] > 0, then the following can be derived:
Pr[Vt pExp k
m+1
= 2 Pr[Vt PtExpI pExp ( x ]Exp _ (j) x
j=1
m+1
= Pr[Vt > r ()] Pr[P p = r(j) IExp- k']
j=1
m+1
= Z Pr[V > r( )] Pr[PtA1 _ r(j)I =k']
j=1
= Pr[Vt PtAl I 1 = k']. (C.12)
In the second equality, we remove the conditioning on I = k', since the valuation V is an
independent random variable unaffected by any history. The third equality follows because
we have already established (4.6) for time t. The final equality also requires independence.
By the inductive hypothesis that (4.7) holds for time t -1, Pr[I E = k'] = Pr[ItA - k']
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If Pr[It_'" = k'] is also non-zero, then the following can be derived using (C.12):
Pr[Vt PExpjj - k'] PrIEP k']
Pr[Vt > PExP x t )1 k
= Pr[Vt PtA11jA1 k'] Pr[ItA'i = k']
= Pr[Vt PtAlfni11= k']- (C.13)
If instead Pr[IEX = k'] = Pr[IAl = k] = 0, then Pr[Vt 2 pExp Exp k] !< Pr[ =
k'] = 0. Similarly, Pr[Vt > PA1 n i j= k'] = 0, and therefore, (C.13) still holds.
We can analogously to (C.12) and (C.13) derive for all k' E {o, ... , k} that
Pr[Vt <pExp ExP - k'] = Pr[Vt < PA1 n hAlX k'].
We can substitute (C.13) and (C.14) into (C.10) to see that
(C. 14)
Pr[I xp = k'] = Pr [I', = k' +1 nVt PtAl+Pr[l = k' n vt <PtAl
t-1 t-1
= Pr[ZXE 1 = k -k' -1n XtA1 =1] +Pr[X4 = k -
t'=1 t'=1
= Pr[tA1 k]
k'n Xt i =0]
for all k' E {0,..., k - 1}. We can similarly substitute (C.14) into (C.11) to see that
Pr[IExp - k] = Pr[ItAl = k]. This completes the induction and the proof of Lemma 4.3.2.
Proof. Proof of Theorem 4.3.3. The following is straight-forward to derive:
T
E[ALGExp] = E[PtExp -(Vt > PExp)
t=1
T m+1
E :r(j) Pr[Vt
t=1 j=1
r(A)] Pr[PtExp r
T m+1
= E r(j)
t=1 j=1
T m+1
E E r()
t=1 j=1
T m+1
E :r() Pr[Vt
t=1 j=1
Pr[Vt r(W)]
k
E Pr[PtExp _ rU) IE - k'] Pr[IE - k']
k
Z Pr[PTA' - r(j)II~lj = k] Pr[Iti1 = k']
k'=O
r(j)] Pr[PtAl - r(j)
T
E[PAl' I(Vt PtA1)].
t=1
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El
Pr[Vt ! r()]
The second and sixth equalities use the independence of V, while the fourth equality uses
both statements of Lemma 4.3.2. The final expression is equal to E[ALGAl], completing the
proof of Theorem 4.3.3. L
Proof. Proof of Lemma 4.3.7. The first statement is easy to see. Since every sample path
fails at time T + 1 by definition, for any sample path HT"'P it must have a unique first
TT
point of failure in fT + 1], say t'. Hy"'P then falls under exactly one of the events, namely
the one with t = t' and ht = (0, PiamP vsamp,..., o, P VsamP 1). Therefore, the events
are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The case for Exp is argued analogously.
The final statement is argued inductively. For all t C {0, ... , T}, let gt =
(fip1,vi,...,ft,pt,vt) be a vector of realizations to the end of time t, and
let 9t denote the set of such vectors containing no failures. Let GtamP
(FSamp pSamp VSamp FSamp pSamp amp)d
GExP = (FExP, pEXP VExp,..., FExp pExp Exp
We would like to inductively establish that Pr[Giamp = gt] = Pr[Gj'P = gt] for all
t E {0, ... , T} and gt E gt. This is clearly true for t = 0. For t > 0, take any gt E 9t, and
we can write
SapSamp Sa mp - = =tl Samp=g= Sm 0
Pr[Gtamp = gt] = Pr[Gt 1, = gt- Pr [Fj amP = G_ Pr[Pi amP = ptIGl F =
- Pr[VtSamp = = gt=1, FSamp - 0 PSamp
Pr[G = gt] = Pr[G = gt-] Pr[F9t= 0IGl = g, P Pr[PtExp =p GjN = gt=1 FExp
. Pr[V = vtIG x = 1p, =Fgt = P, Ptexp _
We will prove that Pr[GtamP = gt] = Pr[Gt = gt] by arguing that each term in the
expression for Pr[G Samp = gt] equals the corresponding term in the expression for Pr[G xp =
gt]. The first terms are equal because of the inductive hypothesis. The second terms are
equal because both algorithms are sampling runs of Algorithm 7 and trying to hit a run
with IJA1 = k - ,-_1 1(vt, > pt'). The third terms are identical because because we have
conditioned on Famp = 0. The fourth terms are equal because Vsap and VE are IID
and none of the conditioning has any effect.
Having established this, note that for every t E [T + 1] and ht E Ft there exists a
unique gt-I E 9t-1 such that gt-1 is a prefix of ht. We know that for this gt-, Pr[G S" =
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gt_1] = Pr[G~xp = gt_1]. Therefore, it suffices to prove that Pr[F"'m = o|G P = gt1]
Pr[FxP = 0jGj = ge-]. By the same argument as the previous paragraph, these two
probabilities are equal. Therefore, Pr[HsamP = ht] = Pr[HExp = ht], completing the proof
of Lemma 4.3.7. 0
Proof. Proof of Theorem 4.3.10. Applying Lemma 4.3.9 to (4.15), we see that
E[ALGSamP] E[ALGExp] - E[OPTJ eCt2
E[ALGExp - JEOPT( 1 2
E[ALG~x] - -E[OPT]
Furthermore, we know from Theorem 4.3.3 that E[ALGExp] = E[ALGAl] = !E[OPT]. This
establishes the competitiveness.
The statement about runtime also follows easily from the specification of Algorithm 8
since the number of sample runs during each time period t, [-] (k + 1)t 2, is polynomial
in }.
C.4 A Continuum of Prices
In this section we show how to modify Algorithm 7 for the setting where valuations could
take any value in 0 U [1, R]. The competitive ratio obtained will be 1 , recovering the1 ln R
competitive ratio from Ball and Queyranne (2009).
Consider Algorithm 9. Now val[i] keeps track of the highest valuation assigned to
inventory unit i thus far, starting at 0. It is easy to check that the price distributions
specified in lines 8 and 10 are proper.
To analyze the competitiveness of Algorithm 9, we prove lemmas analogous to Lem-
mas C.1.2-C.1.3. We use the same notation as in Definition C.1.1, except instead of Lit and
jt, we use vi,t to denote the value of val[i] at the end of time t, taking a value in 0 U [1, R].
Lemma C.4.1. At the end of each time step t, the probability that any inventory unit i
has been sold is 0 if vi,t = 0, and +1nvi if vi,t > 1. Formally, for all t = 0,... T,
[ ( 0 1 + n v
E[Si,t] = In(viR > 0) - ' , for i E [k]. (C.15)1 + InR 
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Algorithm 9 Weakly Randomized Online Algorithm for Continuum of Prices
1: val[i] = 0, sold[i] = f alse for i= 1, ... , k
2: t = 1
3: while customer t arrives do
4: v = mini{val[i']}
5: i = min{i' val[i'] = v}
6: if sold[i] = false then
7: if v=0 then
8: offer price 1 w.p. 1 and price r w.p. 1 for all r E (1, R]1+lnR' r(1+ln R)
9: else
10: offer price r w.p. _ for all r E (v, R]
11: end if
12: else
13: reject the customer by choosing price oo
14: end if
15: observe valuation Vt and purchase decision Xt
16: if Vt > v then
17: val[i = V
18: if Xt = 1 then
19: sold[i] = true
20: end if
21: end if
22: t = t + 1
23: end while
Input: Customers t = 1,2,... arriving online, with each valuation V revealed after the
price Pt is chosen.
Output: For each customer t, a (possibly random) price Pt for her.
Proof. Proof. We proceed by induction on t. (C.15) is true at time t = 0, where E[Si,o1 = 0
and vi,o = 0 for all i E [k].
Now suppose we are at the end of some time t > 0 and (C.15) was true at the end of
time t - 1. It suffices to prove that E[Sist] = L(ve,tt > 0) . v,. This is immediate if
Vt < vit_1, by the induction hypothesis. Otherwise, if V > vit,t_1, we consider two cases.
Let v = vit,t_1 for brevity.
We know that E[Sit,t] = E[Si,t-1] + E[XtISit,t- 1 = 0] - Pr[Sit,t_1 = 01.
If v = 0, then this equals
1 fvi t
Pr[Xt = 1ISit,t-1 = 0] = (1 + I -dr)
1+ In Rv 1 r
1 + In R
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as desired. On the other hand, if v > 0, then
I1+ In v 1 Vi, 1 1 + Invo
1 + In RnR - Inv J r 1 + InR
1+ Inv Invi t-Inv InR-Inv
1+InR nR - Inv 1 + InR
1 + In vi,t
1+ InR
This completes the induction and the proof of the lemma.
Lemma C.4.2. Suppose Vt = vi,,t > vitt,_ in a time step t E [T]. Then the expected
revenue earned by the algorithm during time step t is 1+ R(vitt -vi,,t-1-
Proof. Proof. Let t E [T] be any time step for which V > vit,t-1. Again, let v denote t',t_1,
and we consider the two cases v = 0 and v > 0. If v = 0, then
E[PtXt| = 1 + rE[XtPt =r]-dr1+IlnR( +I r
= 1+ I1[vit,, >r]drh1+InR 1
1
= 1+lnR(1vi,-1).
In the first equality, a sale is guaranteed if Pt = 1, earning revenue 1. The final term is the
desired expression.
If v > 0, then
=n-n1 rE[XtPt =In R - Inv (IV
]d1 (InR - In
r )1 + InR
1?
1 + InR (f
as d
=1 + lnR (Vitt - v)
esired. E
With these two lemmas, the rest of the proof follows Section C.1. Indeed, Lemma C.1.4
says that E[ALG] = 1+nR =1 Vi,T. Meanwhile, Lemma C.1.6 says that OPT = j_1 Vi,T.
Therefore, E[ALG] > 1 and since V1, . . . , VT was arbitrary, Algorithm 9 is 1+InR
rere.OPT - 1+nR s
competitive.
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E[PtXt]
1[vitt > r~dr)
C.5 Upper Bounds on the Competitive Ratio relative to the
DLP
First, it is well-known that the DLP overestimates the optimum by a factor of 1 - ., even
when the feasible price set P consists of a singleton (i.e. the dynamic pricing problem is
trivial because there is only one price to choose from). The example requires the starting
inventory k to be 1. Without loss of generality assume P {1}. Consider T customers, each
of whom have a valuation exceeding 1 with probability 1T, and a valuation of 0 otherwise.
It is easy to check that OPTLP = 1 in this case, by setting x l = 1 for all t E [T].
Meanwhile, any algorithm cannot have expected revenue exceeding 1 - (1 - 1)T, where we
have subtracted from 1 the probability of all customers having valuation 0. As T -* oo,
E[ALG] approaches 1 - -.
OPTLP e
However, the gap becomes even larger if P contains more than one price. We illustrate
in the case of two feasible prices.
Lemma C.5.1. Consider the stochastic-valuation model defined in Section 4.3, and let
P = {1,r}, k = 1. For all r > 1, there exists a distribution over v1,... ,VT such that for
any online algorithm,
E[ALG(vl,... ,VT)] 1 r - r/e (C.16)
E[OPTLP(Vl, - .. - , T 2r- - ~r/e
If r < 1 then the RHS of (C.16) is equal to 1 - ~~ .632. However, if r >
then we show that the upper bound is r-r/e which decreases to e-~ .387 as r -+ oo.2r-1-r/e'2-
Proof. Proof. Suppose that r > 1 and let p 1 which is in (0, 1). Consider the1-1/e' n e r(1-1/e)'
following distribution over vi,..., VT:
" The first valuation distribution is deterministically vi = (40), V), Vi) = (0,1,0),
i.e. the first customer deterministically has valuation 1.
" With probability p, valuation distributions v2 ,. . ., VT are all equal to (1- T 1- 0, 4- ).
When this occurs, each of the T - 1 customers 2, ... , T are willing to pay r with
probability T - , and 0 otherwise.
" With probability 1 - p, valuation distributions V2... , VT are all equal to (1, 0, 0).
When this occurs, all customers 2,.. ., T will never make a purchase.
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We first compute the expected value of OPTLP(v1, ... VT). With probability 1 -p,
OPTLP(v1, - - , VT) = 1, setting x - 1. With probability p, OPTLP(v, -... ,vT) =r,
setting x) =X = 0 and x = .. = X = 1. Therefore, E[OPTLP(Vl, - ,vT)]
1 -p +pr.
We now consider the optimal strategy for the online algorithm. It has to decide, at
time 1, whether to sell the only unit of inventory at price 1, without knowing whether
V2 ,.. . , VT are equal to (1 - T' 1, 0, T'1) or (1, 0, 0). Conditioned on it deciding to sell,
ALG(vi, ... , VT) is deterministically 1. Conditioned on it deciding to wait, ALG(vi,... VT)
is r with probability
1 1
- (1 - ( -) -1)(C.17)
r(I - 1/e) T - I
and 0 otherwise.
We explain (C.17). If the online algorithm decides to wait, then it will offer price r to
all customers beyond the first. It gets a sale if V2 =. T = T (1 - T-1-, 0, 7-i), which
occurs with probability p = ,11 , and further if at least 1 of the valuations V2 ,..., VT
realizes to r, which yields the second term in (C.17).
Thus the expected revenue from deciding to wait is (C.17) multiplied by r, or
1 
- (I (1 1 )T- 1) (C.18)(1 - 1/e) T - '
which is always greater than 1. Therefore, the online algorithm is better off waiting, in
which case its expected revenue is (C.18). Taking T -+ oo, (C.18) approaches 1.
As T -* oc, the distribution we constructed over v1 ,... , VT is such that for the best
online algorithm,
E[ALG(vi,. . .,VT)] 1
E[OPTLP(Vl,,VT)] I -p+pr
_ 
r(1 - 1/e)
r(1 - 1/e) - 1 + r
r - r/e
2r - 1 - r/e'
as desired.
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Appendix D
Appendix to Chapter 5
D.1 Proof of Lemmas from Section 5.2
Proof. Proof of Lemma 5.2.3. Let fi denote the deficit max{P - xi, 0} of each item i.
First suppose EZ j fi d. It is clear that the customer should buy all items with Pi xi
regardless of whether the discount is relevant. For the items with P > xi, the customer's
deficit from buying all of them is Eip >x,(P - xi) = En 1 f2, but this is covered by the
discount of d, hence the customer's utility is maximized when she buys the bundle. On
the other hand, if En 1 fi > d, then the customer's utility is increased from not buying all
items with P > xi, since the reduction in deficit is E 1 fi while the discount lost is only
d. 0
Proof. Proof of Lemma 5.2.4. Consider what has to happen for the customer to choose
subset S. If the bundle deal didn't exist, then we would need xi > P for all i E S and
xi < Pi for all i V S. However, the bundle cannibalizes some of the situations where the
items in S would have been individually bought. By Lemma 5.2.3, these are situations
where E_ 1 fi d, or Ej S(P - xi) < d. By independence, we have
p* = *) ( -*)) (I - Pr [E(Pi - xi) : djxj < Pi Vi S]).
iES i~S i~S
In order for (Pi - xi) 5 d, it must be the case that xi > P - d for all i ( S. Therefore,
Pr [Z:(Pi-xi) djx < Pi Vi $ S] = Pr [ Z(Pi-xi) dPi-d < xi < Pi Vi V S] a)
its its igs
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by the laws of conditional probability, completing the proof.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 5.2.6. For all i E S, the conditional distribution yi of P - xi is
uniform on (0, d]. Therefore, the probability that EiES Y' < d is the volume of the unit
simplex in ISI dimensions, or .
D.2 Analysis of Algorithm
In this section we prove error bounds for our iterative algorithm, which imply convergence.
We first provide a high-level overview of the proof and techniques.
Recall that we are trying to solve for variables qj and ai from a system of equations
in high-degree polynomials. While this is generally intractable, we exploit the structure in
customer bundle selection to derive an algorithm which is able to alternate between isolating
the two sets of variables (the qj's and ai's), and iteratively use them to improve the accuracy
in the other.
To analyze the error of such an algorithm, we first derive an expression for its initial
error (Section D.2.3), based on both the error in the input (the error in Ps and FS) and the
error from our approximation used for the starting solution. We then carefully bound the
error propagation over iterations, and show that the error bound decreases (Section D.2.4).
A general error bound then follows by induction (Section D.2.5).
Overall our proof is quite elementary and straight-forward, despite requiring heavy no-
tation and a long sequence of inequalities. This Section D.2 highlights the structure of the
overall proof, while the proofs of individual statements are deferred to Section D.2.8.
D.2.1 No Division by Zero
First, it is imperative to verify that the algorithm never divides by zero. This is true as
long as we don't initialize any of the input probabilities to be zero. Indeed, if fis > 0 for all
S C [n], then for all i E [n] and k > 0, the following can be verified inductively:
1. ql(o) E (0, 1) in (5.6), for all i E [n];
2. a(k) E [0, 1) in (5.7), for all k > 0 and i E [n];
3. q(k+l) E (0, 1) in (5.8), for all k > 0 and i E [n].
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Since every q (k) is in (0, 1) and every a k) is in [0, 1), there cannot be division by 0 in the
algorithm.
To ensure that p, # 0, we use a standard trick, where we start counting the number of
customers who selected each subset S at 1 (instead of 0). This method of smoothing the
input causes a negligible error if the sales counts are high, and is desirable anyway if the
sales counts are low.
D.2.2 Setup and Notation
Definition D.2.1. Define the following.
* For all S C [n], let p* be the probability that a customer with valuation vector x
drawn from D purchases exactly the subset of items S.
" For all S = 0, let F = Pr [ Es (Pi - xi) dlP, - d < xi < P, Vi E S].
With this notation, we can state Lemma 5.2.4 simply as
PS = qi (f (I - q*)) (1 - F[]\S H a, S #? [n]. (D. 1)
ieS igs igs
Definition D.2.2. The algorithm we analyze will always set the parameters Si = ... =
Sn = {0}.
Definition D.2.3. For all i E [n], define the following quantities:
* II := and p* =p
? 
.- := and PiL \j
PO
Q* := qj* and A* := fjj, a*
Q~k and7 (k (ka))S(k) qjk) and Ak) k, a for all k > 0
Also define the following quantities:
* A* := j a
* A(k) :- H a ,k) for all k > 0
* FnI := (recall that our estimate F[njui of F* is for all i E [n])(n -)! [n]\% n\{iJ (n-i )!
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*F, := - (recall that our estimate F[n] of F* is )
Using this shorthand, we can derive the following:
_ .1 - -*A (D .2 )
1-qi 1-F* A*[n]I
(0)
= (0) (D.3)
1- q
(k+1) (k)
1 +% ) 1 - F A(k) (D.4)
-* = Q*(1-q*)(1-a ') (D.5)
P_ = Q(k)(I - qjk))(1 - a'(k)) (D.6)
(D.2) follows from dividing (D.1) for S = {i} by (D.1) for S = 0, while (D.5) follows
directly from (D.1) for S = n \ {i}. (D.3) follows from instruction (5.6) in the algorithm
when Si = 0. Similarly, (D.4) follows from instruction (5.8) when Si = 0. Finally, (D.6)
follows from instruction (5.7), where we have defined
(~(k) - q (] -q)
which is equal to a k) when ak) is non-negative.
Assumption D.2.4. For all i E [n], we make the following mild assumptions on probabilities
not being 0, which allows us to not worry about division by 0 in the analysis. Recall that
we discussed how to set {fs : S C [n]} so that none of them are 0 in Section D.2.1.
1. p E (0, oo) (i.e. p > 0, p > 0) and 0 < qi < 1
2. A E (0, oo) (i.e. P{li > 0, PO > 0) and 0 < q < 1, for all k > 0
3. p* > 0 (i.e. p* \{j} > 0) and a* < 1
4. j.i > 0 (i.e. P[n]\{i} > 0) and a'(k) < 1, for all k > 0
Note the correspondence between Assumptions 1,2,3,4 and equations (D.2),(D.3)-
(D.4),(D.5),(D.6), respectively. Now we derive the following equations, which help us bound
the errors in our estimates. (D.7) and (D.9) are obtained by taking (D.2) divided by (D.3)
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and (D.4) respectively, while (D.8) is obtained by taking (D.6) divided by (D.5).
qi' 1 - q ((0) 1-
1 - a
1- a
(k+1)
(k+1) 1 -q
I - F* APi _ n]A
fi 1- F[* A*
P- Q* (I - q*)_V>0
p- > 0
pi
Pi
1 - F_1 A k)
1 - F* A*
1 F* A*
n] IVk>0
1- FA(k)' -
Definition D.2.5. The following constants are not known to the algorithm, but we derive
error bounds which are parametrized by them:
1. Let L > 0 be a bound on the input error such that both ' and Q lie in + L],Pi P-i 1+
for all i E [n].
2. Let C > 0 be a lower bound on Pr[xi < Pi - djxj < P], i.e. a* < 1 - C for all i G [n].
3. Let Fna (resp. Frn'1) be a constant in
F* < Fmx for all i E [n].
[n]\{i} - n
4. Let Fnma (resp. F "') be a constant in
F a.
D.2.3 Initialization
[n ,! 1) (resp. [0, 1 )]) such that F i <
[ 1) (resp. [0, -1]) such that Fni" < F* <
Lemma D.2.6. The following bounds on the initial estimates q), 0) of q*.., * can
be derived from (D.7):
1 q*
1 + L - (0) 1 - qO)1-~o (D.10)
We have bounded
q* 1-q(O0  q
-jy - -q , but we would like to bound the individual term i-)- an d
1-Zqq(0)
1- The following lemma accomplishes this via the observation that they are either both
greater than 1, both less than 1, or both equal to 1.
Lemma D.2.7. Let q*, q be real numbers in (0, 1) and R > 0 be a bound such that I S. <
1 + R. Then both 9- < 1 + R and - < 1 + R. Taking reciprocals, we also have that ifq - 1q*-
1R - q l-q then 1 q and 1fi< -
1 q1q* +R - q 1+R - -*
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(D.7)
(D.8)
(D.9)
<1 - Fg_( C)n-1.
The following bounds on the initial estimates a1 ) ... ,a of a, a* are then imme-
diate by applying Lemmas D.2.6-D.2.7 to (D.8):
1 -F x(1 - C)"- 1 - (0+L)+"_--___I < 1-a 0  < ( +L)n~l (D.11)(1 + L)n+1 ~ 1-a* - (1 - FnT'l_(1 - C)n-1)n-1
Note that we do not need to distinguish between a'axk) and aO -- 0} when using
(D.8) to bound - , since if a'(k) < 0 and a = 0, then 1 < <
At this point, we focus on bounding the errors in our estimates of 1 - a*. Bounds on
the errors in qi' and 1 - q' will then follow in Section D.2.5.
For all k > 0, our goal is to inductively find a B(k) > 0 such that
1 a <1+ B(k) (D.12)
1 + B(k) - 1 - a
for all i C [n]. We would like to prove that the sequence of error bounds (B(0), B(, B(2 ),...)
decreases toward some small error in a small number of iterations. The error cannot be 0
unless L = 0 and Fr"'' = Fn_1 = F"i, F,""" = Fn = Fnm'. Our specific strategy is to
show exponential decay, i.e. find a and y such that B(k+l) = a + -B(k) is a feasible value
(i.e., satisfies (D.12)).
We can see from (D.11) that the following is a feasible value for B(0 ):
B() (1 - F_(1 - C)-)n-1 - 1. (D.13)
Finally, C was a lower bound on 1 - a* across i E [n]. C = 0 is a valid such bound,
but our algorithm's performance can improve if C is larger. Nonetheless, for technical
convenience, we do not want situations where it is greater than 1/(1+ B(0)) or 1/n. In this
case, we will simply redefine it to be 0.
Definition D.2.8. If C is large enough such that B( 0) < 1 - C or Cn < 1 is violated,1+B7(0 )
then redefine C := 0, which is guaranteed to fix the violations while still satisfying Defini-
tion D.2.5.
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D.2.4 Induction Step
In this section, given an iteration k > 0 and B(k) E (0, B(0 )] such that 1 < -1+B(k) - 1-a*
(k+1)
1 + B(k) for all i E [n], we find a B(k+l) such that < <1 + B(k+l) for all1+B(k+1)- 1
1-a. andl 1-a*
z E [n]. We will show that both 1 and (k+) are no greater than 1 + B(k+). Fix
some parameter z E [0, B(k)], which affects the value of B(k+1) (we explain how to choose z
later).
The following theorem is the key technical ingredient in our analysis:
Theorem D.2.9. Let m > 2. Let a*,..., a* be underlying values in [0,1), and let
al, ... ,am be respective estimates for these values, also in [0,1). Let B > 0 be a bound
on the error of these estimates, where for all i G [m], 1 < '-a,, < 1 + B.1B- 1-a*
Let F, F*, Fmi", Fm'a-', C, z be constants satisfying the following:
1. 0 < Fm< Fax < 1, and both F, F* lie in [F"in , Fmaxj
2. a* < 1 - C for all i C [m], B < 1 - C, Cm <1, and C > 0
3. 0 < z < B
Then the following upper bounds hold for E := 1- F*.ai and its reciprocal:
1 - F* Hm a* cprcl
E < 1+ max {B-i F"(l - C)-1 (F"max - F)(1 - C)
EI+ x + z(1 - F"x( - C)--)' 1 - Fmax(1 - C)m
_( 1 )(1 - C)m-1
E1 < 1 +max{B. - + +
1-F( )( - )m--l '
+ m rCF(I - C)"--+ BI - Fmax(1 
- C)m
(D.14)
(F - F-in)(1 - C) m  mCF( 1 )(1 - C)m -1
+ BF- + .5)I - F(1- 6)m 1 -F(1 - C)m
(D.15)
Definition D.2.10. Based on (D.14) and (D.15), for m = n - 1 and M = n, define the
following constants am, am, and functions 7ym, Tm of z:
am = (Fax - Fm)(1 - C) mam - 1 - Fx(1 
- C)m
(z)CFm( - C)m-1(z) = ~max a(1 - C)m' II+ Z(
(Fm - F"r)(1 - C) m
I -- Fm(1 - -C )m
mCFm( 1 )(1 - )-1
(z) = max 1+z 1+zi1 - Fm(1 - - C) )m
F2a(1 - C)m-I
1 -- Fmma(1 - CQn-1)
am
B(O)
Fm( ')(I- C) m1
1- Fm( B( 0 ) (1+B 0 )m-1
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7mr
am
B(O)7Ymr
Note that am, m 0, and 'ym(z),7m(z) 0 when z > 0. Moreover, Ym(z) is weakly
decreasing (non-increasing) in z. The following lemma shows that Tm(z) is also weakly
decreasing in z:
Lemma D.2.11. Consider the expression y(1 - as a function of z, where m E
{2, 3,... } and C E [0, -11. This is a weakly decreasing function over [0, oc). Therefore, the
maximum of this function is (1 - C)"1, attained at z = 0.
Lemma D.2.12. We can apply Theorem D.2.9 to obtain the following:
1 - (*kA
I F* * <- 1an-I+ Yn-(z) -B Vi, [zn] D 6
- FA(k) < + an + 'Yn(z) - B(k) (D.17)
1 F* A*[n]
S- F* A*n\{ 
_< 1 + -1 + 7,_1(z) - B(k), Vi e [n] (D.18)
1 - Fn__1 A(k)
1 - F*
[n] + N, + 5n(z) B(k). (D.19)
1 - FnA(k)
Definition D.2.13. Define the following. h and K are functions over z, w > 0, and note
that they take values greater than 1 over this domain (the inequality is strict because L > 0).
Similarly, a and d are constants greater than 0. -y and : are non-negative functions over
z > 0. Lemma D.2.11 established that h(z, w),h(z, w), -y(z), T(z) are also weakly decreasing
in z.
h(z, w) = (1 + L)n+1 (1 + a- 1 + wY_(z))- 1 -(1 + an +Win(Z))n-
-(1 + dn- 1 + wTn_ 1 (z)) - (1 + an + wyn(z))
a = (n + 1)L + (n - 1)(a- 1 + Zn) + (Zn-1 + an)
7(z) = (n - 1) (7n_(z) + 7n(z)) + (7n_1(z) + yn(z))
h(z, w) = (1 + L)n+1 (1 + an- 1 + wYn-1(z)) - (1 + n + wnW(z))
-(1 + -n-1 + w7n_ 1 (z))"- 1- (1 + an + WYn(Z))"1
Zj = (n +1)L + (an-1 + 4) + (n - 1)(Zin-1+ an)
7(z) = (yn-1(z) +7%(z)) + (n- 1)(Tn_(z) +-Yn(z))
The intuition for Definition D.2.13 is that when w is close to 0, 1 +a+ wy(z) is supposed
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to be a good approximation of h(z, w) (and there is a respective approximation for h(z, w)).
The following lemma bounds the error in this approximation:
Lemma D.2.14. Let m G N, and let a1,..., a, be non-negative real numbers. Then
H1iI1 (1 as) - 1 as a function of (a,... ,am) takes values in [1, oc) (over the domain
where E l ai = 0), and is weakly increasing in ai for all i G [M].
Therefore, if we define
H(z) := ' (D.20)
a + B(O)y(z)
z h(z, B(0)) - IH(z) := +B0)yz (D.21)N + B(O)T(z) '
then Lemma D.2.14 says that for all 0 < w < B h(zw)-1 < H(z) and h(zw)-) < ft(),
_ - a+w-y(z) - W+w--(Z) -
since w < B(0) implies that h(z, w) < h(z, B(0)). B(O) is a feasible choice of w, so we have
h(z, B(k)) 1 + H(z)(a + B(k)-y(z)) (D.22)
h(z, B(k)) 1 + H(z)(Z + B(k)(z)). (D.23)
Note that to the contrary, z' < z implies that h(z', w) > h(z, w), since
h(z, w),h(z, w),(z), 7(z) are weakly decreasing in z. Therefore, H(z) and 7(z) are also
weakly decreasing in z.
We are finally ready to proceed with the induction step. Applying Lemma D.2.12 to
(D.9), and using Lemma D.2.7, we obtain
(k+1)
max q 1 qj kl) f (1 + L)(1 + an-, + 7,1(z) - BQk))(1 + Za + ;y"(z) -B(k))1 -
(D.24)
I (k+1)
max j , q }5 (1 + L)(1 + zi_1 + 7, 1 (z) - BCk))(1 + an + Yn(z) B(k))
(D.25)
Applying (D.24) n - 1 times and (D.25) once to (D.8), we obtain
1 - a k+l)
ta* < h(z, B(k)) < I + H(z) - a + H(z) - -y(z) - BCk)
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where the second inequality uses (D.22). Applying (D.24) once and (D.25) n - 1 times
to the reciprocal of (D.8), we obtain %L= < h(z, B(k)), which by (D.23) is at most
_ 1 + 7(z) - + H(z) -;(z) - B(k). Therefore, if we define
d(z) max{H(z) -a, H(z)-ZN} (D.26)
(z) :=max{H(z) --y(z),7T(z) -7y(z)}, (D.27)
then both - and Z L are no greater than 1 + &(z) + '(z) - B(k). Thus it suffices1-a k1)
to set B(k+l) &(z) + (z) - B(k), completing the induction. Of course, at this point, we
have not verified that B(k+l) < B(k). We describe when this is the case in Section D.2.5.
D.2.5 Final Error Bounds
In this section we consolidate the induction from Sections D.2.3-D.2.4, in two theorems,
which bound the errors in the algorithm's estimates of the a* and q* parameters, respec-
tively. We illustrate explicit values the bounds can take in Section D.2.6.
Theorem D.2.15. Let n, L, C, Fn, FnT , FaX be constants satisfying Defini-
tions D.2.5-D.2.8. Let B(0) be defined as in (D.13), and let z be a non-negative parameter.
Let &(z), (z) be as defined through the sequence of Definition D.2.10, Definition D.2.13,
(D.20)-(D.21), (D.26)-(D.27), and suppose they satisfy the following conditions:
(i)~7z) &1 ( Z) B(0), (iii) &( z. (D.28)<_1 (Z) > (z)
Furthermore, define
&(z)
B(k) B(00) + (Z)k(B(0) - B(Oo)) Vk > 0.
Then, for all k > 0 and i E [nJ,
1 1 k) < 1+B(k).
1+ B(k) - -a -
In Theorem D.2.15, z is a parameter which can be optimized to make the error bounds
B(k) as small as possible. However, it must satisfy the conditions in (D.28) which guarantee
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that B(k) is decreasing in k. Note that if the errors in the input observations are too large,
then it is possible that no z can satisfy (D.28). In these extremely noisy cases, there is no
guarantee that iterating our algorithm will improve the estimates; in fact, it may overfit to
the noisy input, as we will see in Section D.2.6 when we display explicit values taken by the
bounds.
We propose the following convenient method for choosing z which compares just two
possibilities; we will follow it in displaying most of the explicit values shown in Section D.2.6.
Note that (iii) is guaranteed to be satisfied (contingent on (i) being satisfied) if we choose
z = 0. However, since -y(z),7(z), H(z),7I(z) are weakly decreasing in z, d(z) and ~'(z) are
also weakly decreasing in z, which means that choosing z = 0 results in the worst bounds.
Therefore, we do the following:
1. Consider z = B(0). This is the maximum possible value for z, since it is imposed that
z < B(k) for all k > 0. If (i) and (ii) in (D.28) are not satisfied, then they cannot be
satisfied by any z, since &(z) and (z) are at their minimum when z = B(O).
2. If (i) and (ii) in (D.28) are satisfied, then define 1 (B(o)) (i) and (ii) imply
1 -- (B( ))
<B().
3. Now consider z = B. If (i) and (ii) are still satisfied when z is this smaller value, then
we claim that (iii) is guaranteed to be satisfied, because (iii) would be equivalent to
&(B) __(B___)
~(B) > &0 ,which is true since &(z) and ~(z) are weakly decreasing.1-1 (B) - (B(O))
Returning to Theorem D.2.15, we now translate Theorem D.2.15 to bounds on 4 and
1-) in the following way.
1-q k
Theorem D.2.16. Define
R(O) :=I + L1 - F"Tlx(1 - C)n-1
R(k+l) := max {(1 + L)(1 + a,_1 + yn-1(z) - B(k))(1 + an + 7n(z) - Bk)
(1 + L)(1 +n-1 +7n_ 1 (z) - B(k))(1 + an + -yn(z) - B(k))} Vk > 0(D.29)
_____ 1 q(k)Then 1 -() - < 1+ R(k) for k - 0, 1. Furthermore, suppose conditions (i)-(iii)1iR(k) - T (k) 1-q - -O 2
1____ q! 1-(Win Theorem D.2. 15 are satisfied. Then --Rk < .(k q <1I + R(k) also holds for k > 2.I + 13 ', l-q
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Theorem D.2.16 follows easily from Theorem D.2.15, and (D.7), (D.24), (D.25). It
implies multiplicative bounds on Z and ) via Lemma D.2.7.
qk) 1-q (k
D.2.6 Explicit Values of Error Bounds
We now illustrate explicit values the bounds from Theorems D.2.15-D.2.16 can take. We
consider values of n in {3, 4, 5} and values of L in {0, 0.02, 0.05}. We consider values of C
in {0, 0.05}.
We consider two approaches for setting the Fnin 's and Fm"'s. In the first approach,
we directly impose that both F[n]\I} and -L- lie in [1+ , I +F for all i E [n], for an
error parameter EF taking values in {0, 0.25, 1}. This implies that F,," = 1 and
F.' = '+'F for m C n - 1,I n}.
In the second approach, we assume some lower bound on the conditional density of
each Di on [P - d, P). Specifically, for all i E [n] and y E [P - d, P), we impose that
1-fdnPy , where EUnif is an error parameter taking values in {0, 0.1, 0.2}.
Explicit values of Fmi" and Fmm for m E {n - 1, n} can then be derived. The derivation is
deferred to the end of Section D.2.9.
In Tables D.1-D.3, we display explicit values taken by the formulas from Section D.2.5,
for different combination of n, L, C, and EF or EUnif (and the values of Frni", Fm'" im-
plied). For each combination, if conditions (i)-(ii) are satisfied by B and thus we have
the exponentially decaying error bounds in Theorems D.2.15-D.2.16, then we display all of
BM I B(O), RM, R(0), where R(') is defined by substituting B(') into (D.29). We display
arrows going from the initial error bounds to the asymptotic error bounds. If conditions
(i)-(ii) are not satisfied for a combination, then we only display B(0) (which is still a valid
error bound), and R(0) followed by R(1) (R(0) and R(1) are both valid error bounds, and
either one could be smaller).
Additional details about the numbers in Tables D.1-D.3 can be found in Section D.2.9.
In general, the tables are arranged in order of smallest error bounds (n = 5) to largest
error bounds (n = 3). In the top-left corners, we have error bounds decreasing to 0 and
thus convergence to the true values a and qi'. Over the possibilities of eF or EUnif from left
to right, the ranges [Fm" FT'] (for m = n - 1, n) are roughly increasing. From top to
bottom, note that the error bounds are increasing as L gets bigger, and C gets smaller.
We would like to point out that these error bounds arise when the inaccuracies in
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Table D.1: Error Bounds for n = 5, with different values of L, C, and EF or EUnif-
n =5 eF = eUnif = 0 6F _ 4Unif = 0.1 EF = I EUnif = 0.2
F00417 0.0333 0.0273 0.0208 0.0171
x 0.0521 0.1039 0.0833 0.1893
FI00083 0.0067 0.0049 0.0042 0.0027
Fax 0.0083 0.0104 0.0352 0.0167 0.0863
B(k) : 0.15 -4 0 B(k) 0.19 -+ 0.05 B(k) 0.42 - 0.32 B(k) 0.32 - 0.21 B(k) : 0.96 -+ 0.95
c = .05 R(k) :0.04 -+ 0 R(k) 0.04 -+ 0.01 R(k) : 0.09 -+ 0.06 R(k) :0.07 -+ 0.04 R(k) : 0.18 -+ 0.16
0B(k) : 0.19 - 0 B(k) 0.24 -+ 0.06 B(k) 0.55 -+ 0.39 B(k) 0.42 -* 0.25 B(k) :1.32 -+ 1.22Co= 0 R(k) :0.04 -+ 0 R(k) : 0.05 - 0.01 R(k) : 0.12 - 0.07 R(k) :0.09 
- 0.05 R(k) : 0.23 - 0.19
B(k) : 0.29 0.16 B(k) : 0.34 -+ 0.20 B(k) : 0.60 -+ 0.49 B(k) : 0.49 -+ 0.37 B(k) :1.22 -+ 1.20C = .05 R(k) : 0.06 -+ 0.03 R(k) : 0.07 -+ 0.03 R(k) : 0.11 -+ 0.08 R(k) : 0.09 -+ 0.06 R(k) : 0.21 -+ 0.18
L 0 B(k) : 0.34 - 0.17 B(k) : 0.39 -+ 0.22 B(k) : 0.75 -+ 0.59 B(k) : 0.59 -+ 0.41 B(k) : 1.61 -+ 1.52
R(k) : 0.06 - 0.03 R(k) : 0.08 - 0.04 R(k) : 0.14 -+ 0.10 R(k) : 0.11 -+ 0.07 R(k) : 0.26 -+ 0.21
B : 0.54 -+ 0.44 B(k) : 0.59 -+ 0.48 B(k) : 0.91 -+ 0.81 B(k) : 0.78 - 0.65 B(k) :1.70 -+ 1.62
C_=_.__ R(k) : 0.09 -+ 0.06 R(k) : 0.10 -+ 0.07 R(k) : 0.15 - 0.12 R(k) : 0.13 -+ 0.10 R(k) : 0.24 -+ 0.22
-B(k) : 0.59 -+ 0.46 B(k) : 0.66 -+ 0.51 B(k) :1.08 -+ 0.91 B : 0.90 -+ 0.69 B : 2.10 -+ 2.02
C_ =_ R(k) : 0.10 -+ 0.07 R(k) : 0.11 -+ 0.08 R(k) : 0.17 -+ 0.13 R(k) : 0.15 - 0.10 R(k) : 0.30 -4 0.25
Table D.2: Error Bounds for n = 4, with different values of L, C, and EF or EUnif-
n= 4 eF = eUnif = 0 6F = aEUnif = 0 .1 F =1 eUnif=O. 2
Fin 0.1333 0.1215 0.0833 0.0853
3max 0.1667 0.2083 0.2710 0.3333 0.3813
F""" 0.0333 0.0273 0.0208 0.0171
Fax0.0417 0.0521 0.1039 0.0833 0.1893
B(k) 0.59 -+ 0 B(k) : 0.80 - 0.25 B(k) : 1.21 -+ 0.83 B(k) : 1.74 -+ 1.39 B(0 ) = 2.28C = .05 R(k) 0.17 -+ 0 R(k) : 0.22 -+ 0.06 R(k) :0.30 -4 0.16 R(k) : 0.40 -+ 0.27 R(k) = 0.49, 0.39
L 0 B(k) 0 B(k1-k) : 1.58 - 1.00 B(0 = 2.38 B(0 ) 3.22
C = 0 f(k) :0.20 -+ 0 R(k) : 0.26 40.08 RCk) : 0.37 -+ 0.19 R(k) 0.50, 0.35 R(k) = 0.62,0.46
B.) : 0.75 -+ 0.37 B (k) : 0.99 -+ 0.54 B(k) :1.44 -+ 1.14 B(k) : 2.03 -+ 1.79 B(0 ) - 2.62
C .05 R(k) : 0.19 -+0.08 R(k) :0.24 -*0.11 R(k) : 0.33 -+0.20 R(k) : 0.43 -+ 0.32 R(k) = 0.52, 0.43
L C .02 B(k) 0.91 -+ 0.49 B(k) : 1.23 - 0.70 B( 0) = 1.85 B( 0) = 2.73 B(0) = 3.66
C 0 R(k) : 0.22 -+ 0.10 R(k) : 0.29 - 0.14 R(k) = 0.40, 0.27 R(k) = 0.53,0.39 R(k) = 0.65,0.51
B(k) 1.03 -+ 0.83 B(k) :1.30 -*1.07 B(k) :1.82 -+ 1.76 Bk : 2.50 - 2.49 BTO) = 3.19
C R(k) : 0.23 - 0.15 R(k) : 0.28 - 0.19 R(k) : 0.37 - 0.28 R(k) : 0.47 - 0.38 R(k) = 0.56, 0.50
L = .05 B(0 ) = 1.21 B(0 ) = 1.57 B(0 ) = 2.29 B(0 ) = 3.31 B(0" = 4.39
C = 0 R(k) = 0.26, 0.18 R(k) = 0.33, 0.23 R(k) = 0.44, 0.33 R(k) = 0.58, 0.46 R(k) = 0.70, 0.58
Table D.3: Error Bounds for n = 3, with different values of L, C, and EF or -Unif
n =3 eF = EUnif = 0 EF EUnif = 0-1 EF = I EUnif = 0. 2
F [n 0.4000 0.4050 0.2500 0.3200
F0.5000 0.6250 0.5950 1.0000 0.6800
F"" i n 0.1333 0.1215 0.0833 0.0853
F0.1667 0.2083 0.2710 0.3333 0.3813
C = .05 2B() = 4.26 B(O) = 3.66 B(O) = 104.19 B(O) = 5.70
L 00 R(k) = 0 R(k) = 1.29,1.22 R(k) = 1.16, 1.06 R(k) = 9.26, 66.53 R(k) - 1.59, 1.58
C 0 B = 3.00 ->0 B(O) = 6.11 B(O) = 5.10 BT) = oo B(O) = 8.77
R(k) = 1.00 -- 0 R(k) = 1.67, 1.52 R(k) = 1.47,1.31 R(-) 00 R(k) = 2.13, 2.02
C = .05 B(0) = 2.59 B(0) = 4.70 B(0 ) = 4.05 B(0) = 112.87 B(0) = 6.25
L = .02 R(k) -0.86,0.78 R(k) = 1.34, 1.31 R(k) = 1.20,1.15 R(k) = 9.46, 73.05 R(k) = 1.64,1.68
C - 0 BM = 3.33 B(0) = 6.70 B(O) = 5.60 B(O) = oc B(0) = 9.57
R(k) = 1.04,0.90 R(k) = 1.72,1.62 R(k) = 1.52,1.40 R(0) = oo R(k) = 2.19, 2.13
C - 05 B( 0) = 3.04 B( 0) = 5.40 B(-) = 4.67 B(O) = 126.86 B(0) = 7.15
L = .05 R(k) (k) = 1. 41,1.44 R(k) = 1.27,1.27 R(k) = 9.77, 83.82 R(k) = 1.72, 1.83
C 0 B(O) = 3.86 B(0 ) = 7.64 B(0) = 6.41 B(0) = oc B(0) = 10.87R(k) = 1.10, 1.01 R(k) = 1.80, 1.75 R(k) = 1.59, 1.53 R(0) = oo R(k) = 2.28, 2.28
the observations Ps and approximations Fs result in worst-case error. The error in our
algorithm's estimates could be significantly less, and even in combinations where the error
bounds are not decreasing, it could be the case that iterating decreases the error.
Finally, note that if we compare the tables to each other, the numbers are generally
increasing from Table D.1 (n = 5) to Table D.3 (n = 3)-indeed, it can be seen that the
error bounds, roughly, scale with F_1 = (7n-i) However, when n = 5, it takes more
samples to achieve the same bound L on the input error. We discuss this in Section D.2.7.
D.2.7 Iterations, Samples, and Bounds on Other Quantities
In this section we discuss (i) the number of iterations, (ii) the number of samples, and (iii)
bounds on the errors in our estimates of the three original probabilities of interest.
For (i), the rate of convergence to the asymptotic error bound of B(') is that of expo-
nential decay. Every iteration, the error bound is multiplied by f(z) < 1, but then a fixed
error of &(z) is accumulated due to inaccuracies in the observations Ps and approximations
Fs. The number of iterations required to guarantee a desired error bound can be calculated
directly from Theorem D.2.15:
Corollary D.2.17. Suppose the conditions in Theorem D.2.15 are satisfied. Let B' C
(B(*), B(0)] be our error threshold. Then for k > K, 1 < < I+ B' for all i c [n],
where
K := [(lni(z))'(ln(B' - B(0)) - ln(B(0 ) - B( )))1.
Now we compute (ii), the number of samples needed to guarantee a specific L with high
probability. Recall that L was a bound such that both 11 = !!a and Q-]- =Pi P ; P P-i Pn\i
lie in I 1+ L], for all i E [n]. Expressions of the form 24 can be controlled with the1+L PS
multiplicative Chernoff bound:
Proposition D.2.18. Suppose we have T independent samples of an event that occurs with
probability p*. Let P be the sample average approximation of p* over the T samples. Then
for all - E (0, 1),
Pr[1 - E < P <1I+ El > I - 2e- .
p
To use Proposition D.2.18, we need a lower bound on the probability p*. We base such
a lower bound on the following definition, which will also be a useful benchmark in the
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numerical experiments:
Pmin =min (min{Pr[x, < Pi - d], Pr[P - d < xi < P], Pr[Pi xj}). (D.30)
iE[n]
Pr[xi < Pi - d], Pr[Pi - d < xi < P], and Pr[Pi xi], where xi is a valuation drawn from
distribution Di, were the three probabilities that we were originally interested in estimating,
for each i c [n]. If these probabilities are small, then more samples are required achieve a
specific L:
Theorem D.2.19. Given an instance with distributions D1 ,..., Dn and values of
P1,... , Pn, d, define pamn as in (D.30). Let L > 0 be the desired bound on multiplica-
tive error. Then for any J > 0, EL, E E [ I , 1+ L] Vi E [n] with probability at least 1 -6,
so long as the number of samples T is at least
3 (In 4n +2 2 )2(1 Pmin)
2 L Pmin
The sample bound is exponential in n, which is explained by the following intuition. As
n increases, the fraction of customers for which the discount is relevant sharply decreases,
and as a result, many more samples are required to see the impact of the discount. In
general, we think of the bundles analyzed in this chapter as being small, motivated by
fashion retailers and budget airlines.
Finally, we discuss (iii), i.e. how to translate, on the k'th iteration, q(k) and a(k) into
estimates of Pr[xi < Pi - d], Pr[P - d < xi < P], and Pr[Pi xi] and obtain bounds on
(k) (k)
the errors in these estimates. First we bound 9--. It can be derived from 1 < <
af 1+B(k) - I-a*
1 + B(k) that
(k)I - B ( -- 1) 5 + B (k)( - 1).
as a a
Now, recall from Definition 5.2.2 that Pr[xi < P - d] = (1 - qi')(1 - a*), Pr[P - d <
xi < P4] = (1 - qg)a*, and Pr[Pi xi] = qg. Our estimates of these probabilities are thus
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bounded as follows:
1 (1 - q<))(1 
- ) (l+R(k))( + B(k))(1 + R(k))(l + B(k)) - (1 - q*)(1 - a*)
1 - B (k) (- - 1) (ik))a k)a*(I- 1) )a(k < (I + R((k))(1 + B(k)( -))
l+ R(k) (1 - q')a
(k)
< q -* <1 + R(k).
1+ R(k) 
-i
For each specific i, if - is large, then our estimate (1 - qj )a of Pr[P - d < xi < Pi
could be poor even if B(k) and R(k) are small. Furthermore, the error in the lower bound
(k)
on is additive instead of multiplicative, so the lower bound could be negative and thus
meaningless. Intuitively, small a* = Pr[Pi - d < xjIxj < P] corresponds to the case where
the bundle discount is irrelevant, so the firm is essentially conducting individual sales, and
we can accurately estimate q* and 1 - q* but not a*. Nonetheless, if we are in a regime
where B(k) k-o 0, so long as a* $ 0, B(k) will eventually be much smaller than - 1
(and the convergence of B(k) is not adversely affected by small al).
D.2.8 Supplement to Section D.2
Proof. Proof of Theorem D.2.9
First we prove the following propositions, which will aid us in the proof of Theorem D.2.9.
Proposition D.2.20. Let F, G 1,.. ., Gm, Hi,... , Hm are arbitrary constants, and consider
1 - 11' (Giai + Hj)
any expression of the form 1H 1 - Gam -i H )as a function of (ai,... , am) over a poly-1 - F Hi_ 1 as
tope where both the numerator and denominator and positive. For any i G [m], the sign of
the i'th partial derivative does not depend on aj. In other words, the extreme values of the
function are attained at the vertices of the feasible region.
Proof. Proof. The i'th partial derivative is
-Gi H, (Gjaj + Hj)(1 - F Hf1 aj) - (1 - H;1 (Giai + H ))(-F f aj)
(1 - F lI1 ai)2
The coefficient of ai in the numerator is
Gi (Gjaj+ Hi) F (flaj) - G4 (+(Gja+Hj)) F a) = 0
is i J#i j~i
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and the denominator is always positive, completing the proof.
Proposition D.2.21. Let 6 > 0 be such that 0 < y - 6 < y 5 1. Then ym - (y - 6)n <
mym- 16.
Proof. Proof. The statement follows immediately from the fact that f(y) := ym is convex
over y E [0, 1] and mym- (the derivative) is a subgradient of f at y, i.e. f(y - 6) - f(y) >
mym-1((y 
- 6) - )L
Now we finally proceed to the main proof of Theorem D.2.9.
First let's analyze the maximum value of E. This expression is maximized when the ai's
are minimized, i.e. ai = max{a* - B(1 - al), 0} for all i E [m]. Now consider the problem
of maximizing
1 - F H', max{a* - B(1 - al), 0} (D-31)
1 - F* Hl a*
over a, .. . , a* E [0, 1 - C]. If any a* is small enough such that a* - B(1 - al) < 0, ie.
a < , then a* can be increased to B decreasing the denominator while leaving the1 B' 2 1+B' thIeoiao hl evn h
numerator unchanged. Therefore, (D.31) is at most
1 - F HmI 1 (a* - B(1 - a7)) (D.32)
1 - F* rLW a*
where a*,..., a* E [ ,1 - C] (note that B < 1 - C by assumption).
By Proposition D.2.20, (D.32) is maximized when each a* is B or 1 - C. Observe2 +B
that if any a* = T , then J7j, (a* - B(1 - aj)) = 0, hence the expression is maximized
when a* = 1 - C for all j 0 i. Therefore, the maximum value of (D.32) is the greater of
1 1+BI --I + B(D.33)
1 - Fm(ax (B)(1 - C)m-1 1+ B - BFma(1 - C)m-1
and
1 - F(1 - C - BC)m (
w - Fma(l - C)m(D
where we have also made F* as large as possible.
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Putting together (D.33) and (D.34), we have
BF"m "(1 - C"-E < max{1 + B-BFiax(1 - C)-l'
I+Fnmax(1 - C)"m - F(1 - C)" + F(1 - C)"m - F(1 - C - BC )"
1+ 1- Fm (1 - C)m 1 - Fmax(1 -C)n
BFm1(1 - C)m-1
I 
+ max{+B( F (l -C)-1)
(Fmiax -F) (I - C)"+ F((1 - C)"m - (I - C -BC)"m)
1 - Fmax(1 - C) + 1- Fmax(1 - C)m
S1+ max{ BFm x(l - C)m15 1+ max1 + z(1 - Fmiax (1 - C)"'-1) '
(F'ax - F)(1 - C)' F(m(1 - C)m- 1 )(BC)
1 - Fmax(1 - C)m 1 - Fmx(1 - C)"
where the final inequality follows from z E [0, B] and Proposition D.2.21 (note that 1 - C -
BC > 0 since B < 1 - C). This completes the proof of (D.14).1+B
Now let's analyze the minimum value of E. E is minimized when the ai's are maximized,
i.e. ai = a* + 1B( 1 - a*) for all i E [m]. Therefore, we can consider the problem of
minimizing
S- Fyl,(a* + B(1 - a*))
1 - F* MH a'
over a, ... ,a* E [0, 1 - C.
Again employing Proposition D.2.20, this expression is minimized when each a* is 0 or
1-C. If any a* = 0, then H1m a = 0, hence the expression is minimized when aj = 1 - C
for all j $ i. Therefore, the minimum value of this expression is the lesser of
S- F( ) (1 - C + B C)"M- (D.35)
1 + B 1 + B
and
1 -F(1 -C+ BC)'. (D.36)
1 - Fmin(1 - C)m
where we have also made F* as small as possible.
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Putting together (D.35) and (D.36), we have
-1 F( B)(1 - C + B C)"elE 1  < max{1B 1+B
- 1 - F(B)(1 - C + BC)M-'
F(1 - C)M - F"ni(1 - C)M F(1 - C + lBC)" - F(1 - C)"
1-F(1-C+ BC)" 1-F(1-C +BC)m
= +mx{ B~-~(-1B 1B
BF '(1 - C)m-1
=1+ max{- 1B +
I - F(B)(I - C+ 1BC)"-'
(F - Fin) (1 - C)m F((1 - C + B C) (1 - C)")
S- F(1 - C+ BC)"m 1 -F(1- C+ B C)"
BF' ( - C)-1< 1 +max{- F Id )( 1 -C+BN )"
I - F(1 B C)(I C" 1- ( - C + BCC)"1
< +) 1mB
I - F(d)( -C )B C -1'+
(F - F"nin)(1 - C)m F(m(1 - C)T-1)(B C)+ 1-F(1-B - )(F -- Fm(1 - C)yn 1~ - C( 6"
where the second inequality uses Proposition D.2.21, while the final inequality uses z E [0, B]
and Lemma D.2.11. This completes the proof of (D.15) and the proof of Theorem D.2.9. El
Proof. Proof of Lemma D.2.6. Fix an arbitrary i E [n]. First we establish the lower
bound. Since F*] = Pr[Z=>(P - xj) 5 djPj - d xj < P Vj C [n]] while F*
Pr[ZEg(P3 -x3 ) d|P3 -d x3 < P ki $ i], F* < F[*]\I}. Furthermore, A* < A*, since
1-F* A* tq: 1-q(0 )
ai < 1.As a result, I -F 2 A 1, and we can see from (D.7) that ( --q > 1
[n]\{j,} i iP -I L
1-F* A*
For the upper bound, the numerator of n-F* is at most 1, while the denominator[fl\{i}A
is at least 1 - Fn"i(1 - C)"-1. P is also at most 1 + L, completing the proof. L
Proof. Proof of Lemma D.2.7. If - < 1, we are done immediately since R > 0. Otherwise, ifq
- > 1, then < 1, so we can obtain from 21 -j - 1+R that < < (1+R) 1q < 1+R.
We can use the same argument to show that I~-q <1 I+ R in either case. L
Proof. Proof of Lemma D.2.11. Let y = so that y E (0, 1]. The derivative of y(l -
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Cy)m-l with respect to y is
(1 - Cy)"m + y(m - 1)(1 - Cy)m- 2 (-C) = (1 - Cy),- 2 (1 - Cy - Cy(m - 1))
= (1 - Cy) m- 2 (1 - Cym)
which is non-negative since Cm < 1 and y 1. Thus the derivative with respect to z
is non-positive. As a result, the expression is maximized when z = 0, completing the
proof. 1
Proof. Proof of Lemma D.2.12. Fix some i - [n]. First let's apply Theorem D.2.9 with
m = n - 1, {ai, ... ,am} = {a(k) j -A i}. Note that choosing B = B(k), F = F,-, F* =
f* ,F"" = F1, Fax = F"L satisfies the conditions imposed on those constants.
Finally, using the same C and z satisfies the remaining conditions of Theorem D.2.9 (note
that B(k) < B() < 1 - C and C(n - 1) Cn 1). Therefore, we can use (D.14) tob+B(k) - 1+B(n)
obtain
1 - F 1 A(k)
S-F* A*
< 1+max{BF(k) F (1 - C)"- 1 _ + (k). mCF(1 - C)"
z(1 - Fax(1 - C)"-) 1 - Fm-iax(1 - C)"
= +a +B (k) maX{ Fma( 1 - cr'-1 am mCF(l - C)"1 + z(1 - Fmnax(1 - C)"l) 1) B(k)' 1 - F"'(1 - C)
1 +am+ym(z)-B(k)
where m = n - 1 and the final inequality follows because B(k) < B(O), completing the proof
of (D.16).
Similarly, we can use (D.15) to obtain
1 - F* ]\{}A*
1 - F._1A)
Fm( )1_c m-
< 1 + max{B(k). _+Z +Z1 - Fm( 1 1B))(1 - )m-M-1
1 - Fm( - c ))(1 
-C )m
SB +B Bm(- }
1-Fm(1 l+B )" 1 Fm(1 C
< 1+max{B (k . ,
1 - Fm
= 1+m+B (k) . max
< 1+-m+;m(z)-B(k)
m~)(1 -O m + B (k) mCFm( )(1
__, m+Bm(1I O) )(I_- aC m-- 1 - Fm(I -
C)m-1
C+Bz7}
1+B(0
C )m-1
-- +~
T O)
Fm(I)(1 - C)"~1
1 F+BWy ( - alty -TO7
}dkm rnCFm(1)(1B(k)' 1m -F(I -
where m = n - 1 and both the second and final inequalities follow because B(k) K B( 0),
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completing the proof of (D.18).
(D.17) and (D.19) follow by applying Theorem D.2.9 with the following changes: m = n,
ai = a(k) for all i E [n], and F = Fn, F* = F[*, Fmi" = FinI F" = FXm. This yields
1-FnA(k) 1-F* A*
< I + A*,, + l m m(z) - B(k) and [n < 1 + m + 7m(z) - B(k) where m = n,1 -F* A* I - Fn A(k)[n]
completing the proof of Lemma D.2.12.E
Proof. Proof of
since +(1
R= 1 (1 + aj) - 1
1= a
.s (Hjoi (I + aj))
Lemma D.2.14. It is immediate that (+ a_) - I
aj) 1 + E', ai when al,...,am 0. To prove that
is weakly increasing, fix some i E [m] and the i'th partial derivative
j-, aj - (H'1i(1 + aj) - 1(E - 1 - a)2. The numerator can be rewritten as
(j;=1 )2
= 1-(1-Zaj)fl(+aj)
> exp(- : aj) fj(1 + aj)
>1 -exp(- aj) f exp(aj)
= i joi
=0
where both inequalities use the fact that 1+ y 5 ey for all y E R, the first inequality uses the
fact that all aj 0, and the second inequality uses the fact that exp(- EZoi aj) 0. 0
Proof. Proof of Theorem D.2.15. We know that 1+Ik _ 1 -+ B(k) for all i E [n]
when k = 0, from (D.11). Now proceed inductively and assume that we have established
1 < l-a < 1 + B(k) for all i E [n], for some k > 0. Under the conditions of Theo-1 -B(k) - 1-a
rem D.2.15, Section D.2.4 shows that < + + (&(z) + (z)B(k))
1+((z+ ()Bk- 1-a!
for all i E [n]. But by the definitions of B(k) and B(o),
&(z) + I(z)B(k) - &(z) + (z)(B + (Z)(B(O) - B(O)))
= (&(z) + ' (z) &(Z) ) + (Z)k+1(B(O) - B(* )
1 - + (z)
= ~ (z) + (~+1B0 - B
1 -j'(z)
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m
( +(1+aj))( aj - (1+aj))j~i j=1
which is precisely the definition of B(k+l), completing the proof.
Proof. Proof of Theorem D.2.19. Set c = L, which is less than 1, so Proposition D.2.18
applies. Let S := {S C [n] : |SI E {0, 1, n - 1}}. It is easy to see that if 1 - e < 1 + e
-PS
for all S E S, then P* - 1+ L and Q-> . We can further calculate that < ' _-- - L
(by the definition of e) and ( > j > 1 - L > 1. Therefore, it suffices to find a 6 suchi- 1+E1L
that with probability at least 1 - 6, 1 - e < P K 1 + E for all S E S.PS-
By Proposition D.2.18, the probability that any P is outside of [1 - e, 1 + el is at most
Ps
2 exp(- eTpS). If we choose T large enough such that this expression is at most + then3 2n+1'
we can union bound over the 2n + 1 sets in S to achieve the desired result. We precisely
need T to be at least 3ln(4 "+ 2)E-2- for all S E S. But from (5.3) and the definition
of Pmin, every p~ is at least pmin(2pmin) 1-Pmi (realized when S is of the form [n] \ {i}),
completing the proof of Theorem D.2.19. L
D.2.9 Supplement to Section D.2.6
Computing Fin and Fm, given EUnif
We can without loss generality re-normalize d to 1 and consider the interval [0, 1] instead
of the interval [P - d, P]. We have independent random variables X1,. . . , Xm on [0, 1] each
satisfying f (y) _> 1 - EUnif for all y E [0, 1], and our goal is to find the minimum and
maximum values for Pr[xi + ... + xm K 1].
Pr[xi + ... + xm 1] is minimized when each random variable has a point mass of
size 1 - EUnif at 1, and the remaining 1 - Eunif mass distributed uniformly over [0, 1]. In
this case, x1 + ... + x, only has a chance to not exceed 1 if no xi takes value 1, which
occurs with probability (1 - Eunif) m, by independence. Conditioned on this occurring, the
probability that Pr~xi + ... + x, 1] is -, by Lemma 5.2.6. Therefore, we can set Fmi"
to (1 - EUnif)m .
Pr[xi + ... + xm 1] is maximized when each random variable has a point mass of
size 1 - EUnif at 0 (and the remaining 1 - EUnif mass distributed uniformly over [0, 1]). To
compute Pr[x1 +... + xm K 1], we condition on the number of random variables taking on
value 0. Let Y denote this random variable, which is binomially distributed, consisting of
m trials of probability EUnif. Conditioned on Y = , Pr[x1 + ... + xm 1] = (M 1 f), by
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Lemma 5.2.6. Therefore,
Pr[xi +... + x < 1] = EUnif( - EUnif) 1
f=0(I)M
so we can set F, to this value.
Pre-iteration for Improved Error Bounds
We note the following about the computation of the numbers in Tables D.1-D.3:
" For the combinations in Table D.2 with arrows, we used the pre-iteration technique
below, with 3 iterations, to obtain improved bounds.
" For the combinations in Table D.3 with arrows, we used the pre-iteration technique
below, with 73 iterations, to obtain improved bounds.
" In the numbers displayed in Tables D.1-D.3, C never had to be redefined according
to Definition D.2.8.
" For the combinations in Table D.3, we displayed the improved error bounds when
F* = F (see next subsubsection).
We explain how to obtain better error bounds by doing pre-iteration. The observation
is that in the analysis in Section D.2, the initial error bound B 0 ) is fixed given values of
L, C, and Fm '. However, 7m(z), m,57m(Z) (defined in Definition D.2.10) and H(z),H(z)
(defined in (D.20)-(D.21)) are all increasing in BM. Therefore, if we could "restart" the
analysis after each iteration k, where we set the new B(0) to be B(k) (which is less than
B(0 )), the induction step in Section D.2.4 would still be applicable with decreased values of
&(z) and ~y(z).
Therefore, we can improve the procedure from Section D.2.5 as follows. We have an
initial BCo), and then we can do one iteration of the induction step in Section D.2.4 with
z = BM to obtain B(. If B(M) < B(, then we do another iteration of the induction
step where we set the new BM0 ) (and the new z) to be the old B(. We can repeat this
process indefinitely to get the smallest error bound, but after some number of iterations
we stop and apply Theorem D.2.15 (with z = B) to get the closed-form error bound. Of
course, in Tables D.1-D.3, the values of BM0 ) and R(0) displayed are still the values before
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any iterations of the induction step-but the final values of BC ) and R( are smaller as
a result of this pre-iteration.
Improved Error Bounds when F* =F
(D.9) can be rewritten as
q k+1) P*
1 - q* -
1 - F* A*
-n]
1-F* A*[n]\i} i
1 - Fn_1 Ak)
1 - !Fna k)A(k)
Consider the third fraction on the RHS of the expression. It is equal to
(k) la (k)I - F -A-" " i
-i 1 - !Fnla k)A k
Now, since a( < 1, 1 - a < 1. Therefore, the preceding expression is maximized when
n i
A is minimized. For all j # i, let _ -- a k a*j Recalling that A = H a(k)
we have
1 - F -1 H (k)
1 -F* A*
1 - Fn_1 H s4)
1 -F* A*
[n]\{i} i
1-F* A*
1 - IF aa(k) H (k)
1- F* Alal
1 - FA a k)
Applying a similar analysis to the reciprocal of (D.9) where maxjak), a;}, we also
have
1 - qi
1 -q(k+1)
(k+1)
gq
1 - FnA a(k)
I- F* Ala*
In the case where F* = Fa, we
without using Theorem D.2.9.
1 - FnA a'
1- FA (k)
K
1-F,* A*a* 1FAak
analyze the expressions - F and-(k) 1-F* A~a!1-F.A~ai[ I]
1 - F.A 'a
I-- FnA(a* + B ) a)-
1
1 - FnA'( B~k)
(D.37)
where for the second inequality it can be checked (via taking the derivative) that the RHS
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q*
(k+1)
q(
q k+1)
1 - q(k+l)
1-q
< Pi
- A
p 1
A
1_F* Al
I - Fn.-1 11,4 -(k-Pi
of (D.37) is a decreasing function of a* on [0, 1 - C].
*(k)1 - FnA a 1 - FnA*(a* - B(k)(1 - a*)) (D.38)
1 - FA a 1 - FnA a*
1
1 - FnA (ikC)
where for the second inequality it can be checked (via taking the derivative) that the RHS
of (D.38) is a decreasing function of a* on [ B(k) C].
In both cases, we would like to bound
=~k I + BC ) .nI0 
-
1 1 I+ B~k)
1 - FnA*( )) 1 + B(k) - Fa(1 - C)n-1B(k)
1+Bk) Fn(1 0 C)-11 +BC ) 1 + z(1 - Fe(1 -
where the inequality follows from the fact that z E [0, B(k)]. Therefore, (D.17) and (D.19)
hold with
'n(Z) =n(Z) = .0n-1(D.39) 1 +z(1- n(1 - C)n-)
Note that an = Zn = 0 when Fnm"n = = F .
D.3 Testing our Algorithm on Synthetic Data
In this section we numerically test our algorithm on synthetically-generated data instances,
whose true parameters are known.
D.3.1 Instance Generation
For consistency, we follow the set-up from Chu et al. (2011) as closely as possible. We
let n be 3, 4, or 5. We use the same two-parameter families of valuation distributions
commonly used to model demand-Uniform, Normal, Gumbel, and Lognormal. The ranges
of parameters we use for these families, whose justification we leave to Chu et al. (2011),
are disclosed in Table D.4.
We make some modifications to allow for heterogeneous variances (since otherwise our
estimation problem would be trivial). Also, we need to generate prices P1,... , Rn and
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Table D.4: Ranges of Parameters, derived from Chu et al. (2011).
Gumbel Marginal distributions are Gumbel, with locations p chosen uniformly
from [0, 2.5], and scales - chosen uniformly from [0.5, 1.5].
Lognormal Marginal distributions are Lognormal. Logarithms of valuations are
Normally distributed, with means p chosen uniformly from [-1.5, 1],
and standard deviations o- chosen uniformly from [0.5, 1.5].
Normal Marginal distributions are Normal, with means p chosen uniformly from
[0, 2.5], and standard deviations o- chosen uniformly from [0.5, 1.5].
Uniform Marginal distributions are Uniform on [a - b, a + b], where mean a is
chosen uniformly from [0, 2.5], and b is chosen uniformly from [1, 3].
discount d from which we will learn the valuations.
For each item i E [n], its individual price P is chosen uniformly from [1.25, 2.5]. Then
the bundle discount d is chosen uniformly from [0.25, min _1{P }]. Note that we choose
P1,...,P, d independent of any of the underlying distributions, which ensures that the
prices alone do not provide any information about the valuations. However, this results in
instances where the probabilities of interest (Pr[xi < Pi - d], Pr[P - d < xi < Pi], Pr[Pi <_
xi]) can be zero. Therefore, we restrict to instances where pmin, defined in (D.30), is at
least 0.05. Additional numerical experiments with the weaker restriction pmin > 0.01 can
be found in Section D.3.5. Of course, the algorithms we test operate independent of these
restrictions, and also do not know the ranges of parameters from Table D.4.
For each combination of n (out of 3 choices) and family of distributions (out of 4 choices),
we define an instance to consist of n independent valuation distributions D1 ,.. . , Dn from
that family, n individual prices P1 , . . . , Pn, and a discount d. This induces true values for the
three probabilities of interest for each item i, which we denote by ri,, ri,2 , ri,3 for brevity:
1. ri,1 := PrxiDi i < Pi - d]
2. ri,2 := Prx~Di [Pi - d < xi < Pi]
3. ri,3 :=Prxi~Di [Pi < Xil
We let T denote the total number of customers, who have IID valuations drawn from
D1 ,. . . , Dn, and vary T over {103, 104 , 105 , 106, 107}. For each S C [n], an algorithm ob-
serves Ns, the number of customers who chose to purchase subset S under prices P1 , ... , Pn
and discount d. An algorithm's objective is to output an estimate qg of ri,f, for all i E [n]
and t E [3].
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Each algorithm is evaluated on its Mean Average Percentage Error (MAPE), which is
defined
MAPE = 1 1: 1: 1
i=1 f=1 '
For small errors, MAPE is very close to the errors bounded in Section D.2.7. We use
MAPE because it is typically used and easily interpretable.
D.3.2 Algorithm Variants Compared
In this section we specify the algorithm variants we compare. By algorithm variant we
mean an exact procedure for converting input P1,... , Ps, d, {Ns : S C [n]} into output
{fij, fi,2, Fi,3 : i E [n]}.
We specify the parameters we use for our algorithm. We set Fs = r (following
Lemma 5.2.6) and Ps = Ns 1 (following Section D.2.1) for all S C [n], which also en-
sures that there is no division by zero in the algorithm.
Regarding the number of iterations, we use the following stopping criterion: on every
iteration k > 1, the algorithm checks whether
I (k) - (k-1)| < 0.001. (.0
n
i=1
If so, it sets K := k and returns the estimates ij,1 = (1- qK))(I-a(K)), i, 2 = (--4K)a K)
(K)
Regarding choice of Si, we test two variants of our algorithm which differ in their choices
(one makes the collection Si as small as possible; the other makes Si as large as possible):
1. LfB-One: Set Si = {0} for all i E [n].
2. LfB-All: Set Si = {S : S ; ([n] \ {i})} for all i E [n].
Also, we compare two algorithms which receive different input.
First, we test how our algorithm is affected if we do not observe the lost sales No (and
thus do not know T). In this case, we estimate PO as follows:
= (1- 1 + (D.41)
n =1 jAi
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The motivation for (D.41) is as follows. We know from (5.3) that p* = (1- ) HF 1(1-- -i).
Therefore, we can combine estimates of q*,...,q* to estimate p*. For each i and S C
[n] \ {i}, we know that Ns~s 1+1 is an estimate of , whose bias is smaller for S of
smaller cardinality. However, we cannot use S = 0, since we don't observe No. Therefore,
we take the geometric mean for all S of cardinality 1, other than {i}. Knowing that
SN{ i,,}+1 n sovn fo
= 
lli *{}1, solving f r1- q*resultsin(D.41). Afterward using ,we
solve for the unique T which ensures that the probabilities Ps sum to 1:
3. LfB-Blind: Set PO according to (D.41), followed by T = 1_ s+),followed by
PS = Ns+1 for S y 0. For all i E [n], use Si = {S: 0 C S C ([n] \ {i})} (note that we
exclude 0 from Si since any ratios involving PO may be less accurate).
Secondly, we test an algorithm which observes individual sales at prices P1,. . . , P" with
no bundling. Such observations allow for accurate estimates of the ri,2's, but the algorithm
must guess the breakdown between ri,o and ri,1 :
4. NoBndl: Set fi,2 = Ni for all i E [n], where Ni :Esi NS is the number of customers
who bought item i. Afterward, set fi,o = rij,1= .ii22
D.3.3 Results
For every combination of n (3,4,5) and demand family (Uniform, Normal, Gumbel, Log-
normal), we fix 1000 instances, each consisting of n distributions from that family and
experimental prices P1,... , P, and discount d, all generated randomly and independently
in accordance to Section D.3.1. For every T (103,..., 107), we compute the median MAPE's
(over the 1000 instances) in the estimates returned by each of 8 algorithm variants (defined
in Section D.3.2). In Table D.5, we display the average of these median MAPE's over the
4 demand families; we display the families separately in Section D.3.5.
We draw the following conclusions from Table D.5:
" The MAPE is quite high when T is small, because the sales observations are just too
noisy. The MAPE quickly drops below 10% as T increases. It converges to errors as
small as 1%, despite not knowing the demand family.
" LfB-One, the variant we analyzed in Section D.2, is indeed better than LfB-All in the
asymptotic regime. However, LfB-All performs better when T < 105 .
318
Table D.5: Median MAPE's over the 1000 instances, averaged across the 4 demand families. The algorithm variant achieving the smallest
MAPE within each rectangle is bolded.
n 3 4 5
T 10 103 1 105 106 10 103 104 10 106 10 10 3 104 110 106 1107
LfB-One .249 .083 .031 .016 .012 .351 .129 .041 .016 .008 .484 .228 .075 .024 .010
LfB-All .209 .072 .031 .019 .017 .312 .114 .040 .017 .011 .462 .211 .075 .026 .014
LfB-Blind .270 .173 .158 .158 .159 .345 .139 .058 .034 .029 .476 .223 .079 .029 .016
NoBndl .413 .402 .400 .401 .400 .433 .421 .418 .418 .418 .454 .443 .440 .439 .439
Table D.6: Average numbers of iterations taken over 20000 experiments (1000 instances for
each of 4 demand families and 5 values of T).
n 3 4 5
LfB-One 3.46 2.01 1.32
LfB-All 7.39 6.92 6.40
" For a fixed T, all algorithms perform worse for larger n. Indeed, even though the sales
rates of more subsets are observed, these observations are far less accurate. However,
for larger n, the disadvantage of LfB-Blind from not observing No is much smaller.
" The option of not bundling does not perform well, because it only obtains one piece
of information for each item. However, when the bundle observations are at their
sparsest (T = 103 , n = 5), guessing using it is better than over-fitting to bundle sales.
We briefly discuss the number of iterations taken by our algorithm, displayed in Ta-
ble D.6. The number of iterations decreases with n because the initial estimates improve
with n, as implied by the bound in Lemma D.2.6. LfB-All takes more iterations than LfB-
One, but nonetheless, the number of iterations taken by our algorithm to satisfy (D.40) is
very small and never a concern.
Finally, we further investigate the surprisingly small asymptotic error when the demand
family is not Uniform, despite our algorithm performing computations as if demand was
Uniform. To isolate this error from the error caused by inaccurate input, we consider larger
T, and only LfB-One (the best algorithm variant in the large-T regime). It can be seen
from Table D.7 that for the non-Uniform families:
" For T < 106, the MAPE is greatest when n = 5. In these cases, the main contributor
to the MAPE is inaccurate input, a factor most significant when n = 5.
" For T > 0 , the MAPE is greatest when n = 3. In these cases, the main contributor
to the MAPE is non-Uniform demand, a factor most significant when n = 3.
Nonetheless, for all values of T, there is a very small increase in MAPE from moving from
Uniform to non-Uniform demand, especially when the non-Uniform demand is Gumbel. We
provide an explanation of why the error is so small for any unimodal family of demand in
Section D.3.4.
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Table D.7: Median MAPE's over the instances for the LfB-One variant. The largest MAPE within each rectangle is bolded.
T 104  10 5  106 107  108
n 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5
Uniform .077 .126 .193 .025 .036 .061 .009 .014 .021 .005 .006 .008 .004 .005 .006
Normal .081 .132 .237 .031 .043 .076 .016 .015 .025 .012 .008 .010 .012 .007 .007
Gumbel .075 .111 .201 .025 .036 .066 .013 .013 .021 .008 .007 .008 .007 .005 .005
Lognormal 1 .100 .148 .282 .044 .050 .096 .025 .021 .030 .023 .011 .012 .012 .009 .007
D.3.4 Unimodality and Uniformity
We sketch why the error caused by our algorithm performing calculations as if the condi-
tional distributions on [P - d, P) were uniform is usually insignificant.
First, consider the following example. There are 3 IID Normal valuations with means
1 and standard deviations 1. Let the prices be 2.5 for each item, with a global discount
of 2 if all items are purchased. The critical region is [0.5, 2.5], on which a N(1, 1) random
variable has much more mass on the lower end than the upper end. Therefore, the approx-
imation in Lemma 5.2.6 is poor, overestimating the valuations in the critical region and
the demand overall. Indeed, in this example, the true values of ri,, ri,2, ri,3 for each item
are 0.308,0.625,0.067 (respectively), while the estimated values approach 0.265, 0.663,0.072
(respectively). Note that pmin = 0.067, just above the minimum of 0.05. The MAPE is
8.8%, translating to a maximum additive error of 4.3% in this example.
We argue that this is roughly the most inaccurate the approximation in Lemma 5.2.6
can be. Indeed, suppose the true mass on the critical region was more lopsided than in
this example, e.g., it is zero on the upper half of the critical region. However, for any
unimodal distribution, this implies that the probability ri,3 of the valuation lying above the
critical region is zero! This is a detectable failure where the experimental price was set too
high. If the distribution was not unimodal, then it could theoretically be the case that both
Pr[P - d < xi < Pi - d] and Pr[Pi xi] are large while Pr[P - < xi < Pi] is zero, in
which case our conclusion would be highly flawed despite the sampled probabilities being
accurate.
However, for unimodal distributions, if it were the case that the mass of ri,2 on [Pi-d, Pi)
was highly non-uniform, then it must be the case that either ri, and ri,3 is very small, in
which case there would be high sampling error in the input probabilities. Therefore, the
main contributor to the error is never due to non-uniformity.
D.3.5 Additional Reports
See Tables D.8-D.12.
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Table D.8: Median MAPE's over the 1000 instances, averaged across the 4 demand families, with p . 0.01 (instead of pmin > 0.05).
n 3 4 5
T 103 104 105 106 107 103 104 105 106 107 103 104 105 1106 1107
LfB-One .287 .111 .046 .023 .016 .420 .182 .058 .021 .011 .536 .295 .126 .041 .014
LfB-All .255 .106 .050 .029 .024 .484 .197 .063 .029 .018 .713 .328 .141 .053 .026
LfB-Blind .334 .244 .229 .227 .229 .537 .230 .133 .098 .088 .749 .357 .150 .063 .032
NoBndl .632 .619 .616 .615 .615 .612 .596 .593 .591 .591 .621 .615 .613 .611 .611
Table D.9: Median MAPE's over the 1000 instances with Uniform valuations.
n 3 4 15116 17
T 103  1 10 5 1 106 110 7  103 1104 1105 1 106 107 10 3 [ 104 1 106 17
LfB-One .222 .077 .025 .009 .005 .335 .126 .036 .014 .006 .421 .193 .061 .021 .008
LfB-All .170 .059 .020 .008 .005 .291 .095 .033 .013 .007 .361 .171 .055 .018 .007
LfB-Blind .225 .156 .141 .140 .142 .322 .107 .044 .026 .022 .369 .183 .057 .018 .008
NoBndl .360 .351 .347 .349 .348 .412 .404 .402 .402 .402 .378 .370 .368 .367 .367
NNW
Table D.10: Median MAPE's over the 1000 instances with Normal valuations.
n 3 4 5
T 1j3 i0 4  05 1 06 J 107 103 1104 1105 106 J 10 7  W3 14 10 5  106 1 107
LfB-One .279 .081 .031 .016 .012 .357 .132 .043 .015 .008 .518 .237 .076 .025 .010
LfB-All .220 .071 .031 .019 .018 .317 .116 .042 .019 .013 .537 .228 .085 .029 .015
LfB-Blind .296 .214 .197 .207 .203 .354 .144 .069 .046 .045 .543 .244 .088 .031 .019
NoBndl .381 .369 .368 .367 .367 .394 .381 .377 .377 .377 .402 .392 .388 .388 .388
c-31
Table D.11: Median MAPE's over the 1000 instances with Gumbel valuations.
n 3 4 5
T 103 104 1 105 1 106 1 107 103 104 1 105 [ 106] 107 103 1 104 105 1106 107
LfB-One .222 .075 .025 .013 .008 .323 .111 .036 .013 .007 .476 .201 .066 .021 .008
LfB-All .195 .064 .023 .014 .011 .248 .098 .031 .014 .009 .391 .168 .054 .019 .009
LfB-Blind .219 .127 .106 .106 .108 .271 .103 .038 .017 .013 .400 .174 .059 .019 .010
NoBndl .396 .389 .387 .388 .388 .418 .411 .407 .407 .407 .437 .432 .429 .428 .428
Table D.12: Median MAPE's over the 1000 instances with Lognormal valuations.
n 3 4 5103____ 1 _ 104~ [Th35 106 1o 10 7 -1 -110' 47__ __ ______ 5 __ _
T1_0___4 1_105 1 106 1 10 7  103 1 04 105 106 10
LfB-One .271 .100 .044 .025 .023 .387 .148 .050 .021 .011 .520 .282 .096 .030 .012
LfB-All .251 .092 .049 .034 .033 .391 .148 .054 .022 .015 .557 .278 .106 .039 .023
LfB-Blind .341 .195 .187 .179 .184 .432 .203 .082 .046 .037 .592 .290 .110 .046 .027
NoBndl .514 .499 .498 .498 .498 .506 .488 .486 .486 .486 .598 .576 .575 .574 .574
Ci3
D.4 Generalizations
D.4.1 Two-part Tariffs via Complementarity
In this section we show that our learning results also hold for the Two-Part Tariff (TPT)
pricing scheme. Recall that in the pricing scheme analyzed throughout the rest of this
chapter, which we will refer to as Mixed Bundling (MB) in this section, each item i E [n]
is sold individually at price Pi, and a discount of d > 0 is applied if all of the items are
purchased. In TPT, there is a tariff t > 0 to enter the market, after which each item i E [n]
may be purchased for its individual price Pi.
The following theorem shows that the information contained in TPT sales data is equiv-
alent to the information contained in MB sales data.
Theorem D.4.1. Let there be n items with (potentially correlated) valuations distributed
according to random variable x = (xi, xn). Given a TPT scheme with individual prices
P,..P.,n and tariff t > 0, let psPT denote the (true) probability that subset S is selected
by a customer, for all S C [n].
Now, consider a disjoint n-item instance with valuations distributed according to y =
(2P1 -xi,... , 2Pn-xn). Given a MB scheme with individual pricesP1,... Pn and discount
d = t, let ps denote the probability that subset S is selected by a customer, for all S C [n].
Then for all S C [n], ps B - P sTPT
Proof. Proof of Theorem D.4.1. We saw from Lemma 5.2.3 that under the original pricing
scheme, the customer buys everything if En max{P - yj, 0} d, and otherwise buys only
the items for which yi > Pi. Therefore, pMB is the probability that EL 1 max{Pi-yi, 0} d.
Since yi is distributed according to 2Pi - xi for all i E [n] and d = t, this is equal to the
probability that D = 1 max{xi - Pi, 0} < t. However, it is easy to see that under TPT,
the customer buys nothing if E'l max{xi - Pi,0} t, and otherwise pays the tariff to
buy the items for which xi > Pi (here we have differentiated between strict and non-
strict inequalities in a way to facilitate the proof, but these details are unimportant, since
in general we model valuations as continuous and break ties arbitrarily). Therefore, the
previous probability is equal to 4 PT, as desired.
For S C [n], p MB is the probability that E' 1 max{RP - y, 0} > d and is s(yi > Pt)
and nos(yi < Pi). Doing the same substitution, this is equal to the probability that
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En= 1 max{xj - Pi, 0} > t and fls(xi <; P) and fis(xi > Pi). Since S : [n] implies
[n] \ S # 0, this is equal to pjTPS, completing the proof. D
Therefore, given a TPT with prices P1 ,.. ., Pn, t and empirical probabilities psPT of each
subset S being selected, one can use our MB learning algorithm with individual prices equal
to P1 ,..., P, discount equal to t, and complement selection probabilities PMB = PTPT
to infer n independent distributions. Let these distributions be represented by random
variables yi, . . . , yn. Then the original distributions are represented by the random variables
2P1 - yi, ..., 2Pn - yn.
D.4.2 Deducing the Number of No-purchases using Bundle Sales
Throughout the analytical sections of this chapter, we have assumed that the number of
no-purchases was observed, so that the empirical probability Ps for each subset S C [n]
could be computed. However, suppose instead that we could only count Ns, the number of
transactions that contained subset S, for S $ 0.
In Section 5.2.4, when we tested on synthetic data instances, we considered a version
of our algorithm which does not observe No. We tested a method based on estimating
the value of No and thus being able to compute the empirical probabilities. The method
performed well numerically, although it was worse for n = 3, when there were fewer subsets
that could be used to estimate No.
In this section, we propose an alternate method which bypasses need to estimate No,
and instead directly solves the theoretical equations without 0, motivated by the following.
Observe that in instructions (5.6) and (5.8) of our algorithm in Fig. 5-4, ( is updated
using the relative value P , which is equal to Ns ut, i.e. it can still be computed soPSi NS I silb ptds
long as 0 V Si. Knowing No is only important for updating a ,k) where we needed the
absolute value of probability P[n]\i for instruction (5.7). We now propose an alternative
for updating a(') from the q k)'s, using only known relative sales counts. We used this
method for computing the numbers in the example in Fig. 5-3.
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Recall from Lemma 5.2.4 that:
p{i}= qi' J( - q)(1 -(- a)
n n
f equ)(1o- I t at)
S#oo i=1 i=1
For each i, we can divide the former equation by the latter to obtain
qg' Hji (1 - q')(1 - (n 1)! 1jo a )
1l -1 (1 -q*) (1 -_L 11n a )'
N(
EsOO Ns
i E [n];
z E [n] (D.42)
where we have replaced the LHS by an expression in known relative sales counts. Recall
that our goal is to solve for a*,.. . , a* using (D.42) where the values of q* are replaced with
the algorithm's current values of q k) on iteration k. Therefore, we can treat (D.42) as a
system of equations in n variables a*,..., a*, with all of the other expressions being known.
For brevity, we will let Ni denote Ns , ignore all superscripts, and solve for ai,... , an
in the following system:
qi H i (1 - qj)(1 - (n 1)! Hj i aj)
1l -, (1 -q* )(1 - 1 11n jai)' (D.43)
We let A denote f"_ ai and isolate the H3ji a3 term in (D.43) for each i:
fa = (n - 1)! I -
N,(1 - Hn 1(1 - q*)(1 - A))
qi H3#i(1 - qj) )
Multiplying together for all i E [n], we obtain
-= ((n - 1)!) - N(1 - H 1(1 - qf)(1 -
qi Hj (I - qj)
This is a degree-n polynomial in A. We solve for A numerically,
recover each ai via dividing A by HjA aj.
-LA))
and then it is easy to
This allows us to iteratively use {q(k) : i E [n]} to derive {a : i E [n]}, and use
{ai : i E [n]} to derive {qik+1) : i E [n]}, for k = 0, 1,..., even when no-purchases are not
observed.
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i E [n].
D.4.3 n = 2 case via Explicit Calculations
In this section we perform further calculations, solving the n = 2 case using brute-force (as
opposed to our iterative algorithm from Section 5.2).
Our objective is to solve the following system of equations (it may be useful to refer
to the diagram in Fig. 5-1) in variables T (the total number of customers including no-
purchases), q1, q2, a,, and a2, where N12 , N1, N2 are known, while No may or may not be
known:
a1ia2
N 1 2 = Tqq2 + Tqi(1 - q2 )a2 + T(1 - q)alq2 + T(1 - q1)(1 - q2) 22
Ni = Tqi(1 - q2)(1 - a2)
N2 = T(1 - qi)(1 - al)q2
No = T( - qI)(1 - q2)(1- )aa2)2
Of course, this system for n = 2 is underdetermined, because there are 5 variables (and
either 3 or 4 equations, depending on whether No is known).
Nonetheless, it is easy to see how to solve the system assuming either No and one of
qi, q2, a,, a2 are known, or two of qI, q2, a1 , a 2 are known-any single variable can be isolated
from one of the equations; in the end we may have to solve a quadratic formula due to the
aa2 term. As a concrete example, suppose we had N 12 = 7, N = 4, N 2 = 2, No = 11, and2
knew that q2 Summing the four equations, we get that T = N 12 + N1 + N2 + NO = 24,
and the following equations:
4 1 24 qi(1 - 4)(1 - a2) = = qi(1 - a2) (D.44)24 4 9
2 1 1
24= (1 q1)(1 - a) - = (I - qi)(1 - a) (D.45)24 4 3
11 1 aia2  11 ala2
-= (1 - qi)(1 - -)(1 - ) 18 = (I - q)(I - ) (D.46)24 4 2 18 2
We can use the rightmost equation in (D.44) to write a2 = 1- = 9g 2. Similarly, we
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can use (D.45) to write a= 1 - 3- = 2-3q. Substituting into (D.46), we obtain
11 (9q, - 2)(2 - 3q1)
18 2 -9q,(3 - 3qi)
11 54q, - 54q2 - 18q, + 27q2 + 4 - 6qi
18 qj(54qi (1 - qi)
27q + 3qi - 4 = 0
The final quadratic yields qi = (since the other solution of qi = - is inadmissible),
leading to a2 = and al = j, completing our example of solving the system.
D.5 Testing our Model on Real Data
In this section we provide the details on how we processed the statistics in Definition 5.3.1.
First we describe the raw data given to us by the online retailer. In this section, we will
use i to refer to items and j to refer to bundles. For each i and j, we will let mij denote
the number of copies of item i contained in bundle j, which is a non-negative integer.
For each i and j, we were given its sales transactions (time and price) for 26 weeks
starting June 1st, 2016. Note that a sales transaction a for bundle j containing i does not
lead to a separate transaction for item i. The last of these 26 weeks is Black Friday week,
where we observed a sharp decline in prices. Hereinafter we will refer to the first 25 weeks
as "Period 1", and the final week as "Period 2".
Most of the items under consideration were staple home and kitchen items, and the
bundles containing them were consistently available. Therefore, the stream of sales was
relatively stable before Black Friday. To account for the occasional items and bundles that
would incur no sales transactions for an extended period of time, we used the following rule.
If an item or bundle had 0 transactions in a given week, then we discounted that week in
computing its average sales per week, assuming that it was either unavailable or stocked
out.
After this pre-processing, we arrived at the following quantities for each item i and
bundle j:
P!, P<: average price for the transactions of item i, during periods 1, 2, respectively;
" Pj, PJ: average price for the transactions of bundle j, during periods 1, 2, respectively;37
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" Ni, Nj: number of transactions for item i, during periods 1, 2, respectively;
" Ni, N : number of transactions for bundle j, during periods 1, 2, respectively.
We now progressively derive the quantities in Table D.13, all based on Pi, P, Ni, and
Nj. This is the knowledge we have before Black Friday, and we will later relate them to the
sales during Black Friday week.
AvgBundDisc(i), PctBund(i), and PctBundPartners(i) are the extant quantities used in
Definition 5.3.1. We consider their relationship with the price elasticity PriceElas(i) of an
item i, which we define as
Price Elas(i) = (N/2 - ')AI --. (D.47)
Ni/25Pi
Finally, for the graphs displayed in Section 5.3, we eliminated data points according to
the following rules.
1. We removed the rare items whose individual sales were negligible either before or after
Black Friday. Specifically, we only kept items with Ni > 25 and Ni > 10.
2. We also removed the items that were not offered in bundles. We only kept items
with NumSoldlnBund(i) > 25 and AvgBundDisc(i) > .025, where the latter constraint
guarantees that the bundles containing item i provided a substantial incentive for
buying them.
3. We removed items that were not marked down on Black Friday. Specifically, we only
kept items with Pj' < .95 -Pi.
4. Finally, we removed items whose bundles were also heavily marked down during Black
Friday, which would muddle their individual price elasticities which we calculated
according to equation D.47. That is, the price elasticity is most clear for examples
like Table 5.1, where the Black Friday sales of the bundles was 0 because it was not
marked down (while its constituent items were marked down, dominating the original
bundle discount). Therefore, we only kept items with Nj' 10 -E j mij , which sold
10 times more copies individually than in bundles during Black Friday week.
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Table D.13: The progressive derivation of quantities, which leads to the statistics in Definition 5.3.1
Quantityv
BundDisc(j)
NumSoldInBund(i)
AvgBundDisc(i)
PctBund(i)
Partners(i)
PctBundPartners(i)
Definition
Pi
1~EimnijPi
Z mj Nj
EZ mjjNjBundDisc(j)
NumSoldlnBund(i)
NumSoldlnBund(i)
Ni + NumSoldlnBund(i)
U {i':m<'>0,i'#i1
j:mi3 >0
ZiEPartners(i) PctBund(i')
IPartners(i) I
Description
The percentage by which bundle j is discounted, as com-
pared to the sum of the constituent prices. BundDisc(j) E
(0,1).
The total number of copies of item i sold in bundles.
The average percentage by which item i was discounted over
all of the times it was sold in a bundle.
The fraction of all copies of item i sold which came from
bundles (as opposed to individually).
All of the items i' that are bundled with item i, which we
call partners. (Items i' which were present in less than 10%
of the times i was sold in a bundle were discarded.)
A simple average of the tendency for partners of item i to
be sold in bundles (as opposed to individually).
Ouantitv I i
I
Appendix E
Appendix to Chapter 6
E.1 Proofs from Section 6.2
Proof. Proof of Proposition 6.2.2. By the definition of PBD, the customer can purchase any
non-empty subset S of items for the price of POPBD pPBD Of course, the customer
can also choose not to make a purchase. Altogether, the class of menus represented by PBD
is
{(ls, PPD _ PPBD): S : 0} U {(O,0)}
ivS
PBD 0 pPBD >OPBD >pPBD + pPBDI
where Is E {0, 1} is the indicator vector for items belonging to S.
Now, note that (6.2) defines a valid menu within PCUD since for all , zPCUD - pPBD +
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(E.1)
PoPCUD > pPCUD _pBD E pPBD > 0. The class of menus represented by (6.2) is
{(1, Z pPCUD P (Sj 1)PCUD) S = 0} U {(0, O)}
iES
P BD BpPBD> , p P > pPBD + PPBD}
n
{(1, ZpPBD + (pPBD _ EpPBD)) S I 0} U {(0, 0)}
iES =1
P'BD BD > PBD PBD PBD
= {{(s, PPBD _F PBD):S#0U(OO)}
igS
pBPBD pPBD > 0 pBD > PBD PPBD}
which is identical to (E.1). Furthermore, it is easy to see that the relation defined by (6.2)
is a bijection between (E.1) and
{(Is, E pPCUD P (ISI _ I)pPCUD) S PCUD >pPCUD > 0 Vi E [n}
iGS
Similarly, note that (6.3) defines a valid menu within TP since POTP = POPBD -
=E n PBD > 0 and for all , P - pPBD > 0. The class of menus represented by
(6.3) is
{(1s, POT + YP TP) : S $ 0} U {(0, 0)}:
iES
pPBD PBD >opPBD PBD PBD
n
= {(1s, (PcPBD _ PBD)+E PBD)
i 1 iES
pPBD pPBD pPBD pBD PBD
= {{(s, PoPBD _ PBD):S740U(OO)}
igS
pPBD 0,. PBD > 0 PBD >PBD + + PBD}
which is identical to (E.1). Furthermore, it is easy to see that the relation defined by (6.3)
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is a bijection between (E.1) and
{{(Ls,PoP+ZP7P):S0} U{(,)} :POPO,[PO,..., PT>}.
iES
This completes the proof of Proposition 6.2.2. El
Proof. Proof of Proposition 6.2.4. Consider any valuation vector x E R'. First suppose
the customer bought the bundle with all the items for pPB. Under the PBD menu, the
customer will still buy the bundle, since it is non-negative utility even if she keeps all the
items. However, she will choose to return any items i with xi < ci. Let S denote the set of
such items, which is possibly empty.
" The producer surplus under PB is pPB - ca. The producer surplus under PBD
is (pPB _ iES C) - iS ci, which is identical.
" The consumer surplus under PB is Ei= 1 xi - pPB The consumer surplus under PBD
is ZigS x% - (PPB _ Zi 9 ci) = ZD 1 max{xj, ci} - pPB which can only be greater
than the consumer surplus under PB.
" The deadweight loss is 0 in both cases: under PB every item is transferred, whereas
under PBD every item valued above cost is still transferred.
" The overinclusion loss under PB is ZEs(ci - Xi) > 0. The overinclusion loss under
PBD is 0, since items in S are not transferred.
On the other hand, suppose the customer did not buy the bundle with all the items for
PPB.
" The producer surplus under PB is 0. The producer surplus under PBD is either 0 or
pPB - En 1 ci (if the return option allowed the customer to enter the market), which
is non-negative.
" The consumer surplus under PB is 0. The consumer surplus under PBD cannot be
negative, since the customer is rational and the no-purchase option is always available.
" The deadweight loss under PB is Zix>C1 (xi - ci), which is the maximum possible.
Therefore, the deadweight loss under PBD cannot be greater.
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* The overinclusion loss under PB is 0. The overinclusion loss under PBD is always 0
when p.PBD = c_ for all i, since items valued below cost are never transferred.
In both cases, we have proven that the statements in Proposition 6.2.4 hold. E
Proof. Proof of Proposition 6.2.5. The firm's problem is to find a menu along with tie-
breaking rules which maximize profit. Note that this is equivalent to finding functions q, s
defined on X which are incentive-compatible, individually rational, and profit-maximizing.
Formally, the firm's problem is
max Ex~D[s(x) - q(x)Tc]
s.t. q(x)Tx - s(x)
q(x)Tx 
- s(x)
q(y)Tx - s(y) Vx, y C X
0 Vx E X
which can be rewritten as
max Ex~D[s(x) - q(x)TCI
s.t. q(x) T (x - c) - (s(x) - q(x)T c)
q(x) T (x - c) - (s(x) - q(x) T c)
q(y)(x - c) - (s(y) - q(y) Tc)
0
Now, define x' := x - c, y' := y - c, q'(x) := q(x + c), and s'(x) := s(x + c) - q(x + c)Tc. Let
X' : {x - c: x c X}, and similarly let D' be the distribution D shifted ci units downward
in dimension i for every i C [n]. We can see that the above is equivalent to
max Ex,~Dls(X)]
s.t. q'(x')TX' - s'(x') 
q'(x')T x - (x') >
q/(y')Tx' 
- s'(y')
0
which is identical to the original problem without costs on this new distribution D'.
Now suppose there was a restriction on the menu M = {(q(1), s(1), (q(2), S( 2)),...} to
belong to some class A in the original problem. The menu after the transformation, M',
looks like {(q(1), S(') - (q(l))Tc), (q(2) I(2) - (q(2))Tc), ... }. Therefore, M' is restricted to
the class
.': {{(q(1), S(1 ) - (q(1))Tc), (q( 2 ), S(2) - (q( 2))Tc) . . .} : {(q(1), s( 1)), (q( 2 ), S(2)) . . I E z }
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Vx,y G X
Vx E X
Vx',y' E X'
V'x' C X'
By assumption that s - qTc > 0 for all menu entries, the payments in M' are non-negative.
Throughout this chapter, it will be clear whether we are in the context of the original
problem or the transformed problem, and we will omit the superscripts used in the preceding
proof.
Remark E.1.1. As a concrete example of this transformation, consider the pricing scheme
PBDC. M is restricted to be of the form {(Is, poBD ]\c [0)
where Is E {0, 1} is the indicator vector for items belonging to S. Hence M' is restricted
to be of the form
{(1s PPBD IT - Isc) S C [n]} U {(0, O)}
= {(1s,PPBD c
Put in words, M' must belong to the class of menus that offer the same price for any non-
empty subset of items. The fact that the customer can choose to take a subset of items
instead of taking all the items is important, because valuations x' can be negative (x' is
equal to the original valuation xi subtract the cost ci).
E.2 Proof of Theorem 6.4.1
We will WOLOG normalize the valuations so that the optimal PC revenue is 1 (we can do
this so long as the original optimal revenue was positive; if it was 0 then the statement of
the theorem is trivial).
E.2.1 The Core-Tail Decomposition
We use the core-tail decomposition of Babaioff et al. (2014), with the original idea coming
from Li and Yuan (2013). We will cut up the domain of the joint distribution and consider
the conditional distributions on the smaller subdomains. Below, we introduce the notation
for working with these distributions on smaller subdomains. One should get comfortable
with the idea that some of the distributions defined could be the null distribution, if they
were distributions conditioned on a set of measure 0, or a product over an empty set of
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distributions. The product of a null distribution with any other distribution is still a null
distribution.
Definition E.2.1. We make the following definitions for this appendix.
" For all i E [n], let ri denote the optimal revenue earned by selling item i individually
(by our normalization, En 1 r, = 1).
" Let DC (the "core" of Di) denote the conditional distribution of Di when it lies in
the range (-oc, 1].
" Let DT (the "tail" of Dj) denote the conditional distribution of Di when it lies in the
range (1,oo).
" Let pi := PX~Dj [xi > 1], the probability item i lies in its tail.
* Let A C [n] represent a subset of items, usually the items whose valuations lie in their
tails.
" Let DZ:= xiEADT, the product distribution of only items in their tails.
" Let D :=xiADq, the product distribution of only items in their cores.
" Let DA DC x DT, the conditional distribution of D when exactly the subset A
of items lie in their tails. Let PA be the probability this occurs, which is equal to
(Hi A( 1 - Pi))(HeA pi), by independence.
" Let x4 := max{xj, 0}.
" For any valuation distribution S, let VAL+(S) := E s[x'], which is the expected
welfare after the transformation from costs to negative valuations. Note that the sum
is only over the admissible i if S is a distribution on a smaller subdomain.
" Let REV(S) denote the optimal revenue obtainable from valuation distribution S via
any Incentive Compatible and Individually Rational mechanism, which could include
lotteries.
" Let SREV(S) denote the optimal revenue of any pricing scheme falling under the class
of separate sales (Pure Components).
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* Let BDcREV(S) denote the optimal revenue of any pricing scheme falling under the
class of PBDC.
(It is understood that VAL+, REV, SREV, BDcREv are 0 when evaluated on the null distri-
bution.)
E.2.2 Lemmas for Negative Valuations
We need to modify the statements of lemmas from Hart and Nisan (2012), Li and Yuan
(2013), and Babaioff et al. (2014) to handle negative valuations. While their proofs can be
extended to negative valuations in a straight-forward manner, we provide full self-contained
proofs here for ease of exposition.
Lemma E.2.2. (Marginal Mechanism) Let S, S' be (potentially negative) valuation distri-
butions over disjoint sets of items. Then
REV(S x S') <; VAL+(S) + REV(S)
The Marginal Mechanism tells us that when selling a group of independent items, we
cannot do better than breaking off some items individually, extracting the entire welfare
from those items, and selling the remaining items as a group.
Proof. Proof of Lemma E.2.2. Consider the following mechanism for selling to a buyer with
valuations drawn from S'. First, sample a value v ~ S, and reveal to the buyer these make-
believe valuations for the items in S. Then run a mechanism obtaining REV(S x S') on this
buyer, with the modification that whenever the buyer would have received an item i from
the support of 5, instead she will receive (or pay) money equal to vi. By independence,
this modified mechanism on the buyer with valuations drawn from S' is IC and IR (a buyer
with valuations S' will choose the same menu entry under the modified mechanism as a
buyer with valuations S x S' would have chosen under the original mechanism) and we will
obtain REV(S x S'), but then have to settle for the items in S. The most we stand to lose
in the settlement is E' iv (each item i in S is transferred in full whenever vi > 0, and not
transferred when vi < 0), so this amount is upper bounded in expectation by VAL+(S).
Therefore, the optimal revenue from S' is at least REV(S x S') - VAL+(S), completing the
proof of the lemma. 0
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Lemma E.2.3. (Subdomain Stitching) Let S be a product distribution over valuations, with
support X C Rm for some m E N. Let X1 ,.. . , Xk form a partition of X inducing conditional
distributions S(1),..., S(k), respectively, and let sj = P.,s[x G Xj]. Then
k
REV(S) E sjREV(S(U))
j=1
Intuitively, Subdomain Stitching says that revenue can only increase if we sell to each
subdomain separately, since we can use a different mechanism for each subdomain that
specializes in extracting the welfare from that customer segment.
Proof. Proof of Lemma E.2.3. Let M be an optimal mechanism obtaining REV(S), and
for any valuation distribution S', let REVM(S') denote the expected revenue obtained
from mechanism M when the buyer's valuation is drawn from S'. Clearly REV(S) =
j= 1 sjREVM(S(U)), and furthermore for all j E [k], REVM(SU)) 5 REV(S(i)) since M is
an IC-IR mechanism for selling to S(i), completing the proof of the lemma. I
Lemma E.2.4. Let S be a product distribution over valuations, with support X C R'
for some m 6 N. Let X' be a subset of X inducing conditional distribution S', and let
s' = Px-S [x C X']. Then
REV(S) > s'REV(S')
While Subdomain Stitching places an upper bound on REV(S), Lemma E.2.4 places a
lower bound on REV(S) based on the optimal revenue of any single subdomain.
Proof. Proof of Lemma E.2.4. Consider an optimal mechanism for S', and extend this
to an IC-IR mechanism on S by allowing the buyer to report a value in X' maximizing
her utility. With probability s', the buyer's valuation will actually be drawn from S' and
we will obtain revenue REV(S'); otherwise, we still earn a non-negative revenue, since the
mechanism never admits a negative payment. Therefore, the optimal revenue for S is at
least s'REV(S'), completing the proof of the lemma. 0
Lemma E.2.5. Let S be a product distribution over m independent (potentially negative)
valuations, for some m G N. Then
REV(S) < m -SREV(S)
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While selling m items together can definitely be better than selling them separately, this
lemma tells us it can be no more than m times better.
Proof. Proof of Lemma E.2.5. We proceed by induction. The statement is trivial when
m = 1. Now, suppose we have proven the statement for m valuations, and we will prove it
for m + 1 valuations.
Partition the support X C Rm+1 of S into 24 and X2 , where X1 := {x E X 1
max{x, 0} V j = 2, ... , m + 1} and X2 = X \ 21. Let si denote the probability a value
sampled from S lies in X1, and let Si be its distribution conditioned on this event. Define
s2, S2 respectively. Subdomain stitching tells us REV(S) siREV(S(')) + s2 REV(S(2 )).
Our goal is to separately show that s1REV(S(1 )) (m + 1)SREV(Sl) and s2 REV(S(2 )) <
(m + 1)SREV(S- 1).
Now, applying Marginal Mechanism on S(1) and multiplying both sides of the inequal-
ity by si, we get s1REV(S(1 )) < S1VAL+(S(1) + s1REV(S(')). By considering a distri-
bution that samples v ~ S but only outputs vi, we can use Lemma E.2.4 to show that
s1REV(S(')) REV(Sl). To bound VAL+(S ), consider the following mechanism for sell-
ing just item 1: sample v_ 1 ~ S_ 1, and set the price to be max+ 1 {max{vi, 0}}. Since
the buyer's valuation is drawn from S1, by independence, we get a sale with probabil-
ity exactly si. Furthermore, max'+'{max{vi,O}} 0 - E" max{vi, 0}, so conditioned
on us getting a sale, the expected payment is at least -VAL+(Sd1). We have proven
REV(S1 ) !VAL+(S(1), hence s 1REV(S(1)) (m + 1)REV(S1 ) = (m + 1)SREV(S), as
required.
It remains to bound s2 REV(S(2 )), and using Marginal Mechanism and Lemma E.2.4
in the same way as before, we obtain that it is no more than s 2VAL+(S( 2)) + REv(S-1 ).
Consider the following mechanism for selling items 2, ... , m + 1: sample v, ~ Si, and set
the individual price for each item 2, ... , m + 1 to be max{vi, 0}. Note that the probability
of getting at least one sale is less than s2, since even when there is some j = 2,.. ., m + 1
such that v, < max{x,0}, it is possible for both vi, x3 to be negative. However, in this
case max{vi, 0} = 0, so not getting a sale is still equivalent to getting at least one sale for
max{v1, 0}. Therefore, we can think of it as we get at least one sale with probability S2, in
which case we earn in expectation at least VAL+(S( 2 )). We have proven that s 2 VAL+(S( 2 )
SREV(S- 1), and by the induction hypothesis REV(S- 1) 5 m-SREV(S- 1), so s2 REV(S(2)) <
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(m + 1)SREV(S_ 1 ).
Putting everything together, we have REV(S) 5 (m + 1)(SREV(S1 ) + SREV(S_ 1))
(m + 1)SREV(S), completing the induction and the proof of the lemma. L
Using these lemmas, we decompose the revenue of the initial distribution D in the same
way as Babaioff et al. (2014):
REV(D) 5 PAREV(DA)
AC[n]
PA (VAL+ (Dc) + REV(DT))
AC[n]
2 PAVAL+(Dc) + E PAREV(D T)
AC[n] AC[n]
= VAL+(DC)+ Z PAREV(DT)
AC[n]
where the first inequality is Subdomain Stitching, the second inequality is Marginal Mech-
anism, the third inequality is immediate from the definition of DC, and the equality is a
consequence of ZAC[n]PA = 1.
Now, for all A [ [n] such that PA > 0, Lemma E.2.5 tells us that REV(DI) T
IAISREV(D T) = JAI EiCA SREV(D[). Lemma E.2.4 tells us that SREV(DT ) 5 , where
pi # 0 since PA > 0, SO
PAREV(DA PAAIZ:-
AC[n] AC[n] i A
n
= ri JA APA
i=1 AEi
ZA i IAI P is the expected number of items in their tails conditioned on item i being in its
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tail, so it is equal to 1 + E p. Thus
n
PAREV(DA 1: +(p
AC;[n] i=1ji
= 1+ p3 ri
j=1 i~j
n
= 1+ pj(1-rj)
j=1
We will use r to denote the quantity E= 1 pi(1 -ri). It is immediate that 7 < En_1 P, <
1, but we can get a stronger bound for the welfare of the core if we don't immediately apply
the inequality r < 1. We have
REV(D) 5 VAL+(Dc) + 1 + r (E.2)
Before we proceed, one final lemma we will need later is:
Lemma E.2.6. Let Y be a random variable distributed over [0, 1] and suppose y(l - F(y))
is upper bounded by some value v C [0,1]. Then Var(Y) < 2v.
Proof. Proof of Lemma E.2.6.
Var(Y) = E[Y2 _ E~y]2
< E[Y 2
1
= ] P[Y 2  y]dy
< -dy
~ 0 V h
= 2v
where the second inequality uses the fact that the Myerson revenue for Y is upper bounded
by v. 0
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E.2.3 A Tighter Bound for the Welfare of the Core
The main observation behind our improvement is that for r to be large (and the above
bound to be weak), the tail probabilities must be large. However, we will choose the price
of the grand bundle, Pt, to be at most 2, so that whenever 2 or more valuations lie in their
tails, the customer is guaranteed to want to buy the bundle (and dispose of items for which
her valuation is negative). Thus
P[E xi<Pt= PO - Px~DtE x <Pt +E pA' Px~DA[Zx<Pt +E pA - (0)
IAI=1 IAI>2
0 (+ Z7 PA) ' x-Dc 4xi+<P4l
IAI=1
1(1 -Pi)+ piJ(1 -Pj)) x-D P E X <Pt] (E.3)
i=1 i=1 jsAi
where the inequality comes from the fact that the probability of E x+ being less than the
bundle price is greater conditioned on no items being in the tail, than conditioned on some
item being in the tail. We used independence to compute the probabilities in the final
expression, which we will bound in the following way:
Lemma E.2.7. Let pi,... ,Pn, r,.. ., rn be real numbers satisfying 0 < pi _< ri and
i= 1. LetT= n I pi(1 - ri). Then
n n 5
rI(1-pA) + :pi r( - pi) < :1
j=1 i=1 joi
This is the key inequality that enables our improved ratio and its proof requires new anal-
ysis. Note that we do indeed have the condition pi < ri in our case, since by Lemma E.2.4
ri > piREv(DT), and REV(Df) must be at least 1 when DT is distributed over (1, oo).
Proof. Proof of Lemma E.2.7. We will first prove
n(-pi)+ Pi7 (1- P)< 1+r (E.4)
i=1 i=1 joi
Assume that pi < 1 for all i E [n]; the lemma is trivially true otherwise because we would
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have LHS = 1 and T = 0. Since T = Z i ps(1 - ri) and 1 - x < ex, it suffices to prove
- (i - pi) + >jpi j1J(1 -pj) I (i + Zpi(1 - ri)) fJ( -pi(l - ri)) i=1 i=1 jsi = =
which is equivalent to
3 pA Pi ri
-+ E <1+ E(p - piri)) f(1 + )4 (=1 1 - 1i p=) 1 -pi
Observe that the RHS is at least
(+ (pi - pir )) (I+ E Pi)
= i+ (p2 pii)(1 -pi)+pir~ +(Zp (1 -i))Zi
1 - =1 I p11-
n (p ii )+pr n n
=1+ E 1 + EPi(1_-ri))E pr
i=1 I =1 =1
n1n P 2(1 2 ) n nZ i pi ).
= + - E (i1 rP )2+ pi(1 - ri) - ir
i=1 - i =1 -~ - - j
so it remains to prove
n P (1 - ri)2
i=1 I- i isi I-p.
But pi : ri for all i E [n], so the LHS is at most En 1 p (1 - p,), which can be seen to be
at most -, since pi(I - pi) is always at most and n 1 P, < 1.
Also, since -r < zip=1 P, e- T > exp(-ZD i) H 1(1 -pi). Multiplying by 1 and
adding to (E.4), we complete the proof of the lemma. L
E.2.4 Applying Cantelli's Inequality
To bound Px c[E x' < Pt], we want to show that E x+ concentrates around its mean,0
where valuation xi is drawn from its conditional core distribution DF for all i E [n]. Note
that y(l - Fxi(y)) is bounded above by ri for all y E [0,1]; otherwise SREv(DC) > ri --
SREV(D) > ri which is a contradiction. Hence y(l - F + (y)) is also bounded above by ri
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and we can invoke Lemma E.2.6 to get Var.~D c(xf) < 2ri for all i E [n]. By independence,
Var (ZX) = En VarD (4) Z 1 2ri = 2 and we have successfully bounded
the variance of the quantity we are interested in.
At this point, it is common in the literature to see an application of Chebyshev's in-
equality (e.g. Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999); Fang and Norman (2006); Hart and Nisan
(2012); Babaioff et al. (2014)). However, since we are only interested in the lower tail,
we can actually use Cantelli's one-sided inequality (Lemma 6.3.1), which optimizes a shift
parameter to obtain an improved bound for a single tail.
Now, note that Ex~DC i[= 1 4] = VAL+(DC) by definition. Also, it will be convenient
to write the bundle price as Pt = a - VAL+(DC), for some a E [0, 1] (we would never want
a > 1 since then the price would be greater than the mean and it would be impossible to
use Cantelli). Then
n
Px~DC[ZX+~<D]= P Z4 - VAL+(Dc) < -(1 - a)VAL+(Dc)
Varx-DC ( X)
VarxD (E x+) + (1 - a)2VAL+(DC)2
2
~ 2 + (1 - a) 2VAL+(D)2
where the first inequality is Cantelli's inequality, and the second inequality comes from our
variance bound above. So long as we choose Pt 2, we can use (E.3), and combined with
Lemma E.2.7 we get
1.25 + -r 2
-m e
T  
' 2 + (1 - a) 2VAL+(DC)2
and hence the expected revenue from selling the grand bundle at price a -VAL+(Di) is at
least
a V L(S)- 1- in{1.25 + -r 2
e
T  2+(1 - a)2VAL+(DC)2J
Recall from (E.2) that REV(D) VAL+(DC) + 1 + -r. While -r could take on any value
in [0, 1], we can choose the price of the bundle based on -r and VAL+ (DC) by adjusting
a E [0, 1].
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Case 1. If VAL+(D ) 3.2, then REv(D) < 3.2 + 1 + 1 5.2 - SREv(D) is immediate
and we can just sell the items individually.
Case 2. If 3.2 < VAL+(Dc) 4, then we will choose a = } which guarantees Pt 5 2.
Thus
BDcREv(D) > VAL+(Dc) . I - mini 1.25 + r 2
- 2( e7' 2 + (1 - 1)2(3.2)2)
It can be shown with calculus (or numerically) that:
Proposition E.2.8. For all T E [0, 11, 2 ( - min { 1 2+(1-1)2(3.2)2) + (1 T) <
5.2, with the maximum of ~ 5.1952 occuring at the unique positive T satisfying 125+r1
Hence VAL+(DC) 5 (4.2 - r)BDCREv(D). Substituting into (E.2), we get
REv(D) 5 (4.2 - r)BDCREv(D) + (1 + T)SREV(D)
< 5.2 - max{SREv(D), BDCREV(D)}
as desired.
Case 3. If 4 < VAL+(Dc), then we will still choose a = . We no longer have Pt 5 2,
so we have to use the weaker bound Px~D [E i < Pt] Px~DC [Z < Pt]. However,
applying Cantelli yields
~P [ tp] < 2 1
~ 
- 2 + (I 1)2(4)2 3
so BDcREv(D) ;> VAL+(Dc) - !(1 - j). We get REv(D) 5 3 - BDcREv(D) + (1 +
-r)SREv(D) < 5.2 - max{SREv(D), BDCREv(D)}, completing the proof of Theorem 6.4.1.
E.3 Proof of Theorem 6.4.3
It is immediate that the optimal revenue from PC is 2p, attained by selling individual items
at any price in [1, 2]. Next, we would like to argue that the optimal revenue from PB is also
2p. If we offer the bundle at 2, it is guaranteed to get bought if either valuation realizes to 2
or both valuations realize to a positive number, and won't get bought otherwise. Therefore
the revenue is 2(p2 + 2(1 - p) ) = 2p.
We can do equally well by offering the bundle at 3, and any other price is inferior.
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Lemma E.3.1. The optimal revenue from PB is 2p, attained by setting a bundle price of
2 or 3.
Proof. Proof of Lemma E.3.1. Let z denote the price of the bundle. We will systematically
analyze all the cases over 1 < z < 4 and show that the maximum revenue of 2p is attained
at z = 2 and z = 3.
Case 1. Suppose 1 < z < 2. Let us condition on the realization y of the first valuation.
If y = 0, then we get a sale with probability 2. If y E [1, z), then we get a sale so long as
the second valuation realizes to a positive number, which occurs with probability 1 - p. If
y z, then the first valuation alone is enough to guarantee a bundle sale. The expected
revenue is
z ((1 - p) + (p - )p + = 2p + (z - 2)p 2
which is clearly maximized at z = 2, in which case the revenue is 2p.
Case 2. Suppose 2 < z < 3. Let us condition on the realization y of the first valuation.
If y = 0, then we have no chance of selling the bundle. If y E [1, z - 1], then we get a
sale when the other valuation is at least z - y. Since z - y E [1, 2], the probability of this
occurring is P. If y z - 1, then we get a sale so long as the other valuation realizes to a
positive number, which occurs with probability p. The total probability of getting a sale is
z-1- - dy+ P p
S y2 z - y z -1
where the PDF of Y satisfies f(y) = over [1, 2). Using partial fractions, the antiderivative
of _ can be computed to be
1 (Iny - ln(z -y) 1
Z z y
as demonstrated in the proof of (Hart and Nisan, 2012, lem. 6). Therefore, the definite
integral evaluates to
P2 (21n(z 2- 1) +2 1p 2 + -
and the expected revenue is
zP (2ln(z 2 - 1) +2 1 - 1 1) 2p2  ln(z - 1) + zp 2 +-- + =2p +1
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However, in(z-1) is a strictly increasing function on (2, 3], so this expression is uniquely
z
maximized at z = 3 where it equals 2p2 (Ln2 + 1) = 2p.
Case 3. Suppose 3 < z < 4. Let us condition on the realization y of the first valuation.
If y < z - 2, then we have no chance of selling the bundle. Otherwise, the probability of
getting a sale is P, since z - y E [1,2]. The total probability of getting a sale is
Z-2 Y2 z - Y 2 z - 2
and the integral evaluates to
2 2ln2 - 2ln(z - 2)+ z7(z ) )
Z2 z~-2) 2z
Therefore, the expected revenue is
Z2 21n 2 - 21n(z - 2) 1 1 1 I22(In 2 - ln(z - 2) + 1(z2z(z-2) 2z 2(z2-)2) z zP-2
1n2-ln(z-2) + 2 is a strictly decreasing function on [3,4], so this expression is uniquely
maximized at z = 3.
Now, consider the strategy of offering either item for 2 or the bundle for the discounted
price of 3. Note that if buying the bundle is non-negative utility for the customer, then
buying either individual item cannot be higher utility, since the price savings is one and the
value of the item lost is at least one (recall that the firm gets to break ties in a way that
favors itself). Hence there is no cannibalization of bundle sales from individual sales and we
earn revenue at least 2p. However, when exactly one valuation realizes to a positive number
(in which case we have no chance of selling the bundle), we still have a i conditional2
probability of selling that individual item. Hence the revenue from Mixed Bundling is
2 p + 2 (2 (l - p)2) = 2p(2 - p).
The relative gain over both the PC revenue and the PB revenue is 2 - p = 3-2In23+1n 2'
completing the proof of Theorem 6.4.3.
Remark E.3.2. A motivating example for our construction is a small modification of the
earlier best-known example from Hart and Nisan (2012): consider a distribution that takes
on values 0, 1, 2 with probabilities ., 1, 1, respectively. Let D be the instance consisting
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of two independent copies of this distribution. Then it can be shown that the optimal PC
revenue is 1 (attained at individual prices 1 or 2), the optimal PB revenue is 1 (attained
at bundle price 2 or 3), and the optimal revenue is at least 1 (attained at individual prices
2 and bundle price 3), achieving a ratio of 9. Hart and Nisan (2012) had the probabilities
be }, j, } instead, achieving a ratio of 1231 3 3 13~
E.4 Example where BSP Performs Poorly
Consider a firm that is bundling a higher-profit-margin, lower-valuation good with a low-
profit-margin, high-valuation good. This is a common occurrence, for example when video
games are bundled with a console, which we will hereinafter refer to as item 1 and item 2,
respectively. Item 1 costs zero to produce and has a valuation uniform on [0,1]; item 2 costs
4.5 to produce and has a valuation uniform on [0,5] and independent from item 1. Most
of the welfare comes from the lower-valuation item: the expected welfare for item 1 and
item 2 are 0.5 and 0.025, respectively.
The optimal deterministic profit is ~ 0.265, attained by offering item 1 at 0.51, item 2
at 4.83, and the bundle at the discounted price of 5.13.
The optimal BSP pricing charges 4.83 for a single item and 5.03 for both items, earning
only 19% of the deterministic optimum. This example highlights the issue with BSP: it
cannot afford to charge a low price for a single item if any item has a high production
cost. However, most of the potential profit could be coming from offering lower-valuation
items at low prices! Chu et al. (2008) bypass such examples in their numerical experiments,
assuming that all items have a low cost compared to its mean valuation.
PBDC offers item 1 at 0.51, item 2 at 5.01, and the bundle at 5.01-which is the
right idea and earns 99.1% of the deterministic optimum. Interestingly, even the analytical
solution provided by Bhargava (2013), which computes the optimal deterministic pricing
when there are two independent uniform distributions and costs, is less effective than PBDC
on this example. The solution from Bhargava (2013) only attains 97.5% of the deterministic
optimum for this example, because it requires a bit of linear approximation.
Optimal bundling is an intricate problem even in the case of two independent uniform
distributions, so a simple pricing heuristic as robust as PBDC is invaluable. In fact, for this
example PBDC recommends Partial Mixed Bundling, which is a Mixed Bundling scheme
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where one of the items, in this case item 2 (the high-cost low-welfare item), is never sold
individually. This matches the intuition that the seller should add item 1 (the low-cost
high-welfare item) to item 2 in order to increase the total amount customer is willing to pay
(see Proposition 1 in Bhargava (2013)). BSP, on the other hand, does not perform well: it
recommends a Partial Mixed Bundling scheme where item 1 is never sold individually.
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Appendix F
Appendix to Chapter 7
F.1 Examples of transforming SK jobs to Markov chains.
1. Consider a job that takes time 5 with probability 1, and time 2 with probability
2 (and cannot be canceled once started). If it finishes, the reward returned is 2,
independent of processing time. This can be modeled by fig. F-I where rB = ,
rE = 2, and B = {B, C, D, E}. Note that instead of placing reward 2 on arc (B, C'),
we have equivalently placed reward 1 on node B. A corollary of this reduction is3
that the following reward structure is equivalent to the original for the objective of
maximizing expected reward: a guaranteed reward of 1 after 2 time steps, after which3
the job may run for another 3 time steps to produce an additional 2 reward.
2. Consider the same job as the previous one, except the reward is 4 if the processing
time was 5, while the reward is 1 if the processing time was 2 (the expected reward
for finishing is still 2). All we have to change in the reduction is setting rB = and
rE = 4 instead.
3. Consider either of the two jobs above, except cancellation is permitted (presumably
on node C, after observing the transition from node B). All we have to change in the
reduction is setting B = 0 instead.
4. Consider the job from the second bullet that can be canceled, and furthermore, we
find out after 1 time step whether it will realize to the long, high-reward job or the
short, low-reward job. This can be modeled by fig. F-2 where rB' = 1, rE = 4, and
B = 0.
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Figure F-1: A Markov chain representing a SK job with correlated rewards
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Figure F-2: Another Markov chain representing a SK job with correlated rewards
F.2 Example showing preemption is necessary for uncorre-
lated SK.
Consider the following example: there are n = 3 items, I1, 12, 13. 1, instantiates to size 6
with probability }, and size 1 with probability 2. 12 deterministically instantiates to size
9. 13 instantiates to size 8 with probability I, and size 4 with probability 1. I1,'2, 13, if
successfully inserted, return rewards of 4, 9, 8, respectively. We have a knapsack of size 10.
We describe the optimal preempting policy. First we insert I1. After 1 unit of time, if
11 completes, we go on to insert '2, which will deterministically fit. If I, doesn't complete,
we set it aside and insert 13 to completion. If it instantiates to size 8, then we cannot
get any more reward from other items. If it instantiates to size 4, then we can go back
and finish inserting the remaining 5 units of 1. The expected reward of this policy is
1(4 + 9) + 1(18 + 1(8 + 4)) = 11.5.
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Now we enumerate the policies that can only cancel but not preempt. If we first insert
12, then the best we can do is try to insert I1 afterward, getting a total expected reward
of 11. Note that any policy never fitting I2 can obtain reward at most 11, since with
probability 1 we cannot fit both I1 and 13. This rules out policies that start with 13, which
has no chance of fitting alongside 12. Remaining are the policies that first insert I,. If it
doesn't complete after 1 unit of time, then we can either settle for the 9 reward of 12, or
finish processing I1 with the hope of finishing 13 afterward. However, in this case, 13 only
finishes half the time, so we earn more expected reward by settling for 12. Therefore, the
best we can do after first inserting I1 is to stop processing it after time 1 (regardless of
whether it completes), and process 12, earning a total expected reward of 11.
We have shown that indeed, for uncorrelated SK, there is a gap between policies that
can preempt (which includes canceling) versus policies that can only cancel. It appears that
this gap is bounded by a constant, contrary to the gap between policies that can cancel
versus policies that cannot cancel (see (Gupta et al., 2011a, appx. A.1)).
F.3 Proofs from Section 7.2.
F.3.1 Proof of Lemma 7.2.5.
Suppose we are given {z7 g} , {y,t} satisfying (7.2a)-(7.2c), (7.3a)-(7.3c) which imply (7.4).
For all i E [n], u C Si, t E [B], let su,t = Z S:7 , yx,t, and let Xa't = aESsa- zf
for each a E A. We aim to show {xat}, {su,t} satisfies (7.10a)-(7.10c), (7.11), (7.12a)-
(7.12c) and makes (7.9) the same objective function as (7.1). For convenience, we adopt
the notation that xu,t = EaeA XUt and zIit = EaA z7ig.*
(7.11): EnS XU,t = 1 ES. z,,i,t = E u Es,_,Z zz,,i,t. But
there is a unique u E Si such that u = 7ri, so the sum equals EZ s Z=1 Z,,t, which is at
most 1 by (7.4).
(7.10a): For u E Si, xu,t = E,: Z,,,t, and each term in the sum is at most yi7-,t by
(7.2a) and (7.2c), hence xu,t E _j=U Yir,t = Su,t.
(7.10b): For u E B, x, - a Ziit, and each term in the sum is equal to y,,t by
(7.2b), hence xt = E _:r=u yir,t = su,t.
(7.10c), (7.12a), and (7.12b) are immediate from (7.2c), (7.3a), and (7.3b), respectively.
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For (7.12c), fix t > 1, i E [nJ, and u E Si. Sum (7.3c) over {7r : 7ri = u} to get
> 7r,t = Y7r,t-- -Z 7r,j ,t-1 7r, - - ,7r
7r::rr=u T7 7=U 7r:7ri=u j=1 7r:7r=u j=1 (v,a)EPar(7rj)
Su,t SU,t-1 -- Z7r,i,t-1 - E > Z7r,j,t-1
7r:7r!=U 7r:1r;=u joi
+ >3 Z,i,tl P u+ Z 7r ,jt1 - P7r
7Tr:7ri=u (va)EPar(u) Tr:7ri=u j/iz (v,a)EPar(-rj)
SUt SU't-1 -Ut - E E 7rjt-
7r:7ri=u j$i
(v,a)EPar(u) ir:iri=u ij i VES aEA {7r:7ri=u,Par(7r 3)3(v,a)}
SUt SUt-i - Xu,t-1 - E 13 Z7r,j,t-1
ir:ri=u j~i
+(> Zai,t_1) -Pau+ ZajtW(
(va)EPar(u) 7r:7ri=v ji VES aEA 7r:7ri=u,7rj=v
S't =SUt-i - XUt-i - E E3Z 7r,j,t-i
1r:7r;=u ji
X,t _ Pa, + Zaj' ~
(v,a)EPar(u) ji i vES, aEA 7r:7ri=u,7rs-v
SUt = Sut-i - XUt-i- > Z7r,j,t-1+ 3 X t 1 P V u+
j#i 7r 7ri=u (v,a)EPar(u) isi 7r:7r
SUt = Sut-1 - Xut-1 + X 3 t_ PVU
(v,a)EPar(u)
Ziaj1 Pa
E PV'w)
w:pa >0
which is exactly (7.12c).
(7.9): a E X Xa', = E ra z and by the(79) uES ZaEA U 5 t=1 ut Zi=1 E~uESi ZaEA U t=1 Zir:iU 7r Z ndbyth
same manipulation we made for (7.11), this is equal to ZrSZ zaCA rrZ i t
Thus (7.9) is the same as (7.1), completing the proof of Lemma 7.2.5.
F.3.2 Proof of Lemma 7.2.6.
Suppose we are given {zajt}, {y,,t} satisfying (7.6a)-(7.6c), (7.7a)-(7.7e) which imply (7.8).
For all i E [n], u c Si, t c [B], let su,t = E7rES':7j=u yir,t, and let Xat= aS':,=,i
for each a E A. We aim to show {xa}, {s,t} satisfies (7.10a)-(7.10c), (7.11), (7.13a)-
(7.13d) and makes (7.9) the same objective function as (7.5). For convenience, we adopt
the notation that xu,t =ZaEA Xut and Z,,i,t = EaEA zi,t*
(7.11): EZuS xu,t = Eu1  EZru Z 7,,i,t = ELS ZuESu=. z ,,i,t. The
difference from the previous derivation of (7.11) is that there is only a unique u E Si such
that u = 7ri, if 7ri $ #i. So the sum equals ZES' EieI(7r) z,,,it, which is at most 1 by (7.8).
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E:Zr,j,t--1
r =U
Using this same manipulation, the equivalence of (7.9) and (7.5) follows the same deriva-
tion as before. (7.10a) and (7.10b) also follow the same derivations as before; (7.10c),
(7.13a), and (7.13b) are immediate. It remains to prove (7.13c) and (7.13d).
(7.13d): Fix t > 1, i E [n], and u E Si \{pi}. First consider the case where depth(u) > 1.
All 7r E S' such that 7Tri = u fall under (7.7e), so we can sum over these 7r to get
S Y-7, t = 5 5 zvit 1 *Pa,
7r: 7ri =U r:7ri=u (v,a)EPar(u)
(SU't = a)Eir1 ) (r: pV
(v,a)EPar(u) 7r:7ri=u
Since depth(u) > 1, v # pi, so {vrv : 7r E S, 7ri = u} = {7r :r :E S', 7ri = v}. Hence the RHS
of the above equals ,a)EPar(u) _ -pu which is exactly (7.13d).
For the other case where depth(u) = 1, all 7r E S' such that 7ri =
we can sum over these 7r to get
E
7r: 7ri =U 7r:7ri=u a:(pi,a) E Par(u) Ir' EP(7rPi )
a:(pi,a) E Par(u) 7r:ri =u -r'EP(7rPi)
a:(pi,a)EPar(u) 7r:lri=pi
su,t 
-1 piU
a:(pia)EPar(u)
u fall under (7.7d), so
a~
We explain the third equality. Since u # pi implies arm i is the active arm in all of
{7r E S' : 7ri = u}, this set is equal to {pi, #1} X ... X u X .. X {p , 0,,}. Thus {7r' E P(7rPi) :
7r E S', 7ri = u} = {7r' E P(7r) : 7r E {pi, $i} 0 - --. X - x {p, 04}}. Recall that P(7r) is
the set of joint nodes that would transition to 7r with no play. Therefore, this set is equal
to {7r' E S' : 7r = pi}, as desired.
(7.13c): Fix t > 1 and i E [n]. Unfortunately, 7r E S' such that 7ri = pi can fall under
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(7.7c), (7.7d), or (7.7e). First let's sum over the 7r falling under (7.7c):
E5 7r,t
7rOAi7rjp
= E E r',t-1 - E 7r,j,t
7rVA-ri=pj 7r'E'P(7r) jEI (7r')
S r,t-1 - Z7r,i,t-1 E 
-7rjt-
7rES':7rj=pi jEI(7r)\{i}
spit-1 - rpi,t-1 -- Zr,j,t-1
7rES':7rj=pj jEI(7r)\{i}
where the second equality requires the same set bijection explained above. Furthermore,
ES E
it-CS':7i-=pi E (. \i
Z7r,j,t-1 S E S (Z7r,k,t-1 +
k-i 7rEAk:7ri=pi jEI
+ E E Z7r,j,t-1
7r A:7r=pi jEI(7r)\{i}
= E E (Z7r,k,t-1 +
k:i -7rEAk 1ri=pi j:7rj
+ E S Z7r,j,t-1
7r A-7ri pi j:7rj=pj,jAi
E E S Z7r,k,t-1 +
k$i 7rEAk 1ri=pi 7E S':
S
(ir)\{2i,k}
E Z7r,j,t-1
=Pj ,
7i-=Pj j: 7rj =pj ,j Oi
Now let's sum over the 7r falling under (7.7e):
S S: Yir,t
j: i {-7r:7rj=pj,depth(-7rj)>1}
Za ,jt-1 . Par
j 4i {7r:7rj=pj,depth(7rj)>1} (v,a)EPar(7rj)
za,j,t-1 . Pair
j:i VESj\{pj} aEA {7r:7r=pj,Par(7t-)3(v,a)}
= E S: S S: 7 ,j,t-1 ,W
=~ i VESj\{pj} aEA 7r:Sri=p 7rj=v W:p >
j:/i vCESj \pj} a EA 7r:7ri=pi,7rj =V
E T Zr,j,t-1
joi 7r E Aj:7ri=pi
where the third equality uses the fact that v , p3 to convert 7rv to 7r. Finally, let's sum
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Z7r,j,t-1
Z7r,j,t-1)
over the 7r falling under (7.7d):
E YS Yir,t
j74 {ir:7rj=pj,depth(7rj)=1}
a i par
7i {lr:7rj=pi,depth(7rj)=1} a:(pj,a)EPar(7rj) 7r'EP(7r's )
jAi aEA {7r:7rj=pi,Par(7rj )3(pj ,a)} 7r'EP(-rPj)
a,-1 Ppa ,w )
si aEA 7r:7ri=pi,7rj =pj w:pa.>O
za, 1
jia E A7r:7ri=pi,7r =pj
5 5 Z7r,j,t-1-I
7r:7r.=pi j: 7rf=p ,ji
where the third equality requires the same set bijection again. Combining the last four
blocks of equations, we get sp2 ,t = spit-1 - zpit_1 which is exactly (7.13c), completing the
proof of Lemma 7.2.6.
F.4 Proofs from Section 7.4.
F.4.1 Proof of Lemma 7.4.1.
Finding the q's is a separate problem for each arm, so we can fix i E [n]. Furthermore,
we can fix u E Si \ {pi}; we will specify an algorithm that defines {qv,b,t',u,a,t : a E A, t E
[B], (v, b) E Par(u), t' < t} satisfying (7.19a) and (7.19b).
Observe that by substituting (7.10a) into (7.12c), we get su,t, < E(,b)EPar(u) bV-1
for all t' > 1. Summing over t' = 2, ... , t for an arbitrary t E [B], and using (7.10a) again
on the LHS, we get E'=2 EaEA -rt/ = (,b)EPar(u) ,' 'U
Now, for all t' = 2, .. ., B and a E A, initialize jr, := x ,. For all t' = 1,...,B -1 and
(v, b) c Par(u), initialize ,, := X,,l -pVU . We are omitting the subscript u because u is
fixed. The following B - 1 inequalities hold:
t=2 aESA t'=1 (v,b)EPar(u)
t" = 2,..., B (F.1)
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The algorithm updates the variables z, and .b , over iterations t = 2,..., B, but we will
inductively show that inequality t" of (F. 1) holds until the end of iteration t". The algorithm
can be described as follows:
Decomposition Algorithm
* Initialize all qv,b,t',u,a,t := 0.
" For t= 2, ... , B:
- While there exists some a E A such that zi > 0:
1. Choose any non-zero .b, ,, where (v, b) c Par(u), with t' < t.
2. Let Q = min f., b
3. Set qv,b,t',u,a,t :-- Q ,
4. Subtract Q from both z and ,.
Let's consider iteration t of the algorithm. The inequality of (F. 1) with t" = t guarantees
that there always exists such a non-zero . ,, in Step 1. In Step 4, Q is subtracted from
both the LHS and RHS of all inequalities of (F.1) with t" > t, so these inequalities continue
to hold. (Q is also subtracted from the RHS of inequalities of (F.1) with t' < t" < t, so
these inequalities might cease to hold.) This inductively establishes that all inequalities of
(F.1) with t" > t hold during iteration t, and thus Step 1 of the algorithm is well-defined.
Now we show that (7.19b) is satisfied. Suppose on iteration t of the algorithm, we have
some > 0 and ,, > 0 on Step 1. Note that qv,bt',u,a,t must currently be 0, since if it
was already set, then either z or ,,, would have been reduced to 0. Therefore, in Step 3
we are incrementing the LHS of (7.19b) by x,, - x, = Q, after which we are
vV V Vu
subtracting Q from ;H in Step 4. Since over iterations t = 2,..., B, for every a E A, x
gets reduced from xzt to 0, it must be the case that every equation in (7.19b) holds by the
end of the algorithm.
For (7.19a), we use a similar argument. Fix some (v, b) E Par(u) and t' E [B - 11.
Whenever we add b ' to the LHS of (7.19a), we are reducing V, , by Q. Since zt,Xv t' PV,U
btrt at ban cano berdcdbeo hstarts , p, and cannot be reduced below 0, the biggest we can make the LHS of
(7.19a) is " = 1.
362
Finally, it is clear that the algorithm takes polynomial time, since every time we loop
through Steps 1 to 4 either 4, or ibt, goes from non-zero to zero, and there were only a
polynomial number of such variables to begin with. Other than the statement for u E B,
this completes the proof of Lemma 7.4.1.
Now, if u E B, then we can strengthen (F.1). Indeed, substituting (7.10b) (instead of
(7.10a)) into (7.12c), we get that all inequalities of (F.1) hold as equality. At the start of
iteration t = 2, it is the case that - = E(v,b)EPar(u) .,t-,, and by the end of the iteration,
it will be the case that sf = 0, and j-b = 0, qv,b,t-1,u,a,t = 1 for all (v, b) C Par(u).
As a result, the equalities of (F.1) with t" > t will continue to hold as equality. We can
inductively apply this argument to establish that qv,b,t',u,a,t'+1 = 1 for all (v, b) E Par(u)
and t' c [B - 1], as desired.
F.4.2 Proof of Lemma 7.4.2.
We make use of the following conjecture of Samuels, which is proven for n < 4 (see Samuels
(1966, 1968)):
Conjecture F.4.1. Let X1,..., Xn be independent non-negative random variables with
respective expectations p1 _ ... pn, and let A > i=1 pi. Then Pr[Z 1 X A ] A] is
maximized when the Xi's are distributed as follows, for some index k E [n]:
" For i > k, Xi = pi with probability 1.
* For i < k, Xi = A _ Z=k+1 pe with probability _k , and Xi = 0 otherwise.
If we have E[Yil + E[Y] < for i : j, then we can treat Y + Y as a single random
variable satisfying E[Y + Y] 1 . By the pigeonhole principle, we can repeat this process
until n < 3, since ET E[Y-] < 1. In fact, we assume n is exactly 3 (we can add random
variables that take constant value 0 if necessary), so that we can apply Conjecture F.4.1 for
n = 3, which has been proven to be true. We get that Pr[Y + Y2 + Y3 : 1] cannot exceed
the maximum of the following (corresponding to the cases k = 3, 2, 1, respectively):
e ~ L 1 1(2-) (1 13)2 2 2
_ 
- ()
* --(2 - -P3
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Now we employ Lemma 4 from Bansal et al. (2012) to bound these quantities:
Lemma F.4.2. Let r and pmax be positive real values. Consider the problem of maximizing
1- ~ 1(1- pi) subject to the constraints ( 1 pi r, and 0 < pi Pmax for all i. Denote
the maximum value by 3(r, pmax ). Then
rr/3(r, pmax) = 1-(1-max) max(1-(r -- _r_] .Pmax))Pmax
< 1 -(p max
Recall that Al, A2,p3 i and +/p2 +/13 3.
" In the first case k =3, we get Pmax = and r = , so the quantity is at most
3(i, 1) < 1 - (1 - 1)2 = 5, as desired.
* In the second case k = 2, for an arbitrary A3 E [0, ], we get that the quantity is at
t t t
most (~ s, , o ) 1- (1- _ e )(-3)/(i). It can be checked that the
-pA3 2-p 3 A 3
maximum occurs at p3 = 0, so the quantity is at most j for any value of p3 E [0, [],
as desired.
" In the third case k = 1, we get that the quantity is at most t Al A
2 (3-Al) + PI,
which at most over IL1 E [0, 1], as desired.
Therefore, Conjecture F.4.1 tells us that the maximum value of Pr[' 1 Y > 1] is ,
completing the proof of Lemma 7.4.2.
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